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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
Within a number of Western nation-states, internal national minorities are advancing 
demands for political recognition and a measure of autonomy short of full 
independence.  General acceptance of democratic ideals places pressure on these 
states to accede to such demands and devolve political power to national minorities.  
This thesis examines the consequences that this process implies for political and 
social cohesion in nationally diverse states; does the formal political recognition of 
national diversity facilitate the integration of the state? Can nationally diverse 
societies generate and maintain the bonds of social solidarity that are necessary if 
they are to bind together effectively? 
 Part One of the thesis examines these issues from a theoretical perspective; 
drawing on a range of existing analyses, from both classical and contemporary 
literature, the concepts of state, nation, sovereignty, self-determination and social 
cohesion are subject to detailed examination with a view to understanding how they 
shape the political demands of national minorities and what the most implications of 
these demands are. 
 Part Two aims at further interrogating these theoretical claims through an 
empirical analysis of the Scottish devolution in 1999, established in 1999, and the 
impact it has on political and social cohesion in Britain.  This involves an 
investigation into the historical development of a distinct Scottish nation, its 
evolving relationship with the British state and the concept of ‘Britishness’, and the 
factors accounting for the rise of Scottish nationalism in the second half of the 
twentieth century.  Finally, the devolution settlement itself is made the central focus 
of analysis, and the questions of its impact on the future political stability of Britain 
as a single state and on the social cohesion of British society are examined with 
reference to existing literature on devolution, survey data provided by the British and 
Scottish Social Attitude surveys, and an analysis of significant discourses of nation-
building in the speeches of a number of important political figures. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
Evidence of the capacity of nationalism to confound the expectations of those who 
would predict its imminent demise is not difficult to unearth; nationalist movements 
of various stripes can be found operating across virtually every region of the globe, 
and the idea of the nation continues to occupy a central role in all states’ attempts to 
construct and maintain a claim to political legitimacy.  Perhaps most surprising of all, 
minority nationalist movements that contest the legitimacy of the state are to be 
found in a number of so-called consolidated nation-states of the Western world; 
states for which the task of state- and nation-building might have thought to have 
been completed.  There is, moreover, ample evidence that a number of such 
movements are in fact gaining in strength as they display an ability to exploit 
opportunities provided by the growing interdependence of states in a global age.  The 
states in which such nationalist movements operate, committed as they are to 
democratic ideals, find themselves under increasing pressure to respond by 
extending some form of political autonomy to national minority communities.  Such 
political autonomy can take the form of devolution, in which functionally-specific 
powers are transferred from the centre to the periphery without affecting the 
constitutional superiority of the former, or federalism, by which a constitutionally 
guaranteed formal division of powers between central and regional levels of 
government is established that leaves neither subordinate to the other. 
 In its theoretical dimension, the objective of this thesis is to examine what 
some of the principle consequences of such a decentralization of political authority 
through the granting of a measure of autonomy to internal minorities are; how it 
contributes to the transformation of the nation-state model and whether it impacts 
upon political and social cohesion within the state?  Does devolution, for example, 
foster friction and conflict between different levels of government representing 
different visions of nationality, thereby facilitating the disintegration of the state, or 
does it, by contrast, re-legitimize the state in the eyes of alienated minorities, thereby 
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strengthen political cohesion?  Can states extending political recognition to a 
diversity of semi-autonomous national communities continue to generate the bonds 
of solidarity necessary for the maintenance of social cohesion? 
 
 The case of Britain, where a process of political devolution was initiated in 
1999 in response to nationalist claims advanced by its internal minorities, provides 
our empirical focus.  As a case study for an analysis of the consequences of granting 
political autonomy in response to the nationalist claims of internal minorities, Britain 
presents a number of idiosyncratic features, not the least of which is terminological 
in nature.  The official title of the state is the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland – generally shortened to either the United Kingdom or the UK – 
and comprises four constituent territorial units; England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland.  Britain, the term is used in this study, properly refers only to the 
three territorial units that together form the British mainland; England, Scotland and 
Wales.   
 With its distinctive division between a Protestant Ulster community 
committed to membership of the United Kingdom and a Catholic Irish community 
that reject the legitimacy of the UK state and instead favour their incorporation into a 
united Irish state, the historical and political experience of Northern Ireland is 
markedly different from mainland Britain.  Northern Ireland is, for example, the only 
territorial unit of the United Kingdom in which the three major political parties – 
Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats – are without parliamentary 
representation.  Given the specific  issues  associated  with  Northern  Ireland’s 
integration in the United Kingdom, and the history of political violence that this has 
engendered, its analysis is beyond the scope of the present study, which instead is 
restricted to a concern with mainland Britain alone. 
 Although reference is made to England, Scotland and Wales, it is on the case 
of Scotland that the major weight of the empirical analysis falls, a approach justified 
on account of the relative strength of nationalist sentiment in Scotland and the 
greater extent of the political autonomy it possesses as part of the 1999 devolution 
settlement.  Given that the nationalist movement is significantly stronger in Scotland 
than in Wales, and that the autonomous powers of the Scottish are considerably 
greater than those granted to the devolved Welsh Assembly, it is reasonable to 
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assume that any consequences as the process of devolution might bring about will be 
most pronounced in the Scotland.  That being said, where the impact of devolution 
on social cohesion is concerned, the asymmetrical nature of the devolution 
settlement means that its impact on the English population is a factor of considerable 
importance.  Whilst the overall objective is therefore an analysis of the impact of 
devolution on political and social cohesion in Britain, the weight of empirical 
arguments fall on Scotland and, to a lesser degree, the effect of devolution on 
English attitudes toward the Union. 
 A fundamental assumption underpinning this study is that Britain is 
accurately described as a state exhibiting national diversity; it is, and has been from 
its foundation, a multinational state.1  To describe Britain as a multinational state is 
to draw an analytical distinction between nation and state that rejects the observed 
tendency to treat them as synonymous or interchangeable (as is done, for example, 
by the use of the term ‘International Relations’ or in the title ‘United Nations’, both 
of which are actually concerned with states rather than nations).  Since the 
significance of maintaining an analytical distinction between nation and state is 
discussed in depth at various point throughout this study, it is sufficient here to note 
simply that nation and state, whilst intimately linked in the modern era, are not 
synonymous and that exclusive possession of an independent state is not a sine qua 
non of nationhood.  Thus one can, for example, understand Scotland and Wales as 
nations despite the absence of an independent Scottish or Welsh state. 
 Additional concerns arise in the British case with regard to the status of 
England and Britain.  At the risk of pre-empting the analysis, despite the absence of 
an independent English state, it would be somewhat misleading to describe the 
England as a ‘stateless’ nation in a manner analogous to pre-devolution Scotland or 
Wales, given England’s historic dominance of  the British state and the tendency of 
the English to conflate England and Britain.  Furthermore, there are strong grounds 
for regarding ‘Britishness’ as itself referring to a national identity since a significant 
proportion of the English, Scots and Welsh evidently regard it as such (see chapter 
seven). 
 Finally, in addition to therefore being a national diverse state, Britain as, 
principally as a result of power-war immigration flows, both ethnically and 
religiously diverse.  In considering the impact of diversity on political and social 
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cohesion, ethnicity and religion are without doubt salient categories.  However, 
given the distinctive concerns associated with ethnic and religious diversity, and the 
different demands that ethnic and religious minorities make on the polity as 
compared to national minorities, the analysis of the former’s significance lies beyond 
the scope of the present study.  That being said, it should be noted that the interaction 
between national and ethnic diversity in the context of devolution is itself an 
interesting area of concern, not least as it raises the question of how the devolution of 
political power to national minorities impacts upon ethnic minorities living within 
the devolved territories. 
  
Central questions and structure 
This study has three principle aims.  First, by drawing on an account of the principle 
assumptions underpinning the ideal-typical nation-state model, the significance of 
the recognition of internal national minorities through political autonomy 
arrangements is assessed, in particular the likely implications for political and social 
cohesion.  Second, on the assumption that the specific historical circumstances in 
which a distinctive Scottish national consciousness evolved, and the manner in 
which Scotland was integrated into the British state, both have an important bearing 
on the nature of contemporary Scottish nationalism, an analysis of the distinctive 
Scottish experience of nationhood is developed.  Third, the consequences of the 1999 
devolution settlement for both the future cohesion of the British state and the 
cohesion of British civil society are analyzed. 
 This thesis is divided into two parts; chapters one, two and three provide a 
theoretical examination of the key theoretical themes, followed by an analysis of 
Scotland and the British state as an empirical case study in chapters four, five, six 
and seven. 
 Chapter One examines a number of leading theories of the modern state on 
the one hand, and the nation on the other.  Rather than an examination of the 
historical development of the nation-state, the analysis contained in Chapter One 
seeks to draw out the fundamental assumptions that underpin the nation-state as a 
model state form.  The interpretation that emerges is thus oriented toward the nation-
state’s  ideal-typical aspects and is not an empirically accurate description of 
actually-existing nation-states.  Given the acknowledged importance of maintaining 
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an analytical distinction between the concepts of nation and state, both are dealt with 
separately via an exploration of a selection of dominant theoretical interpretations.   
 Chapter Two interrogates the relationship between the nation-state and 
national minorities residing within its borders, taking as its central theme the concept 
of sovereignty.  The concept of national minority is defined, amongst other things, as 
a collectivity that contains a substantial portion of members who do not identify 
exclusively with the dominant or  ‘core’ national  identity of  the  state within which 
they reside, but instead define themselves either as belonging to a separate and 
distinct  nation  or  as  possessing  a  ‘dual’  identity.    The  evolving  doctrine  of 
sovereignty is used as a lens through which to analyze the motivations of national 
minorities claiming a right to political autonomy, and the challenge that these claims 
pose to what has hitherto been the dominant interpretation of sovereignty in the 
context of the nation-state.  In addition to a critical engagement with the idea of 
sovereignty as it is expressed in classical political thought the chapter also takes up 
the issue of the relationship between sovereignty, the nation-state and national 
minorities. 
 Chapter Three analyzes the concept of social cohesion and considers its 
relationship to national identity and the nation-state.  Following a definition of the 
term social cohesion, its interpretation in classical social theory is examined through 
an analysis of the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, Ferdinand Tőnnies,  Émile 
Durkheim and Max Weber.  Contemporary approaches to the concept of social 
cohesion are then considered, with a particular emphasis on the significance of 
national identity as a resource implicated in the generation of the types of social 
relationship capable of best sustaining social cohesion. 
 Chapter Four adopts a long-term historical perspective in order to analyze the 
origins and development of a distinctive Scottish national consciousness from the 
initial consolidation of a limited Scottish identity under the impact of institutional 
reforms of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, through to Scotland’s integration into 
the British state.  Of particular interest are the impact of the historical origins of 
Scottish nationality on the character of that identity; the nature, evolution and 
significance of Anglo-Scottish relations; and the form taken by the newly created 
British state following the Treaty of Union 1707. 
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 Chapter Five examines the rise of modern Scottish nationalism, from the 
creation of the Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA) in 1886 to the 
establishment of an autonomous Scottish parliament in 1999.  Again the focus is 
primarily on the distinctive nature of the national consciousness underpinning 
Scottish political nationalism and how this interrelates with the evolving British state.   
 Chapter Six analyzes the consequences of the 1999 devolution settlement for 
the political cohesion of the British state, addressing the question of whether, and to 
what extent, the devolution of political power from the centre to the periphery 
introduces  centrifugal  forces  that  undermine  state’s  future  capacity  to  remain  a 
unified  entity.    Devolution’s  consequences  are  divided  into  three main  categories; 
legal-constitutional (where the issue of sovereignty dominates), political-institutional 
(in which the major controversies involve the asymmetrical nature of British 
devolution), and economic (where fiscal autonomy and equity are of paramount 
concern). 
  Chapter Seven focuses on the social cohesion of post-devolution Britain 
using data collected by the British Social Attitudes survey (BSA) and the Scottish 
Social Attitudes survey (SSA) as rough indicators of resources such as trust, identity 
and shared values considered to be implicated in the reproduction of social cohesion.  
This is supplemented by an analysis of the types of nation-building discourse and 
devolution in the speeches of five prominent public figures; Tony Blair, Donald 
Dewar, Alex Salmond, Gordon Brown and David Cameron. 
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PART ONE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
12 
 
1 
The Nation-State 
 
 
 
The demand for a right to exercise national self-determination emanating from 
contemporary minority nationalist movements represents a challenge to the nation-
state model in so far as it rejects a) the notion that the state must be the political 
expression of a single national identity; and b) that final political authority within a 
particular territory must inhere in a central state.  To the extent that both a) and b) are 
features of the nation-state model, that model can be said to contain a two-fold 
commitment to unitariness; the state requires a single national identity and a single 
source of ultimate political authority.  Both of these requirements are contested by 
minority nationalist movements, which assert the existence of a plurality of national 
identities within the state, and contest that  state’s  claim  to  ultimate  political 
authority.  Such is particularly the case where the minority nationalist movement in 
question does not seek to use a right of national self-determination to secede and 
form an independent nation-state of its own but instead wishes to alter the structure 
of the existing state so as to accommodate internal national diversity. 
 A minority nationalist movement may choose to exercise its right to self-
determination via a number of mechanisms that fall short of independent statehood; 
from measures such as language rights designed to guarantee cultural recognition, to 
forms of political autonomy such as devolution or federalism.2  Such measures aim 
at altering the structure and assumptions underlying the hitherto pre-eminent state 
form of modernity - the nation-state.  In place of the nation-state, these nationalist 
movements seek to construct an alternative state type better able to accommodate 
national  diversity;  a  model  that  has  been  termed  the  ‘plurinational  state’3 or the 
‘post-traditional nation-state.’4   
It thus follows that if we are to form an adequate understanding of 
contemporary minority nationalist movements, we must first consider the context 
within which they have developed and which they seek to alter: that context being 
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the nation-state.  Therefore the objective of this chapter is to analyze the nature and 
form of the nation-state. In recognition of the importance of maintaining an 
analytical distinction between two concepts that are often (erroneously) treated either 
as interchangeable, or at least subject to varying degrees of analytical confusion, we 
examine theories of the state and nation separately.  Only by so doing can an 
adequate understanding of the compound term nation-state be developed.   
We begin by examining and comparing the influential theories of the state 
developed by Max Weber, Anthony Giddens, Michael Mann and Gianfranco Poggi 
respectively.  Because their primary focus is on the state, none of these four authors 
construct a fully developed theory of the nation within their writing.  We therefore 
subsequently examine the work of Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, John Breuilly 
and Anthony D. Smith, all of whom advance detailed theories of nations and 
nationalism.  As well as presenting an accurate description of each theoretical 
explanation, the aim of our analysis is to elucidate the potential points of conflict 
between the nation-state model and the political demands of national minorities 
residing within the state’s borders.  
Before proceeding it is first necessary to say a few words about the use in this 
chapter of the terms modern state and nation-state.  Although we use the term 
modern state when examining the four different theories of the state, it should be 
recognized that I understand the nation-state to be the pre-eminent form of modern 
state.  We restrict ourselves to the term modern state only because the theories 
reviewed are themselves primarily concerned with the state rather than the nation, 
and so as to avoid the confusion of referring to the nation-state before having defined 
what is meant by the term nation.  Thus, subsequent to the first section we use the 
term nation-state when talking of the modern state.  Rather than a description of 
actually-existing congruency between nation and state, the term nation-state is a 
reflection  of  the  state’s  aspiration  to  bring  about  such  congruency,  an  aspiration 
which it pursues by means of nation-building policies. 
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Theories of the State 
Max Weber 
Perhaps the most influential modern definition of the state is that developed by the 
German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920).  Weber’s classic definition is intended 
as an accurate description of the state-in-general in the sense that it is held to apply 
equally to all of the otherwise very different organizations that are called states.  
However, as we shall see, Weber does also go on to address the question of what is 
distinctive about the modern state.   
Weber defines the state as ‘a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.’5  The first 
striking feature of this definition is that it makes no reference whatsoever to the 
functions or the ends to which states typically orient themselves.  It is instead an 
entirely ‘institutional’ definition of the state, adopted by Weber in recognition of the 
extreme multiplicity of ends that have variously been pursued by political 
organizations reasonably described as states.  Weber therefore emphasizes the 
peculiar means by which all states exercise authority, rather than the ends that they 
serve.  This is not to say that Weber, in placing coercion at the centre of his 
definition of the state, considers physical force as either the normal or the only 
means employed by the state in exercising its authority.  Rather, he aims to suggest 
that physical force is the means specific to the state; the method to which only states 
can legitimately turn as a last resort.   
This definition appears as the culmination of a lengthy discussion of the 
‘fundamental  concepts  of  sociology’  in  which Weber  outlines  his  methodological 
approach and pursues a rigorous definition of various sociological terms.6  Two 
elements of  Weber’s  methodological  approach  are  of  key  importance  in 
understanding his theory of the state.  First, his understanding of sociology as a 
science concerned with interpreting the subjective meaning of social action prompts 
him to assert the necessity of an ‘individualistic’ method.  For Weber, the subjective 
meaning of any social action – social action here defined as any subjectively 
meaningful human action that is oriented in such a way as to take into account the 
behaviour of others – derives only from the individual undertaking that action.  Such 
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an individualistic methodology has important consequences for the way in which 
collective concepts such as the state are to be understood from a sociological 
perspective.  It is common for authors to treat the state as a pseudo-individual, as is 
done for example when it is treated as the possessor of rights and duties.  Weber, 
however, rejects such a characterisation of the state: Owing to the fact that sociology 
is concerned with the subjective meaning of social action, and that subjective 
meaning can only exist in the behaviour of individuals, collective concepts such as 
the state must, from a sociological perspective at least, be understood as a type of 
social relationship between individuals, and agents in themselves.  A social 
collectivity  such  as  the  state  exists  only  as  a  ‘complex  of  social  interaction  of 
individual  persons’.7  In this way the state can only be said to exist in so far as a 
group of relevant individuals orient their behaviour toward a belief in the existence 
and validity of the particular state.  As we shall see later, this methodological 
consideration has important consequences for the way in which Weber understands 
legitimacy as a concept relating to the prevailing belief orientation of individuals. 
The  second  aspect  of  Weber’s  methodological  approach  that  is  of  crucial 
relevance to understanding his definition of the state is the concept of the  ‘ideal-
type’,  the  employment  of which  he  sees  as  emblematic  of  the  distinction  between 
sociology and history.  Unlike the discipline of history, which is concerned with 
causal analysis and explanation of culturally significant phenomena, sociology 
‘seeks  to  formulate  type  concepts  and  generalized  uniformities  of  empirical 
process.’8  In this way, historical phenomena, according to Weber, can only be 
understood sociologically by reference to an analysis that abstracts from reality to 
construct ideal-types against which the real phenomena can be compared.  Rather 
than an adequate description of reality,  the Weberian  ideal  type  is  a  ‘conceptually 
pure  type of  rational action.’9  By this is meant that it signifies what would be the 
result were the relevant individuals to have been guided in their action by perfect 
rationality.  The ideal type is thus a hypothesis of purely rational action (rationally 
oriented to either discrete ends or to absolute values) against which actual action can 
be compared in terms of its degree of ‘deviation’ from the ideal type accounted for 
by the myriad irrational factors that enter into individual behaviour.  Moreover, ideal 
types are constructed so as to be clearly understandable and unambiguous, in 
contrast to the infinite complexity of reality.  All of the sociological definitions that 
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Weber develops, including those of the state and the bases of legitimacy, are 
intended as ideal types rather than descriptions of concrete reality.  Indeed, it is very 
unlikely that any real phenomenon could ever correspond exactly to a single ideal 
type.  Finally, it is important to say that the two methodological considerations 
discussed above – the individualistic method and the rational character of ideal types 
– in no way  imply  the predominance of an ‘individualistic system of values’ nor a 
‘positive valuation of ‘rationalism’’.10   
As we have seen, the state, like all social collectivities, is understood by 
Weber as an example of a social relationship rather than as an agent itself.  By 
conceiving the state solely as an expression of individual action, so that its very 
existence consists entirely of the probability or otherwise of a course of social action 
oriented to a belief in the state’s existence and validity prevailing, Weber intends to 
avoid the ‘reification’ of the state.  The state is the expression of a particular social 
relationship, and as such cannot be regarded as an autonomous actor in its own right.  
Moreover, the state as social relationship is based upon observable empirical 
uniformities of social action or ‘typical modes of action.’  The existence of the state 
implies the existence of a certain uniformity in the orientation of social action, 
whereby the attachment of a particular subjective meaning to the state on behalf of 
the relevant individuals is widespread.  According to Weber, such a uniformity of 
social action can be appropriately described as an ‘order’ when it  is based upon an 
orientation to ‘certain determinate ‘maxims’ or rules.’11  It is from the nature of these 
maxims that the state in question derives its legitimacy.  Legitimacy exists in the fact 
that a widespread uniformity of social action exists owing to a recognition on the 
part of relevant individuals that the maxims or rules of an order are recognized as 
either binding or desirable.  According to Weber, in the vast majority of cases the 
fact of the submission of actors to an order implies that they ascribe to it some form 
of legitimacy.  We return to the concept of legitimacy below when analyzing 
Weber’s characterization of the distinctiveness of the modern state. 
The concept of social relationship, of which the state is perhaps the most 
important example, can be further divided into ‘communal’ and ‘associative’ social 
relationships – a distinction that deliberately echoes Ferdinand Tőnnies well-known 
distinction  between  ‘Gemeinschaft’ and ‘Gesselschaft’ (see chapter three).12  The 
distinction between communal and associative relationships refers to the principle 
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from which its legitimacy is derived.  A communal social relationship is one in 
which legitimacy is based upon a subjective feeling of belonging or togetherness, in 
contrast to an associative social relationship, in which agreement is the product of 
‘rationally motivated adjustment of  interests.’   An  important  feature of  the modern 
state, according to Weber, is that it tends toward being an associative social 
relationship, whose legitimacy is a product of a rationalised acceptance of its 
authority.  The subjective feelings of belonging characteristic of communal social 
relationships decline markedly in importance with the development of the modern 
state, whose  ‘rational-legal  authority’  requires  little  in  the way  of  these  subjective 
bonds.  We return to this point below through an examination of Weber’s conception 
of the modern state and its implications for the topic of contemporary minority 
nationalism.   
In addition to being either communal or associative, social relationships can 
be  characterised  as  either  ‘open’  or  ‘closed’;  an  open  social  relationship  permits 
participation from any individual who so wishes, whereas a closed social relationship 
is one in which ‘participation of certain persons is excluded, limited, or subjected to 
conditions’.13  The distinction between open and closed social relationships has no 
necessary correspondence to that between communal and associative.  Importantly 
for our present purposes, Weber views the state as tending toward being a closed 
social relationship, participation in the order of which is limited to those individuals 
fulfilling a certain set of criteria, relating as we shall see primarily to territoriality.   
Moreover, the state as closed social relationship is described as a ‘corporate 
group’, meaning that it has at its head a chief whose regular function is to enforce the 
state’s  order,  something that is carried out in conjunction with a dedicated 
administrative staff.  Weber draws a further set of distinctions within the category of 
corporate groups based upon their relation to the concepts of autonomy, heteronomy, 
autocephaly, and heterocephaly.  First, the distinction between autonomy and 
heteronomy  refers  to  the  corporate  group’s  (in  this  case  the  state’s)  having  either 
established its own authority in the case of the former, or having had its order 
imposed by an outside agency in the case of the latter.  That between autocephaly 
and heterocephaly refers to whether the state’s chief and administrative staff acts by 
the autonomous authority of the corporate group itself, or by the authority of 
outsiders. 
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Interestingly for our present purposes, Weber explicitly states that neither 
autonomy and heterocephaly, nor heteronomy and autocephaly are mutually 
incompatible.  He cites the example that a member of the federal German Empire is 
an autocephalous corporate group that is heteronomous in the sphere of authority of 
the  Reich,  but  autonomous  in  the  sphere  of  religion  and  education:  ‘All  of  these 
elements may be present in the same situation to some degree’.14  Thus, in Weberian 
terms there is no contradiction in a state consisting of different spheres of authority 
in which a mix of autonomous and heteronomous authority exist side-by-side.  This 
is similar to the conception of the state advanced by a number of contemporary 
minority nationalist movements, according to whom the fact of national diversity 
necessitates that the centralised and unitary nature of the nation-state be replaced 
with a state form that encompasses a system of divided authority in recognition of 
the existence of internal national diversity.   
As already indicated, territoriality is afforded a central role in Weber’s theory 
of the state, as it forms the basis for the criteria on which the state’s status as a closed 
corporate  group  is  based.    According  to  Weber,  the  state  possesses  ‘territorial 
validity’, meaning that the criteria by which its system of order is imposed on non-
members relates to residency or birth within a given territorial area.  The order of the 
state is considered binding over all those individuals to whom this criterion applies.   
It is in this sense that the state is conceived by Weber as a ‘compulsory association.’   
We now turn to the distinctive features of the modern state as understood by 
Weber.  Two features are considered; the nature of legitimacy in the modern state, 
and the type of administrative staff typical of the modern state.  As indicated earlier, 
Weber’s  approach  to  the  concept  of  legitimacy  is  intimately  tied  up  with  his 
methodological approach, in particular his insistence on the necessity of adopting an 
individualistic method in sociological  analysis.    He  writes;  ‘the  legitimacy  of  a 
system of authority may be treated sociologically only as the probability that to a 
relevant degree the appropriate attitudes will exist, and the corresponding practical 
conduct ensue’.15  In the case of the modern state, legitimacy is predominately based 
upon  the widespread  existence  of  a  belief  in  the  ‘legality’  of  its  order,  norms  and 
rules.    This  form  of  legitimacy  Weber  terms  ‘rational-legal’  authority,  and  is 
contrasted against alternative types of legitimate authority – ‘charismatic’  and 
‘traditional’  – which are more typically found in pre-modern states.  The modern 
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state tends toward the associative end of the corporate group spectrum in which, as 
we have seen, agreement is the product of rationally motivated adjustment of 
interests rather than subjective feelings of belonging.  The rational-legal character of 
the  modern  state  is  expressed  to  the  degree  that  ‘every  body  of  law  consists 
essentially in a consistent system of abstract rules which have normally been 
intentionally  established’.16  Only in the modern state is this statement true to a 
significant degree.   
By emphasizing the legal-rational basis of its claim to legitimacy, Weber 
downplays the extent to which the legitimacy of the modern state is related to the 
affective bonds of national identity.  The extent to which this is a fair assessment of 
legitimacy in the modern state is directly apposite to the analytical concerns of this 
study.  From the perspective of national minorities, the state is often perceived as 
deriving its legitimacy from a particular interpretation of national identity that it 
seeks to impose upon the entire population using its considerable institutional 
resources.  To the extent that national minorities do not identify with the state-
supported national identity, or perceive it as a threat to their own distinct national 
identity, the legitimacy of the state is subject to contestation regardless of the legality 
of its order, norms and rules understood in terms of rationality.  
The second distinctive feature of the modern state, according to Weber, is its 
employment of an administrative staff structured according to the bureaucratic model.  
Weber identifies ten constituent elements of bureaucratic administration including 
the tenet that individuals making up the administrative staff are separated from 
ownership of the means of administration; are organized according to the principle of 
hierarchy; selected on the basis of technical qualifications; and operate in a spirit of 
formalistic  impersonality.    The  bureaucratic  nature  of  the  modern  state’s 
administrative apparatus is closely related to the rational-legal character of its 
legitimacy  in  the sense  that;  ‘Bureaucratic administration means  fundamentally  the 
exercise of control on the basis of knowledge.  This is the feature of it which makes 
it specifically rational’.17   
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Anthony Giddens 
The definition of the state advanced by Anthony Giddens is somewhat similar to the 
classic Weberian one encountered above, in particular with regard to the prominent 
role it accords to coercion and territory.  Giddens, however employs an analysis of 
power  in  order  to  demonstrate  that  Weber’s  definition  of  the  state  as  a  political 
organization that successfully claims a monopoly of the means of legitimate violence 
is a valid description only of the modern state, rather than the state-in-general.  
Indeed, it is precisely the ability to successfully claim such a monopoly that is a key 
distinguishing feature of the modern state as compared to its pre-modern 
counterparts.   
 According  to  Giddens;  ‘A  state  can  be  defined  as  a  political  organization 
whose rule is territorially ordered and which is able to mobilize the means of 
violence  to sustain  that  rule’.18  Similarly to Weber, Giddens chooses to define the 
state with regard to the means it adopts in order to enforce its authority rather than 
any particular ends or functions that states orient themselves toward.   
 More  so  than  Weber,  Giddens  emphasises  the  importance  of  the  state’s 
exercise of military power in addition to its internal monopoly of coercion.  This is 
part of Giddens’ broader claim that warfare and international relations must be at the 
heart of any analysis of the development and nature of the state.  He criticizes, for 
example, classical social theorists such as Spencer, Durkheim and Marx for failing, 
as he sees it, to provide any systematic interpretation of the association between 
military violence and the rise of the modern state.  Whilst such a criticism clearly 
cannot be made of Weber, who after all defines the state by reference to its 
association with physical force, nevertheless Giddens argues that Weber projects to 
all states features that are properly exclusive to modern states.  This reflects 
Giddens’  emphasis on  the  radically  ‘discontinuist’  nature  of  the  modern  state  as 
compared with its predecessors, meaning that the differences between the modern 
state and all forms of pre-modern state are significantly more profound than the 
differences between various types of pre-modern states.  Giddens therefore criticizes 
Weber  for  tending  to  ‘minimize  the  differences  between  traditional  and  modern 
states’.19   
Two factors are of particular importance to Giddens’ argument in this regard; 
first, only the modern state successfully claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of 
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force, primarily because the chronic segmentalism of all pre-modern states precludes 
it, or any other organization, from projecting its administrative power wide enough 
to enforce such a claim.  Second, whilst all states are political organizations whose 
rule is territorially ordered, only in the context of the modern state is this territory 
clearly  defined  by  ‘borders’,  in  contrast with  pre-modern states whose territory is 
always somewhat ill-defined and characterised by more fluid ‘frontiers’.   
As already indicated, Giddens places an analysis of power at the centre of his 
theory of the state, using it to further expand upon the nature of the modern state’s 
distinctiveness.  In Giddens’ terms, power in a general sense refers to ‘transformative 
capacity’ and is fundamentally related to the resources available to agents exercising 
power - resources which can be understood as forming aspects of the structural 
properties of a given social system. These resources do not, however, insert 
themselves into the structural properties of a social system in any automatic manner.  
Rather, they come to form an overarching ‘mode of domination’ as ‘they are drawn 
upon by contextually located actors in the conduct of the day-to-day-lives’. 20  
Domination thus provides the key to understanding the role of power in social 
systems,  all  of  which  exhibit  forms  of  domination  expressed  as  ‘relations  of 
autonomy and dependence between  actors or  collectivities of  actors’.21  Influenced 
by Foucault, Giddens is careful to emphasize the importance of what he terms ‘non-
decision making power’, capable of asserting itself silently through the interactions 
of everyday routine.  Pace Foucault, Giddens argues that power and domination in 
any given social system are always to a significant degree sustained by routine 
practices and the unconscious influences they are capable of asserting over the 
activities of subordinates.  Day-to-day routines provide a ‘predictability’ upon which 
all social systems are grounded.   
Owing to the nature of the resources available to it, the modern state stands in 
a radically different relation to power as compared with all forms of pre-modern 
states.  According to Giddens, we can understand this relation by dividing systems of 
rule into two facets, dealing with its ‘scope’ on the one hand and its ‘intensity’ on the 
other.  In Giddens’ terms, the ‘scope’ of rule refers to the size of the area over which 
superordinates are able to enforce their authority, whilst the ‘intensity’ of rule refers 
to the sanctions at their disposal.   
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All pre-modern states, whilst they invariably reserve for themselves the most 
intense sanctions for securing compliance, are nevertheless chronically unable to 
generate a high degree of scope to their rule.  This being the case, the degree to 
which the administrative centre of pre-modern states is able to penetrate its rule 
throughout its territory is limited.  It is this that prevents the state from successfully 
claiming a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory.  Instead, 
the pre-modern state must always contend with competing organizations, operating 
politically outside the scope of the state.  It is only with the development of the 
modern state that a vast expansion in the scope of rule is achieved, evidenced by the 
increased capacity of its administration to penetrate society and its successful 
monopolization of legitimate coercion:  ‘One  of  the  major  characteristics  of  the 
modern  state…is  a  vast  expansion  of  the  capability  of  state  administrators to 
influence even the most intimate features of daily life activity’.22   
The expanded administrative capacity of the modern state entails important 
implications  for  the  operation  of  what  Giddens  terms  the  ‘dialectic  of  control’.  
Power relations, depending in part as  we  have  seen  on  the  ‘predictability’  of 
everyday routine, are intimately associated with reciprocity.  Power depends upon 
securing a necessary amount of compliance from others.  Giddens argues that the 
ubiquity of reciprocity within power relations leads to the operation of a ‘dialectic of 
control’,  meaning  that,  ‘No  matter  how  great  the  scope  or  intensity  of  control 
superordinates possess, since their power presumes the active compliance of others, 
those others can bring to bear strategies of their own, and apply specific types of 
sanctions’. 23   Thus,  all  systems  of  rule  contain  certain  ‘openings’  available  to 
subordinates to influence superordinates: Control is a dialectical process.   
According to Giddens, the increased scope of rule that the modern state 
wields increases the availability of these openings in the dialectic of control, so that 
the  intensity  of  the  state’s  rule  is  necessarily  decreased.   When  the  administrative 
centre of the state expands its reach, as occurs with the development of the modern 
state, it inevitably relies on a greater level of reciprocity between governors and 
governed.   Thus,  the low intensity of  the modern state’s system of rule  reflects  the 
fact that the subordinate population has greater opportunities for influencing the 
activities of their superordinates, as compared at least with all pre-modern states.  
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Giddens takes this as evidence of the inherently polyarchical nature of the modern 
state, a feature that derives directly from its expanded administrative capacity. 
Giddens defines the state as a political organization, a term for which he 
intends a very specific meaning.  The day-to-day routines that serve to sustain social 
systems  are  themselves  sustained by what Giddens  terms  ‘non-discursive practical 
consciousness’. This term refers to the fact that ‘actors routinely monitor reflexively 
what they do in the light of their complex knowledge of social conventions, 
sustaining or reproducing those conventions in the process’.24  In other words, social 
reproduction  is  a process guided by  the  ‘reflexive monitoring’ of agents.   Giddens 
intends to reserve the term organization to refer to collectivities that are implicated in 
the process of reflexive monitoring.  The distinctiveness of the modern state lies in 
the fact it displays these organizational features to a hitherto unprecedented degree.  
System reproduction in the context of the modern state is far more grounded in the 
process of reflexive monitoring than in previous eras.  Moreover, not just the state 
itself, but social life in general, is, in modern societies, more highly characterized by 
organization in the above sense as compared with all forms of pre-modern society.  
This is another expression of the discontinuity of modernity. 
Finally, Giddens employs the concept of ‘power-container’ to further identify 
what is distinctive about the modern state.  To understand how the state can be 
described as a power-container, we must look first at Giddens use of the concept of 
‘locale’ which refers to the ‘settings of interaction, including the physical aspects of 
setting – their ‘architecture’ – within which systemic aspects of interaction and social 
relations are concentrated’.25  In other words, locales facilitate the concentration of 
resources which, as we have seen, are fundamentally related to the exercise of power.  
It is in this sense that locales are always potentially power-containers.  The state is an 
important example of a power-container, although in its pre-modern manifestation it 
exists within a milieu of competing power-containers.  However, with the expansion 
of administrative scope that is a feature of the development of the modern state, the 
state becomes the pre-eminent  ‘bordered’  power-container, permitting of no rival 
power-containers within that territory; hence the successful claim to the monopoly of 
violence.  Whereas all pre-modern states encounter rival power-containers within 
their territories, such as castles and manorial estates for example, for the modern 
state, with its wide scope of rule, all such rival power-containers are eliminated. 
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The modern state, this suggests, is of necessity a unitary and centralized 
authority, in contrast to the system of divided and overlapping authority that is 
characteristic of pre-modern states.  Contemporary minority nationalist movements 
that seek to modify the state so as to structurally recognize its internal national 
diversity therefore confront a state committed to an ideal of unitariness antagonistic 
to their demands, the satisfaction of which implies the establishment of divided and 
separate spheres of political authority in recognition of national diversity. 
  
Michael Mann 
In contrast to both Weber and Giddens, Michael Mann offers a two-fold definition of 
the state, supplementing an institutional definition with a functional analysis of the 
state  in  which  certain  ‘higher-level  crystallizations’  are  taken  as  constitutive  of  a 
definition of the (modern) state.  First, Mann’s institutional definition of the state is 
as follows: 
 
‘1. The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel 
2. embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from the center, to 
cover a 
3. territorially demarcated area over which it exercises 
4. some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up some organized physical 
force’.26 
 
Again following Weber, Mann makes explicit reference to the use of physical 
force in his institutional definition of the state; ultimately it is the state’s potential to 
deploy force in the exercise of its rule that distinguishes it from other organizations 
wielding  power.    Like  Giddens,  Mann  rejects  Weber’s  definition  of  the  state  as 
successfully claiming a monopoly over the legitimate means of force, insisting 
instead that this is a distinctive feature of the modern state, and is associated with the 
latter’s expanded administrative capacity. 
According to Mann’s definition, the modern state embodies centrality in the 
sense that ‘political relations radiate to and from the center’.  Whilst the central state 
may choose to decentralize political power to regional levels of government, the 
latter remain constitutionally subordinate with their powers revocable by the central 
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state at will.  Minorities advocating the establishment of a divided system of political 
authority that recognizes their distinct and separate claim to national self-
determination therefore oppose a fundamental interest of the state; its commitment to 
centrality and a unitary conception of political authority.   
All forms of state, both modern and pre-modern, have, according to Mann, 
four fundamental features; they are (uniquely) territorially centralized, both place 
and actor, differentiated and lacking coherence, and involved in geopolitics.27  One 
area in which the modern state can be differentiated from its predecessors is the 
changed nature of state-society relations.  Mann accepts Weber’s argument that the 
modern state, more so than its predecessors, is able to use routinzed, formalized, and 
rationalized institutions to extend its law and administration deeper into its territories.  
However, whilst Weber saw this as evidence only of the state’s increased capacity to 
penetrate society, Mann argues that the reverse is also true: In the context of the 
modern state, society is increasingly able to penetrate the state.  For Mann, this is 
evidence of a tightening state-society relationship, and is a key feature of the modern 
state’s distinctiveness for it transforms the nature of the state’s legitimacy.  Because 
the state now confronts society directly, it is forced to conceive of itself as 
responsible for ‘representing citizens’ internal sense of community’28, with the result 
that its legitimacy becomes increasingly dependent on the relations between itself 
and its subjects. 
Mann uses a similar framework as Giddens in his elaboration of the reasons 
for this altered state-society relation that accompanies the development of the 
modern state.  By distinguishing between two facets of power, Mann is able to 
dispute Weber’s  claim  that  the  modern  state’s  use  of  bureaucracy to increase its 
penetration represents an overall increase in power.  Rather, for Mann it represents 
an increase in one aspects of power, namely ‘infrastructural power’, but an increase 
that is bought at the cost of a diminution of another aspect  of  power,  ‘despotic 
power’.    The  terms  infrastructural  and  despotic  power  are  somewhat  analogous  to 
Giddens’ scope and intensity of rule in that infrastructural power refers to the central 
state’s institutional capacity to  implement decisions, whereas despotic power refers 
to the distributive power of state elites over civil society.   
The process of bureaucratization, so carefully analyzed by Weber, increases 
the  state’s  infrastructural  power  but  actually  weakens  its  despotic  power.    This  is 
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explained by the idea that, ‘Infrastructural power is a two-way street: It also enables 
civil  society  parties  to  control  the  state’. 29   In other words, an expansion of 
infrastructural power, by bringing the state into a more direct relation with civil 
society, inevitably decreases  the  state’s  ability  to govern without  some measure of 
consent from that civil society.  The modern state then is infrastructurally strong but 
despotically weak.  Whilst state elites are now part of a state institutional machinery 
that is able, for the first time, to logistically implement its decisions throughout the 
entirety of its territory, at the same time state elites are ineluctably forced into 
negotiation and compromise with civil society.  The result of this process, according 
to Mann, is  that  social  relations  become  ‘caged’  over  the  national  terrain  at  the 
expense of more local or transnational levels, and that more than ever before, social 
life is politicized. 
Despite recognizing the difficulties associated with defining the state by 
reference to the ends it typically pursues, Mann nevertheless argues that a functional 
analysis of the state can be undertaken if we recognize that state’s ‘crystallize’ as the 
centre of a number of power networks.30  These crystallizations represent the state’s 
underlying functions.  Mann identifies four such crystallizations that are fundamental 
to  the modern  state,  such  that  they  can  be  legitimately  termed  the modern  state’s 
‘higher-level’ crystallizations.  The modern state crystallizes as capitalist, militarist, 
representative and national.  It is the last of these two crystallizations that is of 
particular relevance when speaking of the politics of national minorities residing 
within  the  states  borders.    According  to  Mann,  the  history  of  the  state’s 
representative and national crystallizations has been one of struggle between 
centralized and local-regional powers which, far from having been uncontroversially 
resolved, are struggles that are still woven into the fabric of the modern state.   
The expanded administrative capacity of the modern state, as we have seen, 
compelled it toward more extensive negotiation with civil society in order to 
maintain its legitimacy.  The results of this are seen in the gradual expansion of 
citizenship rights.  However, in identifying the representative and national 
crystallizations as fundamental to the nature of the modern state, Mann argues that 
citizenship has from its foundation consisted of two disputed facets: The questions of 
who should enjoy it, as well as where it should be located.  Therefore, any theory of 
the state must recognize the essentially contested nature of relations between central 
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and local-regional levels of government.  The continued salience of minority 
nationalist movements  from within  ‘consolidated’  nation-states such as the United 
Kingdom, Canada and Spain would  seem  to provide empirical  support  for Mann’s 
statement that, ‘politics in the modern state fundamentally concerned the distribution 
of power between levels of government’31. 
 
Gianfranco Poggi 
According to Gianfranco Poggi, the state should be recognized as itself constituting a 
distinctive social force, capable of operating autonomously according to its own 
vested interests.  The definition of the state upon which he constructs his analysis is 
as follows: 
 
'An organisation which controls the population occupying a definite territory is a state 
insofar as (1) it is differentiated from other organisations operating in the same territory; (2) 
it is autonomous; (3) it is centralized; and (4) its divisions are formally coordinated with one 
another'.32 
 
 Poggi analyzes the relationship between power, politics and the state. 
Subscribing to a tripartite division of social power into economic, political, and 
normative facets, he argues that the state is situated in the sphere of political social 
power, meaning it is concerned with the 'material and organizational facilities for 
sustained coercion'. 33   In other words, pace Weber, the state can be defined 
according to its ultimate means of exercising authority; its control of the means of 
coercion.  Again, this is not to suggest that political social power consists entirely or 
normally of the exercise of coercion, merely that coercion is 'conceptually intrinsic' 
to political power and by extension the state.   
 Whilst political power is therefore ultimately grounded in coercion, within 
the context of the state it becomes both stabilized and standardized, expressing itself 
as the issuing of commands.  The issuing of commands must always be associated 
with an element of intersubjectivity and contingency, owing to the fact that the act of 
commanding contains within it the implication that the person subject to that 
command must both understand and be willing to obey it.  Along lines similar to 
those followed by Weber, Poggi argues that political power is therefore intimately 
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associated with the concept of legitimacy, a term that refers to the manner by which 
commands are reciprocated by obedience, based upon a belief in the moral 
entitlement of the command-giver to expect obedience.  In other words, legitimacy 
stems from moral value orientations of those subject to political power.  This reflects 
Poggi's belief that, whilst coercion may be conceptually intrinsic to the political 
power wielded by the state, any political authority that relies exclusively on the 
threat or actual use of coercion is likely to be highly unreliable and unstable.  In the 
context of the state, political power is stabilized, something that is only made 
possible by the development of the state's legitimacy in the above sense of the word. 
 Related to the stabilization of political power effected by the state is what 
Poggi describes as the state's 'institutionalization' of political power via the 
depersonalization, formalization, and integration of power relations.  The process of 
institutionalizing political power in this way is largely distinctive of the modern state, 
so much so that Poggi is reluctant to use the term state to describe political authority 
in pre-modern societies.  Pre-modern societies, rather than effecting the 
institutionalization of power relations through a differentiated state, 'were structured 
as loose confederations of powerful individuals and their group of followers and 
associates, with uncertain or varying spatial boundaries', the conduct of which, 
'lacked those characteristic of intensity, continuity and purposefulness which follow 
from entrusting such activities to an expressly designed, territorially bounded 
organisation'.34  Poggi therefore restricts his analysis to the defining features of the 
modern state. 
 An important aspect of the modern state’s distinctiveness, according to Poggi, 
lies in the fact that it is a highly differentiated organization.  The term differentiation 
is used by Poggi to refer to the extent that the state undertakes all and only political 
activities.  Thus, to say that the modern state is a highly differentiated organization is 
to suggest that a large proportion of all political activity within the relevant bounded 
territory is coordinated through the state, which in turn restricts itself to activity 
considered to be political.   
 Moreover,  the  modern  state  is  ‘concerned  and  committed  to  a  distinctive, 
unified  and  unifying  set  of  interests  and  purposes’,35  in contrast to the various 
conflicting and competing interests and purposes typical of the less centralized states 
of pre-modern society.  Again, we can see the difficulty that this presents for the 
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nationalist project of changing the structure of the modern state so as to make it more 
representative of the national diversity found within the population.  Such minority 
nationalist  challenges  inevitably  come  into  conflict  with  the  modern  state’s 
commitment to a unifying set of interests, and its use of nation-building policies 
intended to homogenize its population. 
The high degree of organizational differentiation displayed by the modern 
state implies the existence of a separation of state and society whereby the state 
recognizes a sphere of non-political activity (most notably, although not exclusively, 
that of economic activity) in which individuals are to be substantially free from state 
interference.  Within the modern state, therefore, there is a more or less clear 
distinction between the public and private sphere. 
 To say, as Poggi does, that the modern state is an autonomous political 
organization is to point to the fact that it alone is considered the body within which 
sovereignty resides. The modern state owes its power to no other organization, and 
answers to no higher organization with respect to the operation of that power.  Poggi 
relates the autonomous nature of the modern state to its structure as both centralized 
and formally coordinated.  According to Poggi, the modern state is of necessity a 
unitary organization from which all political activities either originate or refer to.  
Furthermore, the distinct parts of the state must be formally coordinated, in the sense 
that they work toward asserting the state’s power on behalf of the state as a whole, 
rather than operating as independent power centres.  Again, by defining the modern 
state as one in which independent power centres are anathema, Poggi not only 
highlights the contrast between the modern state and pre-modern states (in particular 
the feudal states of medieval Europe), but also gives an indication of the degree to 
which  state’s  can  be  expected  to  resist  claims  advanced  by  internal minorities  for 
political autonomy. 
 Prior to the development of the modern state, law possessed a degree of 
autonomy from rulers in the sense that its validity was often explicitly oriented 
toward  religious  and  other  ‘traditional’  practices.    The modern  state  on  the  other 
hand possesses the exclusive prerogative for making law within its territory: No 
autonomous sources of law other than the state exist.  Moreover, in addition to thus 
possessing a monopoly over the right to create law, the modern state, according to 
Poggi, increasingly carries out its political activities by means of law. This highly 
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juridicised nature of the modern state is related to another of its central features; its 
adherence  to  bureaucratic  principles  in  its  organization.    Influenced  by  Weber’s 
theory of the state, Poggi identifies three basic principles underpinning the 
bureaucratic model.  First, it requires that the activities of the state ‘consist either in 
the framing of general directives, or in the articulation of these into less general ones, 
or  in  the  implementation  of  the  latter’36; second, qualification for state office is 
dependent upon demonstrating a command of the appropriate technical knowledge: 
and third, considerable significance is attached to the complex body of public law 
designated ‘administrative law’. 
 In addition to the institutional analysis of the modern state examined above, 
Poggi advances a normative appraisal of the achievements of the modern state, 
identifying three features that, he argues, demonstrate its evident superiority as 
compared to the states of the ancien regimes that preceeded it.  First, in the context 
of the modern state, organized coercive power is both enhanced but also 
considerably tamed, meaning that political life is to a considerable degree 
‘civilianised’.  Whilst this does not alter the fact that the political power of the state 
is ultimately grounded in control over the means of coercion, nevertheless the 
modern state makes little direct reference to coercion in the day-to-day exercising of 
its authority.  This reflects the modern state’s replacement of violence with juridicial 
instruments; power within the modern state is ‘normalised by means of law’.37   
 Second, the modern state, whilst enlarging the scope of political power, at the 
same time significantly reduces the opportunity for its arbitrary exercise.  This is 
largely as a consequence of the depersonalization of power that is associated with the 
bureaucratic model upon which the modern state’s administrative apparatus is based.  
By separating the state official from the means of administration, the exercise of 
power must be justified according to law and objective circumstances rather than 
personal interests.   
 Third, there is a far greater breadth to the scope of social participation in the 
context of the modern state as symbolized by the creation of citizenship as the 
cornerstone of the relationship between state and society.  The political equality that 
citizenship represents is, according to Poggi, markedly superior to the situation 
found in pre-modern state in which political rights were distributed unequally, 
unevenly and often arbitrarily across different groups within the population.  Here 
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we see that Poggi understands citizenship under the modern state to be a status that is 
uniformly applied to all members of the population regardless of their specific 
identities or attachments.  There is thus likely to be difficulty in reconciling the 
modern state to the idea of different and perhaps asymmetrical ‘national’ citizenship 
rights such as is demanded by some minority nationalist movements. 
 
Summary 
The four theories of the state examined above adopt a similar sociological approach 
and consequently emphasize similar features in their attempt to identify what is 
distinct about the state as an organization and how modern states in particular differ 
from older state forms.  Starting from different premises, alternative approaches 
would emphasize other dimensions of the state.  In the tradition of Western political 
theory, for example, writers such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau construct 
essentially normative accounts of the state in which ideas such as the social contract 
and the possibilities of freedom in association figure prominently.  There are, 
moreover, a variety of more recent accounts of the modern state that bear the 
distinctive  stamp  of  the  authors’  ideological  predilections  and arrive at markedly 
different conclusions from the four theories examined in this chapter.  The modern 
state has, for example, been analyzed from a Marxian class perspective as essentially 
a capitalist state operating structurally to privilege the dominant position of the 
ruling class(es)38;  from  a  ‘pluralist’  perspective  as  essentially  a  liberal  state  that 
operates as a neutral arena for political contestation between a multiplicity of 
countervailing interest groups39; and from a ‘statist’ perspective that focuses on the 
state as a potentially autonomous ‘macro-structure..’40  
 The decision to examine the theories of the state developed by Weber, 
Giddens, Mann and Poggi respectively is motivated by the objectives of the present 
study; namely an analysis of the consequences associated with the devolution of 
political power to sub-state national minorities.  Although it must be acknowledged 
that, as is true of all such decisions, an element of arbitrariness is unavoidable and 
alternative theories equally relevant could have easily been chosen instead, the four 
theories examined are especially apposite to the subject matter of this thesis and the 
question of the relationship of national minorities to the modern state.  Through their 
emphasis on the modern state’s expanded administrative capacity, its commitment to 
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a unitary and centralizing structure of political authority and the distinctive nature of 
its claim to legitimacy, the significance of the political demands of national 
minorities are brought into sharper focus. 
 The first thing we learn from the analysis contained in this chapter concerns 
the distinctness of the modern state in a number of significant areas.  Giddens, Mann 
and Poggi are particularly concerned to emphasize the uniqueness of the modern 
state (Giddens, for example, goes so far as to describe his as a ‘discontinuist’ theory 
of the state in recognition of the radically different nature of the modern state as 
compared with all previous models of state), and although Weber intends his basic 
definition as a description of the state-in-general, he also focuses on what is unique 
about the modern state in his analysis of its claim to legitimacy and its reliance on 
the bureaucratic model of administrative organization.  What is implied by the 
concept of state is, then, not static over time but is rather a historically contingent 
ideal, and an understanding of what marks the modern state as distinct from previous 
models of state is of central importance for any analysis of the relationship between 
the state and national minorities residing within its borders.  
 At a basic level, all four authors acknowledge the necessity of defining the 
modern state in institutional terms; that is, by focusing on the means by which it 
exercises political authority rather than the ends that it pursues.  In this respect, the 
influence of Weber is decisive; as he notes, what ultimately distinguishes the state 
from all other forms of organization is its claim to a monopoly of the legitimate use 
of coercion.  As Giddens and Mann are careful to point out, what makes the modern 
state unique is the success with which it advances this claim; the modern state alone 
comes close to realizing the ambition of monopolizing the legitimate use of coercion.   
 From  this  basic  idea  of  the  modern  state’s  relationship  to  physical  force 
follow a number of important associated ideas which help us understand the 
significance of contemporary minority nationalist movements.  Bound up with the 
modern state’s monopolization of legitimate coercion is the importance assumed by 
the notion of territoriality.  As Weber himself makes clear, there is a territorial 
dimension to the concept of the state; the state is described as a closed corporate 
group possessing ‘territorial validity’, meaning that  it  is residency or birth within a 
given territorial area that provides the criteria for identifying who is subject to its 
system of order.  The scope of the relevant territorial order is made substantially 
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more definite with the development of the modern state and its subordination of rival 
sources of legitimate coercion.  As Giddens observes, the territorial area over which 
such a state rules must be unambiguous and clearly defined, a fact that receives 
expression in the replacement of the indefinite ‘frontiers’ characteristic of pre-
modern states with the definite ‘borders’ of the modern era. 
 The far greater degree of success with which the modern state is able to 
monopolize the legitimate use of coercion enables it to exercise direct rule over its 
population.  By contrast, pre-modern states, lacking the requisite administrative 
capacity, can only exercise rule indirectly and rely to a greater or lesser degree on the 
co-operation  of  intermediate  ‘power-containers’.    Pre-modern societies are, as a 
result, best described as segmental.  Having access to a far greater degree of what 
Mann terms ‘infrastructural power’, modern states are able to overcome the chronic 
segmentalism characteristic of pre-modern states and effectively govern directly 
across the entirety of their territory.  This is expressed by Giddens in the statement 
that within its territorial borders the modern state stands as the ‘pre-eminent power-
container’, meaning  that  the presence of  rival power-containers is eliminated.  The 
significance of this aspect of the modern state for understanding the demands of sub-
state national minorities is substantial for it implies that the destruction and/or 
marginalization of autonomous sites of political power is constitutive of the modern 
state form itself.  This helps account for the reluctance most modern states display 
when  confronted  with  internal  minority  groups’  demands  for  some  measure of 
political autonomy, since such demands are interpreted as undermining the power of 
the state itself.   
 The commitment to a unitary structure of political authority described above 
is further expressed in the modern states tendency toward centralization and 
functional  integration.   According to Mann’s definition the modern state is a set of 
institutions ‘embodying centrality’, whilst for Poggi it is both ‘centralized’ and made 
up of divisions ‘formally coordinated with one another.’   The centralized nature of 
the  modern  state  is  manifest  in  the  idea  that  in  it,  as  Mann  observes,  ‘political 
relations  radiate  to  and  from  the  centre.’    The  demand  for  political  recognition 
advanced by some national minorities is based on their claim to constitute a distinct 
community with its own right of political self-determination.  Insofar as this is 
accepted, the central  state’s  position  as  the  ultimate  source  through  which  all 
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political relations radiate is fundamentally contested.  If national minorities are 
granted a measure of political autonomy in recognition of their distinct claim to 
national self-determination, then it is the latter rather than the central state that is the 
source of political authority.  This is a clear challenge to one of the core attributes of 
the ideal-typical modern state as theorized by Weber, Giddens, Mann and Poggi and 
we should expect state’s to resist the demand so far as politically possible. 
Weber’s conception of sociology as a science concerned with interpreting the 
subjective meaning of social action underpins his insistence in the necessity of 
adopting an individualistic method, according to which the subjective meaning of 
social action can derive only from individuals.  The significance of this for his theory 
of the state is that it underpins his insistence that the state be understood not as an 
agent  in  itself  but  as  a  ‘complex  of  social  interaction  of  individual  persons.’ 41  
Weber’s intention is to avoid the reification of the state, and in doing so an important 
idea about the concept of legitimacy is introduced that is similarly examined in the 
theories of Giddens, Mann and Poggi.  The basic idea is that the exercise of political 
power implies some sort of relationship between the subject and object, so that the 
subject exercising power elicits obedience from the object because of the  latter’s 
belief in the validity of the former. 
 Giddens, for example, employs the concept of the dialectic of control as a 
way of expressing the idea that power and domination depends upon securing a 
necessary amount of compliance from others.  Along similar lines, Poggi asserts that 
commands are always associated with inter-subjectivity and contingency; commands 
elicit obedience on the basis of a belief in the moral entitlement of the command-
giver to that obedience.  Applied to  the concept of  the state,  this shows that state’s 
can expect to receive the obedience from their citizens to the extent that the latter 
accept its legitimacy.  Where a system of order endures for a substantial amount of 
time, where political power is institutionalized, it is rare that coercion alone sustains 
it.  Instead, it is because that system enjoys some form of legitimacy.   
 Whilst legitimacy is therefore a generic condition of statehood, not all states 
derive their legitimacy from the same source.  In considering the relationship 
between the modern state and internal national minorities, the specific form of 
legitimacy associated with the former is of considerable significance.  Weber’s well-
known theory of legitimacy is based upon his understanding of the basic types of 
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social action; rational, affective and traditional.  The modern state, he argues, is 
unique in the overwhelming predominance of the rational-legal type basis of its 
legitimacy and the extent to which it depends upon a bureaucratic form of 
administration.  It is interesting to note that whilst Weber is critical of the process of 
bureaucratization associated with the development of the modern state, arguing that 
it threatens to replace the dynamic, passionate leadership of the politician who bears 
responsibility for his actions with a leaderless ‘civil-service-rule’, Poggi interprets it 
as a form of depersonalization that aids the elimination of the invidious arbitrariness 
characteristic of the exercise of political power in pre-modern states.   
 Whereas Weber locates his analysis of legitimacy in the context of the basic 
types of social action, Giddens and Mann focus on the manner in which the modern 
state’s  expanded  administrative  capacity  alters  the  relationship  between  state  and 
society.  According to Giddens, the modern state operates a system of rule with a 
uniquely wide scope, meaning that it is capable of successfully enforcing its 
authority over a large area.  The increased scope of the modern state’s rule enables it 
to increasingly penetrate the intimate and day-to-day lives of its citizens in a manner 
unthinkable in previous eras, but is achieved at the cost of a decrease in the intensity 
– of the sanctions available to it – of the state’s rule.  This is explained in terms of 
the operation of  the dialectic of control;  the wider the scope of the state’s rule,  the 
greater the extent of openings available through which citizens can influence the 
state.  Mann constructs a similar account in terms of two dimensions of power; 
infrastructural and despotic.  Largely owing to the superior efficiency of its 
bureaucratic model of administration, the modern state wields a far greater degree of 
infrastructural power as compared with any pre-modern forms of state.  An 
inevitable corollary of this expansion of infrastructural power is a decrease in 
despotic power; that is, the capacity to rule without reference to the interests of the 
population.  Mann describes this process as a tightening of the state-society 
relationship.  Henceforth, legitimacy is more than ever constructed with reference to 
the relationship between  rulers  and  ruled  (although he  rejects Giddens’  suggestion 
that the modern state is therefore inherently polyarchic, pointing instead to the 
significant degree of continuity in distributive power relations). 
 The changed nature of legitimacy in the context of the modern state is 
significant for the understanding of the relationship between the state and national 
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minorities for three reasons.  First, more so than previous state forms, the modern 
state’s  legitimacy derives  from  its  relationship  to  its  population.    It  adheres  to  the 
ideal of popular sovereignty (see chapter two for a detailed analysis of the concept of 
sovereignty).  Second, the unitary character of the modern state is mirrored by its 
commitment to a unitary conception of the demos from which its legitimacy derives.  
Third,  as Mann  recognizes,  the modern  state’s  legitimacy is intimately associated 
with  its  ability  to  represent  its  citizens’  internal  sense  of  community.    The 
transformation of legitimacy in the context of the modern state into something 
dependent upon the state representing the internal sense of community of its 
population, gives it an intrinsic interest in promoting homogenization aimed at 
instilling a common culture amongst all the groups within its territory.  
 National minorities question the legitimacy of the state precisely because of 
its perceived failure to represent their internal sense of community and a rejection of 
the unitary conception of nationality to which the state adheres (see below).  From 
the perspective of the state, acceding to the demands of national minorities is seen as 
itself undermining its legitimacy, for it implies the acceptance of alternative sources 
of political authority and legitimacy.  Mann examines this issue when he describes 
the  essentially  contested  nature  of  the modern  state’s  crystallization  as  a  national 
state.  The development of modern citizenship, Mann argues, was always concerned 
with both who should enjoy it and where it should be located.  The resulting conflict 
of interests is manifest in the struggle between central and local-regional powers 
which, far from having been uncontroversially resolved, are woven into the fabric of 
the modern state.  Acknowledgement of the essentially contested nature of the 
modern  state’s  claim  to  represent  a  unitary  national  population  from  which  its 
legitimacy is derived is paramount if we are to understand the forms of minority 
nationalism currently prevalent in the so-called consolidate states of the Western 
world. 
  
In analyzing the nation-state it is of crucial importance that we maintain an analytical 
distinction between the concepts nation and state, which unfortunately are often used 
in such a way that they become virtually interchangeable.  Only by presenting a clear 
understanding of the difference between the nation – a human community sharing a 
common culture, values and symbols – and the state – an institution that seeks to 
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create such a common culture via the pursuit of nation-building policies – can we 
hope to explain the role and importance of stateless nations in the contemporary 
world.  The following section is thus dedicated to the examination of four competing 
theories of the origins and nature of nations and nationalism.   
 
Theories of the Nation 
Ernest Gellner 
In his book, Nations and Nationalism (1983), Ernest Gellner defines a ‘nation’ as a 
collective group, the members of which share two essential elements – a common 
culture, and a subjective recognition of shared national identity.  Thus defined, he 
argues, the nation is part cultural and part voluntaristic.42  However, as Gellner 
points out, these two elements can also be found in various social collectivities that 
we would not want to recognize as nations, and that to arrive at an accurate theory of 
the nation we must enquire further into the conditions of industrial society, within 
which alone nations emerge.  For nations are not, according to Gellner, inherent 
attributes of humanity, but are rather contingent categories of human association – 
contingent upon certain conditions pertaining to industrial society.  Prior to the 
process of industrialisation, no social collectivities recognizable as nations existed, 
whereas subsequent to industrialisation the development of nations was both 
necessary and inevitable.  It is only within the context of industrial society that the 
two elements will and culture become fused within the polity to form nations.  For it 
is industrial society that makes possible the standardised, homogeneous and centrally 
sustained high cultures that are the foundations of nationhood.   
 According to Gellner, human history can be divided into three principal 
stages; pre-agrarian, agrarian, and industrial.  Since Gellner argues that a nation 
cannot develop in the absence of a state, which acts as the political shell within 
which the common culture of nationhood develops, it is self-evident that nations are 
absent in pre-agrarian society where no such thing as the state existed.  Why then, 
asks Gellner, are nations similarly absent in agrarian societies which, after all, often 
have significantly developed state structures?  It is, he concludes, because the 
division of labour found in agrarian society engenders a social structure that 
systematically favours internal cultural differentiation rather than cultural 
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homogeneity.  This is true both with regard to the ruling classes and for the great 
majority of the subject population engaged in direct agricultural production.   
 In agrarian society, the various sub-strata of the ruling class are separated 
from each other, and from the mass of the peasantry, by horizontal lines of cultural 
cleavage.  Cultural differentiation between the various sections of the ruling class is 
maintained  as  a  desirable means  by which  to  reduce  ‘friction’  and  ‘ambiguity’,  as 
well as helping to further their position of power and privilege vis-à-vis the subject 
population.  The conditions of the peasant communities that constitute this subject 
population similarly militates against the development of cultural homogeneity, as 
they  live  within  ‘laterally  insulated’  communities  whose  inward-turned lives 
preclude the possibility of more extensive cultural identification.  For its part, the 
agrarian state has little interest in promoting cultural homogenization either within 
the subject population or between it and themselves, since the agrarian state is by 
and large content to restrict its activities to extracting taxes and maintaining a 
minimal peace. 
  Moreover, not only is the maintenance of horizontal cultural cleavages 
between the ruling classes and subject populations desirable – it is actually feasible 
in the context of the relative stability that agrarian society represents.  Sharp 
differentiation between sections of the population are experienced less as an 
intolerable inequality and more as a balm that soothes the undeniably radical 
inequalities  ‘by  endowing  them  with  the  aura  of inevitability, permanence and 
naturalness’.43  The  ‘invisibility’  of  a  peasant  culture  that  is  necessarily  inward-
turned excludes any inclination on their behalf for attaching any political pretensions 
to that culture such as is required for the development of nationhood.  In such a 
context  the  development  of  an  overriding  and  homogeneous  ‘national’  culture  is 
impossible. 
 The social structure of industrial society is, however, very different.  Whilst 
he accepts that the causes and origins of industrialism (its aetiology) are, and are 
likely to remain, essentially disputed, Gellner nevertheless posits an analysis of the 
‘new spirit’ of  industrialism.   Taking his cue from Weber, Gellner understands the 
concept of rationality, and its commitment to the twin ideals of orderliness and 
efficiency, as emblematic of the new spirit of industrial society.  This new spirit, 
according to Gellner, is expressed in the philosophy of David Hume and Immanuel 
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Kant and their philosophical project of cognitively ordering the world according to a 
‘universal  conceptual  currency’. 44   Gellner  terms  this  the  ‘equalization  and 
homogenization  of  facts’,  and  uses  it  to  argue  that  industrial  man  is  the  first  to 
understand facts as analyzable according to a single universal logic.  Gellner relates 
this cognitive process to profound changes in the forms of social organization that 
occur within industrial society; changes that make the development of nations 
inevitable. 
 According to Gellner, industrial society is based upon a commitment to 
perpetual economic and cognitive growth.  This perpetual growth implies a 
commitment to the ideals of progress and continuous improvement that can only be 
satisfied  by  a  social  structure  in  which  human  roles  are  themselves  ‘optimal  and 
instrumental’.   Continuous economic growth demands a commitment to innovation 
and efficiency, things that are incompatible with the rigidly stable social structure of 
agrarian society.  Instead, what is required is the far greater degree of mobility and 
egalitarianism which is characteristic of industrial society.   
This is also reflected in the nature of specialisation present in the division of 
labour of industrial as compared with agrarian society.  In industrial society, 
specialists, whilst more numerous in total, are possessed of a greater ‘mutual affinity 
of style’ than their agrarian counterparts as a product of their shared grounding in a 
preceding generic and universally standardized form of training.  The 
implementation of standardized and unspecialized education that industrial society 
demands places the responsibility for social reproduction firmly in the hands of the 
central state as the only body capable of providing such an education.   
For continuous economic growth to become a reality, then, the state must 
take possession of a monopoly of the means of education in a manner that excludes 
the possibility of ‘self-reproductive’ sub-communities such as are commonly found 
in agrarian society.  The fusion of will, culture and polity that the nation represents 
now becomes a reality under the direction of a state charged with the implementation 
of centralized ‘exo-education’.  We can relate this to the terms used by Giddens by 
saying that, according to Gellner at least, the nation develops as a result of the state 
taking primary responsibility for the reflexive monitoring of system reproduction, 
via the institution of compulsory state education, in response to the demands of the 
industrial division of labour.  Thus, the only way that a common national culture can 
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be sustained, according to Gellner, is under the direction of a centralized state 
possessing a monopoly of education within its boundaries.  Only such an education 
system  can  perform  the  function  of  producing  a  ‘standard  culture’  that  lies  at  the 
heart of the formation of the nation.   
Gellner’s  theory  of  nations  and  nationalism,  involving  the  argument  that 
national identity and common culture are produced and sustained by a centralized 
state, struggles to account for the existence of stateless nations and minority 
nationalist movements.  The continued existence of stateless nations such as 
Scotland, Catalonia and Quebec suggests that a common culture can be sustained by 
means other than a centralized state using its monopoly of education to homogenize 
its population.  Whilst Gellner recognizes the possibility of such state-less 
collectivities to persist for some time, in keeping with his overall theory he predicts 
that such groups must inevitably seek their own independent state, for without such a 
state their survival is made impossible.  Thus he writes;  
 
‘A culture can and now often does will itself into existence without the benefit not 
only of a dynasty, but equally of a state but in this situation, when devoid of its political 
shell, it will then inevitable strive to bring such a state into being, and to redraw political 
boundaries so as to ensure that a state does exist, which alone can protect the educational 
and cultural infrastructure without which a modern, literate culture cannot survive.’45 
  
Eric Hobsbawm 
The concept of nation cannot, according to Eric Hobsbawm, be satisfactorily defined 
purely by reference to either objective criteria, such as language, ethnicity, or culture, 
nor by subjective criteria such as a sense of shared group attachments.  The former 
because  closer  analysis  so often  reveals  their  arbitrary or  ‘invented’  character,  and 
the latter because it leads to tautology and extremes of voluntarism.  Given these 
considerations, Hobsbawm’s  theory of  the nation contains no  a priori definition of 
what constitutes a nation.46   Instead, he focuses on the historical circumstances 
surrounding the development of the concept, arguing that to understand the nation 
we must look at a particular historical period, late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century Europe, during which the idea of nationhood was founded.  Hobsbawm 
argues that nations did not, and indeed could not, have existed prior to the 
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‘revolutionary-democratic’  events  that  occurred  in America  in  1776  and  France  in 
1789. 
 As indicated, then, Hobsbawm argues that it is a mistake to analyze nations 
in terms of their cultural aspects alone, since so-called national traditions are most 
usually the product of invention.  Hobsbawm’s theory of the nation instead focuses 
on  the  concept’s  relation  to  the  modern territorial state, arguing that to discuss 
nationality in any way other in than its relation to the ‘nation-state’ is meaningless.  
In saying this, Hobsbawm does not suggest that prior to the development of the 
modern state human beings did not belong to extensive communities of popular 
identification.  Rather, he posits that such communities as did exist have no 
necessary relation to modern national communities which, crucially, are territorial 
political organizations.  Thus, according to Hobsbawm, there can be no nation 
without a state. 
 The discontinuity that exists between pre-modern group attachments (what 
Hobsbawm somewhat confusingly  terms  ‘popular proto-nationalisms’)  and modern 
nations, can be demonstrated by looking at the role of language in identity formation.  
Whilst it is undoubtedly true that linguistic traits act as an aspect of communal self-
identification in all eras, it is only under certain modern conditions that language can 
become associated with extensive national communities.  Language in pre-modern 
societies lacked the level of standardization to which we are now accustomed.  
Rather,  it  took  the  form  of  a  ‘complex  of  local  variants  of  dialects 
intercommunicating  with  varying  degrees  of  ease  or  difficulty’.47  Therefore the 
concept of a national language should be seen as more a product of artifice than an 
objective foundation of national identity.  Criticizing those who would posit a 
‘mystical’  identification  of nationality with  language, Hobsbawm suggests  that  the 
very idea of national language is a ‘literary’ rather than an ‘existential’ concept.  We 
shall  have  cause  to  return  to  Hobsbawm’s  account  of  the  role  of  language  in  the 
development of nations below. 
 The roots of nationhood do not, according to Hobsbawm, lie in the ‘popular 
proto-nationalisms’  around  which  group  identification  coalesced  prior  to  the  late-
eighteenth century.  This is because nowhere did these proto-nationalisms carry the 
particular political implications that are central to the contemporary understanding of 
the term nation.  It was in the success of the ‘revolutionary-democratic’ movements 
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of the later eighteenth century, in particular the American Revolution of 1776 and 
the French Revolution of 1789, that the ideal of popular sovereignty asserted itself as 
the most important legitimating principle amongst Western European states.  This, 
for the first time, allowed the idea of ‘the people’, meaning the group of citizens in 
which collective popular sovereignty ultimately inheres, to be equated with the state 
to whose authority they are subject.   
The increasing importance of popular sovereignty lead to the state being seen 
as the political expression of its citizens, such that the latter could now be 
legitimately described as a nation.  The important thing to note about this process is 
that nationality referred to a human collectivity united by their common citizenship 
status under the authority of a state seen as their political expression.  It did not 
imply anything about the level of cultural homogeneity or otherwise of those 
individuals constituting the nation.  According to Hobsbawm, there is no intrinsic 
connection between nationhood and culture.  The fact that nation and culture have 
become so intimately linked in contemporary times is, according to Hobsbawm, 
largely a product of elite manipulation in the service of power and privilege. 
 The nation was thus originally conceived as the ideal at the heart of a 
unifying and expansionist political project indicative of the historical evolution of 
mankind toward larger and larger organizational units.  Nationality represented an 
opportunity to overcome the myriad of particular (and hence divisive) identities and 
interests and work instead toward the common good.  Prior to the development of a 
modern state rooted in the discourse of popular sovereignty there could be no such 
thing as nations, and when the concept of nation was born it asserted the primacy of 
citizenship over the particularist attachments of culture.  Hobsbawm thus argues that 
nationality, in its original  liberal  incarnation,  referred  to  one’s  status  as  a  citizen 
residing within a particular state.  From such a perspective the peripheral 
nationalisms of stateless nations are particularistic and divisive political movements 
and as such are an affront to efforts at working toward the common good.  By 
emphasizing  so  strongly  the  association  of  nation  and  state,  Hobsbawm’s  theory 
concludes by asserting the civic and progressive potential of state-supported 
nationalisms, as opposed to the inevitably particularist, because founded upon 
culture, nature of minority  stateless nationalisms. Hobsbawm analyzes the process 
by which  the  initially  ‘civic’  nature  of  the  concept  of  nation,  as  developed  in  the 
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context  of  the  ‘democratic-revolutionary’  politics  of  later eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century Europe, was transformed by the end of the nineteenth century into 
an  ‘ethno-linguistic’  concept.    According  to  Hobsbawm,  this  transformation  was 
largely a product of the activities of various elites whose interests and access to 
power could be promoted by the invention of ethno-cultural nations.  The 
development of the modern state changed the nature of state-society relations.  
Similarly to Giddens and Mann, Hobsbawm argues that the development of the 
modern state brought  ruler  and  ruled much  ‘closer’  than  ever  before  so  that  they 
were now ‘inevitably linked by daily bonds’.48  The increasingly direct relationship 
between state and citizen raised the hitherto relatively unimportant issue of citizens’ 
loyalty higher up the political agenda of the state.  This at the same time as 
traditional sources of loyalty, such as religion and social hierarchy, were losing much 
of their traditional potency.  Within this context governments increasingly turned 
toward the concept of a ‘civic  religion’  in  the form of  ‘state-based patriotism’ as a 
way of strengthening the loyalty of its citizens.  Moreover, ‘states and regimes had 
every reason to reinforce, if they could, state patriotism with the sentiments and 
symbols  of  ‘imagined  community’  wherever  and  however  they  originated,  and  to 
concentrate them upon themselves’.49   
In other words, governments themselves found that constructing the nation as 
an ethno-cultural group was essential if they were to inspire the feelings of loyalty 
that, because of the changed nature of state-society relations, had become an 
important part of the political agenda.  The ethno-cultural nation that emerged from 
this process differed from its civic predecessor in at least three respects; first, the 
‘threshold principle’, according to which only such groups as were large enough to 
form viable units of economic development could qualify as nations, was abandoned, 
thus  paving  the  way  for  ‘mini-nations’.    Second,  ethnicity  and  language  became 
defining features of nationality, and third, the discourse of nationality shifted away 
from its liberal progressive roots towards the political right. 
 The role of language in the transformation from a civic to an ethnic 
conception of nationalism is linked by Hobsbawm to the class nature of nationalist 
movements.  He argues that linguistic nationalism is largely the preserve of a petty 
bourgeois stratum for which there is a clear material interest in raising their language 
to the status of official ‘national’ language requiring political protection.  Linguistic 
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nationalism was attractive to a lower-middle stratum whose opportunities for social 
mobility were potentially advanced if their vernacular language could be upgraded to 
the medium of secondary education.  There is thus a clear class interest in the 
promotion of linguistic nationalism that is a more important explanatory factor than 
any supposed inherent association between language and identity.  Moreover, 
according to Hobsbawm, in the hands of the petty bourgeoisie, nationalism, ‘mutated 
from a concept associated with liberalism and the left to a chauvinist, imperialist and 
xenophobic movement of the right’.50 
 Not only is the conception of the nation as an ethno-cultural community a 
social construction which serves the material interests of the dominant class(es), the 
very principle of nationalism – that the political and the national unit be congruent – 
is doomed to failure on the grounds that unscrambling the diverse mix of ethnic and 
language groups found within most states is evidently impossible.  Hobsbawm 
writes; ‘The  logical  implication  of  trying  to  create  a  continent  neatly  divided  into 
coherent territorial states each inhabited by a separate ethnically and linguistically 
homogeneous population was the mass expulsion or extermination of minorities’.51  
Such a conclusion  flows naturally  from Hobsbawm’s  insistence  that  the nationalist 
principle can only be realised by the creation of independent nation-states for every 
nation.  However, by maintaining a clearer conceptual distinction between nation 
and state, it becomes possible to view national self-determination as realisable in 
ways that fall short of independent statehood.   
 
John Breuilly 
John Breuilly also rejects the notion that the concepts of nation and nationalism 
should be understood primarily from a perspective that views them as cultural 
phenomena, but departs  from Hobsbawm’s analysis by  rejecting as  equally  invalid 
the argument that nationalism is the expression of ‘deeper’ phenomena such as class 
interest or social structure.  Instead, nations and nationalism, according to Breuilly, 
should primarily be understood as forms of politics.  Appealing to the ideal of nation 
presents itself as a peculiarly appropriate form of political behaviour for opposition 
movements operating in the context of the modern state.  Within Breuilly’s theory, 
the concept of nation is described as an ‘institution’, meaning that it is a device for 
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achieving other ends, namely the capturing of state power on behalf of political 
opposition movements.  Breuilly defines nationalism as follows: 
 
‘The  term ‘nationalism’  is used  to refer to political movements seeking or exercising state 
power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments.  A nationalist argument is a 
political doctrine built upon three basic assertions: 
a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character. 
b) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values. 
c) The nation must be as independent as possible.  This usually requires at least the 
attainment of political sovereignty.’52 
 
Defined in this way, nationalism did not exist prior to the development of the 
modern state which provides the only context within which such a form of politics 
makes sense.  Breuilly identifies the development of the modern state with a number 
of general changes in the economic, political and cultural spheres, all of which make 
possible  the  type  of  ‘mobilisation’  that  nationalist  politics  implies.    Because 
nationalism is, by definition, a form of ‘mass’ politics, it relies on the prior existence 
of these changes which have the effect of mobilizing attitudes at the popular level 
that previously were contained by more local barriers.  In terms of economic changes, 
Breuilly highlights the increasing penetration of market relationships and the 
creation of an urban working class; politically, the modern state entails a greater 
centralization of authority and the spread of bureaucracy; and culturally, changes 
such as the introduction of state-controlled education, mass-literacy,  ‘print 
capitalism’,  and  new  methods  of  communication,  all  ‘provide  the  basis  for  new 
popular political attitudes and demands’.53  Breuilly employs the term ‘mobilisation’ 
to describe the combined outcome of these changes, ultimately arguing that 
nationalism develops as an effective political response to mobilisation thus 
conceived.  
To understand exactly why nationalism emerged as an appropriate form of 
political behaviour in coping with mobilisation, Breuilly suggests that we must look 
to the changed nature of the relationship between state and society that the 
development of the modern form of state entails.  The growth of the administrative 
power of the state saw its authority extended at the expense of other institutions such 
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as churches, estates and guilds, resulting in a state that resembled a ‘nation-state’.  It 
is only following such an extension of state authority that the idea of nation could 
attain any political relevance.   
Breuilly argues that the expansion of the state’s administrative power, with its 
effect of turning the state into a nation-state, paradoxically brings about a 
‘separation’ of state and society.  He explains this as the replacement of ‘horizontal’ 
distance  with  ‘vertical’  distance,  to  describe  the way in which the state, as it 
intervenes more and more in the intimate activities of its citizens, actually appears 
more  rather  than  less  detached  from  them.    Moreover,  the  claim  to  ‘absolute’ 
sovereignty  advanced  by  the  state  implies  the  existence  of  a  ‘public’  authority 
standing above the ‘private’ interests of civil society.  This separation of public and 
private, unknown in the context of the pre-modern state, brings forth the question of 
how exactly the two realms should be connected.  Nationalist ideology, influenced 
by the historicism of writers such as Herder, offers to resolve the separation of state 
and society by integrating the cultural nation as a political nation, thereby protecting 
the nation’s ‘authenticity’.  Breuilly, argues that the claim of nationalist ideology ‘to 
link cultural distinctiveness with the demand for political self-determination’54 is 
only plausible in the context of the separation of state and society (or public and 
private) that accompanies the development of the modern state and the modern states 
system.   
The success of  the nationalist ‘solution’ to  the separation of state and society 
lies in its ability to perform the functions of co-ordination, mobilisation and 
legitimation.  Nationalist politics can provide a unity of purpose and values for an 
opposition movement otherwise possessed of a variety of diverse interests; it can 
bring in hitherto uninvolved or unorganized sections of society into politics; and, in 
the context of an international states system built around the principle of state 
sovereignty and national self-determination, can engender support from outsiders.  
The success with which nationalist politics is able to perform these three functions 
accounts for its pervasive prevalence in the modern era. 
 Like Hobsbawm, Breuilly argues that, in its original manifestation, the ideal 
of nation was not so much conceived as a cultural entity, but was rather a by-product 
of  the modern  state’s  embrace  of  the  principle  of  popular  sovereignty.    Once  the 
modern state was seen as deriving its sovereignty from the ‘people’, the occupants of 
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the clearly defined territory could begin to imagine themselves as a nation.  It is only 
subsequently that nationhood began to acquire specifically cultural connotations.  
Particularly in the case of weak opposition movements, appealing to the cultural 
characteristics of the nation offered the best opportunities for mobilizing support 
against the existing state authorities.  Echoing Hobsbawm, Breuilly writes, ‘Once the 
claim to sovereignty was made on behalf of a particular, territorially defined unit of 
humanity, it was natural to relate the claim to the particular attributes of that unit’.55 
 In sum, Breuilly identifies three essential premises upon which nationalist 
politics build, all of which are closely associated with the development of the 
modern state and the modern state system; the concept of a ruled society definable 
according to its private character, the sovereign territorial state, and the existence of 
an international states system of competing sovereign states.  Breuilly argues that 
nationalism developed as a form of politics that was appropriate within this context, 
and, moreover, is a form of politics that remains tied to these conditions.  
Nationalism is an ideology of opposition – it can play no distinctive role in the actual 
exercise of state authority, precisely because its claim to reintegrate the separation of 
state and society is impossible in the context of a modern state that is founded on just 
such a separation. 
 
Anthony D . Smith 
The  starting  point  for  Anthony  D.  Smith’s  theory  of  the  nation  is  that  there  are 
important continuities between modern nations and pre-modern  ‘ethnie’.  That the 
form and content of ethnie are both durable and intimately linked with those of 
modern nations provides the  ‘underlying  motif’  of  his  analysis.    He  argues  that 
national identities are to a significant degree dependent on the memories, myths, 
values and symbols that provide the content of pre-modern ethnic identity.  It is only 
by recognizing the historical continuity that exists between nations and ethnie that 
we can explain the intense emotional power engendered by nationalist sentiment, and 
the ardent nature of individuals’ attachment to their national identity.   
 Smith defines ethnie as  ‘named  human  populations  with  shared  ancestry 
myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a 
sense of solidarity’.56  These qualities exert a ‘binding’ influence over the members 
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of the ethnie in the manner by which they condition the interactions and perceptions 
of the community, and provide shared meanings.  Moreover, the memories, symbols 
and values of ethnie adopt a ‘historicity’ which conditions the form that subsequent 
communal expressions will take.  There is therefore a significant degree of 
continuity between ethnie and modern nations.  This is because the form and content 
of ethnie constitute the raw material from which national identity is formed. 
 According  to  Smith,  ethnicity  so  defined  represents  a  ‘central axis of 
alignment and division’ in the pre-modern world, in which the existence of ethnie is 
‘widespread and chronic’.57  The complex of myths, memories and symbols that lie 
at the heart of these ethnie,  what  Smith  refers  to  as  the  ‘myth-symbol  complex’, 
endow the community with a distinctive political mythology – a  ‘mythomoteur’.  
Whilst this political mythology remains largely implicit and assumed, it nevertheless 
plays an important role in shaping goals and ideals toward which the members of the 
ethnie strive.  Furthermore, different forms of mythomoteur are associated with 
different types of ethnie.  E thnie,  according  to  Smith,  can  be  either  ‘lateral-
aristocratic’  or  ‘vertical-demotic’.   Membership within  lateral-aristocratic ethnie is 
largely limited to an elite class, with the bonds of ethnic identification rarely 
penetrating further down the social scale.  Vertical-demotic ethnie are both more 
intensive, exclusive and diffuse throughout the social scale.   
What  distinguishes  Smith’s  argument  from  those advanced by Gellner, 
Hobsbawm and Breuilly is his assertion that numerous examples of vertical-demotic 
ethnie can be found in pre-modern societies.  Although it is true that many pre-
modern ethnie are of the lateral-aristocratic kind and hence limited to a small strata 
of society, it is not the case, as the theories of Gellner, Hobsbawm and Breuilly 
suggest, that these represent the only type of identification community in pre-modern 
society.  Rather, according to Smith, even in pre-modern societies, ethnie can be 
found in which ‘a single ethnic culture permeates in varying degrees most strata of 
the population’.58   
 E thnie, whilst providing much of the cultural material from which nations 
develop, are not the same as nations.  It is, according to Smith, the ‘triple revolution’ 
of modernity that plays the pivotal role in transforming ethnie into nations.  The 
three aspects of this triple revolution being; first, the transition to capitalism with its 
implications of a single territory-wide occupational system; second, the 
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transformation of military and administrative methods of control, in particular the 
rise of the bureaucratic ‘rational’ state; and third, a revolution in the sphere of culture 
and education whereby the bureaucratic state comes to replace ecclesiastical 
authority  as  the  ‘active  principal  of  cultural  change’.59  According to Smith, the 
relevance of these three revolutions is that they all ‘revolved around the fashioning 
of centralized and culturally homogeneous states’.60  Within this context ethnie were 
gradually transformed into political nations.   
 The term nation is defined by Smith as ‘a named human population sharing 
an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, 
a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members’.61  Nations, 
therefore, can be distinguished from ethnie with respect to the former’s relationship 
to political and economic organization.  Following the triple revolution of modernity, 
ethnie can only survive by becoming ‘activist, mobilized and politically dynamic’: In 
other words, in the context of the emerging European and colonial inter-state system, 
ethnie are forced into the political arena, to become politicized nations.   
 Asymmetries in the timing and form of the triple revolution of modernity 
play an important role in the direction that nation formation takes.  As in 
Hobsbawm’s theory of the nation, Smith distinguishes between two types of nation; 
the  ‘territorial  nation’  and  the  ‘ethnic  nation’.    However,  Smith’s  account 
fundamentally differs from that developed by Hobsbawm insofar as he argues that 
the boundary between these two categories cannot, upon closer inspection, be 
maintained.  For Smith, there is an inherent dualism in the concept of nation, so that 
all nations must inevitably possess both territorial and ethnic elements.  According to 
Smith, a territorial nation consists of three basic elements; a sovereign, 
geographically-bounded state, the inhabitants of which constitute the nation, a 
common code of laws and legal institutions, and a set of common citizenship rights.  
It  is  the  fact  that  the  concept  of  citizenship  carries  implications  of  ‘solidarity  and 
fraternity  through  active  social  and  political  participation’ 62 , that the distinction 
between territorial and ethnic nations cannot be clearly maintained.  The enactment 
of citizenship rights led to an assumption that citizens had a will to participate, and 
hence were  ‘predicated  upon  an  attachment  to  the  land  and  an  affiliation with  the 
community’.63  In other words, owing to the fact that citizenship implies a sense of 
solidarity which cannot exist in the absence of some shared myths, memories and 
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symbols, territorial nations cannot survive without also being cultural communities.  
Recognition of this fact explains the role of mass state education in consciously 
promoting cultural homogeneity. 
 Just as territorial nations are thus driven toward the project of promoting 
cultural homogeneity as a foundation for a sense of solidarity, so too are ethnic 
nations compelled to take on aspects of the territorial nation, such as a common 
division of labour and the legal rights associated with citizenship.  Smith thus argues 
that the concept of nation is driven ‘back and forth between the two poles of ethnie 
and state which it seeks  to subsume and transcend’.64  This dualism inherent in the 
concept of nation is, according to Smith, evidence of the importance of the myth-
symbol complexes of ethnie for the formation of nations.  Nations, compelled by the 
triple revolution of modernity to become territorially centralized, politicized and 
legally and economically unified, nevertheless remain solidary communities rooted 
in the myths, memories, symbols and values of pre-existing ethnie.  Nations thus 
face simultaneously forward to a political future, and backward to a cultural past.  It 
is wrong, according to Smith, to suppose that nations are radically new categories of 
human association.  Instead, he stresses the continuities between ethnie and nations, 
arguing that nations simply  ‘extend,  deepen  and  streamline  the  ways  in  which 
members of ethnie associated and communicated’.65 
 
Summary 
The concept of the nation is one of the most contested in the social sciences and as 
such there are a plethora of alternative accounts from which this section could have 
drawn that would have emphasized alternative dimensions.  The four theories 
examined are, however, especially well known and influential accounts of nations 
and nationalism, and together provided much of the foundations for the considerable 
advances in the specialist field of nationalism studies that occurred in the final 
decades of the twentieth century.  Three principal themes emerge from the above 
analysis that are pertinent to our understanding of the political demands of 
contemporary minority nationalists; the relationship of the concept of nation with 
modernity, the cultural dimension of nationality, and the significance of the state for 
nations and nationalism. 
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 A prominent debate in the field of nationalism studies concerns the relative 
modernity of nations; that is, the extent to which collectivities with the qualities 
associated with nationhood are present only in the modern era.  On this question, 
Gellner, Hobsbawm and Breuilly unequivocally support the view that nations are 
indeed found exclusively in the modern era; the formation of nations, they argue, is 
dependent upon certain developments associated with modernity, although which 
features of modernity act as the catalyst enjoys less agreement.  For Gellner the key 
factor is the establishment of the industrial mode of production and the specific 
division of labour with which it is associated.  His is a structural account of the 
formation of nations according to which it is the social mobility required by a system 
of production based upon continuous economic growth that provides the impetus for 
the creation of nations.  Rather than industrialization, Hobsbawm understands the 
triumph of the ideal of popular sovereignty following the democratic-revolutionary 
events in late eighteenth century North America and France as providing the impetus 
for the creation of nations.  Finally, Breuilly focuses on specific qualities of the 
modern state which, he argues, create conditions in which nationalist ideology for 
the first time an effective political strategy. For all of three of these authors, nations 
are essentially modern phenomena with marked discontinuities compared to all 
forms of pre-modern collectivity. 
 With a greater emphasize on the symbolic significance of historical myths 
and memories in constituting national consciousness, Smith rejects the view that 
nations are entirely modern.  Instead he argues that there are important continuities 
between pre-modern cultural communities – ‘ethnie’ – and modern nations.  
Although he accepts that a revolution in the spheres of politics, economics and 
culture occurring initiated in the eighteenth century contributed to the transformation 
of pre-modern ethnie into modern politicized nations, the myth-symbol complex of 
the latter continue to significantly shape the former.  Whilst the political claims that 
are partly constitutive of nationhood are, Smith argues, largely a product of 
modernity, the form and content of nations as cultural communities is constructed 
around pre-existing myths, memories, symbols and values.  
 This debate concerning the relative modernity of nations is apposite to the 
study of contemporary minority nationalist movements for the manner in which it 
enables us to consider why these communities continue to advance political claims.  
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From the perspective of Hobsbawm’s theory of the nation, for example, the assertion 
of nationalist claims on the part of minority groups in opposition to the existing state 
is a reflection of the material interests of certain elites within that minority.  The 
distinct attributes that such minorities attach to their national identity are, Hobsbawm 
argues, merely the products of invention and serve only to promote the interests of 
actual or potential elites.  From the very different perspective of Smith, by contrast, 
nationalist appeals to the historicity of their distinct community are to be taken 
seriously on their own terms.   
 The authors examined in this section offer different interpretations of the 
relationship between nationality and culture; in broad terms, we can say that 
Hobsbawm and Breuilly reject the contention made by both Gellner and Smith that 
nations are necessarily cultural communities.  Gellner, for example, understands the 
demand for continuous economic growth peculiar to industrialized societies as 
dependent upon a culturally homogeneous, mobile population.  It is then the 
assumption by the state of the responsibility for mass education that acts as the 
principal means of cultural homogenization.  Smith also argues that a cultural 
dimension  is  constitutive  of  the  concept  of  nation  since  both  ‘civic’  and  ‘ethnic’ 
nations are always to some extent founded on a set of common myths, memories, 
symbols and values.  It is impossible, Smith suggests, to maintain a strict analytical 
distinction between the idea of the civic and the ethnic nation.  So-called civic 
nations are principally defined according to a set of shared citizenship rights, but the 
concept of citizenship itself implies the existence of bonds of social solidarity 
capable of motivating the active social and political participation of citizens.  For this 
reason the extension of citizenship rights fostered the assumption that citizens shared 
an attachment to a common cultural community. 
 Hobsbawm and Breuilly are much less inclined to understand the cultural 
dimension as constitutive of the concept of nation.  According to Hobsbawm, the 
assertion and gradual spread of the principle of popular sovereignty following the 
revolutionary-democratic movements of the late eighteenth century meant that the 
state was for the first time seen as the political expression of its citizens, who were 
thus constituted as a nation.  Common membership of a territorial state thus defined 
nationhood.  It was only in the nineteenth century that the concept of the nation 
acquired cultural connotations of homogeneity, and even then this was as a result of 
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the invention of tradition on the part of political elites for whom the promotion of the 
spurious idea of the nation as a cultural community served definite material and class 
interests.  For Breuilly, the appeal of nationalism is to be explained by reference to 
its capacity to perform the functions of co-ordination, mobilization and legitimation 
in the context of the bureaucratic modern state rather than by the extent of cultural 
homogeneity exhibited by any national group.   
 The demand for political recognition advanced by some contemporary 
national minorities is based upon an assertion that they constitute a separate and 
distinct national community understood  as  containing  a  ‘civic’  and  an  ‘ethnic’ 
dimension.  Whilst on the one hand, only by defining their nation in inclusive civic 
terms can a minority nationalist movement satisfy democratic norms, they 
nevertheless also claim to embody distinct cultural values from the majority national 
identity; cultural values that are given insufficient protection in the absence of 
political autonomy.  Moreover, as Smith observes, citizenship implies corresponding 
bonds of social solidarity that depend to some extent on a sense of shared culture and 
identity.  The emotional bonds of membership in a national minority are a significant 
source of social solidarity which, from the perspective of minority nationalists, foster 
greater civic and political participation where that identity is afforded political 
recognition.   
 How we conceptualize the relationship between nation and state impacts 
considerably on how we understand the political demands of internal minorities.  In 
different ways and to a varying extent, all four of the theories examined in this 
section equate nation and state, implying both that all nations seek independent 
statehood without which they could not survive as distinct national communities.  In 
this regard Hobsbawm is most trenchant; he baldly argues that the concept of nation 
has no independent significance outside of the context of the nation-state.  From a 
different perspective Gellner arrives at a similar position; the nation can only survive 
within the ‘political shell’ of the nation-state, since it is the monopoly of education 
possessed by the latter which alone is capable of sustaining the literate high culture 
of nationality.  Although more sensitive to the historical, cultural and symbolic 
aspects of nationality, by including in his definition of the nation factors such as 
common economy and legal framework, Smith also suggests that possession of a 
nation-state is a sine qua non of nationhood.  Finally, according to Breuilly’s theory 
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of the nation, it is only in the context of the modern bureaucratic state that the 
concept of nation and the ideology of nationalism make sense as forms of politics.  
Whilst he acknowledges that nationalism is an ideology of opposition movements, 
he argues that such groups appeal to nationalist arguments in the pursuit of a nation-
state of their own. 
 From the perspective of national minorities, this equation of nation and state 
serves the interest of existing states and majority national communities.  By equating 
nation with common membership in a state – i.e. citizenship – the distinct identity of 
minority groups is denied and/or marginalized.  The continued existence of 
territorially-concentrated historic communities whose members self-identify as a 
nation suggests that it is not only the possession of an independent nation-state that 
can sustain a sense of nationhood.  Historical myths, and symbols, distinct civil 
society institutions, and memories of lost political independence are some of the 
factors that are capable of sustaining a sense of distinct national identity in the 
absence of an independent nation-state.  Moreover, despite the assertion by the four 
authors examined in this section that the desire to form an independent nation-state is 
constitutive of the concept of nation, a number of contemporary national minorities 
explicitly eschew the goal of secession in favour of a measure of political autonomy 
short of independent based on a claimed right of national self-determination.   
  We have seen that the nation-state is characterized by its possession of a 
monopoly  of  the means  of  legitimate  force  and  is  ‘concerned  and  committed  to  a 
distinctive,  unified  and  unifying  set  of  interests  and  purposes.’ 66   Through its 
prominent role in the reflexive monitoring of social reproduction, in particular its 
control of education, the nation-state thus aims at the promotion of homogeneity 
within its boundaries, as a way of reinforcing its legitimacy.  It is when the nation-
state fails in its attempts at homogenization that we see the continued existence of 
internal minority nations - what have been termed ‘nations without states.’67  These 
minority nations, by opposing the unitary and centralist nature of the nation-state, 
enter into a dialectical power relationship with it, and call into question its legitimacy.  
Therefore, to understand contemporary peripheral nationalist movements arising 
from within stateless nations, we must look closer at the way in which the nation-
state, rather than being the institutional expression of a unitary nation, in reality 
actively seeks to build a nation.  When such nation-building efforts are unsuccessful, 
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and we find the continued existence of internal national minorities, the legitimacy of 
the state, based upon a claimed link between nation and state, is called into question.   
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2 
National Minorities Within the Nation-State 
 
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter we analyzed a number of influential theories of both the 
(modern) state and the concept of nation, with a view to elucidating some of the 
central attributes of what was described as the pre-eminent state form of modernity; 
the nation-state.  Within this analysis were interspersed a number of comments 
oriented toward exposing potential points of conflict between the nation-state model, 
as it is most commonly interpreted, and national minorities residing within the state’s 
borders.  It was suggested that the highly centralized (and centralizing) nature of the 
nation-state model, combined with the fact that legitimacy is therein grounded in the 
presumed link between nation and state, functions to problematize the existence of 
national diversity.  The existence of substantial numbers of individuals who do not 
self-identify  with  the  dominant  ‘core’  national  identity,  and  claim  the  right  to  be 
recognized as a separate and distinct nation, is inherently in tension with the 
centralizing and homogenizing ambitions of the nation-state. 
 The objective of the present chapter is to further interrogate the relationship 
between the nation-state and national minorities included within the state’s territory.  
It is only having highlighted the points of tension in this relationship that the task of 
theorizing how best they can be reconciled within a democratic framework can be 
undertaken.  First, however, we need to clarify what exactly is meant by the term 
national minority. 
 
What is a National Minority? 
As should at this point be evident, a basic assumption at work within this study is 
that there exists a certain congruency shared between state-bearing and stateless 
nations; that is to say, national minorities, despite lacking a state of their own, can 
nevertheless quite properly be considered as nations.  Such an equation of national 
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minority with nation is not, however, uncontested, owing to the already observed 
tendency for much of the relevant literature to treat as nations only those 
collectivities in possession of a unified nation-state.  We have already seen a most 
strident statement to the effect that nations are to be considered as such only where 
they either possess, or actively strive to possess, a nation-state of their own in 
Hobsbawm’s insistence that a nation ‘is a social entity only insofar as it is related to 
a  certain  kind  of  modern  territorial  state,  the  “nation-state”,  and  it  is pointless to 
discuss nation and nationality except insofar as they relate to it.’68 The implication of 
Hobsbawm’s claim would seem to be that what are treated in this study as national 
minorities are in fact merely regions or ethnic groups.  A less normatively loaded 
version  of  Hobsbawm’s  claim  can  be  found  in  Giddens’  insistence that, ‘A 
‘nation’…only  exists  when  a  state  has  a  unified  administrative  reach  over  the 
territory  over which  its  sovereignty  is  claimed.’69  In claiming that to qualify as a 
nation a collectivity must be subject to a unitary administration within a clearly 
demarcated territory, the thrust of Giddens argument is not to argue that no analytical 
distinction can effectively be made between nation and state, but rather to highlight 
that their typical connection in the context of the modern state is a major aspect of 
the  latter’s  distinctiveness  vis-à-vis pre-modern forms of state.  Thus he writes; 
‘Both  the nation and nationalism are distinctive properties of modern states and  in 
the context of their original emergence as well as elsewhere there is more than a 
fortuitous connection between them.’70   
 Whilst accepting the reality of the intimate link between the concept of nation 
and the modern state identified by Giddens, we nevertheless feel justified in treating 
as nations certain minority groups that neither possess, nor in some cases seek to 
attain, full statehood.  Observing that the conventional alignment between nation and 
state referred to by Giddens increasingly fails to recognize the social reality in a 
number of contemporary Western states that contain territorially concentrated 
minority groups, an overwhelming proportion of whose members self-identity as a 
distinct nation without however aspiring to independent statehood, a number of 
contemporary scholars of nationalism reject the identification of the nation with the 
independent state. 71   Following this approach allows us to analyze the political 
claims of national minorities as nations, whatever their expressed attitude as to the 
desirability of forming an independent nation-state.   
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 It still remains, however, to distinguish the concept of national minority from 
other categories of minority group that inhabit contemporary Western nation-states.  
In particular, it is important that, whilst recognizing that all conceptual definitions in 
the social sciences are to some extent theoretically rooted and thus unable to be 
adequately captured in a single universal definition72, the concept of national identity 
is distinguished from regional and ethnic minorities, since the different attributes 
pertaining to the latter largely account for the different types of claims they typically 
make on the polity as compared to the former.   
A national minority is a collectivity that contains a substantial number of 
members who do not identify exclusively with the dominant ‘core’ nationality of the 
state within which they reside, but instead define themselves either as a separate and 
distinct nation, or as having a ‘dual’ identification (i.e. individuals who self-identify 
with both the core nationality and a minority national identity).  Kymlicka identifies 
three dimensions – territorial, cultural and political – of the concept of national 
minority that together serve to highlight their distinctiveness vis-à-vis regional and 
ethnic minorities.73  Unlike various immigrant groups, national minorities are more 
or less territorially concentrated within a geographic area that is considered to be a 
territorial ‘homeland.’  Their status as a minority is therefore usually a result of the 
historic incorporation of this homeland within the territory of a larger state, by means 
of conquest, colonization or federation, rather than as a consequence of migration.74  
The concept of national minority, unlike that of region, implies a cultural dimension, 
in the sense that significant portions of its members consider themselves culturally 
distinct from the majority population of the state.  Finally, a national minority, by 
definition, does not possess its own nation-state, but invariably seeks to establish 
some measure of political autonomy, however conceived.  
 
The Concept of Sovereignty in Classical Political Theory 
The doctrine of sovereignty, so familiar to the political discourse of both antiquity 
and modernity, was almost entirely absent from the political thought and practice of 
medieval Europe. 75   As a doctrine of the unity of states and their internal 
governmental functions, sovereignty found little resonance in the context of the 
divided and overlapping structure of political and religious authority that was 
characteristic of European feudalism.  It was only following the collapse of the 
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medieval order in the sixteenth century, with its attendant political and religious 
conflict, that the doctrine was revived and reinterpreted.  The emerging doctrine of 
sovereignty was conceived as offering a political solution to chronic problems of 
instability and insecurity that were increasingly seen as inevitable consequences of 
the absence of a state monopoly over the means of violence.   
 The development of the modern doctrine of sovereignty proceeded in tandem 
with the sociological developments associated with the rise of the modern state 
charted in the previous chapter.  Whilst here is not the place to embark upon a 
discussion of the relative weight of structure versus agency in the social sciences, it 
is  worth  noting  Giddens’  comment  that  the  individuals  and  groups  involved  in 
developing  and  articulating  the  modern  doctrine  of  sovereignty,  ‘were  not  only 
describing a series of changes, nor even only making policy recommendations; they 
were helping to constitute what the modern state is as a novel concept ordering 
administrative power’.76  The construction and articulation of the modern doctrine of 
sovereignty is thus indicative of the reflexive monitoring of social reproduction that, 
as previously indicated, is a pervasive aspect of social and political development 
under conditions of modernity. 
 Sovereignty is a historically contingent political concept, and the relationship 
between sovereignty, state, and nation has been interpreted in a variety of ways 
throughout the historical development of the idea.  It is the French philosopher Jean 
Bodin (1530-1596) who is usually credited with coining the first modern 
interpretation of sovereignty in his book On Sovereignty.  In it, Bodin defines 
sovereignty as the  ‘absolute  and perpetual power of  a  commonwealth’,  and argues 
that political stability, security and good governance are all dependent on the 
existence of a single central authority invested with absolute and unlimited power.77  
By arguing that sovereign power  is of necessity  indivisible and unlimited, Bodin’s 
interpretation of the doctrine of sovereignty seeks to construct a justification of 
political absolutism.   
 
Thomas Hobbes 
Of perhaps greater importance, however, to the history of the modern idea of 
sovereignty is the work of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) who, in his famous book 
Leviathan, argues that the imperatives of ‘Peace and Common Defence’ require for 
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their satisfactory protection  the creation of a sovereign ‘Common Power’ endowed 
with the unlimited  power  of  a  ‘Mortall  God’.78  Hobbes’  political  philosophy  is 
grounded in an account of human nature that proceeds from the profoundly modern 
assertion that ‘Nature hath made man so equall’, and that consequently, ‘From this 
equality of ability, ariseth equality  of  hope  in  the  attainment  of  our  Ends’. 79  
Unfortunately, owing to the fact that human nature is such that men are everywhere 
motivated in their actions by ‘Competition’, ‘Diffidence’, and ‘Glory’, this equality 
of hope, in the absence of ‘the feare of some coercive Power’, leads inexorably to a 
situation of ‘Warre of every one against every one’.80  Justice, Hobbes argues, has no 
meaning outside the framework of law, and law cannot exist in the absence of a 
single sovereign power: ‘Where there is no common Power, there is no law: where 
no law, no injustice’.81  
 Stability and security are dependent, according to Hobbes, on the 
establishment of ‘Civill Society’, in place of the anarchic state of nature, by means of 
a social contract.  The nature of the social contract is determined by what Hobbes 
terms  the  ‘Fundamentall  Laws  of Nature’, which, when  reflected  upon,  reveal  the 
wisdom  of  transferring  the  entirety  of  one’s  rights  to  a  central  sovereign  power.  
According to the first Law of Nature, all men ought to seek peace, but are, in its 
absence, justified in defending themselves by whatever means possible.  From this 
Hobbes  infers  a  second  Law:  ‘That  a man  be willing,  when  others  are  so  too,  as 
farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay 
down his right to all things; and be contended with so much liberty against other 
men, as he would allow other men against himselfe’.82 
 Men, Hobbes argues, must covenant to transfer all of their natural rights to a 
powerful common power in whom absolute sovereignty would henceforth reside.  
Individuals thus enter into a social contract expressing their consent to the following 
principle: ‘I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or 
to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and 
Authorise all his Actions in like manner’.83  By entering into this ‘mutual covenant’ 
individuals agree to transfer sovereignty to a central authority, in the process 
retaining no rights whatsoever in respect of their relationship with that sovereign 
power.   
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 If sovereignty were anything other than absolute, indivisible and self-
perpetuating, individuals would immediately lapse back into a state of nature, with 
all its attendant insecurities.  Having entered into a social contract to erect a 
sovereign authority, the individual forfeits all right of resistance to the exercise of 
that authority: 
 
‘Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant made by the 
Soveraigne at his Institution; and other, or one other of his Subjects, or himselfe alone, 
pretend that there was no such breach, there is in this case, no judge to decide the 
controversie: it returns therefore to the Sword again; and every man recovereth the right of 
Protecting himselfe by his own strength, contrary to the designe they had in the 
Institution’.84 
 
 By characterizing any challenge to the foundation or practice of the sovereign 
power’s  authority  to  be  a  declaration  of war  threatening  the  renewal  of  a  state  of 
nature,  Hobbes’  doctrine of sovereignty clearly leaves no room for any form of 
minority group protest.  Moreover, by denying the right of any sub-state entity to 
exercise political authority, the significance of the state is vastly inflated according 
to this conception of sovereignty.  As compared with the medieval conception of 
political authority, this greatly imperils the position of sub-state minority groups85 
who wish to retain a degree of political autonomy from the central state.  Thus, in 
terms of its implications for state-minority relations, the principle significance of 
Hobbes’ doctrine of sovereignty lies  in  the vastly  inflated importance it attaches to 
the idea of a unitary centralized state.   
 Whilst the doctrine of sovereignty advanced by Hobbes, in its denial of all 
individual or collective rights vis-à-vis the central power, may strike the modern 
reader as profoundly illiberal, Hobbes himself understood it to be grounded in the 
liberal concepts of consent and representation.  Despite exercising absolute power 
over  its  subjects,  the  authority  of Hobbes’  sovereign  stems  from  a  social  contract 
initiated by the people, and can in this sense be said to be based upon their consent.  
Hobbes writes;  ‘A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when  they are by one 
man, or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of 
that Multitude in particular.  For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of 
the Represented, that maketh the Person One’.86      
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 David Held summarizes Hobbes’ position in this regard as follows; ‘Through 
the sovereign a plurality of voices and interests can become ‘one will’, and to speak 
of a  sovereign state assumes, Hobbes held,  such a unity’.87  Because the sovereign 
represents the will of the people, the latter cannot logically dissent against the 
former’s  actions,  for  to  do  so would be  to dissent  from one’s own opinion,  an  act 
contrary to natural law.88  The  limitations of Hobbes’  interpretation of consent and 
representation are clear.  Despite having no means by which to influence them, the 
individual is considered the author  of  all  of  the  sovereign’s actions, so that 
consequently howsoever the sovereign chooses to act, never can he logically be said 
to have committed an injustice.  Furthermore, the assumption that the plurality of 
interests  prevailing  in  a  given  society  can  be  represented  as  ‘one will’  effectively 
denies the existence of significant group interests at the sub-state level and is in 
direct  conflict with  national minorities’  claim  to  constitute a separate nation with 
distinct interests. 
 Hobbes’  doctrine  of  sovereignty  introduced  a  powerful  new  idea  into  the 
history of political thought; that of impersonal state power.  Sovereignty, according 
to Hobbes, is a public concept that inheres in the office of head of state rather than 
the individual personality of the ruler.89  In other words, Hobbes boldly declares the 
state, rather than the king, to be sovereign; in the process replacing political authority 
based upon individual allegiance to a personality with the idea of political authority 
based upon possession of land areas.  Such a novel conception of state sovereignty 
has the effect of greatly increasing the salience of territory, as something capable of 
fixing limits to the spatial extent of sovereignty. 90   The existence of national 
minorities claiming possession of a distinct territorial homeland within the borders 
of the sovereign state thus conflicts with this new conception of political authority. 
  
John Locke 
The idea of sovereignty as public and impersonal provided the framework within 
which progressively more inclusive interpretations of the doctrine could be 
developed.  The emerging debate surrounding sovereignty focused on two 
fundamental questions; where should sovereignty be located, and what is its 
legitimate scope?91 
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 The uncompromising state sovereignty of Hobbes was rejected by, among 
others, John Locke (1632-1704), according to whom it offers insufficient protection 
from the threat of tyranny and oppression.  Locke too founded his analysis of the 
origins of government and the nature of sovereignty on the modern premise that all 
men are by nature equal.  However, according to Locke, the state of nature, despite 
its absence of government, is nevertheless ‘governed’ by the law of reason, which he 
understands to be a fundamental law of nature, and is consequently not the state of 
brutal anarchy that Hobbes suggests.  The law of reason implants in men an 
understanding of, and respect for, the principle that 'no one ought to harm another in 
his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions’.92  As such, every individual, be he in the 
state of nature or political society, is obliged to do whatsoever he can to preserve 
himself and the ‘rest of mankind’. 
 The principal feature of the state of nature, as Locke describes it, is that every 
individual is charged with the task of implementing the law of nature (reason), in the 
sense of possessing the right to punish those who transgress its bounds; ‘in the State 
of nature,’ he writes,  ‘every one has  the Executive Power of  the Law of Nature’.93  
Whilst Hobbessian anarchy is by this means avoided, nevertheless the tendency for 
‘Ill Nature,  Passion  and Revenge’  that  inclines men  toward  impartiality  leads  to  a 
significant  level  of  ‘Confusion  and  Disorder’,  in  which property in particular is 
inadequately protected.  It is with the aim of remedying these inconveniences that 
men enter into a social contract to establish political society, the principal feature of 
which is that individuals renounce the executive power of the law that they held in 
the state of nature, by transferring it to the state: 
 
 ‘there  and  there  only  is  Political  Society,  where  every  one  of  the Members  hath 
quitted  this  natural  Power  [‘to  preserve  his  property,  that  is,  his  Life,  Liberty  and Estate, 
against  the  Injuries  and  attempts  of  other  Men’],  resign’d  it  up  into  the  hands  of  the 
Community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for Protection to the Law 
established by it’.94 
 
 The argument that political society is established when men transfer the right 
to restrain and punish those who offend against the dictates of reason to a common 
sovereign power is broadly similar to that advanced by Hobbes.  The distinctiveness 
64 
 
of Locke’s interpretation of the idea of sovereignty lies in his interpretation of why 
the social contract is entered into, and the relationship that this implies to the idea of 
consent.  According to Locke, the principle objective of the establishment of political 
society – the raison d’être of government – is the ‘preservation of the property of all 
the members  of  that  Society,  as  far  as  is  possible’.95  The scope of sovereignty is 
limited by this principle, meaning that only such activity as is oriented toward this 
goal is considered legitimate for the state to undertake.  Sovereignty is therefore not 
absolute, but circumscribed within clearly defined boundaries.   
 By limiting the legitimate authority of the sovereign state to activity related 
to the protection of property, Locke seeks to draw a distinction between a public 
sphere, in which the state can legitimately exercise sovereign powers, and a private 
sphere from which state power is excluded.  The classical liberal interpretation of the 
distinction between a public and a private sphere, of which the Lockeian model is 
symptomatic, has important consequences for the way in which the political 
demands of national minorities are received.  Within such a framework, the private 
sphere is usually conceived as encompassing the myriad phenomena that can be 
grouped under the rubric of ‘culture’.   As a result, national minorities are likely to 
find any demand for political recognition of their separate and distinct national 
status dismissed on the grounds that the domain of culture belongs to the private 
sphere.   
However, the claim that issues of culture are private concerns, and thus not 
legitimate topics for state legislation, can be subject to serious question.  It is hard to 
see,  for  example,  how  a  ‘cultural’  phenomenon  such  as  language,  can  be  entirely 
relegated to the private sphere given the inevitable linguistic implications of public 
administration and education.  The question of which language public administration 
or education should be conducted in has profound consequences within a 
multilingual society, so that its  relegation  to  the ‘private’ sphere of culture appears 
somewhat absurd.  Moreover, there is no a priori reason for suspecting the domain 
of language to be a singular anomaly in respects of the otherwise private nature of 
cultural concerns.  It is highly likely that various aspects of religious and cultural 
identity are potentially of public significance in much the same manner.   
 In addition to thus restricting its scope, Locke’s doctrine of sovereignty also 
offers a distinctive answer to the question of where it is located.  Whereas for 
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Hobbes the significance of consent is restricted to the social contract that establishes 
political society, subsequent to which it plays no part in legitimating political 
authority, for Locke the principle of consent is fundamental to the continuing 
exercise of sovereign power.  He writes, for example; ‘Men being, as has been said, 
by Nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of his Estate, and 
subjected to the Political Power of another, without his own Consent’.96  In other 
words, the exercise of legitimate authority by the state is conditional upon the 
consent of the majority of the governed, in whom is retained the right to withdraw 
their consent should the state fail in its primary duty to protect the property of the 
individual.  Sovereignty, by implication, ultimately resides in the people; it is 
popular sovereignty.   
 Locke writes; 
 
 ‘there  remains  still  in the People a Supream Power to remove or alter the 
Legislative, when they find the Legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them.  For all 
Power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end 
is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the Power 
devolve into the hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew where they shall think 
best for their safety and security.  And thus the Community perpetually retains a Supream 
Power’.97 
 
 Sovereignty is popular – it resides ultimately in the people – in the sense that 
the political authority of the state is a gift of trust from the people, and remains 
legitimate only insofar as that trust is retained.  Significantly, however, who or what 
exactly constitutes  the ‘people’  is  left undefined.   This  is particularly cogent given 
the various interpretations that the term has been subject to throughout history.  As a 
result  primarily of  intense  struggle  from  those  excluded,  the  idea of  the  ‘people’  - 
once consisting of only a thin strata of propertied men – only slowly evolved into a 
term signifying the entirety of the adult population.  Furthermore, it is important to 
recognize that despite his emphasis on the importance of the consent of the governed 
for the exercise of legitimate political authority, Locke is not an advocate of 
representative democracy.  Locke is content to defend the more limited notion of 
‘tacit consent’, by which he means that consent to the political authority of the state 
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could  be  inferred  from  such  passive  acts  as  possessing  land,  ‘lodging  only  for  a 
week’, or even ‘travelling freely on the highways’.98 
 
Montesquieu 
The question of the appropriate scope of sovereignty was taken up in the eighteenth 
century by Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755), 
according to whom the institution of constitutional government is the best means by 
which to limit the scope of sovereignty according to the principle of the balance of 
powers.  Although it is true that Locke defends the partial separation of the different 
branches of government 99 , his willingness to afford the ruler a power of 
‘prerogative’, whereby he  is  authorized  to  act  contrary  to  the  law  so  long  as  such 
action  promotes  the  ‘public  good’,  and  his  stipulation  that  the  power  to  call 
parliament should rest with the executive, indicate the unsystematic nature of his 
thinking in this regard.  It is in the writing of Montesquieu that we find the first 
systematic analysis of the role of constitutional government in limiting the scope of 
the state’s legitimate exercise of sovereign authority.   
 As befitting a philosopher of the Age of Enlightenment, Montesquieu 
believes that the world embodies order rather than chaos. 100   Montesquieu’s 
analytical approach has been described by Raymond Aron as the search for 
intelligible order from meaningless facts by grasping the underlying causes which 
account for the seemingly accidental course of events.101  This analytical orientation, 
combined with Montesquieu’s  interest  in  the  interrelations  between  social  life  and 
forms of power, persuades Aron of Montesquieu’s status as one of the great theorists 
of sociology, despite his predating the coining of the actual term by Auguste Comte. 
 Influenced by the classical Greek tradition of Aristotle and Plato, 
Montesquieu’s political  theory  is grounded in an account of the different forms of 
government; in his case, Republicanism, Monarchism, and Despotism.  This 
classification, Aron observes, is informed by two fundamental criteria; who holds 
sovereign power, and by what method this sovereign power is exercised.102  In the 
case of Republican government, sovereignty is popular, in the sense of being held by 
the people: Republican government is ‘that in which the people as a body, or only a 
part of the people, have sovereign power’.103 
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 The answer to the second question – by what method is sovereign power 
exercised – is contained in Montesquieu’s famous analysis of the eighteenth century 
English Constitution, the ‘direct end’ of which, he argues, is the defence of political 
liberty, an end which it achieves through the device of the institutionalized 
separation of powers.  In this association of political liberty with the separation of 
powers, Montesquieu advocates  the  following principle:  ‘So  that one cannot abuse 
power, power must check power by the arrangement of things’104 – the arrangement 
of things here referring to the constitution.   
 Political liberty, Montesquieu argues, is incompatible with a political 
structure in which the power of the legislative and the executive are combined within 
one individual or organization since, ‘one can fear that the same monarch or senate 
that makes tyrannical laws will execute them tyrannically’.105  Similar would be the 
result were the power of the judiciary not separated from both the legislative and the 
executive.106  It is only in the presence of a constitutional government, in which the 
powers of the executive, legislative, and judiciary are clearly separated, that the 
liberty of the people is guaranteed: ‘All would be lost if the same man or the same 
body of principal men, either of nobles, or of the people, exercised these three 
powers: that of making laws, that of executing public resolutions, and that of judging 
crimes or the disputes of individuals’.107 
 According to Montesquieu, it is constitutionalism, rather than democracy per 
se, that is the guarantor of political liberty.  He advocates the principle of ‘moderate 
government’, and argues that this could be equally well achieved by the existence of 
a strong aristocracy within a monarchical form of government as by republicanism.  
Even in the case of democracy, its ‘duration and prosperity’ requires the division of 
society into unequal social classes, principally because, as he writes;  ‘The  lesser 
people must be enlightened by the principal people and subdued by the gravity of 
certain eminent men’.108   
 There can be detected a certain degree of ambiguity in the doctrines of 
popular sovereignty advanced by writers such as Montesquieu and Locke with 
regard to the central question of where exactly sovereignty is located.  On the one 
hand, sovereignty, it is claimed, ultimately resides in the people, for the legitimate 
exercise of political authority by the state is dependent upon their consent.  On the 
other hand, the idea of the social contract involves the transferral of sovereign 
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powers to the state.  Sovereignty is on the one hand the possession of the state, and 
on  the  other  the  possession  of  the  people.    ‘In  a  democracy’, Montesquieu writes, 
‘the  people  are  in  some  respects  sovereign,  and  in  others  the  subject’.109  To the 
extent that what is at issue is simply the fact that the people, though sovereign, must 
employ representatives to undertake the practical business of politics, this 
observation is unremarkable.  However, when the definition of  the ‘people’  is  itself 
the source of conflict, as it is in the case of the political demands of national 
minorities, the popular nature of sovereignty is potentially compromised by the 
state’s capacity to deny the legitimacy of any collective action not organized through 
it.110  
 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
According to the doctrines of popular sovereignty examined above, the people are 
able to alienate their sovereignty to the state, which henceforth acts as their political 
representative.  They are thus predicated on a separation of state and society.  
According to Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), the device of political 
representation, and the separation of state and society upon which it relies, is 
incompatible with genuine popular sovereignty.  The proper function of the social 
contract, Rousseau argues,  is  ‘to find a form of association which will defend and 
protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in 
which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain 
as  free  as  before’. 111   By rejecting categorically the possibility of the people 
alienating their sovereignty, Rousseau arrives at the conclusion that popular 
sovereignty and political representation are fundamentally incompatible.  Rather, 
Rousseau argues, the principle of popular sovereignty demands that the people retain 
the power of self-government through their active and direct participation in political 
authority.112 
 Contrary to the view propounded by Hobbes, the state of nature is, according 
to Rousseau, one in which man, guided by his innate instincts for love of self and 
compassion for others, enjoys freedom, equality and security.  Being mutually 
independent, man in this condition is free from the threat of systematic oppression: 
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 ‘every one must see that as the bonds of servitude are formed merely by the mutual 
dependence of men on one another and the reciprocal needs that unite them, it is impossible 
to make any man a slave, unless he be first reduced to a situation in which he cannot do 
without the help of others: and, since such a situation does not exist in the state of nature, 
every one is there his own master, and the law of the strongest is of no effect’.113 
 
 Historically speaking, the establishment of political society was preceded by 
the slow development of phenomena such as language, agriculture, communal living, 
and property, which combined to push men into relations of mutual dependence and 
inequality.  Contrary to its promise of securing liberty, however, political society 
according to Rousseau in fact ‘subjected all mankind to perpetual labour, slavery and 
wretchedness’.114 
 Rousseau’s aim in The Social Contract is to advance a conception of political 
society embodying a conception of popular sovereignty capable of leaving men as 
free as they had been in the state of nature.  To this end, the concepts of tacit consent 
and political representation are rejected in favour of the ideal of direct citizen 
participation.  In addition to implying that sovereignty ultimately resides in the 
people, Rousseau argues that the people must actively exercise sovereign powers if 
the ideal of popular sovereignty is to be fully realized. 
 Rousseau’s ideology is, according to G.D.H Cole, concerned with the idea of 
sovereignty in its philosophical sense, as opposed to the legal or political sovereign 
of  ‘fact  and  common  sense’. 115   Sovereignty, in its philosophical sense, is not 
something  that  inheres  in  an  institution  such  as  the  state,  but  is  rather  ‘the 
embodiment of the notion of social contract’.116  The philosophical ideal of popular 
sovereignty is thus championed over the state sovereignty of political practice.  
However, as will be presently demonstrated, this radical democratic vision rests on 
a conception of national unity that seeks to deny the political significance of national 
minorities. 
 ‘This formula’, Rousseau writes, 
 
 ‘shows us  that  the  act of  association comprises  a mutual undertaking between  the 
public and the individuals, and that each individual, in making a contract, as we may say, 
with himself, is bound in a double relation; as a member of the Sovereign he is bound to the 
individuals, and as a member of the State to the Sovereign’.117 
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 This  line of argument bears a  striking similarity  to Hobbes’ contention  that 
no  individual  can  logically  dissent  from  the  sovereign’s  actions  owing  to the fact 
that, as a consequence of the social contract, the former is considered the author of 
everything  the  latter  does.    Although  Rousseau  emphatically  rejects  Hobbes’ 
conception of state sovereignty in favour of a radically popular sovereignty, he 
nevertheless follows Hobbes in arguing that sovereignty implies a unity that obviates 
the need  for  the  individual  to be guaranteed protection  from sovereign power:  ‘the 
sovereign power need give no guarantee to its subjects, because it is impossible for 
the body to wish to hurt all its members’.118  
 This  ‘double  relation’  that  binds  all  individuals  within  Rousseau’s  idea  of 
popular  sovereignty  implies,  Held  suggests,  ‘a  society  in  which  the  affairs  of  the 
state are integrated into the affairs of the ordinary citizen’.119  If it is to be an 
alternative to the device of political representation, popular sovereignty, according to 
Rousseau, requires that the sum of individuals be merged into a single social unity.  
Whereas Montesquieu argues that political liberty results  from  the  ‘action  and 
reaction between social groups’120, Rousseau’s political philosophy is based upon a 
vision of society as a unified collective being, capable of expressing its unity through 
the articulation of the general will. 
 The unity of the people is based upon their membership in a shared national 
community; popular sovereignty is interpreted as national sovereignty.  ‘Every act of 
Sovereignty’, Rousseau argues, ‘i.e. every authentic act of the general will, binds or 
favours all the citizens equally; so that the Sovereign recognizes only the body of the 
nation,  and  draws  no  distinction  between  those  of  whom  it  is  made  up’. 121  
Interpreted in this way as national sovereignty, the idea of popular sovereignty 
implies that the people must constitute a single, homogeneous national community, 
within which no identity cleavages are recognized as politically significant.   
The existence of national minorities is thus seen as inimical to the proper 
functioning of popular sovereignty, and remains an obstacle to democracy so long as 
they remain unintegrated into the dominant national identity.  Rousseau’s theory of 
popular sovereignty, and the Jacobin conception of democracy for which it is a 
direct inspiration, whilst insisting that the people are sovereign and must actively 
exercise sovereign powers, nevertheless excludes a priori the recognition of national 
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minorities as distinct and separate nations.  National diversity and democracy are 
thus seen as incompatible.  By implication, the problem of national diversity can be 
resolved in one of two ways: Either the national minority relinquishes its 
distinctiveness through successful assimilation into the dominant national identity, or 
else it separates from the existing state to form its own independent state within 
which it would no longer constitute a national minority.   
This assumption has exerted a powerful influence over much literature on the 
topic of the politics of national minorities up to the present day, underpinning as it 
does the widely expressed conviction that nationalism by definition aims toward the 
establishment of an independent nation-state.  According to this perspective, only an 
independent state can function as the formal expression of popular sovereignty – to 
be  sovereign  is  to  posses  one’s own state.  By failing to maintain an analytical 
distinction between state and sovereignty, this line of argument effectively collapses 
the two into a single conceptual idea.     
 
 
John Stuart Mill 
The idea that popular sovereignty necessitates the triumph of unity over diversity, of 
the community over the individual, is explicitly rejected by John Stuart Mill (1806-
1873).  According to Mill, the Rousseauian doctrine that the interest and will of the 
ruler are ideally the same as the interest and will of the people, is fatally flawed 
owing to its failure to provide adequate safeguards for the protection of individual 
liberty.  Arguing on similar lines to his contemporary Alexis de Tocqueville, Mill 
argues that the subordination of the individual will to the  will  of  the  ‘People’ 
(constituted as a nation),  represents nothing  less  that  the  ‘tyranny of  the majority’, 
and the ‘despotism of society over the individual’.122 
 In contrast, Mill interprets popular sovereignty as individual sovereignty: 
‘Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign’.123  Human 
individuality, Mill contends, is an irreducible value, and must therefore be secured 
against the stifling threat of customary opinion and norms, which threaten to subject 
it  to  the ‘tyranny of prevailing opinion and feeling’.124  Grounded in a belief about 
the intrinsic value of human individuality, Mill’s political  theory goes considerably 
further than both the political rights theory of Locke, and the constitutionalism of 
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Montesquieu, in its assertion that liberty is equally under threat from the both state 
and society.  As such, strict limits must be placed upon the legitimate exercise of 
power over the individual by both the state and the community.  There ought, Mill 
argues,  to  be  ‘a  limit  to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with 
individual independence’.125   
 The principle according to which this limit should be set is, according to 
Mill, that of self-protection.  The sovereignty of the individual can only be 
legitimately compromised in such instances as self-protection requires it; 
 
 ‘That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-
protection.  That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
number of a civilized community, against his own will, is to prevent harm to others’.126 
 
 Mill identifies three dimensions of individual liberty, the protection of which 
from infringement by the state or any collectivity must be guaranteed in a free 
society: liberty of conscience, thought, and feeling (including the liberty to express 
one’s opinions);  liberty of  tastes and pursuits; and  liberty of association.127  To the 
extent that the activity of an individual does not cause harm to others (to the extent 
that it is ‘self-regarding’), it should remain outside the power or authority of the state 
and society.   
 In contrast to the national sovereignty advocated by Rousseau, Mill’s 
doctrine of sovereignty argues against the cultivation of social unity and 
homogeneity, and in this sense, and this sense alone, leaves individual members of 
national minority groups free to preserve culturally distinctive traditions and 
practices should they so wish.  If well-being is directly related to diversity, then 
national diversity, it would seem, is conducive to human development.  However, 
Mill’s individualism prevents him from advocating that a collective form of diversity 
such as national diversity should be afforded any form of political protection.  This is 
because he is equally inclined to view the concept of national culture as a potential 
constraint upon human individuality.   
 ‘Human nature’, Mill writes, ‘is not a machine to be built after a model, and 
set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and 
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develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces, which 
make  it  a  living  thing’.128  External influences on human nature such as custom, 
tradition, and cultural norms, suppress this essential human individuality, and serve 
only to create a ‘deficiency of personal impulses and preferences’129, within society.  
For this reason, Mill denies for collectivities such as national minorities the rights 
which he advocates for individuals.     
 More significantly in terms of the implications of Mill’s political thought for 
the politics of national minorities, is that, despite the emphasis he otherwise places 
on the value of diversity, Mill argues that national diversity and free institutions are 
incompatible:  
 
 ‘Among a people without fellow-feelings, especially if they read and speak different 
languages, the united public opinion necessary to the workings of representative institutions 
cannot exist...[it] is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries 
of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities’.130 
 
 As a result, the forced assimilation of national minority groups into a 
common national identity is a justified objective of the state, a process that is in any 
case beneficial to the supposedly primitive and backward cultures of smaller 
nationalities.  It is, Mill argues, far better for a Scottish Highlander or a member of 
the Basque nation residing in France to be assimilated into the superior British and 
French  nation  respectively,  rather  ‘than  to  sulk  on  his  own  rocks,  the  half-savage 
relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or 
interest in the general movement of the world’.131 
  
Sovereignty, the Nation-State, and National Minorities 
Characteristic of the nation-state, as Weber indicates, is its successful claim to a 
monopoly of the legitimate exercise of violence within a clearly demarcated 
territory132 and its commitment to a unitary and centralist conception of sovereignty, 
a commitment expressed in the nation-state’s  ambition  to  homogenize  its  subject 
population  by  means  of  various  ‘nation-building’  policies’.133  The nation-state’s 
desire to homogenize its population is a direct consequence of the fact that it derives 
its legitimacy from a supposed linkage between state and nation.  In its ideal-typical 
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form the nation-state  is  regarded as  the ‘institutional affirmation’134 of a single and 
unified nation. 
 One logical consequence of the association of legitimacy with common 
nationality is that internal national diversity represents at least a potential threat to 
the state’s legitimacy.135  The members of a nation-state are understood to constitute 
a single demos based upon a shared national identity.  It is thus commonly 
interpreted as being incompatible with the aspiration of national minorities to be 
recomposed as a separate demos with the right to decide on their own political 
future.  The dominant interpretation of the doctrine of sovereignty within the nation-
state constructs the idea of a single unified demos as the necessary counterpart to 
the central state.  It thus problematizes the issue of internal national diversity in a 
way that was not apparent prior to the revival of sovereignty as a theory of political 
authority. 
 What is the relationship between sovereignty, the nation-state and national 
minorities?  It is first important to note that sovereignty and the nation-state, despite 
certain conceptual affinities, are not the same thing, although they are frequently 
used in a way that treats them as virtually interchangeable.  Moreover, the specific 
manner in which the idea of sovereignty is interpreted affects the nature of the 
relationship between the nation-state and national minorities residing within its 
borders. 
 According to its dominant interpretation, the contemporary doctrine of 
sovereignty is a theory of legitimate power or authority which expresses the idea that 
‘there  is  a  final  and absolute political  authority  in  the political  community’.136  As 
has already been indicated, the revival and reinterpretation of the doctrine of 
sovereignty from the seventeenth century onwards played an important role in the 
modernization and development of the unitary nation-state in place of the politically 
fragmented structure of European feudalism. 137   The intimate association that 
therefore exists between sovereignty and the nation-state has to some degree resulted 
in a tendency to collapse the two terms into a single ideal of ‘state sovereignty’.138  
Morgenthau, for example, argues that the modern doctrine of sovereignty ‘referred in 
legal terms to the elemental political fact of [the] age – the appearance of a 
centralized power that exercised its lawmaking and law-enforcing authority within a 
certain  territory’.139  Sovereignty,  for  Morgenthau  and  many  ‘realist’  scholars  of 
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International Relations, is the ‘political fact’ of the centralized nation-state converted 
into a legal theory, whereby sovereignty is taken to be an intrinsic property of 
statehood. 
 This perspective, by appropriating sovereignty on behalf of the consolidated 
nation-state,  is  open  to  criticism  for  its  failure  to  distinguish  both  the  ‘popular’ 
dimension of sovereignty, and the historically contingent and changeable nature of 
the nation-state as a structure of political authority. 140   Moreover, as Keating 
observes, the failure to maintain an analytical distinction between the concepts of 
nation-state and sovereignty reinforces the constellation of power that is the existing 
state  system by endowing  it with  a  ‘powerful normative principle’.141  Rather than 
assuming sovereignty to be an intrinsic property of statehood, Keating argues, it is 
more useful to interpret it as a right to self-determination potentially invested in a 
variety of subjects.142  This interpretation has the advantage of clearly distinguishing 
between the institution of the state, and the idea of sovereignty, at the same time as 
emphasizing the popular foundation of the latter.  
 
Popular Sovereignty and Self-determination 
The argument that popular sovereignty can be interpreted as a right to self-
determination is based upon the presumption that the latter is intimately linked to, 
and inseparable from, democracy.  Such a position is adopted by Daniel Philpott, for 
whom self-determination should be considered a basic liberal democratic right, 
owing to the fact that self-determination, democracy, and liberalism are commonly 
rooted in the principle of individual moral autonomy, and Kai Nielsen, who 
understands national self-determination to be implied by the basic liberal democratic 
right of a people to political self-governance.143  
 For Philpott  democracy  is  the  activity  of  exercising  one’s  autonomy  in  the 
political realm.144  It is, as such, intrinsically valuable.  Autonomous individuals, 
according to this argument, must have the freedom and opportunity to take part in 
shaping their political context – to be self-governing.  Self-determination is one 
manifestation of the democratic right to self-government, and as such should be 
considered a prima facie right.  In other words, the denial of a right to self-
determination is incompatible with the principle of autonomy from which democracy 
derives its justification.  Although it should be noted that Philpott does specify the 
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following important qualifications to the right of self-determination; the self-
determining group must ‘be at least as liberal and democratic as the state from which 
they are separating, to demonstrate a majority preference for self-determination, to 
protect minority rights, and to meet distributive justice requirements’.145   
 Kai Nielsen constructs a somewhat similar argument when he writes that the 
‘egalitarian  belief  in  an  equal  respect  for  persons  and  for  autonomy’  leads  to  the 
conclusion  that  ‘the right of a people to political self-governance is so deeply 
embedded that it cannot be easily overridden’.146  According to Nielsen, nationality 
is of fundamental importance in the sense that, as an encompassing culture, it 
provides the ‘context of choice’ within which all of one’s life plans are carried out.  
The association of nationality with self-identification and self-definition mean that; 
‘Without  nationhood  involving  necessarily  self-governance in some form, people 
will be psychologically crippled or at least seriously disadvantaged’.147  
 The equation of popular sovereignty with a right to self-determination is not, 
however, unproblematic.  In the light of the human rights violations and economic 
dislocations that have historically resulted from secessionist attempts, Buchanan 
argues that we should be cautious in our defence of the principle of self-
determination.148   
 Buchanan  raises  a  number  of  direct  objections  to  Philpott’s moral  case  for 
self-determination.  First, the interpretation of democracy as ‘self-government’ is, he 
argues, an inaccurate description of majority rule government, which, by definition, 
‘excludes self-government for every individual’.149  Second, the scope of individual 
autonomy is not exhausted by the realm of politics, and as such there is no reason to 
suppose that it is fatally compromised when individuals lack the capacity to 
‘participate  in  the  higher  levels  of  state politics’.150  Buchanan’s  point  in  making 
these two objections is to suggest that democracy and self-determination, rather than 
being ‘inextricable’, are grounded in quite distinct justifications. 
 More significantly, however, Buchanan argues that interpreting the doctrine 
of popular sovereignty as a prima facie right to self-determination, in actuality tends 
toward undermining democratic values by encouraging destructive strategic 
behaviour in place of the ‘principled political participation’ required for a flourishing 
and deliberative democracy.151  An insufficiently qualified right to self-determination 
could be used by territorially concentrated minorities as a ‘strategic bargaining tool’, 
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effectively granting them a veto over majority decisions, thus undermining political 
cohesion.  Democracy requires that citizens be prepared to work toward principled, 
rational consensus; a requirement that is undermined by the perception that ends can 
be achieved other than by the threat of exit.  This is perhaps a moot point, given the 
fact that from the perspective of national minorities, democratic values are 
themselves already compromised by the absence of a right to self-determination.  In 
other words, the democracy that the threat of exit allegedly undermines, is, in the 
absence of a right to self-determination, incompatible with the democratic value of 
self-government. 
 Buchanan’s  final  criticism  of  what  he  terms  the  plebiscitary  right  to  self-
determination  is  that  it  betrays  ‘an  attempt  to  avoid  the  messiness  of  political 
disagreement by drawing a boundary around oneself and those who agree with 
one’.152  The best political society, Buchanan contends, is not the most homogeneous 
one,  but  is  one  in  which  ‘democratic  decision-making and the institutions they 
support  take  diversity  as  a  given  and  are  designed  to  use  it  constructively’.153  In 
other words, self-determination’s  promise of maximizing homogeneity within a 
political community is not one that finds support in democratic principles. 
 Given the problems associated with a view of self-determination that equates 
it directly with the idea of popular sovereignty, Buchanan advances an alternative 
theory,  which  he  terms  the  ‘remedial-right  only’  view  of  self-determination.  
According to this approach, the right of self-determination exists only in cases where 
the  minority  group  in  question  has  been  subjected  to  ‘serious  and  persistent 
grievances’ – violations of human rights; exclusion from democratic participation; or 
unjust annexation of previously autonomous territory. 154   
 The objective of such an approach is to protect legitimate states from the 
threat of self-determination claims, where the idea of legitimacy is based upon 
democratic governance.  Citing the Copenhagen Agreement of 1990 in support of his 
argument, Buchanan suggests that a state ought to be recognized as a legitimate 
member of the international state system if it satisfies accepted standards of 
democratic governance and human rights protection.  To guard against the dangers 
associated with self-determination identified above, a right to self-determination 
should only be recognized in the case of illegitimate states, thus defined.   
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 It was argued above that the idea of sovereignty should be clearly 
distinguished from the institution of the state.  So as to avoid the collapsing of the 
two concepts into a single ideal of state sovereignty, Keating has suggested that 
sovereignty instead be interpreted as a right to self-determination.  There is a large 
literature dealing specifically with the topic of self-determination, the examination of 
which is beyond the scope of the present discussion.  It is enough at this stage to note 
the essentially contested nature of the relationship between self-determination and 
democracy. 
 Although the interpretation of the idea of sovereignty as a right to self-
determination is an attractive one, for reasons already indicated, the objections put 
forward by Buchanan are important ones that need to be taken seriously.  Moreover, 
his assertion that an unfettered right to self-determination is likely to undermine 
political cohesion is directly relevant to the purposes of the present study.  This 
being the case, a number of  points  in  response  to  Buchanan’s  approach  will  be 
useful. 
 First, the object of Buchanan’s analysis is secession, implying independence, 
rather than self-determination, which can be achieved through a variety of measures 
of political autonomy that fall short of independent statehood.  It is reasonable to 
assume that self-determination is likely to have a less de-stabilizing effect on the 
functioning of democratic decision-making when interpreted as implying political 
autonomy rather than independent statehood.  Self-determination, according to this 
perspective,  is  less  easily  characterized  as  a  ‘threat  of  exit’,  since  the  self-
determining minority would remain attached to the same state, albeit with a greater 
degree of political autonomy.  Moreover, the belief that a right to self-determination 
could lead to interminable political instability, with a plethora of groups preferring to 
exploit the threat of secession rather than engage in democratic decision-making, 
underestimates the high costs involved in secession.  Few minority groups in society 
are capable of supporting a claim to self-determination.  As Philpott observes; ‘Can 
one conceive of a random collection of individuals...yearning to govern itself?  Why 
would it want such a thing?’155   
   Second, the assumption that self-determination necessarily betrays a desire 
to create a more homogeneous political society – ‘to  banish  diversity  by 
reconfiguring  the  political  map’ 156  – misrepresents the political aims of some 
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national minority groups who profess a desire to exercise self-determination, even in 
the cases where full independent statehood is sought.  Where nationality is defined in 
civic rather than ethnic terms, the claim for self-determination should not be 
understood as an attempt to promote homogeneity.  There is, for example, no reason 
to suspect that an independent Quebec, Scotland or Catalonia would have, or seek to 
create, a more homogeneous citizenry than contemporary Canada, Britain or Spain 
respectively. 
 Third, the suggestion that self-determination should be considered 
impermissible for minority groups residing within legitimate states, where 
legitimacy is inferred from the existence of democratic institutions and respect for 
human rights, fails to account for the fact that the political authority of existing 
nation-states is in large part legitimated by a supposed linkage between state and 
nation – the existence of which is the very thing that is contested by national 
minorities seeking self-determination.  The nation-state model is based upon the idea 
that its members constitute a single, unified demos based upon a shared national 
identity, which the state seeks to create through various nation-building policies.  
Thus, the democratic rights of national minorities are always potentially undermined 
as, unlike the members of the dominant ‘core’ nation, they lack the state institutions 
with which to pursue their own nation-building project.  According to this 
perspective, national minorities that claim a right of self-determination do so in 
response to the homogenizing aspirations of the existing nation-state.  Analyses such 
as Buchanan’s that seek to define the legitimacy of a state according to the existence 
or otherwise of democratic governance, and to protect states thus qualified as 
legitimate from self-determination claims, fail to appreciate the degree to which 
national identity is itself a fundamentally constitutive part of state legitimacy. 
  
Summary 
Sovereignty, it has been presently argued, is not a universal principle of political 
authority but a historically contingent doctrine subject to a variety of differing 
interpretations.  It is in the writings of Bodin, and especially Hobbes, that we find the 
first attempts to revive and reinterpret the idea of sovereignty for the modern world.  
Hobbes constructs a justification for the centralization of political authority in the 
organization of the state, as the best way to guarantee stability and security.  The 
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medieval political structure of divided and overlapping sites of authority was for 
Hobbes the major cause of the religious and political instability that bedevilled 
Europe during his lifetime. 
 The rediscovery of the idea of sovereignty provides a justification for the 
process of the expansion of the administrative power of the state alongside which it 
developed.  As the power and significance of the central state is asserted, the position 
of national minorities becomes increasingly precarious.  No longer is it deemed 
possible for national minority groups to exercise political powers autonomously of 
the central state.   
 Hobbes’  also  introduces  the concept of  the  impersonal  state  to  the political 
thought of seventeenth century Europe.  This idea was later taken up by thinkers 
such as Locke and Montesquieu who nevertheless challenged Hobbes’ advocacy of 
political absolutism.  Sovereignty slowly came to be conceived as residing not in the 
central state, but in the people subject to the jurisdiction of that state; the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty was declared.  The exercise of political authority by the state 
was seen as dependent upon the consent of the governed, although the nature of that 
consent was often very narrowly defined.   
 The idea of popular sovereignty is carried to its logical extreme by Rousseau, 
who marries it to a conception of direct participatory democracy, dependent upon the 
possibility of the people as a unified nation being capable of expressing a general 
will.  The significance of the general will for the exercise of popular political 
authority demands that all national minority groups be forcibly assimilated into a 
common national identity.  A shared national identity is the spring from which a 
democratic ‘general will’ flows.  Any aspiration toward political recognition as a 
separate and distinct nation that national minority groups may harbour must 
therefore necessarily be rejected. 
 The  potential  for  tyranny  that  Rousseau’s  doctrine  of  radical  popular 
sovereignty  possesses  is  a  starting  point  for  Mill’s  alternative  interpretation  of 
popular sovereignty as individual sovereignty.  After declaring the liberty of the 
individual to be the supreme political value, Mill concludes that the power of the 
state and society over the individual must be limited to instances when the liberty of 
another individual is threatened.   
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 Although members of national minorities are thereby protected from the 
‘tyranny of  the majority’, nevertheless Mill’s  focus on  the  internal development of 
human  individuality  and  his  critique  of  the  ‘despotism  of  custom’,  excludes any 
possibility of the active political recognition of national minorities.  Moreover, as 
was common amongst liberal thinkers of his time, Mill argues that the assimilation 
of ‘backward’ smaller nationalities into larger national identities is a necessary part 
of ensuring that all the members of a democracy share the sense of political 
allegiance that is the necessary foundation of free institutions.  Mill thus gives 
explicit voice to the argument that national diversity and political cohesion are 
incompatible. 
 
The doctrine of sovereignty, as it is interpreted in the context of the nation-state 
model, has both an internal and an external dimension.  As has already been 
indicated, in its internal dimension, the doctrine of sovereignty asserts the existence 
of an ultimate political authority within a given political community in which alone 
is invested the constitutional power to make law.157  By contrast, it is precisely the 
existence of such an ultimate authority that the external dimension of sovereignty 
denies with respect to the international sphere.  Thus, whereas in respect of the 
sphere of internal political relations, sovereignty is considered the source of political 
stability, in its external implications it is the source of political instability – hence the 
‘anarchy’ of the international states system.  
 Moreover, the location and scope of sovereignty differs between its internal 
and external dimensions.  In the sphere of internal political relations, sovereignty is 
interpreted as popular sovereignty: the people as a nation are its ultimate source, and 
the scope of the state’s political authority is limited by the requirement of ensuring 
the consent of the governed.  Externally, in the sphere of international relations, 
sovereignty is invested in states, and is to a significant degree unlimited in scope.  
The apparent paradox is, however, only superficial. In fact, the external dimension of 
sovereignty is logically implied by the doctrine of internal sovereignty, in the sense 
that a political organization’s  internal  sovereignty  is  dependent  upon  the  mutual 
acknowledgement of similarly sovereign powers.  It is to this mutual 
acknowledgement of sovereignty claims that Giddens refers in his observation that 
there is an important element of equity in the international system of states, despite 
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the obvious inequalities of power manifested within.158  The internal and external 
dimensions  of  sovereignty  are,  Hinsley  observes,  the  ‘inward  and  outward 
expressions, the obverse and reverse sides, of the same idea’.159 
 What relevance does the distinction between internal and external 
sovereignty suggest for national minorities?  First, the statist assumptions embedded 
in the doctrine of external sovereignty function to blur the distinction between the 
institution of the state and the idea of sovereignty.  As the basic unit of international 
relations is almost exclusively the sovereign state 160 , the popular element of 
sovereignty is easily subordinated to a statist interpretation.  Second, according to the 
doctrine of external sovereignty, national minorities lacking their own state are 
denied the opportunity to act in the sphere of international relations.  The only form 
of collective action oriented toward external relations considered legitimate is that 
which is organized through the central nation-state.  Lacking their own state, national 
minorities are denied access to channels through which to articulate their collective 
interests in the international sphere.   
 The dominant statist interpretation of the doctrine of external sovereignty is 
therefore in tension with the interpretation of internal sovereignty as popular 
sovereignty.  Whilst in the sphere of internal political relations the idea of popular 
sovereignty is the source of democratic governance, in its external dimension, 
sovereignty, because it is attached exclusively to the state, escapes democratic 
accountability.   
 Furthermore, when we examine the issue from the perspective of national 
minorities, the doctrine of internal popular sovereignty stands in a complicated 
relationship to democracy.  Popular sovereignty provides the justification for modern 
democratic governance, expressing as it does the principle that ‘all political and legal 
power ought to rest on the will and consent of those among or over whom power is 
exercised’. 161   However, as MacCormick points out, in terms of its democratic 
implications,  this  principle  begs  two  fundamental  questions:  ‘Who  are  the  people?  
Of what  group must  the majority  be  a majority?’162  Precisely because democracy 
requires that the majority acquiesce to the will of the majority, MacCromick argues, 
there needs  to be an answer  to  the question of  ‘within what group does a majority 
vote constitute a genuine mandate for legislation or executive policy-making?’163       
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 In the context of the nation-state model,  the  answer  is  clearly  the  ‘nation’, 
which encompasses the entire citizenry of the state and is usually, although not 
always, defined in unitary terms.  It is therefore given to the nation-state to define the 
identity of the nation that is taken as the principle unit of political discourse and 
practice.  The state employs the principle of popular sovereignty to assert itself as a 
nation-state in the sense of being the property of a sovereign people conceived of as 
a pre-political entity.164  National minorities are thus denied the right to decide upon 
their own political future as a separate and distinct nation. 
 According to the doctrine of sovereignty, all levels of local decision-making 
power are the ‘creature and delegate of central sovereign power’.165  As such there is 
an inherent bias toward the dominant national identity, which represents the ‘holistic 
majority’ of  the  state.   Such measures of political  autonomy as national minorities 
exercise are considered the voluntary, and reversible, grant of the central state.  
Thus, the decision as to whether or not a national minority can legitimately exercise 
sovereignty through the act of self-determination is ultimately in the hands of the 
state.  Speaking of the specific case of secession, Nielsen observes  that whether  ‘a 
nation can legitimately secede from [the existing state] is a matter of noblesse oblige 
on  the  part  of  that  state’.166  From the perspective of the national minority this is 
easily interpreted as an affront to the principle of popular national sovereignty upon 
which political legitimacy is formally grounded. 
 At issue here is the concept of ‘demos’ and how it is interpreted according to 
the nation-state model.  Majoritarian democracy requires that a relevant demos be 
identified that henceforth engages in the activity of democratic decision-making.  In 
the nation-state model, the demos is formed by all citizens of the state, and as such is 
a single and indivisible unit.  This conception of the demos is most clearly illustrated 
in the Jacobin model of democracy.  National minorities, therefore, are not 
considered a demos in themselves but are a part of a larger demos.  This 
interpretation is contested by national minorities wishing to decide on their own 
political future, to constitute themselves as a separate and distinct demos; 
majoritarian democracy can thus be said to discriminate against their democratic 
will. 
The argument can be restated thus: According to the doctrine of popular 
sovereignty, although it is the state that exercises sovereign powers of government, it 
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does so only as the representative of the people, who in this sense, and this sense 
alone, remain sovereign.  We can therefore say that the people are sovereign because 
they possess the right and the means by which to change the government should the 
manner of its exercising power be considered unsatisfactory.  However, the people 
are possessed of neither the means, nor the right to define, or re-define, the nature or 
scope of the demos.  This power remains exclusively in the hands of the state.  
Therefore, the dominant interpretation of the doctrine of popular sovereignty is 
found wanting in respect of its failure to invest in the people the power to define the 
demos, for in this regard we find sovereignty to be the exclusive prerogative of the 
state.  
By arguing that democracy requires centralization and uniformity in the form 
of a single and unitary demos, the dominant interpretation of sovereignty, despite its 
formal adherence to the doctrine of popular sovereignty, in practice treats 
sovereignty as an intrinsic property of statehood.  Despite the rhetoric of the nation-
state, sovereignty derives not from the nation(s), but from the state.  However, the 
claim that democratic politics must by necessity be underpinned by the centralized, 
unitary and sovereign nation-state, consisting of a single (national) demos is, at the 
very least, subject to contestation.  
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3 
Social Cohesion and National Diversity 
 
 
 
 
The analysis contained in the previous chapter employed the concept of sovereignty 
as a lens through which to interrogate the relationship between the nation-state and 
national  minorities  residing  within  the  state’s  borders.    It  was  suggested  that  the 
dominant interpretation of sovereignty as an attribute primarily of states, because of 
its denial of a popular right to re-define the nature or scope of the demos that is taken 
as the principle unit of government, fails to satisfy the ideal of popular sovereignty 
that underpins democratic rule.  It was further noted that critics of an unqualified 
principle of national self-determination such as Buchanen argue that such an ideal 
undermines the stability and coherence of a polity by investing in national minorities 
a strategic bargaining tool capable of being used to veto majority decisions.  It is to 
this final point – the stability and cohesion of polities - that we now turn our 
attention, with a view to examining in what relationship the existence of internal 
national diversity stands to the concept of social cohesion.  
In examining the relationship between national diversity and social cohesion, 
the following questions are of key significance:  What effect does internal national 
diversity, and in particular the formal political recognition of that diversity, have on 
the achievement and quality of social cohesion within a state?  Does the devolution 
of political power to sub-state national minorities undermine the bonds of solidarity 
that unite civil society and (allegedly) make the maintenance of social cohesion 
possible?  Is social cohesion dependent on a congruence of citizenship and national 
identity?  Or does the political recognition of sub-state national minorities foster a 
greater sense of commitment to the state and enhance the quality of social cohesion 
therein? 
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What is Social Cohesion? 
Of all the conceptual categories thus far analyzed, that of social cohesion is perhaps 
the most ambiguous, controversial and (therefore) most problematic.  In Western 
Europe at least, the modern intellectual history of the idea of social cohesion was 
most decisively shaped by the experience of the Industrial Revolution and the 
dramatic social dislocations that followed in its wake.  In its capacity to overturn 
long-held traditional social relations with an unprecedented rapidity, the coming of 
the industrial age transformed the manner in which the distinctly social dimension of 
political life was understood and theorized.  In England, as Raymond Williams 
persuasively argues, one manifestation of this change was an emerging intellectual 
concern with, and re-interpretation of, the notion of culture: ‘What in the eighteenth 
century had been an ideal of personality…had now, in the face of radical change, to 
be redefined, as a condition on which society as a whole depended.  In these 
circumstances, cultivation, or culture, became an explicit factor in society, and its 
recognition controlled the enquiry into institutions.’167   
 Though it does not provide the central focus of his analysis,  Williams’ 
statement contains two ideas that serve as a useful introduction to what is meant by 
the term social cohesion.  On the one hand, in its most general meaning, social 
cohesion refers precisely to a condition on which society as a whole depends; that is 
to say, it is concerned with the specifically social bases upon which alone a stable 
and coherent society is produced and maintained.  On the other hand, social cohesion 
stands in some important, although as yet unspecified, relationship to the idea of 
culture as  ‘a whole way of  life’168; to the values, customs and mores embodied in 
that culture and the role that these play in ‘holding together’ society. 
 The  image  of  ‘holding  together’  is  in  fact  the  central  motif  of  the  idea  of 
social cohesion, which is often popularly expressed in terms of the ‘glue’ that binds 
society together.  A definition of cohesion that expresses this essential idea is 
suggested by  Jonathan  Joseph, who defines  it  as  ‘the way  in which a  group, bloc, 
order or system is able to maintain itself.  It may refer to a process of unification, 
‘hanging  together’,  maintenance  and  reproduction.’ 169   On the one hand, social 
cohesion thus understood is a very broad concept subject to a wide diversity of 
potential interpretations depending on the theoretical predilections of the interpreter.  
For example, where some might identify the cohesive glue that binds society in the 
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monopolistic political authority of the state, for others the spontaneous order of the 
free-market economy might be considered the best guarantee of social cohesion.  On 
the other hand, the use of the term social cohesion to some extent implies the 
existence of a more or less autonomous role for the specifically social dimension as 
distinct from the political or the economic in accounting for the coherence of 
societies.  
 It is this second interpretation of social cohesion that informs the approach of 
the present study, which can therefore be described as proceeding from an 
assumption that the coherence of societies depends to some extent on certain 
specifically social or cultural factors; in other words, to factors not reducible to 
political or economic relations (this should not, of course, be taken as denying the 
inevitably interrelated character of social, political and economic relations).  Having 
described cohesion as being concerned with the forces that bind society together, we 
can therefore say that one of the key objectives of the present study is to enquire into 
the specifically social conditions that facilitate collective integration and action.  
This final aspect – the link between social cohesion and collective action – is 
especially pertinent for it suggests that a society that exhibits low levels of social 
cohesion will experience difficulty in undertaking forms of extensive collective 
action manifest in, for example, broad-based social welfare policies.170   
Of necessity, collective action demands that individuals sacrifice their 
immediate personal interests in order that a potentially more abstract collective 
interest be furthered from which personally unknown others might directly benefit to 
a greater degree.  Thus, if collective action is not to be enforced by the coercive 
power of state institutions against the will of its subject population, civil society 
must to some extent be activated by a sense of solidarity underpinning individuals’ 
willingness to make sacrifices in pursuit of collective goals.  As it is here conceived, 
social cohesion is synonymous with this element of social solidarity that it is 
suggested is imperative for the successful pursuit of collective goods and objectives. 
The present chapter takes the form of a theoretical enquiry into the forms of 
social relationship most conducive to the flourishing of social solidarity in modern 
Western societies.  Thus it is concerned with the social conditions that foster feelings 
of generalized trust and reciprocity that represent an index of social cohesion and 
solidarity.  Given the analytical focus of the present thesis, of particular interest is 
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the relationship between identity (especially national identity) and social cohesion; 
that is to say, the extent to which forms of shared identity foster bonds of solidarity 
that promote social cohesion.   
 
The Concept of Social Cohesion in Classical Social Theory 
As already indicated, the question of what holds a society together is in some 
respects a distinctively modern one, or at least one connected to a broad set of 
dislocations associated with industrial society.  This is not to suggest that instability, 
disintegration or a tenuous sense of coherence could not be found in pre-modern 
societies but, rather, to indicate the fact that such societies were considerably less 
dynamic and subject to slower processes of change when compared to modern 
societies.  The acceleration of processes of social change in modern societies is, in 
Giddens’ terms, connected to the suffusion of the notion of reflexivity throughout the 
institutions of modernity and the radical reorganization of time and space that this 
implies.171  Because modernity is a ‘post-traditional order’172 it is far more open and 
susceptible to innovation of all kinds, including with respect to those aspects that 
underpin social cohesion.   
 Social cohesion, like the idea of sovereignty, is not therefore an unchanging 
static condition but a historically contingent concept.  Just as the widespread political 
and religious conflict consequent on the collapse of the medieval European order in 
the sixteenth century facilitated a revival in the doctrine of sovereignty, so the issue 
of social cohesion takes on an increased salience with certain developments 
associated with the transition to a modern industrial society.  Given that, as already 
suggested, an interest in social cohesion implies certain claims with regard to the 
potentially autonomous significance of a specifically social dimension, it is in the 
founding texts of social theory that we find the first systematic attempts to construct 
a theoretical account of the production and maintenance of social cohesion in 
modern societies.  It is therefore to a selection of these texts that we now turn. 
 
Alexis de Tocqueville  
The social and political thought of Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859), most notably 
in his famous publication Democracy in America, takes as its principle focus of 
analysis the question of what type of political institutions are most conducive to 
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producing and maintaining a condition of liberty in a democratic society.  Implicit in 
this approach is the idea that democracy, at least as Tocqueville himself defines it, is 
potentially at variance with, and thus presents a threat to, political freedom.  We 
shall have cause to return to Tocqueville’s analysis in this regard, but first we might 
ask why, when so much of his political thought is dedicated to the analysis of 
political institutions and constitutional law, we should look to Tocqueville in our 
present enquiry into the problem of social cohesion, which we have already defined 
as one that properly concerns the specifically social dimension? 
 The answer is that Tocqueville, in addition to his detailed understanding of 
the effect of laws and institutions on the possibility of safeguarding liberty, is also 
highly sensitive to the role played by collective sentiments in advancing the interests 
of society.  In the final chapter of the first volume of Democracy in America 
Tocqueville writes the following; ‘If, in the course of this book, I have not succeeded 
in convincing the reader of the importance I attach to the practical experience, 
behaviour, opinions, and, in a word, the customs of Americans in maintaining their 
laws,  I  have  failed  in  the  main  objective  I  set  myself  in  writing  it.’ 173   It is 
Tocqueville’s acute understanding of the significance of ‘the usages, habits, opinions 
and beliefs’174 for modern democratic societies that justifies our present interest in 
his political thought.  Moreover, although, as already indicated, Tocqueville is 
principally concerned with the possibilities for achieving political liberty under 
conditions of democracy, much of what he writes about the former bears directly on 
the problem of social cohesion, defined in terms of the collective sentiments 
necessary to maintain a sense of unity within civil society.  He writes, for example, 
that ‘the reign of liberty cannot be established without morality, nor morality without 
beliefs.’175 
 As a young French aristocrat and civil servant in the early part of the 
nineteenth century, Tocqueville witnessed first hand the difficulty with which post-
1789 France struggled to prevent its democratic revolution from eroding political 
freedoms.  He thus travelled to America with a view to examining what he saw as 
America’s special, and in some senses unique, capacity to combine democracy and 
liberty, the one reinforcing the other rather than, as he thought the case in France, the 
former undermining the latter.  This question is especially pertinent for Tocqueville 
since he is convinced that democracy was the principle fact of modern society, the 
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advance of which was irreversible since providentially ordained.176  Therefore, for a 
society such as France where liberty was a fragile achievement, the only hope for its 
future prosperity lay in discovering how to make democracy and liberty compatible; 
the option of overturning the democratic revolution and returning to an aristocratic 
political order is discounted. 
 In order to understand how Tocqueville conceives democracy and liberty as, 
at least potentially, in tension with one another, it is imperative that to look at 
Tocqueville’s  particular  definition  of  democracy  as  it  is  some  respects  quite 
unconventional.  For Tocqueville, democracy is defined less by the existence of 
popular participation in a government elected on a wide suffrage, than by the marked 
erosion of social inequalities.  A democratic society, according to this perspective, is 
one in which social conditions are significantly equalized in the sense that the rigid 
distinctions of orders and classes characteristic of aristocratic society are replaced by 
a social structure in which all individuals are socially equal.177 
 Tocqueville cites a wide variety of reasons why democracy thus understood 
can under certain conditions represent a threat to liberty.  At the centre of all of these 
particular reasons lies one fundamental principle.   ‘It  is not  the exercise of power,’ 
writes Tocqueville, ‘nor the habit of obedience that degrade men but the exercise of 
a power which is regarded as unlawful, or obedience to a power seen as wrongly 
held  and  oppressive.’ 178   Whereas under the old aristocratic order widespread 
acquiescence to the legitimacy of political authority was built on acceptance of a 
rigid social structure looked upon as an immutable natural order, the eradication of 
social inequalities brings a greater potential for dissatisfaction with constituted 
political authority.  In a passage typical of his literary style, Tocqueville writes the 
following of the potentially anti-liberal consequences of democracy; 
 
 ‘The dividing up of fortunes has reduced the distance separating rich from poor but 
as the gap has grown smaller they have discovered fresh reasons for mutual hatred; casting 
terrified and envious glances at one another, each seeks to deprive the other of power for 
both of them equally, the concept of rights does not exist and power appears as the sole 
reason for action in the present and the only guarantee for the future.’179 
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 The restless flux of a democratic (i.e. socially equal) society paradoxically 
gives individuals novel reasons to regard as illegitimate the authority charged with 
exercising political power, lending succour to those who would attack liberty in the 
name  of  their  grievance.    We  can  see  that  Tocqueville’s  characterization  of  the 
fragile nature of liberty under democratic conditions has a marked affinity with the 
problem of social cohesion, since the former is explained as emanating from the 
dissolution of the long-standing social ties that bind together aristocratic society.  It 
is, therefore, not unreasonable for us to suggest that where Tocqueville sees liberty 
as under threat so by implication is the achievement of social cohesion. 
 For democracy to flourish without undermining liberty there must occur, 
Tocqueville argues, certain  ‘changes  in  laws,  ideas, customs, and manners.’180  We 
will presently be concerned to examine what the nature of these changes must be, but 
first it is interesting to again note the resemblance that this idea has with the problem 
of social cohesion.  Just as the achievement of liberty cannot be assumed to flow 
automatically from the institution of democracy but, rather, depends upon certain 
sentiments and beliefs prevailing within society, so too we can say that social 
cohesion depends upon the value orientations of actors within civil society.  
 As already indicated, the bulk of Democracy in America is given over to an 
analysis of American laws and their contribution to the successful protection of 
political liberty, much of which does not fall within the analytical concern of the 
present chapter.  Nevertheless, a number of Tocqueville’s remarks about America’s 
legal structure are pertinent to the problem of social cohesion.  In particular his 
analysis of localism and decentralisation encouraged by American laws; its federal 
constitution; and the importance of public participation. 
 Decentralization and a vigorous localism are, Tocqueville argues, important 
because of the civic pride they foster.  Such a sense of civic pride is an indispensable 
element in safeguarding liberty because it unites individual citizens by affective 
bonds rather than bonds of a purely administrative type.  Tocqueville writes;  
 
 ‘In  Europe,  governments often bewail the absence of this community spirit, for 
everyone agrees that it is an ingredient in public order and tranquillity, even though they do 
not know how to create it.  By making the township strong and independent, they are afraid 
they might disintegrate the social fabric and expose the state to the forces of anarchy.  Once 
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you remove the strength and independence of the township, you will reduce the citizens to 
administrative units.’181 
 
 Along somewhat similar lines, Tocqueville praises  America’s  federal 
constitution as that form of government most sensitive to local variations.  From this 
perspective it is decentralized, rather than centralized, government that offers the 
best guarantee of political liberty, and for reasons that apply equally to social 
cohesion.  ‘In great civilized nations,’ Tocqueville argues, 
 
 ‘the legislator has to give laws a uniform character which disregards the variations 
of place and custom.  Since he has not studied individual cases, he can only proceed to 
general rules.  So, men are obliged to bow before the needs of legislation, which is in no 
position to adapt itself to the needs and ways of man; from this stems much trouble and 
wretchedness.’182 
 
 In  Tocqueville’s  discussion  of  the  benefits  of  the  republican form of 
government, in which active public participation in the affairs of government is 
pronounced, we find the idea expressed that the internal division of sovereignty 
expressed through federalism and manifested in strong municipal institutions 
together fuses the dual allegiances of individuals – local and national – into a 
harmonious unity.  ‘The public spirit of the Union,’ Tocqueville writes, ‘is not itself 
anything other than a summing up of provincial patriotism.  Each citizen of the 
United States transfers, as it were, the concern inspired in him by his little republic to 
the  love  of  his  homeland.’183  This idea is relevant to our present purposes for it 
suggests that local attachments need not of necessity conflict with or undermine an 
individual’s  attachment to the wider community of nation or state.  Citizens, this 
suggests, can possess dual allegiances and identities without that fact jeopardizing 
either the stability of the state or its capacity to uphold political liberty. 
 Looking more closely at the influence on American democracy that 
Tocqueville attributes to customs, two ideas stand out as being of particular import.  
On the one hand there is the role played by religions sentiments and on the other the 
importance attached to collectively held beliefs and opinions. 
 The essentially sociological idea that Tocqueville expresses with regard to 
the function of religion in democratic societies focuses in the moral disciplinary 
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power it exerts over individuals.  This moral function is, moreover, especially 
important for democratic societies, since the latter are characterized by radical 
questioning of political authority by independent individuals.184  Religious sentiment, 
then, is seen by Tocqueville as a cohesive counterweight to the potentially 
centrifugal  tendencies  inherent  in  democratic  societies.    ‘How,’  Tocqueville  asks, 
‘could society avoid destruction if, when political ties are relaxed, moral ties are not 
tightened?’185  To put this argument in another way, what Tocqueville is saying is 
that one cannot expect civil society to hold together in a democratic society unless 
the individual citizens that comprise civil society have over them some moral 
disciplinary force capable of restraining their desires and calming the force of 
disputes:  ‘while  the law allows the American people to do everything, religion 
prevents their imagining everything and forbids them from daring to do 
everything.’186  Social cohesion, this suggests, relies upon the existence of certain 
types of belief or sentiment, in this case religious ones, being widespread amongst 
the population, so that in the absence of these collective values individuals will be 
unable to overcome divergences of interest in order to act for the common good. 
 Finally, related to the above idea is that expressed by Tocqueville concerning 
the importance of collectively held opinions that are, by their very nature, in some 
way beyond the rational investigation of individuals.  Or rather, it is more accurate to 
say that Tocqueville recognizes that no society can function in a cohesive manner 
where individuals are expected to generate their own opinions from individual 
reflection  on  all  subjects.    ‘No  social  grouping,’  Tocqueville  argues,  ‘can  prosper 
without shared beliefs or rather there are none which exist in that way; for, without 
commonly accepted ideas, there is no common action, and without common action, 
men exist separately but not as a social unit.’187 
 
Ferdinand Tönnies 
The problem of social cohesion, as defined above, occupies centre stage in the 
analysis of the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936).  According to 
Tönnies’ conception, the objective of sociology is precisely ‘to study the sentiments 
and motives which draw people to each other, keep them together, and induce them 
to joint action.’188  Social Cohesion, then, is understood by Tönnies to constitute one 
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of the fundamental concepts that define the scope of enquiry of sociology as a 
scientific discipline. 
 Tönnies organizes his analysis of the sentiments and motives underpinning 
social cohesion and collective action around the central distinction between 
Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (civil society), which together represent 
‘the modal qualities of  the essence and  the  tendencies of being bound  together.’189  
As Tönnies employs them, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are  ‘normal’  or  ‘ideal’ 
types in comparison with which reality can be recognized and described.  Whilst the 
implication of this ideal-typical status is that no society could exist that was 
exclusively based around either category, nevertheless Tönnies is explicit in arguing 
that an irresistible tendency evident within modern societies is the progressive 
replacement of Gemeinschaft with Gesellschaft.190  This change, Tönnies argues, has 
profound, and ultimately destructive, implications for the possibilities of achieving 
social cohesion in modern societies. 
 The typological distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft operates 
on (at least) two dimensions.  On the one hand, we find a highly abstract analysis of 
the fundamental qualities of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft social relations, and on 
the other an examination of Gemeinschaft- and Gesellschaft-like social organizations, 
including the state.  In addition, some of the factors accounting for the shift from 
Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft are delineated.   
 At its most abstract level, Gemeinschaft is defined by way of analogy as a 
‘living organism’  in  contrast  to Gesellschaft which  is  a  ‘mechanical aggregate  and 
artifact.’191  Gemeinschaft is conceived as a ‘natural condition’ the roots of which are 
found  in  the  fact  that  individuals  ‘are  and  remain  linked  to  each other by  parental 
descent and by sex, or by necessity becomes so linked.’192  The most intense forms 
of Gemeinschaft relationships are, therefore, the relation between mother and child, 
husband and wife, brother and sister; in short, kinship relations.193  The concept of 
Gemeinschaft is not, however, restricted to kinship relations but consists of two 
further pillars; Gemeinschaft of place (neighbourhood) and of mind (friendship).194 
 Gemeinschaft social relations are intimate ones in which the related 
individuals or collectivities  explicitly  or  tacitly  ‘affirm  each  other’s  existence,  that 
ties exist between [them], that [they] know each other and to a certain extent are 
sympathetic toward each other, trusting and wishing each other well.' 195  
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Gemeinschaft implies the existence of common values – expressed in shared 
language, folkways, mores and beliefs – from which result an acknowledgement that 
definite mutual action is regularly required.  The mutuality of Gemeinschaft 
relationships lends them a quality of equilibrium and a unity which, in 
Gemeinschaft-like societies, is the basis upon which living together rests: 
‘Reciprocal,  binding  sentiment  as  a  peculiar  will  of  a  Gemeinschaft we shall call 
understanding (consensus).  It represents the special force and sympathy which keeps 
human beings together as members of a totality.’196  Social cohesion is, therefore, the 
regular and normal condition of Gemeinschaft as a natural unity of individual wills.  
The reciprocal, binding sentiments that link individuals within the Gemeinschaft are 
the very foundation on which the unity of the latter is expressed and by which 
Gemeinschaft-like societies ‘hold together.’ 
 Having established the basic features of the Gemeinschaft in the abstract, 
Tönnies analyzes its distinctive manifestation in a number of societal contexts, 
including home life, the village community, the town and town-country relations.  
Three examples will suffice in painting a picture of Gemeinschaft-like society.  
Within the culture of feudal village life, argues Tönnies, all realities of life are 
dominated by the idea of a natural distribution determined by a sacred tradition and it 
is from this idea, rather than the concepts of exchange and purchase, that harmony is 
achieved. 197   Similarly, the relationship between town and country within the 
Gemeinschaft is regulated by non-contractual ties.  Of the latter, Tönnies writes;   
 
 ‘The  presumption  seems  justified  that,  in  spite  of  the  natural desire  to  keep  one’s 
own or to obtain the largest possible quantities of other people’s goods, a brotherly spirit of 
give and take will remain alive in the relationship of town and country, which, outside of 
those barter activities, is fostered by manifold bonds of friendship and kinship, and for 
which shrines and meeting places provide the rallying points.’198 
 
 Finally, the concept of land within the Gemeinschaft is endowed with a 
profound and spiritual significance insofar  as  it  embodies  the  ‘unity of 
contemporaneous  generations’  and  ‘links  the  living  to  the  dead.’ 199   Tönnies’ 
description of the emotional resonance of land for individuals within the 
Gemeinschaft contains strong echoes of the perspective of romantic nationalism: 
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‘[The land] signifies the close interrelationship of a group of human beings living at 
the same time who have to obey the rules embodied, so to speak, in the land 
itself.’200 
 In Tönnies dichotomous typology, Gesellschaft possesses antipodal qualities 
to those displayed by Gemeinschaft.  We have already seen that, in contradistinction 
to the organic unity of Gemeinschaft, the Gesellschaft is no more than an artificial 
aggregate  of  individuals  ‘essentially  separated  in  spite  of  all  uniting  factors.’ 201  
Rather than being bound together by reciprocal binding sentiments, each individual 
in the Gesellschaft ‘is by himself and isolated, and there exists a condition of tension 
against all others.’202 
 In explaining both the progression toward Gesellschaft and its defining 
characteristics, Tönnies’ places a strong emphasis on the importance of contractual 
relations:  ‘The  law  of  contracts  is  the  adequate  expression  of  a  relationship 
characteristic of the Gesellschaft per se.’203  The transition from a general household 
economy and the predominance of agriculture on the one hand, to a general trade 
economy and the predominance of industry on the other, is a key marker of the 
progress of Gesellschaft, which to a certain extent can be defined by reference to the 
idea of commerce being lodged within the process of production.204  In his emphasis 
on the overwhelming significance of contractual relations within Gesellschaft-like 
societies, Tönnies expresses a similar idea, albeit within a radically different 
framework, to the contractualist sociologist Herbert Spencer, for whom the most 
important sociological tendency at work in the development of modern industrial 
society was the substitution of contract for status.205  Where impersonal contractual 
relationships dominate, as in the Gesellschaft, nothing can be said to possess any 
intrinsic value beyond the temporary fact that it is owned by one individual and 
desired by another.206  As well as the introduction of commerce into the productive 
process and the corresponding rise of contractual relations, Tönnies sees the adoption 
of Roman law as an important source of the progress of Gesellschaft in Northern 
Europe.207 
 The most typical manifestations of Gesellschaft are bourgeois and capitalist 
society, both of which Tönnies describes in dyspeptic tones.  There are strong 
overtones of Marx in Tönnies’ analysis of the relationship between capitalism and 
the Gesellschaft.  He writes, for example, that capitalists are ‘the natural masters and 
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rulers of the Gesellschaft’ which exists for their sake, and that the freedom enjoyed 
by workers is purely nominal since, in the absence of any independent means of 
sustenance, they are compelled to sell their labour for money.208 
  Most interesting, however, in terms of the problem of social cohesion within 
the Gesellschaft is Tönnies’ description of ‘bourgeois society’, which he takes as a 
prototypical example of Gesellschaft.  The absence of ‘mutual familiar relationships’ 
and their replacement with temporary contractual ones that is indicative of bourgeois 
Gesellschaft society sets up a latent tension within it which, we can assume, 
threatens  the  achievement  of  social  cohesion  therein.    ‘In  Gesellschaft’, Tönnies 
writes,  ‘every person strives for  that which  is  to his own advantage and he affirms 
the actions of others only in so far and as long as they can further his interest.  
Before and outside convention and also before and outside each special contract, the 
relation of all to all may therefore be conceived as potential hostility or latent 
war.’209 
 The transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft brings about the liberation 
of the individual from the natural ties of kinship, blood and place which previously 
bound together society as a natural organism.  However, from Tönnies’ essentially 
conservative perspective, the price paid for this liberation can be measured in the 
retreat of social cohesion understood as natural harmonious relations.  The following 
extended quote expressed well Tönnies pessimistic opinion of modern Gesellschaft-
like society and the likely future prospects for social cohesion: 
 
 ‘a  rational  scientific  and  independent  law  was  made  possible  only  through  the 
emancipation of the individuals from all ties which bound them to the family, the land, and 
the city and which held them, to superstition, faith, traditions, habit and duty.  Such 
liberation meant the fall of the communal household in village and town, of the agricultural 
community, and of the art of the town as a fellowship, religious, patriotic craft.  It meant the 
victory of egoism, impudence, falsehood, and cunning, the ascendancy of greed for money, 
ambition and lust for pleasure.’210 
 
 According to Tönnies, the principle obstacle to the achievement and 
maintenance of social cohesion in Gesellschaft-like societies and the source of the 
latter’s progress are one and the same thing.  There is, therefore, a tragic quality to 
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his interpretation of modernity.  Tönnies’ expresses profound scepticism toward the 
possibilities for success of any project to arrest the decline of social cohesion 
through the reinvigoration of Gemeinschaft qualities, although he predicts that such a 
project will  in all  likelihood be attempted by states seeking ‘to create moral  forces 
and  moral  beings.’211  Nonetheless, Tönnies does argue that the resuscitation of 
family life and other forms of Gemeinschaft is  a  ‘moral  necessity’  for  modern 
societies, and identifies a potential source of such resuscitation in co-operative 
associations of workers and the ideology of British Guild socialism with its demand 
for a return to Gemeinschaft in the form of c-operative production.212 
 
Emile Durkheim 
In terms of classical social theory, the writer perhaps most associated with the 
concept of social cohesion is the French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), 
who takes as the leading themes of his sociological project the relationship of the 
individual to the collectivity and the possibilities for securing consensus within 
complex modern societies.213   
 What are the conditions providing for social cohesion in modern industrial 
societies which display a developed and complex division of labour is the central 
focus of Durkheim’s analysis in The Division of Labour in Society.  In it Durkheim 
is concerned with how the social bonds and moral values that are essential to 
achieving social cohesion could be maintained and reinforced in these highly 
differentiated societies in which the concept of individual autonomy was a defining 
ideal. 
 Rather than seek to identify a set of universal moral principles conducive to 
social cohesion in the abstract, Durkheim adopts a scientific and empirical approach 
to the study of morality which recognizes that different societies have been animated 
by widely divergent moral codes, none of which are a priori superior in safeguarding 
social  cohesion.    Changes  in  moral  codes  occur  ‘not  as a result of philosophical 
discoveries’,  but  rather  ‘because  changes have occurred  in  the  social  structure  that 
have necessitated this change in morals.’214  Because moral codes are thus rooted in 
the social structure, the task of sociology is to undertake an empirical analysis of 
actual social conditions to determine the distinctive morality most appropriate to 
them.215  In other words, we should not expect the achievement of social cohesion in 
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modern societies to be based on the same moral values that underpin it in the very 
different conditions pertaining to pre-modern or archaic societies. 
 The most striking difference between the social conditions of archaic and 
modern societies is, argues Durkheim, the rudimentary nature of the division of 
labour in the former as compared to the widespread and highly developed form it 
takes in modern societies.  Modern societies alone exhibit the social phenomenon of 
the division of labour to any significant extent.  Expressed simply, the division of 
labour refers to a situation in which occupations are heavily separated and 
specialized.  The tendency toward the progressive development of the division of 
labour in modern societies can be observed within all sectors of society, including 
the economic, political, administrative, judicial, scientific and aesthetic. 216   The 
division of labour, then, refers to a general process of social differentiation not 
limited to the economic sphere. 
 The existence of a complex and pervasive division of labour exercises a 
profound influence on the type of moral code required to ensure social cohesion as 
compared with archaic societies in which little division of labour is evident.  In the 
latter, social  cohesion  is a product of what Durkheim calls  ‘mechanical solidarity’, 
meaning that its cause ‘can  be  traced  to  a  certain  conformity  of  each  individual 
consciousness to a common type which is none other than the psychological type of 
society.’217  The common type to which this quote refers is designated by the term 
‘collective consciousness’, which  is defined by Durkheim as ‘the  totality of beliefs 
and  sentiments  common  to  the  average  members  of  a  society.’218  The collective 
consciousness is most strongly defined in archaic societies which exhibit little or no 
division of labour.  That is to say, in terms of its extent, the intensity with which it is 
felt, and the determinacy of its content, the collective consciousness exerts a 
dominant influence over individuals within these societies, who are, as a result, only 
marginally differentiated from one another.219  Because common beliefs, sentiments 
and values dominate in this way, individuals in archaic societies closely resemble 
each other, and it is upon this resemblance that social cohesion is achieved.  As 
Anthony Giddens observes; ‘Where  mechanical  solidarity is the basis of social 
cohesion, social conduct is controlled by shared values and beliefs: the collectivity 
dominates the individual, and there is only a rudimentary development of individual 
self-consciousness.’220   
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 Consonant with his proposition that changes in the social structure precipitate 
changes in the moral code of society, Durkheim argues that the progressive 
development of the division of labour associated with the rise of modern industrial 
societies fundamentally alters the basis upon which social cohesion rests from 
mechanical to ‘organic’ solidarity.  Whereas mechanical solidarity refers to a social 
cohesion based on the absence of meaningful differences between the moral values 
held by undifferentiated individuals, organic solidarity denotes a cohesion born of 
the interdependence of differentiated individuals in systematic relations of exchange 
with one another. 221   The relations between individuals in a society of organic 
solidarity are, Durkheim argues, analogous to those found between the component 
parts of a biological system.  The organs of a human body, for example, are mutually 
dependent at the same time as each performs a unique and differentiated function 
and it is in this sense that they form an organic (as opposed to a mechanical) unity.222 
 It is, therefore, the division of labour itself that is the principle source of 
social  cohesion  in  modern  industrial  society:  ‘[The  division  of  labour’s]  true 
function,’ writes Durkheim,  ‘is  to  create  between  two or more  people  a  feeling  of 
solidarity.’223  For such a situation to arise, however, presupposes that individuals 
have to a significant extent been liberated from the constraints of the collective 
consciousness, which becomes less extensive, more feeble and more vague.224  Here 
then, we encounter one of the key themes of Durkheim’s analysis of social cohesion; 
that modern societies which exhibit a complex division of labour by definition 
contain individuals over whom the collective consciousness – the totality of shared 
collective sentiments – exerts a relatively weak influence.  Moreover, since this 
progressive weakening of the collective consciousness is an inevitable and hence 
‘normal’ feature of modern complex societies, it is not, Durkheim argues, in conflict 
with the achievement of social cohesion therein.  On the contrary, modern societies 
achieve social cohesion because of the division of labour. That is, solidarity rests 
precisely on the social differentiation of individuals.   
 This  point  forms  the  substance  of  Durkheim’s  critique  of both Auguste 
Comte and the anti-Dreyfusards225 for whom the weakening of collectively held 
moral sentiments represented the gravest threat to the social cohesion of modern 
societies.  For Durkheim, by contrast, the declining importance of the collective 
consciousness in modern societies is accompanied not by a general collapse in the 
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conditions necessary to sustain social cohesion but, rather, by a shift from one type 
of cohesion (mechanical solidarity) to an alternative type (organic solidarity) more 
consistent with the social conditions of modernity.  In other words, the achievement 
of social cohesion in modern societies is not, Durkheim suggests, dependent on there 
existing an intimate resemblance between all individuals within society or the 
predominance of collectively held sentiments over individual idiosyncratic ones. 
 It is at this point essential to recognize that, although it is true that Durkheim 
understood the weakening of the collective consciousness to be an inevitable 
concomitant of the progressive development of the division of labour, he maintained 
that collective sentiments, values and beliefs nevertheless continued to play an 
important role in the social structure of modern societies.  Indeed, one particular 
facet of the collective consciousness, that relating to the respect of society for the 
individual, is actually strengthened in modern societies.  The collective 
consciousness, this shows, does not disappear altogether under modern conditions 
but rather contracts in scope and transforms in content.226  Modern society remains, 
Durkheim insists, a moral society in which collectively held beliefs, values and 
sentiments, though radically changed in nature from those found in simple societies, 
are necessary elements of social life.  Durkheim writes; 
 
 ‘even where  society  rests wholly  upon  the  division  of  labour,  it  does  not  resolve 
itself into a myriad of atoms juxtaposed together, between which only external and transitory 
contact can be established.  The members are linked by ties that extend well beyond the very 
brief moment when  the act of exchange  is being accomplished…Men cannot  live  together 
without agreeing, and consequently without making mutual sacrifices, joining themselves to 
one another in a strong and enduring fashion…Every society is a moral society.’227 
 
 Durkheim’s  remarks  concerning  the  continuing  importance  of moral 
authority and certain collective sentiments are directed in opposition to the 
‘contractualism’ most famously associated with Herbert Spencer, utilitarianism and 
classical political economy.  In his sociological diagnosis of modern society, Spencer 
emphasizes the prevalence of contractual exchange between autonomous individuals.  
Modern  ‘contractualist’  society,  Spencer  and  the  economists  argue,  has  liberated 
itself from the constraints of collective imperatives altogether, replacing them with a 
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social structure made cohesive by the free decision of individuals.228  It should be 
clear that from such a perspective the problem of social cohesion, at least as it is 
posed in this chapter and in the work of Durkheim, is largely subordinated to the 
ideal of individual autonomy.229 
 Durkheim devotes a considerable amount of space in The Division of Labour 
to refuting the contractualist position.230  Characterizing Spencer’s thesis, Durkheim 
writes, ‘Individuals would only be dependent upon the group to the extent that they 
depended upon one another, and they would not depend upon one another save 
within the limits drawn by private agreement freely arrived at.  Thus social solidarity 
would be nothing more than the spontaneous agreement between individual interests, 
an agreement of which contracts are the natural expression.’231 
 Were society actually to resemble such a description, Durkheim argues, it 
would be the case that ‘every harmony of interests conceals a latent conflict, or one 
that  is  simply  deferred.’232  In reality, however, the increase in the prevalence of 
contractual relationships in modern societies does not, as Spencer suggests, imply a 
decrease in the sphere of social action, as is evidenced by the expansion of legal 
regulation that accompanies the rise of contracts.  Contracts themselves, moreover, 
are fundamentally dependent on the law of contracts which is, after all, a 
phenomenon belonging to the sphere of social action.  More significantly in terms of 
the present discussion, the concluding of contracts cannot in reality be separated 
from  custom  and  collective moral  values:  ‘In  the way  in  which  we  conclude  and 
carry out contracts, we are forced to conform to rules which, although not sanctioned, 
either directly or indirectly, by any legal code, are none the less mandatory.’233 
 Durkheim’s assertion in The Division of Labour in Society that ‘the contract 
is not sufficient by itself, but is only possible because of the regulation of contracts, 
which is of a social origin’234 expresses an idea that is central to his discussion of the 
methodological basis of sociology that can be found in The Rules of Sociological 
Method and Suicide.  The relevant Durkheimian idea here is the objective reality of 
‘social  facts’ as  things external,  and not  reducible,  to  the  individuals  that compose 
society.    Spencer’s  failure, Durkheim  suggests,  lies  in  the  refusal  to  recognize  the 
objective reality of social phenomena, a lacuna that leads him to incorrectly suppose 
that the social fact of contractual exchange can be adequately explained by reference 
to the free interplay of individual interests.  Durkheim, by contrast, argues; ‘To 
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understand the way in which society thinks of itself and its environment one must 
consider the nature of the society and not that of the individual.’235   
 As well as their status as objectively real ‘things’ not amenable to change by 
a simple act of human will, Durkheim attributes two other properties to social facts.  
They are external, in the sense that they are qualitatively different from the sum of 
their individual parts, and they serve to constrain human activity.236 
 In terms of the present analysis of social cohesion, Durkheim’s conception of 
the objective reality of social facts serves as an important reminder that all societies, 
even those of organic solidarity, exhibit collective social phenomena that operate 
externally to individual consciousness, constraining their behaviour.  The collective 
nature of social facts is, Durkheim writes,  ‘conspicuously  evident  in  those  beliefs 
and practices which are transmitted to us ready-made by previous generations; we 
receive and adopt them because, being both collective and ancient, they are invested 
with a particular authority that education has taught us to recognize and respect.’237  
Recognition of this idea that the individual is always dominated to some degree by 
an external collective reality greater than himself justifies a concern with social 
cohesion that is not possible from the individualist perspective of 
contractualism/utilitarianism/classical political economy. 
 
Max Weber 
As is well known, the sociological and political thought of Max Weber (1864-1920) 
is permeated with an interest in such concepts as power, domination and conflict, 
and as such it might be thought that he was relatively unconcerned with ideas of 
cohesion and consensus.  To conclude thus would, however, be an error.  It is true 
that Weber’s position with regard to the possibilities for achieving social cohesion is 
very far from that of Durkheim, for whom cohesion is understood as the normal 
default setting of all societies so long as certain pathological developments are kept 
at bay.  Weber, by contrast, considers conflict and coercion to be endemic features of 
social  and  political  organization.    It  is,  however,  precisely  within  Weber’s 
conceptualization of the nature of domination and authority that can be found his 
distinctive understanding of what constitute the principle bases upon which the 
achievement of social cohesion stands. 
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 For Weber, social cohesion is, to a significant extent, a question of the 
relations of domination and obedience pertaining in any given social structure and 
the kind of legitimacy claimed therein.  Society, according to this view, coheres or 
‘holds together’ through the obedience of its members to authority.  Consequently, if 
we wish to understand the bases of social cohesion, the relevant questions to ask are; 
“When  and  why  do  men  obey?  Upon  what  inner  justifications  and  upon  what 
external means does this domination rest?”238   
 Before examining the link between Weber’s theory of legitimate domination 
and the concept of social cohesion, it is worth first noting the relevance of his work 
on the sociology of religion, in particular the famous The Protestant E thic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism.  Social cohesion, it has been suggested, is a phenomenon 
intimately related to, and hence inseparable from, the sphere of (individual and 
collective) values, beliefs and sentiments.  To put this in another way, the sources of 
social cohesion, whilst not exhausted, are nevertheless significantly affected by what 
are generally termed ‘cultural’ factors.   
 An awareness of the significance that such non-material cultural factors can 
have for the direction and character of historical development animates The 
Protestant E thic and the Spirit of Capitalism.    In  direct  opposition  to  Marx’s 
materialist conception of historical development, Weber argues that a key factor in 
the development of capitalism was the shift in value-orientation that occurred as a 
by-product of Protestantism.  The ethic of Protestantism, Weber argues, is a 
combination of puritan asceticism and worldliness.  This ethic encouraged amongst 
its adherents, albeit as an unintended consequence, a world-view peculiarly suited to 
the  development  and  spread  of  a  capitalist  economy,  the  ‘spirit’  of  which  is  the 
desire for ‘the pursuit of profit, and forever renewed profit, by means of continuous, 
rational, capitalistic enterprise.’239   
 The desire to pursue continuous profit for its own sake, an attitude 
indispensable to the early development of capitalism, is only rational, Weber argues, 
for individuals possessed of a particular world-view; it is not inherently rational in 
and of itself.  The implications of such a conclusion are profound and, as already 
indicated, run directly counter to orthodox Marxist historical materialism.  It 
suggests that the economic activity of individuals can only be understood within the 
context of their subjective value-orientations and world-view.   The  ‘rationality’  of 
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any given economic activity is significantly dependent on the ultimate ends that 
individuals’ value and these ends are conditioned by ethical and cultural factors not 
reducible to material ones.  Hence, Weber demonstrates that all social action – 
including economic activity that is traditionally seen as the most purely ‘rational’ – 
takes place within an ethical framework that structures the means and ends 
individuals’ pursue.    The  aim  of  Weber’s  interpretative  sociology is to arrive at 
objective statements concerning the subjective meanings individuals attach to their 
social conduct.  One implication of this perspective is that the achievement of social 
cohesion in any given society will be intimately related to the subjective meanings 
that underpin individual and social action. 
 As already indicated, it is in relations of domination and obedience that 
Weber locates the principle bases of social cohesion.  This is not to suggest that 
cohesion can be reduced to coercion since it is the case that in most cases obedience 
is forthcoming because the commanding authority is considered in some way 
legitimate:  ‘So  far  as  it  is  not  derived  merely  from  fear  or  from  motives  of 
expediency, a willingness to submit to an order imposed by one man or a small 
group, always implies a belief in the legitimate authority of the source imposing 
it.’240  This implies that the achievement of social cohesion rests to some extent on 
the validity of the social order, where validity is an expression of the probability that 
action is actually governed by a belief in its legitimacy.241 
 The types of legitimacy claimed by social orders fall into three ideal-typical 
categories; rational, traditional and charismatic.  At issue in distinguishing between 
these types are the nature of political leadership and the (administrative) means by 
which the politically dominant powers manage to maintain their domination.242  In 
the  case  of  traditional  authority,  legitimacy  ‘rest[s]  on  an  established  belief  in  the 
sanctity  of  immemorial  traditions’243 and  obedience  ‘is  owed  to  the  person  of  the 
chief who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority and who 
is…bound  by  tradition.’244  Such an authority is maintained by an administrative 
staff linked to the ruler by personal loyalty.  The restrictions of innovation inherent 
in such an order mean that it is impossible to deliberately create law through 
legislation, and the development of rational economic activity is seriously 
hindered.245   
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 In the case of charismatic  authority,  legitimacy  ‘rest[s]  on  devotion  to  the 
exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person’ who is 
obeyed  ‘by  virtue  of  personal  trust  in  his  revelation.’ 246   This emphasis on the 
extraordinary qualities of a charismatic individual creates a large space for 
legislative innovation but is directly opposed to everyday routine structures of 
domination.  As a consequence, social orders whose legitimacy is of the charismatic 
type are inherently unstable and struggle to produce and maintain social cohesion.  
Charismatic authority therefore becomes either traditionalized or rationalized, or a 
combination of both.247 
 Finally, and most importantly for our understanding of social cohesion within 
contemporary states, legal-rational authority  ‘rest[s]  on  a  belief  in  the  legality  of 
enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue 
commands.’ 248   Obedience  to  such  an  order  is  owed  to  the  ‘legally  established 
impersonal  order’  which  maintains  its  domination by means of a continuous 
administration characterized by the separation of officials from the means of 
administration.  The modern state represents the most complete approximation of 
this type of authority to have existed.  ‘In the contemporary ‘state’…the ‘separation 
of the administrative staff, of the administrative officials, and of the workers from 
the material means of administrative organization is completed.’249   
 The predominance of legal-rational authority as the basis upon which 
legitimacy is claimed within modern societies (and their states) is reflected in a 
concomitant increase in the reliance on bureaucratic administration across a wide 
diversity of organizations: ‘The development of modern forms of organization in all 
fields is nothing less than identical with the development and continual spread of 
bureaucratic  administration.’ 250   The reasons for the dominance of bureaucratic 
organization lie in its technical superiority and greater efficiency as compared to any 
other form of administration.  It is therefore completely indispensable for the needs 
of mass administration in complex modern societies; far from being exclusively a 
product of capitalism, a socialist state would require an even greater reliance on 
bureaucracy.  
 Weber’s  views  about  the significance of bureaucratization within modern 
societies are relevant to the issue of social cohesion and what factors account for its 
production and maintenance.  According to Weber, the overwhelming predominance 
107 
 
of the bureaucratic model of administration makes it one of the principle forces 
involved  in  ‘holding  together’  society.    Bureaucracy,  in  other  words,  provides  an 
important contribution to the achievement of social cohesion.  As Joseph writes, 
bureaucratization,  ‘brings  a  new  degree  of  stability and cohesion since, unlike 
previous forms of domination which rely on more volatile personal and political 
relations, bureaucracy represents a continuous form of administration carried out by 
trained professionals who operate ‘impartially’ according to prescribed rules.’251 
However, far from endorsing bureaucracy, Weber, as has already been 
indicated in Chapter One, condemns what he describes as ‘control by officialdom’ as 
a phenomenon that obstructs the rise of quality political leaders.  Bureaucratization 
creates  an  ‘iron cage’  from which modern  states  struggle  to  free  themselves.   The 
answer, as Weber sees it, lies in the use of democratic institutions as the most 
appropriate arena from which charismatic political leaders can emerge.   
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The four authors examined above share an interest in analyzing the underlying bases 
upon which social cohesion is built in different types of society.  Each, moreover, 
structures his analysis around a central distinction between ‘simple’, ‘traditional’ or 
‘pre-modern’ societies on the one hand, and ‘complex’ or ‘modern’ societies on the 
other, with the clear implication that what ‘holds together’ society in a pre-modern 
context is of a different order to that which performs the same function in modern 
ones.  This in itself is an important insight and one that, as we shall see shortly, has 
profound consequences for our understanding of the changing context within which 
national identity and social cohesion interact in the contemporary world.  To put it 
simply, the authors are united around the basic contention that the means by which a 
given society attains a stable coherence change as a result of deeper structural 
transformations affecting it.  Complex industrial societies, for example, produce and 
maintain social cohesion in different ways, and upon different underlying 
foundations, than simple agrarian ones.  To this could be added that social cohesion, 
to the extent that its achievement is a reality at all, will rest on a distinctive support 
in ethnically diverse as opposed to ethnically homogeneous societies.  We will have 
cause to return to this point below. 
 Whilst Tocqueville, Tönnies, Durkheim and Weber are broadly united around 
the essentially sociological conviction that modern societies, because of certain 
specifiable and fundamental structural differences, unite as coherent wholes in ways 
that are clearly distinct from their pre-modern counterparts, their interpretations of 
the essential differences between pre-modern and modern societies are markedly 
different.  It is worth, therefore, taking a brief comparative look at the different 
picture of modern society that each author constructs and how these differences 
impact upon their understanding of the prospects for social cohesion therein.  By 
doing so it will be possible to assess the degree to which the features that allegedly 
characterize modern society still hold for contemporary society and if not, what 
implications this holds for social cohesion.  
 Consonant with his more overtly political, as opposed to sociological, 
emphasis, Tocqueville locates the distinctiveness of modern society in the political 
sphere; in the change from aristocratic to democratic government.  If the mechanism 
of change is therefore political, the most pertinent fact is pseudo-structural – modern 
societies are distinctively egalitarian.  That is to say, they are incompatible with the 
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existence of significant social inequalities, certainly when compared to the rigid and 
hierarchical distinctions of order characteristic of aristocracies.  By contrast, Tönnies, 
Durkheim and Weber place the major weight of their emphasis on the strictly 
structural changes associated with industrialised production.   
For Durkheim in particular industrialism, and the complex division of labour 
with which it is associated and upon which it depends, is the defining feature of 
modern societies.  Durkheim is careful to point out that the highly developed 
economic division of labour associated with industrialism is replicated across all 
spheres of social life, from the administrative to the scientific and aesthetic.  A 
number of pertinent facts flow from the dominance of the division of labour in 
modern societies.  Human beings are themselves highly differentiated from one 
another and are less beholden to the constraining influence of the collective 
consciousness and respect for the autonomy and dignity of the individual is 
widespread and endemic. 
In the analysis of Tönnies, and to a lesser extent Weber, the influence of 
Marx is more evident as the impact of capitalism on the structure of modern societies 
is explicitly theorized.  For Tönnies especially, features associated with the 
development of capitalist economies – the penetration of productive processes by 
commerce and the dominance of contractual relations – are key to understanding the 
distinctiveness of modern societies.  Such developments serve to irredeemably 
shatter  the  ‘organic’  bonds  of  kinship  and  fellowship  characteristic  of  the  social 
order of pre-modernity by substituting natural will with a rational will defined by a 
strict separation of means and ends.   Similarly, for Weber it is rationalization in its 
numerous guises that largely defines modern society as reverence of immemorial 
traditions  and  charismatic  leaders wanes  leaving  the world  ‘disenchanted.’   At  the 
same time, the most rational form of administration – bureaucracy – rises to 
predominance and henceforth provides a formidable buttress to authority. 
With each of these developments associated with the emergence of modern 
society, important consequences follow for social cohesion.  So, the achievement of 
social cohesion cannot be based upon the same elements in a democratic-egalitarian 
society as compared with an aristocratic-hierarchical one; in an organic 
Gemeinschaft as compared with an artificial Gesellschaft; in a segmental agrarian 
society as compared with a complex and interdependent industrial one; in a society 
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where legitimacy is based on an appeal to tradition as compared to one where legal-
rational authority dominates.  Moreover, the likelihood that the attainment of social 
cohesion will be robust and long-lasting is itself subject to change depending on the 
type of society under consideration.  Modernity, in other words, brings with it new 
challenges for the maintenance of cohesion in modern societies 
Tocqueville’s  personal  admiration  for  aristocracy  is  reflected  in  his 
conviction that such societies derive their social coherence from a widespread 
acceptance of aristocratic power as lawful and acquiescence to a social order seen as 
immutable and natural.  It is incompatible with the very nature of democracy for 
social cohesion to be constructed on the foundations of hierarchy and rigid 
immobility in social structure, for democracy is, according to Tocqueville, precisely 
the absence of social inequalities.  The destruction of rigid distinctions of order and 
classes brings fresh dangers of instability and the breakdown of social cohesion, 
dangers which are best avoided in circumstances where strong religious sentiment 
acts as an effective moral disciplinary force and citizens are united by a store of 
shared beliefs and opinions.  For Tocqueville, it is upon these two conditions that 
social cohesion in modern societies is based.   
 If Tocqueville offers a qualified but fairly optimistic view of the possibilities 
for the safeguarding of social cohesion in modern societies, Tönnies paints a picture 
that is almost entirely pessimistic.  Social cohesion is, from his perspective, a 
necessarily exclusive condition.  That is to say, its successful achievement depends 
on the ‘organic’ bonds that unite kith and kin in communities governed by reciprocal 
ties of sentiment rather than the artificial ties of contract.  Since modern society is 
defined precisely by the severance of such intimate and personal bonds, cohesion 
therein is necessarily a precarious achievement.  Individuals in the Gesellschaft, 
recall, exist in a relation of ‘potential hostility or latent war’; a situation clearly not 
conducive  to  society  ‘holding  together’  with  any  stability.    The  implication  of 
Tönnies' analysis is that a society formed of strangers – meaning individuals not 
united by shared personal understanding – is one in which social cohesion is 
fundamentally imperilled.  It is in this sense that social cohesion is interpreted as an 
exclusive condition; its achievement depends on the exclusion of strangers not 
sharing in the same Gemeinschaft.  What such an understanding augurs for the social 
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cohesion of contemporary societies marked by significant national and ethnic 
diversity is a point that we shall return to shortly. 
 As is well known, Durkheim understood consensus and social cohesion to be 
the  ‘normal’  condition  of  all  societies  and  conflict  a  symptom  of  ‘pathological’ 
developments.  He was therefore confident that the social cohesion found in simple 
pre-modern societies would be replicated in the very different circumstances of 
modern industrial societies, even if the foundations on which such cohesion would 
be based diverged significantly.  The defining feature of modern societies, recall, is 
the existence of a complex division of labour across all sectors of social life, a 
situation that is incompatible with a strong and tightly defined collective conscious – 
the very thing that provided the framework for social cohesion in pre-modern 
societies.  Consensus nevertheless remains the normal condition of modern societies 
as the division of labour itself performs the function of holding together society.  The 
interdependence of differentiated individuals in systematic relations of exchange 
ensures  that  consensus  triumphs  over  conflict  except  where  certain  ‘anomalies’ 
emerge. 
 Weber’s  assessment  of  the  security  of  social  cohesion  in modern  societies 
provides an interesting  counterpoint  to  Tönnies'  pessimism  and  Durkheim’s 
optimism.  Put rather simply, Weber saw modern society as perhaps uniquely well-
placed to reproduce the conditions of its own cohesion owing to the efficiency, 
predictability  and  ‘impartiality’ of bureaucratic administration, but saw in this fact 
the danger of a society lacking inspired, principled political leadership and thus 
incapable of breaking out of the stultifying and de-humanizing influence of the ‘iron 
cage’  of  bureaucratization.    In  other  words, the problem facing modern societies, 
according  to  Weber’s  perspective,  is  less  the  safe-guarding of a fragile social 
cohesion and more the preservation of spheres of social life in which action other 
than that motivated by rationality could occur.   
 All four authors address the question of what are the principle threats to the 
social cohesion of modern societies based on their understanding of the foundations 
upon which it is built.  Thus, for Tocqueville it is political centralization and the 
relaxation of moral ties and shared customs that present the greatest danger to 
modern democratic societies.  Political centralization is feared for its potential to turn 
citizens into ‘mere administrative units’, whilst a weakening of the sphere of shared 
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beliefs and opinions threatens to render collective action impossible.  For Tönnies 
the only hope for the restoration of lasting social cohesion lies in the resuscitation of 
family life and other forms of Gemeinschaft increasingly marginalized by the forces 
of capitalism, industrialism and rational law.  The removal of commerce from the 
productive process by means of the establishment of co-operative production along 
the lines recommended by Guild Socialism represents the only tangible 
recommendation made by Tönnies.   
 It is in Durkheim that we find perhaps the most interesting and elaborate 
diagnosis of the most important threats to the social cohesion of modern societies, 
which result, he argues, from the ‘abnormal’ development of the division of labour 
such as is  particularly  characteristic  of  ‘transitional’  periods.    Evidence  of  such 
abnormal  developments  can  be  found  in  such  ‘pathological’  phenomena  as 
widespread  ‘anomie’, conflict between labour and capital, and commercial crises.  
Rejecting the Marxist assumption that such phenomena are rooted in the very nature 
of capitalism itself, Durkheim argues that they are the result of individuals lacking 
consciousness of their involvement in a collective endeavour.  The re-moralization of 
the division of labour can be effected most efficiently, Durkheim argues, via 
associational life since only secondary professional organisations are close enough to 
the individual to effectively tackle anomie.  Here we find a direct parallel to the work 
of Tocqueville, for whom the proliferation of voluntary associational groups in civil 
society was the key to maintaining cohesion and liberty in the context of the 
restlessness of democratic society.   
 For Weber it is not the threats to social cohesion that are the primary danger 
facing modern societies but, rather, the oppressive colonisation of all spheres of 
human activity by the bureaucratic form of organisation.  By way of a remedy, 
Weber offers an instrumentalist defence of democracy as the system of government 
most suited to the development of charismatic political leaders alone capable of 
resisting ‘control by officialdom.’ 
 
Classical Social Theory and National Identity  
Thus far the relationship between social cohesion and identity, and national identity 
in particular, has not been commented on directly.  Whilst none of the four authors 
here considered develop a systematic theory of national identity, it is nevertheless 
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the case that their contrasting accounts of social cohesion are implicitly concerned 
with issues that we might describe as related to national identity.252  In particular, the 
implications that the foregoing analysis suggests as to the relationship between social 
cohesion and diversity will serve as a useful jumping-off point for a subsequent 
analysis of more contemporary analyses of social cohesion that are more directly 
concerned with questions of identity. 
As already indicated, all four of the authors considered in this chapter 
structure their analysis around a central distinction between pre-modern and modern 
societies, showing how certain features associated with the emergence of the latter 
transform the basis upon which social cohesion rests.  By questioning some of the 
assumptions about modern society made by the four authors, it should be possible to 
generate some tentative insights into the conditions for the maintenance of social 
cohesion in contemporary societies. 
 The most fundamental assumption that all four authors share (although to 
differing degrees) is that diversity and social cohesion are locked in an essentially 
antagonistic relationship.  That is to say, all agree that there is a certain amount, and 
certain type, of diversity that when reached represents an intractable problem for the 
maintenance of social cohesion.  Tönnies’ is the most extreme position in this regard 
as he essentially argues that the Gesellschaft is anathema to social cohesion, since 
only a more or less exclusive community can generate the reciprocal ties of 
sentiment which alone can  ‘hold  together’  society.   Thus,  it  is not diversity per se 
that undermines social cohesion, but rather the impersonal relations of individuals 
whose interactions are conducted through the prism of self-interest and contractual 
exchange alone.  There must, Tönnies argues, exist myriad interpersonal bonds not 
rooted in contractual exchange if hostility and war are not to dominate societal 
relations.   
 To some extent Durkheim’s position is constructed in opposition to the dark 
picture painted by Tönnies.  It is a mistake, Durkheim argues, to believe that 
diversity and social cohesion are diametrically opposed conditions.  Such was the 
case in pre-modern societies where the absence of individual differentiation provided 
the cornerstone for the achievement of social cohesion, but cannot possibly be true of 
modern societies since a widening of diversity is an inevitable, and hence normal, 
accompaniment to the complex division of labour.  It is, however, significant that 
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despite his conviction that a strongly defined collective consciousness is 
incompatible with the modern division of labour, Durkheim nevertheless insists that 
modern society remains a moral society that cannot re-produce itself or engage in 
collective action in the total absence of collective sentiments, values and beliefs.  
This reflects Durkheim’s  insistence  on  the  logical  priority  of  society  over  the 
individual and his belief that the former requires of the latter a willingness to engage 
in mutual sacrifice.   
 Moreover, a shared national identity is, it seems, singled out by Durkheim as 
one of the most important sources of such collective sentiments, and he recommends 
the inculcation of a patriotic commitment through civic education and the 
propagation  of  collective  rituals  and  symbols.    In  this  way,  Durkheim’s 
recommendations conform to the classic French model of unitary civic national 
identity, according to which national identity is inclusive in the sense of not being 
defined according to ethnic criteria, but imposed on all citizens residing within the 
state’s territory.253  Social cohesion, from a Durkheimian perspective, requires for its 
successful reproduction a shared commitment to a single national identity defined in 
civic and territorial terms.   
 Whilst Tocqueville also stresses the importance of shared beliefs and customs 
for the maintenance of social cohesion in modern societies, he is nevertheless more 
inclined than Durkheim to support sub-national local identities as conducive to the 
vitality of civil society.  The individual’s commitment to the wider United States is 
understood by Tocqueville  to  emanate  first  and  foremost  from  his  ‘provincial 
patriotism.’  It is from the recognition that participation in a wider Union represents 
the most effective safeguard for the future prosperity of ‘his little republic’ that the 
public spirit of the union derives.   
 These differences in the interpretations of the relationship between diversity 
and social cohesion are highly pertinent to the study of contemporary societies in 
which diversity of all kinds is significantly greater than was the case at the end of the 
nineteenth/beginning of the twentieth century, the time at which all four authors 
were writing.  Contemporary societies display an even more highly developed and 
complex division of labour, and are more than ever characterised by the intrusion of 
commerce and capitalistic relations into all spheres of social life.  Migration and 
globalisation have produced far greater levels of ethnic diversity in contemporary 
116 
 
societies, and the continued rise of individualism in the context of de-regulated 
capitalism has further eroded the extent to which individuals defer to a shared moral 
authority.  The triumph of the bureaucratic ‘rational’ modern state as the only viable 
state form remains perhaps the most important fact of contemporary international 
politics.   
 Whilst it may therefore seem that contemporary society is more than ever 
defined by the marginalization of the Gemeinschaft by purely Gesellschaft relations, 
the continued popularity of nationalism and the fact that the modern state 
everywhere remains a nation-state suggest that Gemeinschaft-like conceptions of 
society and political legitimacy are very much still a going concern.  If the state is 
everywhere legitimated by reference, either explicitly or tacitly, to nationalism and 
national identity, then society continues to be conceived in more or less exclusive 
terms.   
 From Tönnies’ perspective, contemporary society faces insurmountable 
obstacles in the way of securing long-term social cohesion.  The further 
entrenchment of capitalism combined with the large increase in the quantity and 
quality of diversity of all kinds is simply incompatible with the resuscitation of 
Gemeinschaft relations that alone offer the prospect of a rediscovery of social 
cohesion.  However, even from the more moderate perspective of Durkheim, 
developments associated with contemporary society represent a considerable 
challenge to social cohesion.  The continued existence of national diversity across 
virtually all Western so-called nation-states, and the more recent rise in support for 
sub-state nationalist movements, are testament to the failure of the kind of nation-
building policies explicitly recommended by Durkheim.  If the resilience of national 
minority communities is accepted as a given for the foreseeable future, the unified 
civic-territorial patriotism of the type that Durkheim extols is unlikely to provide 
fertile ground for the safe-guarding of  social  cohesion.    If, as Durkheim’s analysis 
suggests, the collective sentiments, values and beliefs upon which all societies 
depend are best fostered in the context of an overarching unified civic national 
identity, then it would seem that national diversity, such as can be found in, for 
example, Britain, is a serious threat to the achievement of social cohesion. 
 The idea that national diversity is antagonistic to social cohesion need not, 
however, be the inevitable conclusion to our discussion of the concept of social 
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cohesion in classical social theory.  We have already seen how Tocqueville praises 
decentralization and localization as forces that lend themselves to fostering 
responsible political and social interaction.  This suggests an alternative way of 
looking at the relationship between national diversity and social cohesion; that is, by 
focusing on associational life and the ways in which the formal political recognition 
of national minorities might encourage it to flourish.  Both Tocqueville and 
Durkheim agree that the modern state is too large and remote from the ordinary 
citizen to act as the principal agent for the re-integration of isolated individuals into 
the collective endeavour of society.  For this reason they support the establishment of 
strong voluntary associational groups in civil society as a way of revitalizing 
democracy and safeguarding social cohesion.  From this perspective, political 
recognition of sub-state national minorities might be seen as a way to bridge the gap 
between the individual and the remote state.  In this sense such minority national 
identities represent the ‘provincial patriotism’ that Tocqueville saw as the bedrock of 
the public life of the wider Union.   
This is a vision of alternative identities being complementary rather than 
antagonistic with  the development of  ‘dual  identities’ contributing  to overall social 
cohesion by encouraging more active participation in local civil society.  Moreover, 
if the modern rational state is overwhelmingly Gesellschaft-like, as represented most 
fully in its monopoly over the granting of formal citizenship rights, sub-state national 
minorities perhaps retain a greater element of Gemeinschaft in their greater reliance 
on language, culture, tradition, and custom.  The ‘Gemeinschaft’ of national identity 
thus complements the ‘Gesellschaft’ of citizenship.254   
 
Social Cohesion in Contemporary Thought 
Having been largely superseded by alternative concerns for much of the twentieth 
century, the concept of social cohesion has more recently re-emerged within political 
and social thought as evidence of growing political disengagement, and the 
challenges presented by increasing diversity of all kinds, prompts a re-examination 
of the integrative qualities of the so-called consolidated nation-states of Western 
Europe.  In what follows two alternative approaches, both of which recall some of 
the principle themes associated with classical social theory, are analyzed.  The first 
approach, social capital theory, takes as its principal focus of analysis forms of 
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associational life and group membership that, it is alleged, foster norms of 
generalized trust and reciprocity that it has already been suggested are key 
components of social cohesion.  The second approach adopts a political philosophy 
approach to examine the significance of national identity as an important source of 
the shared values, morals and customs upon which bonds of social solidarity depend.   
 
Social Capital Theory 
That a wide proliferation of voluntary associational groups within civil society is an 
asset and a resource in facilitating the social integration of the individual into the 
collectivity is, it has been noted, a key insight claimed in the classical social theory 
of Tocqueville and Durkheim.  This idea – that voluntary associations formed in the 
interstices between the state and the individual are essential for the maintenance of 
social cohesion in modern societies – has received a revived emphasis in the field of 
social capital theory that gained considerable influence across the social sciences in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  Notwithstanding the often substantial differences separating 
alternative interpretations of social capital theory, a shared commitment to the 
socially-specific dimension of collective action unites the field and provides a thread 
linking it with the tradition of classical social theory analyzed above. 
 Much of the social capital theory literature is oriented toward an examination 
of the significance of associational networks as valuable resources implicated in 
individual and collective economic development.  Pierre Bourdieu, for example, 
examines the manner by which asymmetric access to social capital in the form of 
durable social connections or networks can operate to reproduce class inequality, 
social stratification and existing power relationships.255  From a different political 
perspective, James Coleman places the notion of social capital within a framework 
of rational choice theory and methodological individualism in order to argue that the 
expectation of reciprocity generated by social capital makes it a valuable resource in 
overcoming  collective  action  problems  and  ‘externalities.’ 256   Significantly, 
Coleman’s  analysis,  in  stark  contrast  to  that  of  Bourdieu,  suggests  that  poor  and 
marginalised communities can also benefit from investment in social capital. 
 It is, however, in the work of Robert Putnam that we find an interpretation 
and examination of social capital theory that is apposite to the analytical concerns of 
the present study.  Putnam defines social capital as ‘connections among individuals – 
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social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from 
them.’ 257   Reciprocal social relations embedded in membership in voluntary 
associations acts generate civic virtue and promote social cohesion.  According to 
Putnam’s theoretical framework, there are two distinct dimensions to the concept of 
social capital (though in practice the line dividing them is often blurred).  Bridging 
(inclusive) social capital refers to social  networks  that  are  ‘outward  looking  and 
encompass  people  across  diverse  social  cleavages’,  and can be contrasted with 
bonding (exclusive) social capital which is ‘inward looking and tend[s] to reinforce 
exclusive identities and homogenous groups.’258   
The idea that the maintenance of strong social capital depends upon the 
extent of active civic engagement contains strong echoes of Tocqueville’s 
celebration of  the salutary  effects of Americans’ enthusiasm for forming voluntary 
associations on the quality of democratic governance in the United States.  Based 
upon extensive empirical data, Putnam concludes that the vibrant civic associational 
life identified by Tocqueville during his travels through America has been 
significantly diminished and impoverished.: 
 
‘In effect, the classic institutions of American civic life, both religious and secular, 
have  been  “hollowed  out.”    Seen  from without,  the institutional edifice appears virtually 
intact – little decline in profession of faith, formal membership down just a bit, and so on.  
When examined more closely, however, it seems clear that decay has consumed the load-
bearing beams of our civic infrastructure.’259 
  
 Putnam draws on the concept of generalized reciprocity in order to examine 
the relationship between ethnic diversity and social capital theory.  The  former’s 
significance is understood in the following terms:  
 
‘Each  individual  act  in  a  system of reciprocity is usually characterized by a 
combination of what one might call short-term altruism and long-term self-interest: I help 
you out now in the (possible vague, uncertain, and uncalculating) expectation that you will 
help me out in the future.  Reciprocity is made up of a series of acts each of which is short-
run altruistic (benefiting others at a cost to the altruist), but which together typically make 
every participant better off.’260 
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Proceeding from an assumption that, owing to immigration and birth rate 
differentials between immigrants and native citizens, the extent of ethnic diversity 
present in Western nation-states can be predictably forecast to increase, Putnam 
surveys a range of quantitative data designed to explore the possible consequences 
for social capital.  The wealth of evidence points in the direction of ethnic diversity 
and  social  capital  being  negatively  correlated:  ‘In  the  short  to  medium 
run...immigration and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity and inhibit social 
capital.’261   
Putnam’s  explanation  for  the  negative  correlation  found  between  ethnic 
diversity and social capital makes use of the distinction between bridging and 
bonding social capital in order to critique dominant assumptions about the 
relationship between in-group and out-group trust.  According to Putnam, it is not 
the case that, as might be suspected, increased ethnic diversity fosters out-group 
distrust and in-group solidarity, thus intensifying conflict between ethnic groups over 
scarce resources.  For this supposition to hold, it must be assumed that bridging and 
bonding social capital are mutually incompatible which, Putnam claims, is not the 
case:  ‘once we recognize that in-group and out-group attitudes need not be 
reciprocally related, but can vary independently, then we need to allow, logically at 
least, for the possibility that diversity might actually reduce both in-group and out-
group solidarity – that is, both bonding and bridging social capital.’262   
This is, in fact, precisely what the empirical evidence suggests, leading 
Putnam to conclude that increasing ethnic diversity is associated with a generalized 
reduction in the social integration of the individual into the collective for which 
Durkheim argues is a symptom of anomie, a pathological condition to which modern 
societies are uniquely vulnerable.  ‘Diversity,’ Putnam writes, ‘seems to trigger not 
in-group/out-group division, but anomie or  social  isolation’ manifested  in  the  fact 
that  ‘inhabitants  of  diverse  communities  tend  to  withdraw  from collective life, to 
distrust their neighbours, regardless of the colour of their skin.’263   
Whilst this suggests that identity occupies an important position with regard 
to the generation of social capital, Putnam declines to offer any systematic theory as 
to why this should be so.  However, his optimistic assertion that ‘in the medium to 
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long run...successful immigrant societies create new forms of social solidarity and 
dampen the negative effects of diversity by constructing new, more encompassing 
identities’264 indicates that it is the salience with which exclusive elements of social 
identity are associated that determines their effect on social capital.  According to 
this view, the malign effects of diversity on social capital diminish as the salience of 
(say) ethnicity for social identity decreases.  By way of illustration, Putnam offers 
the example of religious differences in America writing that  
 
‘for most Americans their religious identity is actually more important to them than 
their ethnic identity, but the salience of religious differences as lines of social identity has 
sharply diminished.  As our religious identities have become more permeable, we have 
gained much religiously bridging social capital, while not forsaking our own religious 
loyalties.’265  
 
 It is, therefore, the prevalence of unitary conceptions of social identity that 
threatens the generation of social capital in ethnically diverse states.  For social 
capital to be safeguarded, it is essential that individuals and communities within civil 
society possess some level of shared identity, but a shared identity that encourages 
the existence of diverse dual identities.  Social capital, Putnam argues, depends upon 
policies  that  foster  ‘permeable,  syncretic,  ‘hyphenated’, identities; identities that 
enable previously separate ethnic groups to see themselves, in part, as members of a 
shared group with a shared identity.’266 
In the various guises in which it appears, social capital theory has been 
subject to a range of criticisms expressing serious doubt as to its explanatory power.  
An early criticism directed toward social capital theory concerned its alleged neglect 
of the potentially destructive effects of social capital; its so-called ‘dark side.’  That 
the idea of community implicitly promoted by social capital theory might potentially 
carry destructive consequences is a well-rehearsed one.  Before the term social 
capital rose to prominence within the social sciences in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
sociologist Richard Sennet argued that, rather than promote social cohesion, the type 
of community it celebrates threatens to undermine the possibilities for meaningful 
social action through the corrosive effect it has on the character of the public 
sphere. 267   According to this perspective, attempts to re-construct a sense of 
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community around shared identity merely facilitate the penetration of the public 
sphere by the principle of (collective) personality that serves as an obstacle to 
genuine collective action:   
 
‘The  community  idea  involved  here  is  the  belief that when people disclose 
themselves to each other, a tissue grows to bind them together.  If there is no psychological 
openness, there can be no social bond...What has emerged in the last hundred years, as 
communities of collective personality have begun to form, is that the shared imagery 
becomes a deterrent to shared action.  Just as personality itself has become an antisocial idea, 
collective personality becomes group identity in society hostile to, difficult to translate into, 
group activity.  Community has become a phenomenon of collective being rather than 
collective action.’268 
 
 According to Sennet, the possibilities for collective mobilization in the 
service of collective interests depends not upon the promotion of common 
Gemeinschaft-like values, but on the legitimacy and coherence of the public sphere, 
which  require  for  their  realization  the  existence  of  ‘common  codes  of  belief’ 
presented  in  impersonal  social  interaction  ‘which  protects  people  from  each  other 
and yet allows them to enjoy each other’s company.’269   
 Putnam acknowledges two distinct aspects of a potential ‘dark side of social 
capital’;  in  respect  of  its  effects  on  liberty  and  tolerance  on  the  one  hand,  and  on 
equality on the other.270  The classical liberal critique of communitarianism rests on 
the proposition that support for strong Gemeinschaft-like social bonds restricts 
freedom and thereby fosters intolerance.  Social capital, according to this view, is as 
likely to impose conformity and social division as reinvigorate democratic 
participation.  Along similar lines, the social networks that generate social capital, 
rather than facilitate the social integration of individuals into civil society, may in 
reality reinforce social stratification and undermine attempts to promote egalitarian 
ideals.  As we have seen, this is precisely the function that Bourdieu associates with 
social capital.   
Based on an empirical analysis comparing trends in social capital with 
changing attitudes toward tolerance and the equality of income distribution, Putnam 
argues that little evidence can be found in support of the claim that social capital is 
generated at the expense of individual liberty and/or equality.  Rather, in the post-
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war United States at least, data suggests that social capital is positively correlated 
with both tolerance and egalitarianism.271  Once again, Putnam’s explanation for this 
evidence rests on the proposition that bridging and bonding social capital are not 
mutually exclusive resources whereby the price paid for in-group solidarity is a 
reduction of out-group solidarity.  Whilst he acknowledges that forms of bonding 
social capital rooted in homogeneous associational networks are generally less well 
suited to democratic public deliberation, he nevertheless argues that generalised 
social disengagement and the decline in social capital that this brings about, 
represents the graver threat to liberty and equality.   
Additional theoretical, empirical and methodological criticisms have been 
levelled at social capital theory in general and the work of Putnam in particular.  Ben 
Fine,  for  example,  argues  that  Putnam’s  analysis  of  his  own  quantitative  data  is 
methodologically  flawed,  writing;  ‘although  Putnam  does  run  simple  regressions, 
there are the questions of how variables are measured, omitted variables, model 
specification…,  relating  cross-section with time-series  analysis…,  and  the 
relationship between correlation and causation.’272  Theoretical criticism focuses on 
the absence within mainstream social capital theory of an adequate account of 
broader structural and historical factors, in particular the role of the central state and 
economic restructuring, that induce the context within which social capital is 
created.273  Without examining the content of such criticisms in depth, we conclude 
this discussion of social capital theory with a few remarks concerning the 
significance of the structuralist lacuna within social capital theory as it relates to the 
issue of identity and diversity.   
As we have seen, in his analysis of the relationship between ethnic diversity 
and social capital, Putnam concludes that increased diversity is, at least in the short 
run, associated with social isolation and declining social capital.  Both bonding and 
bridging  social  capital  are  undermined  as  individual’s  ‘hunker  down’  and  retreat 
from broader civic participation.  If this trade-off between diversity and community 
is to be redressed in the longer term, as Putnam confidently asserts is possible, 
policies that strengthen a sense of shared identity are recommended.  However, 
Putnam’s strong emphasis on the significance of identity conceals a relative neglect 
of the political, historical and structural factors that create much of the context within 
which social identities are articulated and acquire meaning.  The problems associated 
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with this neglect are amplified where it is national rather than ethnic identity that it is 
of concern, if for no other reason than the state’s self-definition as a nation-state with 
all the implications that this entails (see Chapters One and Two).  Whilst it may be 
true that a sense of shared identity is positively correlated with social capital (and 
social cohesion), its analysis cannot be divorced from the structural and political 
context within which sub-state social identities operate.  Where, for example, the 
political demands advanced by sub-state national identities seeking greater autonomy 
are denied by a central state professing a unitary conception of national identity, 
measures designed to promote a sense of shared identity must be understood within 
the  context  of  the  latter’s  interest  in  nation-building as a means by which to 
strengthen its legitimacy.   
 
Communitarianism, National Identity and Social Cohesion 
Described  by  Putnam  as  a  ‘conceptual  cousin’  of  the  idea  of  community, social 
capital theory represents one response to the problem of declining social cohesion in 
modern societies that, as we have seen, shares some of the concerns of classical 
social theory, in particular an interest in the importance of reciprocal ties of 
‘Gemeinschaft’ (community) sentiment and the significance of civic associational 
life.  Continuing with the idea that community is a key concept for theorizing the 
conditions of social cohesion, we now turn to the communitarian critique of rights-
based liberalism as a final approach to understanding the concept of social cohesion.  
The breadth of communitarian thinking is such that an extensive analysis of 
communitarianism falls is beyond the scope of the present analysis.  Rather, our 
primary focus is on those insights generated within communitarian theories that have 
a bearing on the problem of social cohesion as it has been defined in this chapter, 
and on the relationship in which social cohesion stands to national identity.  In terms 
of this final point, the work of two authors – Yael Tamir and David Miller – are 
examined in detail as prominent examples of analyses that employ some of the 
insights of communitarian thinking to the specific issue of nationality and argue that 
a shared national identity encompassing the entire population of a state is a sine qua 
non of social cohesion. 
 The essence of rights-based liberalism is the construction of a neutral 
institutional framework conducive to the free pursuit of individual conceptions of the 
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good life consistent with a similar liberty for others.  The state, according to this 
perspective, refrains from actively promoting any particular moral values or 
conceptions of the good, preferring instead to maximize individual freedom of 
choice.  This is achieved by the protection of certain basic individual liberties 
through a system of inviolable rights:  ‘A  just  social  system,’ writes  John Rawls, 
‘defines the scope within which individuals develop their aims, and it provides a 
framework of rights and opportunities and the means of satisfaction within and by 
the use of which these ends may be equitably pursued.’274   
 The liberal contention that, in Ronald Dworkin’s words,  ‘political decisions 
must be, so far as is possible, independent of any particular conceptions of the good 
life, or of what gives value to life’275 relies on a certain interpretation of selfhood that 
is contested by communitarians.  The liberal self is separate, autonomous and free-
choosing.  Individuals are not constituted by the aims and attachments they hold, 
since these are always potentially subject to assessment and revision.  Thus Rawls 
writes; ‘The self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it; even a dominant end 
must be chosen from among numerous possibilities.’276  A society made up of such 
‘unencumbered’  selves  holding  a  plurality  of  contingent  values  and  attachments  is 
held together through contractual relationships established between individuals and 
through the political obligations generated by political institutions that protect basic 
rights and liberties.  A ‘well-ordered society’, Rawls argues, is synonymous with ‘a 
society  in which  institutions  are  just  and  this  fact  is  publicly  recognized.’277  It is, 
therefore, common membership in a just state, rather than (say) affective ties of 
sentiment or shared values, that is the principal source of social cohesion.  
Additional social bonds as may exist between some or all fellow citizens bear no 
independent weight since the ties of mutual obligation that they imply can under no 
circumstances override the basic rights of citizenship, from which alone are the 
political obligations upon which social cohesion depends derived. 
 Communitarians reject the image of the unencumbered self underpinning 
rights-based liberalism and construct an alternative account of what is required for 
the maintenance of social cohesion.  Contrary  to  Rawls’  assertion  that  the  self  is 
prior to the ends it affirms, communitarianism proceeds from the assumption that 
particular relationships, attachments, memberships, and the common aims and values 
that are associated with these, are partly constitutive of our selves.  That is to say, the 
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notion of an unencumbered self existing prior to particular aims and attachments is 
unintelligible.    Thus  Alasdair  MacIntyre  argues;  ‘We  cannot…characterize 
behaviour independently of intentions, and we cannot characterize intentions 
independently of the settings which make those intentions intelligible to agents 
themselves and to others.’278  Selfhood is, according to this perspective, intrinsically 
and inevitably situated within a wider context; individuals are embedded in 
communal memberships and institutional roles that are morally significant as sources 
of personal identity.  As Sandel argues, an appreciation of the situatedness of the self 
greatly increases the significance of community as a constitutive aspect of social 
identity: 
 
 ‘in  so  far as our constitutive  self-understandings comprehend a wider subject than 
the individual alone, whether a family or tribe or city or class or nation or people, to this 
extent they define a community in the constitutive sense.  And what marks such a 
community is not merely a spirit of benevolence, or the prevalence of communitarian values, 
or  even  certain  ‘shared  final  ends’  alone,  but  a  common  vocabulary  of discourse and a 
background of implicit practices and understandings within which the opacity of the 
participants is reduced if never finally reduced.’279 
 
 One cannot understand the forces that bind society together, that lend it 
cohesion, without reference to the mutual bonds of obligation generated by 
communal ties.  By proceeding as if universal maxims alone constitute the essence of 
selfhood, rights-based liberalism, argues Michael Walzer,  ‘limits our understanding 
of our own heart’s habits and give us no way to formulate the convictions that hold 
us  together  as  persons  and  that  bind  persons  together  into  a  community.’280  As 
Spragens argues, contractual relationships and shared citizenship, whilst perhaps 
necessary, are not sufficient as sources of social  cohesion:  ‘A  properly  ordered 
society…cannot  be  merely  a  congeries  of  contractual  relationships  among  self-
interested individuals.  Instead, it must be at least in part the product of public-
spirited behaviour by citizens who possess the requisite capacities and self-restraint 
for cooperation and self-governance.’281  
 In his analysis of the principle of nationality, David Miller argues that 
national identity is a justifiable and distinctive source of personal identity capable of 
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exercising a pervasive influence  on  people’s  behaviour  even  where it remains 
unarticulated.    Building  on  the  communitarian  assumption  ‘that  memberships  and 
attachments  in  general  have  ethical  significance’282, Miller asserts that nations are 
ethical communities, meaning that one legitimately owes obligations to one’s fellow 
nations that are not owed to other human beings.  As an ethical community, the 
nation engenders mutual bonds of reciprocity conducive to mutual aid and social 
cohesion: ‘because of the loose reciprocity that characterizes the ethics of 
community, a person who acts to aid some other members of his group can be 
sustained by the thought that in different circumstances he might expect to be the 
beneficiary  of  the  relationship.’ 283   For  Yael  Tamir,  the  nation  as  ‘imagined 
community’ fosters social solidarity and togetherness amongst its members: ‘Living 
within  a  community  where  members  share  an  “imagined’  sense  of  togetherness 
engenders mutual responsibilities.’284  With their source in identity and relatedness, 
these mutual responsibilities generate binding ‘associative  obligations’, defined as, 
‘obligations  generated  by  social  associations  that  induce  among  their  members 
feelings of membership and belonging, as well as the belief that the preservation of 
their society is a worthy endeavour.’285   
 For Miller and Tamir, social cohesion and the pursuit of redistributive justice 
depend on the formal bonds of citizenship being complemented and reinforced by 
the communal bonds of national identity and the associative obligations generated by 
shared national membership.  If we are concerned with the conditions that make for a 
cohesive society capable of supporting the mutual sacrifices required by 
redistributive policies, it is necessary to look beyond the contractual view of society 
that underpins traditional rights-based liberalism.  For Tamir, political obligations 
must be justified in part by reference to associative obligations grounded in feelings 
of belonging and identification with the association:  ‘The  process  by  which  we 
assume political obligations to a particular state, our state, can only be understood in 
light of their nature as associative commitments, whose moral importance is derived 
from the notion of membership rather than from general moral duties.’286  According 
to Miller, such associative commitments as nationality generates are essential if the 
levels of generalized trust and reciprocity required to support the voluntary 
cooperation of citizens are  to  be  sustained:  ‘Trust  requires  solidarity  not  merely 
within groups but across them, and this in turn depends upon a common 
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identification of  the kind  that nationality  alone  can provide.’287  Where trust is not 
sustained by communal bonds of nationality, rational egoism and mutual 
disinterestedness threaten to predominate and ‘politics  at  best  takes  the  form  of 
group bargaining and compromises and at worst degenerates into a struggle for 
domination.’288  Shared nationality, in other words, is a fundamental condition for 
the maintenance of social cohesion in modern societies. 
 Where political obligations are seen as, in part, necessarily associative in 
nature, and where nations are understood as ethical communities supporting mutual 
cooperation, there are instrumental benefits to be gained where political institutions 
recognize national membership.  For Miller  this means  that  ‘political  communities 
should as far as possible be organized in such a way that their members share a 
common national identity, which binds them together in the face of their many 
diverse private and group identities,’ and that national communities therefore have a 
good claim to political self-determination.289  Where the boundaries of nation and 
state coincide in the form of a genuine nation-state, citizenship delineates a 
communal associative relationship as well  as  a  formal  legalistic  one:  ‘Communal 
solidarity,’ writes Tamir, ‘creates a feeling or an illusion, of closeness and share fate, 
which  is  a  precondition  of  distributive  justice…Consequently,  the  community-like 
nature of the nation-state is particularly well-suited, and perhaps even necessary, to 
the notion of the liberal welfare state.’290  
 The idea that national homogeneity is a necessary condition for the 
maintenance of society as a continuous coherent framework is, as was noted in the 
previous chapter, the opinion of John Stuart Mill where he writes; ‘Among a people 
without fellow-feelings, especially if they read and speak different languages, the 
united public opinion necessary to the workings of representative institutions cannot 
exist...[it] is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries 
of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities.’291  There are 
two fundamental ways of bringing about a greater coincidence of nation and state 
such as is recommended by Mill, Miller and Tamir; promoting an overriding single 
national identity through a project of nation-building, or by re-drawing state 
boundaries.  Where one holds to a teleological conviction that the historical tendency 
of human associations is moving in the direction of progressively larger consolidated 
states, and/or a belief in the inherent superiority of large nations, nation-building will 
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recommend itself as the most appropriate course of action for a state wishing to 
provide a secure basis for social cohesion.  As was noted in the previous chapter, this 
is essentially the view held by Mill when he asserts the benefits to be gained by 
members of peripheral nations from assimilating into the larger nationalities 
embodied within by consolidated nation-states.    
Despite concluding that nationalities have a good claim to self-determination, 
Miller’s thesis has been criticised for failing to give due consideration to the de facto 
national diversity of the overwhelming majority of nation-states, and for upholding a 
state-centric perspective on the claims of national minorities.  Miller, as we saw, 
argues in favour of drawing political boundaries in such a way as to ensure that the 
bounds of nationality and state coincide as far as possible.  Where nation and state 
coincide, Miller suggests, a number of substantive benefits will accrue.  As Margaret 
Moore argues, the nature of these benefits fall into two distinct, albeit closely related, 
categories; on the one hand internal national homogeneity is desirable owing to the 
intrinsic value of nations as ethical communities.  On the other hand, a coincidence 
of nation and state is instrumentally valuable for the benefits that accrue in terms of 
implementing social justice, securing social cohesion, protecting a common culture, 
facilitating deliberative forms of democracy and fostering collective autonomy.292  
According  to  Moore,  ‘Miller’s  two  justificatory  arguments  point  in  different 
directions: the intrinsic justification suggests that national attachments are 
intrinsically valuable; the instrumental justification points to the importance of 
national ties in supporting a state which is attempting to realise traditional social-
democratic  goals.’   293  The latent tension between these two different justificatory 
arguments surfaces in the course of Miller’s application of his nationality principle to 
a selection of specific political problems, where instrumental justifications are 
deployed in defence of existing large states that are erroneously treated as though 
they were nationally homogeneous.294  This charge is repeated by James Kellas who 
contends that, by reasoning as if existing states in fact display a coincidence between 
nation  and  state,  ‘much  of  [Miller’s]  discussion  on  nationality  and  sovereignty  is 
actually about states.’295 
As  Brendan  O’Leary  argues,  the  implicit  statist  bias  in  Miller’s  theory  is 
most clearly evident in his chapter on national self-determination where he rejects 
the idea of a right to national self-determination in favour of a qualified defence that 
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nations have a good claim to self-determination.296  However, having put forward 
arguments in favour of a good claim to national self-determination, Miller goes on to 
specify a number of qualifications: only nationalities as defined by Miller have 
recourse to the claim; the nation in question must be large enough to form a ‘viable’ 
state; the self-determining  territory  cannot  be  essential  to  the  state’s  military 
security; and the claim is weakened where any act of self-determination would create 
new minorities.   The unnecessarily  conservative  character of Miller’s qualification 
‘effectively  grants  to  existing  states,  not  nations…the  right  to  determine  which 
groups are nationalities, and which ones should be free to exercise self-
determination.’297  As Kellas notes, given the jealous manner in which states can be 
expected to defend their sovereignty, this renders anti-state nationalisms ‘essentially 
out  of  order.’298  Miller’s  theory  is,  therefore,  biased  in  favour  of  the  legitimacy 
states over nations.299 
Proceeding from the assumption that the ideal of the homogeneous nation-
state is increasingly a practical impossibility, Tamir argues that the imperative for 
political institutions to reflect national membership can best be satisfied by 
abandoning the nation-state  model  altogether:  ‘although  it  cannot  be  ensured  that 
each nation will have its own state, all nations are entitled to a public sphere in 
which they constitute the majority.  The ideal of the nation-state should therefore be 
abandoned in favour of another,  more  practicable  and  just.’300  In order for the 
benefits of national solidarity to be harvested without resort to state-oriented nation-
building  programmes,  ‘requires  us  to  redefine  concepts  like  sovereignty, 
independence, and national self-determination.’ 301   This is best achieved, Tamir 
suggests, by conceiving of nationality claims in cultural rather than political terms.  
So,  she  argues;  ‘The  right  to  national  self-determination…stakes  a  cultural  rather 
than a political claim, namely, it is the right to preserve the existence of a nation as a 
distinct  cultural  entity.’ 302   Thus understood, national self-determination is most 
effectively realized within the context of broader supranational political alliances, of 
which the European Union is a prototypical example.   
 
Summary 
What are the implications of the above for the social cohesion of multinational 
states; that is, for states containing one or more national minorities claiming a right 
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to political self-determination?  Furthermore, what are the likely consequences for 
the social cohesion of the state as a whole of devolving some measure of political 
autonomy to territorially concentrated national minorities?   
The basic condition of social cohesion, it has been suggested, is that 
individuals in civil society should feel united by effective ties of mutual trust, 
obligation, reciprocity and solidarity.  Where such ties are weak or absent, 
individuals’  social  integration  into the collectivity is threatened, fostering social 
disengagement and anomie, in the process undermining attempts at sustaining social 
cohesion.  In such circumstances, effective collective action in pursuit of social 
justice objectives requiring redistributive policies is especially imperilled.   
One factor implicated in the reproduction of the integrative bonds of social 
cohesion concerns the horizontal relations of civic associational networks.  Where 
these flourish and encompass a significant portion of citizens they act as resources 
promoting civic engagement that in turn fosters greater levels of mutual obligation 
and social capital.  Leaving aside the more explicitly political and economic factors 
bearing on the shape of civic associational life and instead focusing on the 
specifically social dimension, a number of variables have been identified as 
potentially significant.  Chief among these is the existence of shared values, 
sentiments and beliefs which function to promote generalized trust and reciprocity.  
The relationship between these common sentiments and civic participation cuts both 
ways; associational networks are likely to flourish in societies that exhibit strong 
value-consensus, and membership in associational networks facilitates converging 
value-consensus.   
For social cohesion to be maintained, some means must be found of 
reconciling diverse political cultures around a shared public culture capable of 
supporting mutual cooperation.  This suggests that an overriding common identity is 
needed in order to sustain the ties of mutual obligation and solidarity that are the 
building blocks of social cohesion.  National identity possesses a distinctive 
significance in this regard given that, by definition, it contains a public political 
dimension.  A single encompassing national identity has therefore been historically 
viewed as an essential element in diffusing social solidarity throughout the 
population of the state.  Nation-building has been the principle means by which 
states have striven to achieve this ideal of common identity and common 
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membership seen as underpinning social integration and cohesion.  As Anthony 
Smith observes;  
 
‘The  nation  is…called  upon  to  provide  a  social  bond  between  individuals  and 
classes by providing repertoires of shared values, symbols and traditions.  By the use of 
symbols – flags, coinage, anthems, uniforms, monuments and ceremonies – members are 
reminded of their common heritage and cultural kinship and feel strengthened and exalted by 
their sense of common identity and belonging.’303 
 
 Traditionally understood, nation-building is one means by which to bring 
about a coincidence of state and nation, one of the objectives of which is, as we have 
seen, social integration and cohesion.  The benefits with which the successful 
achievement  of  such  a  coincidence  is  associated  are  the  subject  of  Miller’s 
philosophical analysis of the idea of nationality examined above.  However, of more 
direct concern to the present study are the implications that the association between 
shared identity and social cohesion suggest for situations where two or more distinct 
nationalities co-exist within the territorial boundaries of a single shared state.   
Of course, on one level such a condition of national diversity is precisely the 
target of nation-building, which employs the considerable infrastructural power of 
the modern state in order to refocus the loyalty of its citizens away from pre-existing 
local attachments, which might have as good a claim to being a national identity as 
the state-supported identity.  The demonstrable fact, however, that the vast 
proportion of contemporary states are not nationally homogeneous (are not, in other 
words, true nation-states in the empirical sense of the term) provides strong evidence 
to suggest that nation-building has been unable to bring about the kind of 
coincidence between nation and state that Miller recommends as the most fertile 
condition for the maintenance of social cohesion.  Given this fact, and if we accept 
as legitimate the claim that a shared identity is important for social cohesion, two 
possible courses of action recommend themselves; either a renewed pursuit, via 
continued attempts at state-led nation-building, of national homogeneity, or the 
redrawing of political boundaries with a view to creating more nationally 
homogeneous states.   
133 
 
The survival of territorially-concentrated minorities that maintain a distinct 
and separate national identity within a number of long-established Western states 
paints a sobering picture for any would-be nation-building state, suggesting as it 
does the significant limitations of the nation-building project.  Nationally 
homogenous states are not, it would seem reasonable to assume, likely to be brought 
into being by persuading national minorities, some of which have retained their 
distinctive identity for  centuries  of  ‘statelessness’  and  often in the face of violent 
suppression, to adopt the preferred nationality of the state.  As Guibernau observes, 
such  national  minorities  often  ‘regard  the  state  containing  them  as  alien,  and 
maintain a separate sense of national identity generally based upon a common 
culture, history, attachment to a particular territory and the explicit wish to rule 
themselves.’304   These attachments will not generally be relinquished in response to 
the nation-building efforts of a central state regarded as alien.   
The creation of nationally homogeneous states requires, therefore, the 
boundaries of existing states to be re-drawn around existing nationalities.  To the 
extent that they genuinely are nationally homogeneous, the populations of the new 
states thus created will be united by stronger bonds of social solidarity and thus 
better placed to produce and maintain social cohesion.  This supports a case for a 
prima facie right to claim national self-determination.   
How though should we understand cases where conflicting claims to self-
determination are advanced or where a national minority expresses a desire for a 
form of self-determination that falls short of independent statehood?  Defending the 
principle of national self-determination even in such instances, O’Leary argues that 
‘in  circumstances where  reasonable  and  rival  claims  to  national  self-determination 
clash, the relevant nationalities must be granted a right to co-sovereignty’  that can 
take a variety of forms including federalism, devolution or consociation. 305   As a 
method of accommodating the demands of internal national minorities, political 
autonomy arrangements such as these have the benefit, by according political 
recognition to sub-state national identities, of reinforcing citizenship with the 
stronger solidaristic bonds of national identity.  This reduces the national minority’s 
perception of the central state as alien, thereby removing a significant obstacle to 
social integration.   
134 
 
From the perspective of social cohesion, it may be objected that the political 
recognition of national minorities increases the visibility of national diversity and, by 
emphasising the differences separating citizens rather than the similarities uniting 
them, undermines the capacity of sustaining mutual bonds of recognition and 
solidarity  between  the  state’s  constituent  nationalities.    At  this  point it should be 
noted that the validity of such claims can ultimately only be assessed through 
empirical research (see chapters Seven and Eight).  The following remarks 
concerning the conditions of social cohesion where national minorities exercise some 
measure of political autonomy will suffice.  Such a state, rather than promoting 
social integration through a single overarching nation-building project, would instead 
be one in which several nation-building projects are advanced simultaneously.  
Whether, and to what extent, such nation-building projects are antagonistic to one 
another, and hence potentially damaging to social cohesion, in large part depends on 
their specific character.  In particular, social cohesion is less likely to be imperilled 
where  they  promote  a  democratic,  inclusive  and  ‘civic’  conception  of  national 
identity rather than an exclusive ‘ethnic’ one.  Furthermore, the cohesiveness of the 
‘post-traditional nation-state’ 306  is significantly dependent on nation-building 
programmes  that  facilitate  and  foster  ‘dual  identities’  that  reflect  the  complex 
relationship between nation and state that exists therein.  
Within the post-traditional state, issues of fairness and equity between the 
various national communities become of heightened significance.  Political 
autonomy arrangements are most likely to undermine cohesion where they are 
perceived as unfairly privileging one national community at the expense of another.  
Whilst it is important the political autonomy enables national minorities to pursue 
genuinely distinct policies and decide on their own political future, it is equally 
important that this is not achieved at the expense of inter-national (in a literal sense) 
equity.  Any political autonomy settlement must therefore be capable of 
commanding the assent of all national communities on the basis that power and 
resources are distributed fairly and in such a way that reflects the ‘settled will’ of any 
particular national community.  This does not necessarily mean that political 
autonomy  arrangements  must  express  perfect  ‘symmetry’,  but  it  does  mean  that 
provisions for the satisfaction of future adjustments in national sentiment (be they in 
the direction of more or of less political autonomy) be made. 
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4 
The Scottish Nation, 1057-1886 
 
 
 
 
 
A central theme of traditional nationalist ideology is an emphasis on the importance 
of continuity with the past as an essential element in the project of future national 
regeneration.   According to this  ideology,  the nation’s distinctive moral values and 
its sentiment of forming a community with a shared project for the future all have 
their roots in the nation’s common past.307  Important events in the nation’s historical 
development are therefore examined for their relevance to the contemporary political 
challenges  facing  it.    For  example,  the  image  of  a  ‘golden  age’  in  the  nation’s 
historical development, during which it achieved particular distinction in the spheres 
of politics or culture, is held up as evidence of the nation’s greatness and looked to 
as a source of inspiration for nationalist renewal.  Not only past national successes, 
but also past defeats and injustices are invoked as symbols of national solidarity and 
sacrifice.  Romantic nationalism is concerned with reviving and celebrating historic 
and folkloric traditions which are seen as expressions of the nation’s unique identity.   
Nationalist ideology  is  not  solely  confined  to  an  interest  in  the  nation’s 
specific history and cultural traditions, but given the fact that these elements feature 
to some degree in the discourse of all nationalist movements, an inquiry into the 
origins of national identity, the emergence of the nation as a political community 
claiming  the  right  to  rule  itself,  and  the  pivotal  historical  events  in  the  nation’s 
development inevitably forms an essential part of the analysis of contemporary 
minority nationalisms.  The objective of this chapter is to undertake precisely this 
type of inquiry with regard to the specific case of Scotland.  The explanatory theories 
of the state and of nations and nationalism explored in previous chapters are 
employed as an analytical framework within which to examine the historical origins 
of the Scottish nation, and the mechanisms by which it emerged and evolved.  The 
analysis contained within this chapter is not intended as a systematic or exhaustive 
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account of the historical development of the Scottish nation.  Such a task is well 
beyond the scope of the present study.  Rather, what is offered is a discussion of the 
most pivotal historical events in the development of Scottish national consciousness 
and an examination of the implications that the interpretation of these events contain 
for the nature of contemporary Scottish national identity and Anglo-Scottish 
relations.   
 
The Institutional Roots of Scottish National Identity, 1057-1286 
The existence of a single Scottish kingdom dates back to at least 1057, with the 
union of Scotland’s main ethnic groups, the Picts, Britons, Angles and Scotti under 
the monarchical authority of Prince Malcolm Canmore.  However, whilst the 
majority of the Scottish population owed nominal allegiance to the king, this should 
in no way be taken to imply the existence of a Scottish state presiding over a unified 
or homogeneous people.  Rather, as was common to all European ‘states’ during the 
middle ages, the Scottish kingdom consisted of segmentally autonomous political 
and cultural units amongst whom differentiation rather than uniformity was the norm.  
Scotland  in  the  eleventh  century  was  ‘much  less  an  identifiable  state  than  a 
confederacy of peoples with distinct characteristics and traditions, each prone to 
rebellions and to internecine war.’308 
That neither a unified state nor a homogeneous nation existed in eleventh 
century Scotland should come as no surprise given the theories of the state examined 
in Chapter One.  According to Anthony Giddens, for example, within all traditional 
states ‘the administrative reach of the political centre is low, such that the members 
of the political apparatus do not ‘govern’ in the modern sense.’309  In similar fashion, 
Michael Mann argues that the pre-modern  state  ‘had  considerable  autonomy in its 
own private sphere but  little power over or through society’, and that consequently 
the king’s rule was ‘indirect, depending on the infrastructures of autonomous lords, 
the church, and other corporate bodies.’310  This was certainly the case in eleventh 
century Scotland where, despite the nominal existence of a single kingdom, the 
authority of the central state was minimal and loyalty was owed first and foremost to 
clanship ties.  In other words, Scotland in the eleventh century possessed neither a 
coherent state nor a unified national identity  
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It was in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that a more comprehensive 
Scottish identity started to emerge, primarily as a result of reforms enacted by the 
central monarchical state beginning with the accession of David I in 1124.  David I 
and his successors embarked upon a series of institutional reforms oriented toward 
the extension of monarchical power, the success of which brought a dramatic 
increase in the infrastructural power of the central state, which in turn helped forge a 
greater sense of shared identity amongst its subject population.   
The monarchical reforms that facilitated the emergence of a distinct Scottish 
national identity – albeit one in which significant divisions remained, most notably 
between the ‘Lowlanders’ and the ‘Highlanders’ – contained four main elements; the 
establishment of Anglo-Norman style feudalism, innovations in royal administration, 
church reform, and the establishment of Burghs.311 
 
Sovereignty and Territoriality 
More than any other factor, the establishment of feudalism in Scotland laid the 
foundations for the emergence of the twin concepts of sovereignty and territoriality.  
The Anglo-Norman model of feudalism that was introduced was a form of political 
authority based upon territorial units, whereas the traditional Scottish tribalism that it 
replaced was based upon kinship ties between every free man and the head of his 
tribe.312  For this reason, the introduction of feudalism represented a significant step 
toward the territorialisation of political authority, as its source now stemmed from 
possession of a fief rather than membership of a clan.  Moreover, as feudalism was 
established  across  the  majority  of  Lowland  Scotland  ‘a  concept  emerged  that  the 
king was lord of all the  land  and  fountain  of  all  justice.’313  In other words, the 
concept of sovereignty, although it remained an unrealized ideal, took root for the 
first time within Scottish political society.   
The entwined development of sovereignty and territoriality is a distinctive 
feature of the nation-state model.  As the case of Scotland clearly demonstrates, both 
territoriality and sovereignty are historically contingent principles of political 
authority.  Territory possessed little significance within the social and political 
structure of the medieval era, as political authority was there based upon individual 
allegiances – in the case of Scotland those of clan membership – and a unity of faith, 
rather than possession of land areas.314  Moreover, the meaning of territory was itself 
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ill-defined during the pre-modern era, in which states were separated by frontiers 
rather than borders.  As already indicated, a frontier, according to Anthony Giddens’ 
definition, is an area of the state’s periphery which eludes the regularized control of 
the central authorities.  The fact that pre-modern states are separated both externally 
and internally by  such  frontiers  is  an  indication  of  the  weak  level  of  ‘system 
integration’ they exhibit.  It is only with the emergence of the nation-state model that 
frontiers are gradually replaced by geographically drawn borders capable of 
precisely demarcating sovereignty, reflecting the fact that the nation-state, whatever 
its degree of internal regionalization, and in direct contrast to the pre-modern state, is 
a ‘territorially-bounded administrative unity.’315   
  
Nation-Building in Medieval Scotland 
The entwined development of sovereignty and territoriality that the introduction of 
feudalism facilitated, contributed enormously to the obliteration of the old 
distinctions between the different ethnic groups residing in Lowland Scotland.316  As 
a result of institutional reforms initiated by a central monarchical state seeking to 
expand its capacity to govern effectively, a greater degree of political uniformity was 
established, which in turn had the effect of increasing the degree of cultural 
homogeneity within the population.  The state, in other words, was the principle 
agent of nation-building, although this was a largely unintended by-product of the 
successful attempt to increase the scope and effectiveness of the state’s rule.   
The dominant ideology of nation-building in American post-war political 
science, observes Walker Connor, assumed that the multiplicity of pre-modern ethnic 
identities ‘will unquestionably give way to a common identity uniting all inhabitants 
of the state…as modern communications and transportation networks link the state’s 
various  parts  more  closely.’317  The perspective that nation-building occurs as an 
inevitable outgrowth of modernization processes is most closely associated with Karl 
Deutsch who, in Nationalism and Social Communication, argues that the 
assimilation of previously diverse ethnic communities into a single national identity 
results from the increased level of social mobilization that accompanies the 
development of modern communication and transportation networks.318 
The evidence of nation-building in twelfth and thirteenth century Scotland 
contradicts Deutsch’s thesis that ethnic diversity spontaneously withers away under 
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the assimilating pressures of modernization.  First, the emergence of a distinctive 
Scottish identity can be traced back to changes that significantly pre-date processes 
commonly associated with modernization.  Second, rather than the catalyst being an 
increase in social mobilization, in the case of Scotland the principle agent of nation-
building was the state.   
The institutional reforms introduced by the central monarchical state during 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in Scotland were not limited to the introduction 
of feudalism.  Institutional innovation at this time included the establishment of 
sheriffdoms as new units of government based upon the king’s castles, and changes 
in legal procedure aimed at ensuring the uniform application of law.  All of these 
reforms were similarly oriented toward the goal of ‘holding down’ the outlying parts 
of the kingdom.319   
Because feudalism was only successfully introduced across the Lowland area 
of Scotland, whilst in the Western Highland and Islands clan membership continued 
to  be  the  basis  of  political  authority,  the  scope  of  the  central  monarchical  state’s 
political authority remained limited outside of the Lowlands.  For this reason it is in 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that the division between the Lowlands and 
Highlands first emerged.  T.C. Smout describes the Scottish state in the thirteenth 
century as essentially ‘tripartite’ in structure, divided between an inner core centred 
around St. Andrews diocese in which government was relatively secure; a middle 
area where government strength was less certain and rebellions more frequent; and 
an outer periphery consisting primarily of the Western Highlands and Western Isles 
into which the state barely penetrated.320  Despite the homogenizing pressures which 
to some extent eroded the ancient ethnic cleavages that had previously divided the 
Scottish people, the fact that these identities were replaced by a Lowlander-
Highlander cleavage militated against the rise of a comprehensive Scottish national 
identity, let alone a Scottish political nation conscious of forming a community and 
claiming a right to self-determination.   
 
The Anglo-Scottish Relationship, 1286-1328 
Whereas the principle catalyst for nation-building in Scotland prior to the fourteenth 
century was the gradual expansion of the infrastructural power of the monarchical 
state as a result of a cluster of institutional reforms, in the period following the death 
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of Alexander III in 1286 this role was assumed by Scotland's external relations with 
England.   
Upon his death, Alexander III's sole heir was his three year old grand-
daughter Margaret the 'Maid of Norway'.  When she perished in Orkney on her way 
from Norway to Scotland in 1290, Anglo-Scottish relations arrived at a turning-point.  
With no less than thirteen claimants asserting their right to the Scottish crown in 
1291-2, the Scots turned to the English king Edward I for help in resolving the 
succession crisis.  Immediately following his decision in favour of the claim of John 
Balliol, Edward took advantage of Scotland's weak position to gain recognition of 
his suzerainty of the Scottish kingdom, a demand to which the claimants to the 
Scottish throne, with varying degrees of reluctance, agreed.  However, when in the 
following years Edward insisted on exercising his right of overlordship by 
demanding military service from Scotland's higher nobility, a baronial rebellion 
ensued, signalling the start of Scotland's war of independence, a seminal event in the 
history of the Scottish nation. 
 
Warfare and National Identity 
The capacity for military hostilities to enhance feelings of shared national sentiments 
among participants is widely recognized.  Three of the principle mechanisms by 
which warfare can expedite the crystallization of national sentiment are: (i) by 
contributing to the expansion of the infrastructural power of the central state, (ii) 
through the imposition of cultural and linguistic homogeneity within the armed 
forces which thereby becomes a vanguard of national identity, and (iii) by creating 
powerful myths that reinforce subsequent generations’ sense of a shared history. 
(i) Michael Mann attributes the emergence of more comprehensive forms of 
national identity to the massive expansion in the infrastructural power of the modern 
state and its crystallization as a nation-state.321  With  an  expansion  of  the  state’s 
infrastructural power comes a greater capacity to govern effectively throughout its 
territory, thus bringing the state into a closer and more direct relationship to civil 
society.  According to Mann, this tightening of the state-society relationship 
contributes to  the state’s national crystallization because the more directly  the state 
attempts to govern society, the greater the opportunities afforded to the latter to 
influence the activities of the former.  As a result the state is compelled toward a 
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conception  of  legitimacy  in  which  the  capacity  to  represent  its  citizens’  internal 
sense of community is, for the first time, paramount.   
It is, according to Mann, the increased importance of civil society for the 
legitimacy of  an  infrastructurally  strong  state  that  ‘caged’  social  relations over  the 
national terrain and prompted the state to engage in nation-building activities.  
Crucially, in terms of the link between warfare and nation-building, the expansion of 
the state’s infrastructural power was itself primarily a response to an increase in the 
level and intensity of intra-state competition, which brought demands for an 
extension of conscription and massively increased spending on military technologies.  
The fiscal crisis precipitated by these demands forced the central state to focus on 
increasing its tax-gathering powers, in the process expanding its administrative 
capacity.   
(ii) Daniele Conversi understands the link between warfare and nation-
building to be a product of the development of rigorously professional standing 
armies rather than a tightening state-society relationship brought on by a generalized 
expansion of the infrastructural power of the central state.  As warfare began to place 
increasingly onerous demands on states, mercenary armies were gradually replaced 
by standing armies composed of citizens.  These new armed forces, Conversi argues, 
were the first institution in society to experience the demand for linguistic 
homogeneity that is a key aspect of national identity.   
This need for linguistic homogeneity, combined with the ideals of obedience 
and conformity that are central to the modern army, had the effect of turning it into 
‘the very forge where homogenisation was first envisioned.’322  In other words, the 
origins of the nation-building process can, according to Conversi, be traced to the 
organizational  demands  of  modern  armies,  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  ‘cultural 
homogenisation and standardization [occurred] at the level of the army before they 
could  reach  the  masses.’ 323   Furthermore,  the  ‘essential  emotional  ingredient’ 
provided by the spread of the idea of the nation in post-1789 political discourse, 
meant that ‘military homogenisation became the prototype for the wider organisation 
of society and government-society relations.’324 
(iii) In addition to its capacity to create a stronger feeling of shared ethnic 
sentiment amongst contemporary participants, warfare, Anthony Smith argues, 
contributes to the myth-making process which informs national sentiment.  'The 
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myths of war,' Smith writes, 'set down in epics, ballads, dramas or hymns, possess a 
long-term power to shape distant reactions that far outweigh and surpass the episodes 
themselves.' 325   According to this perspective, the extent to which cohesion is 
actually strengthened by the immediate experience of warfare is less important than 
the integrative power that that it provides later generations in the form of a historical 
'narrative'.  Moreover, the experience of prolonged or repeated warfare against a 
common enemy can sharpen and politicize any existing cultural differences between 
chronic adversaries.  To the extent that this occurs, 'warfare sets the pattern of 
relationships with significant collective outsiders.'326 
When analyzing the import of Anglo-Scottish warfare upon the development 
of national sentiment in Scotland, principle consideration must be given to the pre-
modern nature of the war of independence.  The Scottish forces that fought against 
the English in the wars of the fourteenth century were, like all medieval armies, 
assembled on an ad hoc basis.  Being neither a professional standing army nor a 
modern conscription force, the Scottish army were subject to few of the 
homogenizing pressures that Conversi suggests transform the army into the vanguard 
of nation-building.  Moreover, fourteenth century Anglo-Scottish conflict 
significantly pre-dates the development and spread of the idea of the nation in the 
late eighteenth century.  In the absence of the emotional ingredient that the idea of 
the nation provides, military organisation was not translated as a prototype for the 
wider organization of government-society relations. 
Mann's theory of the relationship between warfare and nation-building is 
equally unsuited to the case of Anglo-Scottish conflict as rather than extending the 
infrastructural power of the state, war actually brought greater instability and a 
partial failure of royal government to Scotland.  The greater institutional coherence 
and uniformity that the state had gradually established during the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries was somewhat undermined as individual feudal lords took 
advantage of the situation to reassert their segmental autonomy.  In the political 
environment created by Anglo-Scottish conflict, 'feudalism collapsed as a vehicle for 
unity, and became instead a vehicle of failure.'327  
Although one should be wary of the contention that Scotland's war of 
independence crystallized national sentiments amongst the Scottish population in the 
sense of forging a homogeneous nation, it is nevertheless true that the war of 
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independence occupies a central place in the development of a stronger and more 
inclusive sense of national identity in Scotland.  In part this reflects the direct effects 
of mobilization for a resistance that 'gradually took the shape of a national 
resistance'.328  Of greater significance, however, is the contribution that the war of 
independence made to the myth-making process, and its capacity to inspire national 
sentiment in later generations.   
The significance of history to national identity, argues Anthony Smith, does 
not depend on 'the authenticity of the historical record, much less any attempt at 
'objective' methods of historicizing, but the poetic, didactic and integrative purposes 
which that record is felt to disclose.  'History' in this sense must tell a story, it must 
please and satisfy as narrative.'329  The motif of independence endows Scotland's 
experience of war against England with a powerful narrative, both for its participants 
and for later generations.  Ditchburn and MacDonald, for example, argue that, 
subsequent to the war of independence, 'The status of the monarchy, its appeal to the 
inhabitants of the realm, was certainly tied up with its insistence on independence.'330   
The war of independence gave birth to myths and legends of heroism and resistance, 
personified in the folk-hero status of individuals such as William Wallace and Robert 
Bruce. 
 
The Declaration of Arbroath, 1320 
A key document in the history of Scottish nation-building is the Declaration of 
Arbroath drawn up on the 6th April 1320.  The Declaration was sent to Rome with 
the aim of securing Papal recognition for the de facto independence that Scotland 
had achieved with their victory in the battle of Bannockburn in 1314.  The rhetoric 
used in the Declaration of Arbroath provides evidence of the nation-building effects 
of the war of independence.   
First, it is significant that, in addition to the signatures of forty-eight nobles, 
the Declaration states that it is signed on behalf of 'the other barons and freeholders 
and the whole community of the realm of Scotland.'  Of Scotland's war of 
independence it has been argued by one commentator that 'the foundation of this war 
was a capacity to by-pass the reluctant traditional leaders of the 'community' and to 
appeal to and command the opinion of other social ranks in the 'nation'.'331  It is in 
this sense that the war of independence resembled a national conflict, and the 
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wording of the Declaration of Arbroath points to the fact that Robert Bruce relied to 
a hitherto unprecedented degree on the active support of the class of freeholders and 
husbandmen.  This reliance can be read as a perceptible widening of the Scottish 
'political nation.'   
Second, the wording of the Declaration lends itself to the myth-making 
process that supports the politics of nationalism.  The author has plainly understood 
the idea that history, if it is to work toward integrative purposes, must satisfy as 
narrative.  The origins of the Scottish people, suggests the Declaration's author, can 
be traced back to ancient times: 'They journeyed from Greater Scythia by way of the 
Tyrrhenian Sea and the Pillars of Hercules, and dwelt for a long course of time in 
Spain among the most savage tribes.'  The 'freedom and peace' that the Scots have 
long enjoyed were, the Declaration asserts, destroyed by the 'countless evils' of the 
English, only to be restored by the 'our most tireless Prince, King and Lord, the Lord 
Robert'.  In the Declaration's most powerful piece of rhetoric, the author declares that 
'as long as but a hundred of us remain alive, never will we on any condition be 
brought under English rule.  It is in truth not for glory, nor riches, nor honours that 
we are fighting, but for freedom – for that alone, which no honest man gives up but 
with his life.' 
It is important to recognize that the Declaration of Arbroath was more 
propaganda than constitutional treatise332, and it would be a mistake to view the 
Scottish war of independence as akin to a modern nationalist movement.  Not only 
were a number of the baronial signatories to the Declaration opposed to war with 
England333, but despite the widening of the ranks of the political nation to include 
some freeholders and husbandmen, Scotland was still a long way from admitting the 
bulk of its population to such a status.  Here we are reminded that the modern 
concepts of nation and nationalism are closely linked to democratic and egalitarian 
ideals which remained alien to the medieval political universe within which 
Scotland's war of independence too place.   
 
The Road to the Union of the Scottish and English Crowns 
England formally recognized Scottish independence in the Treaty of Northampton 
(1328), in return for which Scotland agreed to pay £20,000 in war damages to the 
English crown.  This, did not, however, signal the end of Anglo-Scottish hostilities, 
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which were resumed within a few years of the signing of the treaty and marked 
relations between the two countries for much of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.  
As a result of the experience of such a long period of enmity with England, the 
national sentiment that crystallized in Scotland included a certain degree of popular 
anti-English sentiment as well as a strong pride in Scotland’s successful resistance of 
English attempts at subjugation.   
The signing of a treaty in January 1502, by which the Scottish king James IV 
was betrothed to the elder daughter of the English king, signalled a cooling of 
relations between Scotland and England.  Although Scottish and English forces still 
met on the battlefield after 1502, most dramatically in 1513 when James IV was 
killed leading his troops against the English at Flodden, these engagements were of 
marginal import to the development of either country.  Of greater significance is the 
fact that from the middle of the sixteenth century, political, religious and economic 
factors coalesced to produce an expansion of English influence over Scottish affairs.  
During  this  period,  argues  Kearney,  Scotland  was  ‘drawn increasingly into a 
Britannic framework’.334   
When Queen Elizabeth I died on 24th March 1603 the Scottish king James VI 
acceded to the English throne, thereby bringing into being a Union of Crowns 
between the two kingdoms.  From the outset of his accession, James envisioned a 
complete union of the British Isles as his ultimate objective.  In a speech given on 3rd 
April 1603 James gave the following advice to his subjects: ‘Think not of me as of 
ane King going frae ane part to another, but of ane King lawfully callit going frae 
ane  part  of  the  isle  to  ane  other  that  sae  your  comfort  be  the  greater.’335  James’ 
theory of political absolutism was given expression in a speech made to his first 
Parliament in March 1604, in which he used a marriage analogy to suggest that his 
accession to the English throne necessitated the political amalgamation of Scotland 
and England: 
 
‘I am the Husband and the whole Isle is my lawfull Wife...I hope therefore no man 
will be so unreasonable as to think that I that am a Christian King under the Gospel should 
be a polygamist and husband to two wives; that I being the Head should have a divided and 
monstrous body.’336 
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Unsurprisingly given the history of Anglo-Scottish relations prior to 1603, 
James’  subjects  were  markedly  less  inclined to the opinion that England and 
Scotland’s  continued  political  separation  was  ‘monstrous’,  and  his  efforts toward 
securing full political union proved to be in vain.   
Sharing a monarch with such a powerful country as England did, however, 
have a profound effect on Scottish politics.  Not the least of these effects derived 
from the fact that James resided in England (he returned to Scotland only once after 
1603, and then for only twelve weeks), to which he devoted the greater share of his 
attention. 337  In Scotland,  the experience of an absentee king  ‘left a vacuum at  the 
centre  of  what  was  already  a  highly  decentralized  state.’338  In part this vacuum 
fostered an increase in English influence, as political developments in Scotland were 
increasingly affected by the London court, through which Scottish politicians had to 
frequently orient their activity.339 
Although in principle a union between equal sovereign states which, whilst 
recognizing a sphere of common interests, nevertheless each retained their sovereign 
independence, in practice the Regal Union involved England, not surprisingly given 
her military and economic superiority, as the dominant partner.  The inequality 
inherent in the Regal Union was brought into sharp relief by Cromwell’s conquest of 
Scotland in 1650 and its subsequent incorporation into a wider commonwealth, 
which lasted until the 1660 restoration.   
The idea that English dominance marks the Anglo-Scottish relationship with 
a fundamental inequality is a recurring motif within the discourse of Scottish 
nationalism.  The extent to which English dominance is a true reflection of reality is 
essentially contested, but what is undoubted is that the perception of Anglo-centric 
bias plays a constitutive role in Scottish nation-building and modern Scottish 
nationalism.   
When trying to understand nationalism, suggests David McCrone, one should 
‘be  focusing  on  the  ‘space’  it  occupies  rather  than  its  ‘content’.’340  Along similar 
lines  Rogers  Brubaker  describes  nationalism  as  a  ‘political  stance’  rather  than an 
‘ethnodemographic  fact’.341  To argue, as Brubaker does, that nationalism is not 
determined simply by the existence or otherwise of nations, but rather is a political 
stance induced by certain ‘political fields’, is to reject the efficacy of analyzing one 
particular type of nationalism in isolation, in favour of an approach which 
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appreciates the ‘relational interplay’ between different types of nationalism.  A key 
constitutive element of the political field which induces nationalism is, Brubaker 
argues, the perception amongst members of a national minority that the state 
privileges a ‘core’ national community.  He writes: 
 
‘one  can  impose  and  sustain  a  stance  as  a  mobilized  national  minority  with  its 
demands for recognition and rights, only by imposing and sustaining a vision of the host 
state as a nationalizing or nationally oppressive state.  To the extent that this vision of the 
host state cannot be sustained, the rationale for mobilizing as a national minority will be 
undermined.’342 
 
Although Scotland and England in principle remained independent sovereign 
states following the Regal Union of 1603, nevertheless the perception that the union 
was dominated by England was used by some Scots to sustain a vision of England as 
a nationally oppressive state.  As early as 1702, for example, the Scottish nobleman 
Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, in reference to the effects of the Regal Union, 
declaimed;  ‘we have  from  that  time  appeared  to  the  rest  of  the world more  like  a 
conquered province than a free and independent people’.343   
  
The Treaty of Union, 1707 
Background 
The constitutional arrangements underpinning the terms of the Regal Union came 
under increasing strain toward the end of the seventeenth century, as the gradual 
development of parliamentary government forced the question of to whom the 
monarch should ultimately refer when deciding policy to the forefront of  
constitutional arguments.  As sovereignty shifted toward parliament, it became 
evident that the monarch, in the words of Mackie, 'could not adopt one policy along 
with the parliament of one country, and, at the same time, pursue a contradictory 
policy to meet the demands of the other parliament.'344  The prevailing doctrine of 
sovereignty emphasized its indivisibility and thus seemed to imply either that 
Scotland and England be fully amalgamated or fully separated. 
The eventual Parliamentary union was, however, as much a product of events 
as it was of ideology.  In 1701 the English parliament, without reference to Scotland, 
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passed the Act of Settlement designed to secure the monarchical succession in the 
likely event of William III's successor Princess Anne dying without heir.  There was 
no guarantee that Scotland would accept England's preferred candidate, Sophia of 
Hanover.  Moreover, there was a credible danger of Scotland turning to the Stuart 
dynasty exiled in enemy France.   
English fears were compounded when the Scottish Parliament passed the Act 
Anent Peace and War 1703, by which she reserved the right to conduct an 
independent foreign policy, and the Act of Security 1704 claiming the right to decide 
independently of England on the issue of royal succession.  In the context of 
England's ongoing war with France, the possibility of a hostile Scotland under a 
Jacobite ruler was intolerable to the majority of English Parliamentarians who 
concluded that national stability and security could be guaranteed only by full 
parliamentary union. 
The idea of parliamentary union was received with hostility by the Scottish 
general public, which expressed its disquiet both in anti-union petitions and mob 
violence. 345   Opposition was, moreover, not limited to civil society but was 
expressed within the Scottish parliament itself, most notably by the 'Country Party' 
and the 'Cavaliers'.  Nevertheless, the draft Treaty presented to the Scottish 
Parliament in October 1706 was ultimately approved and the Treaty of Union was 
passed on 16th January 1707.  What persuaded Scottish parliamentarians of the 
benefits of parliamentary union? 
A major source of anti-union opposition was the Scottish Church (Kirk), 
which feared the loss of its independence and subjection to the English Episcopal 
system.  This fear was allayed when the Scottish Parliament passed the Protestant 
Religion and Presbyterian Church Act 1707 which guaranteed the independence and 
Presbyterianism of the Scottish Kirk and was incorporated into the Treaty of Union.   
Scottish acquiescence to parliamentary union occurred in the context of 
severe English pressure, which manifested itself in the English Parliament's decision 
to pass the Alien Act 1705 suspending major Scottish exports to England and 
designating all Scots in England as aliens, as well public preparations for an English 
invasion in support of the Edinburgh parliament against popular protests.346  T.M 
Devine describes the  Alien  Act  as  ‘a  naked  piece  of  economic  blackmail’,  and 
suggests  that English  intimidation  ‘may also have  fuelled popular  fears  that a vote 
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against the union by parliament might well have caused Westminster to impose a 
military solution instead.’347 
Whether or not it can be fairly described as blackmail, economic 
considerations certainly played an important role in convincing the Scottish 
parliament of the desirability of parliamentary union; amalgamation with England 
brought the promise of free access to markets across her expanding empire.  For 
many Scottish parliamentarians, the economic benefits of such free trade were 
considered adequate compensation for the loss of sovereignty that union represented.  
As such, argues Keith Brown, the Treaty of Union  ‘effectively  traded  Scottish 
political independence for access to trade markets.’348 
 
E ffects of the Treaty 
The Treaty of Union was a pre-democratic agreement made between the governing 
elites of Scotland and England, neither of whom was elected by a popular franchise.  
Thus, whilst the Treaty was passed in the Scottish parliament by a vote of 110 to 69, 
this should not be interpreted as a reflection of popular support for union.  Indeed, as 
has already been indicated, parliamentary union met with overwhelming hostility 
from the general public in Scotland. 
The Treaty of Union united Scotland and England into a single state and 
created a single shared Parliament of Great Britain.  Scottish representation to the 
new parliament was calculated according to the ratio of taxable capacity, thus 
leaving Scotland under-represented in terms of the proportion of her population of 
Great Britain.  However, as compensation for assuming responsibility for servicing 
England’s  large  national  debt, Scotland received a cash payment of £398,085, 10s 
plus assurances of further subsequent payments.    
Although Scotland thereby relinquished its status as an independent state, she 
nevertheless retained a significant degree of institutional autonomy guaranteed in the 
terms of the Treaty of Union.  The Protestant and Presbyterian Church Act ensuring 
the future distinctiveness and independence of the Kirk has already been mentioned.   
In addition, Scotland retained her own law and judicature, which were to remain free 
from appeal to any court sitting in Westminster349, as well as safeguards for the 
continuing independence of the Scottish education system and local government.  
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There result of these guarantees was that the autonomy of post-1707 Scottish civil 
society remained more-or-less intact.350   
The degree of autonomy that was afforded to Scotland following the Treaty 
of Union was further enhanced by the hands-off approach to governance in Scotland 
that Westminster was generally satisfied to exercise.  Incorporating union had 
recommended itself to English parliamentarians primarily as a means to ensure 
security, and it was only on issues relating to security that Westminster adopted a 
highly interventionist approach to Scottish political affairs.351  The pre-democratic 
nature of the parliamentary system lent itself to such an approach, as Scottish 
governance was trusted into the hands of non-elected managers such as the Earl of 
Islay.  The significant levels of institutional autonomy that was preserved in Scotland, 
in combination with Westminster’s weak centralism, ‘meant that most of the political 
decisions  that  really mattered  continued  to  be made  in  Scotland  itself...Scotland’s 
semi-independent status was assured.’352  
It was argued above that a distinctive Scottish national identity emerged 
during the twelfth century more as a result of state-building and the development of 
unified national institutions than it was the product of any ethnic or linguistic 
homogeneity.  The relationship between national institutions and national identity in 
the case of Scotland highlights the importance of its maintaining such a significant 
degree of institutional autonomy following parliamentary union with England.  The 
Treaty  of  Union,  argues  J.D.  Mackie,  ‘made  two  countries  one  and  yet,  by 
deliberately preserving the Church, the Law, the Judicial System, and some of the 
characteristics of the smaller kingdom, it ensured that Scotland should preserve the 
definite nationality which she had won for herself and preserved so long.’353 
 
Sovereignty 
The Treaty of Union dissolved the Scottish and English parliaments and replaced 
them with a wholly new British parliament situated in Westminster.  This reflects the 
fact that the union was, in principle at least, an agreement between two equal 
sovereign states, both of whom agreed to relinquish their individual sovereignties 
and amalgamate to form a new state.  In practice, however, the new constitutional 
arrangement was patently unequal, and this inequality stands at the centre of the 
discourse of modern Scottish nationalism. 
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In addition to the issue of Scottish under-representation in the new 
Parliament of Great Britain, the great disparity in the economic and political power 
of the two countries led to an Anglo-centric bias in the structure and practice of the 
new institutions.  This was compounded by the fact that, since the new parliament 
was situated at Westminster, only the Edinburgh parliament ceased to function as 
such,  thus  creating  a  ‘de facto continuity of the historic English parliament after 
1707.’354 
With the Edinburgh Parliament dissolved and the new British parliament 
convened to sit at Westminster, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Treaty of Union’s 
status as a voluntary union between equal partners has been persistently overlooked 
by English constitutional analysts, who have tended instead toward the view that the 
English parliament absorbed Scotland’s.  A number of events occurred in the years 
following parliamentary union that provided fuel to the fire of Scottish claims that 
the Anglo-centric nature of British political decision-making offended against the 
spirit of the Treaty of Union. 
The decision to abolish the Privy Council on 1st May 1708 and its 
replacement by justices of peace issued in the name of English councillors was 
regarded in Scotland as a provocative act which went against the spirit of the Treaty 
of Union.  This was followed, in 1710, by the House of Lords’ reversal of a decision 
made by the Kirk’s Court of Session to refuse redress to a recalcitrant clergyman, in 
seeming breach of the Treaty  of  Union’s  forbidding  English  courts  to  exercise 
jurisdiction in Scotland.355  Similarly, parliament’s decision to apply the malt tax in 
Scotland following the cessation of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713 was 
condemned as being in contravention of the provisions of the Treaty of Union which 
had explicitly stated that any changes to the policy of not taxing malt be made with 
regard to the economic interests of both countries.  
The Treaty of Union, as has already been indicated, was in principle an 
incorporating union by which Scotland and England both renounced their individual 
sovereignties and amalgamated to form a new state.  However, as the examples 
above demonstrate, the idea of parliamentary union being the product of a pact 
between equal sovereign states was not always respected by a British parliament in 
which English interests were numerically dominant.  This disjuncture between the 
principle of the Treaty of Union and Westminster parliamentary practice is 
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highlighted by Scottish nationalists, who claim that it represents an Anglo-centric 
interpretation of the doctrine of sovereignty which is at odds with that prevailing in 
Scotland. 
According to a prominent strand of discourse within Scottish nationalism, 
because the Treaty of Union was a voluntary agreement made between equal 
sovereign partners, ultimate sovereignty is retained by the individual parties to the 
agreement.  In other words, because Scotland chose to surrender her independence 
voluntarily, it is free to reclaim that independence at any time in the future should its 
people so wish.  As Brown et al observe; ‘Scotland never ceased to regard itself as a 
partner in Union.  It had voluntarily given up power in the interests of gaining access 
to British trade and so on, but it always had the right to claim that power back...In 
these senses, Scotland could be said to have retained sovereignty.’356 
The idea that the Scottish nation remained sovereign despite lacking its own 
independent state stands in direct contrast to the dominant interpretation of 
sovereignty, which treats it as an intrinsic property of statehood.  As the case of 
Scotland therefore demonstrates, the dominant interpretation of sovereignty suffers 
from a failure to adequately maintain the distinction between nation and state.  Only 
when the concepts of sovereignty, state and nation are kept analytically distinct can 
Scotland’s  constitutional  relationship  to  the  British  state  be  properly  understood.  
From the perspective of Scotland as a national minority, it is incorrect to assert that 
the Treaty of Union transferred sovereignty from Edinburgh to Westminster.  Rather, 
by asserting its identity as a nation, Scotland can make a claim to national 
sovereignty which survives the dissolution of the Edinburgh parliament in 1707.  
The idea that sovereignty inheres in the nation rather than the state implies a 
collective right to national self-determination that cannot be legitimately denied by 
the multi-national state of which the nation is a part. 
   
The Highlands and the Jacobite Threat 
The Eighteenth century was a period of rapid expansion in the infrastructural power 
of the state in Scotland, the effects of which were felt most dramatically in the 
‘conquest’ of the Highlands, an event that serves to highlight the changing nature of 
citizenship that was taking place during this time.  The most immediate internal 
threat to the newly-formed British state came from Highland supporters of the exiled 
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Stuart dynasty knows as the Jacobites; major Jacobite rebellions occurred in 1708, 
1715, 1719, 1727 and 1745.   
The Highlands had long been viewed as an area of unlawfulness and disorder 
and, quite apart from the military response that met the Jacobite uprisings, was the 
target of a concerted campaign of British nation-building in the eighteenth century.  
A plethora of parliamentary enactments, commissions and societies undertook 
‘improving’ measures in the Highlands, orientated ostensibly toward the pacification 
and homogenization of the population.  Under the leadership of General George 
Wade an extensive network of roads and bridges was constructed through Highland 
territory, the principle objective of which was ‘to  facilitate  the  rapid movement of 
troops and supplies, and to enable force to be brought to bear quickly on any “trouble 
spots”.’357  In addition, Highland clansmen loyal to the state were recruited into what 
became known as the ‘Black Watch’ brigade and charged with the duty of patrolling 
the Highlands.358 
The Jacobite threat was finally extinguished in the decisive battle of Culloden 
in 1745, subsequent to which the victorious British state stepped up efforts to 
enforce peace in the Highlands through such measures as the banning, in 1747, of 
traditional Highland dress and music, as well as land confiscations of Jacobite 
nobleman.  It is a sign of the emerging link between citizenship and national loyalty 
that both the kilt and bagpipes were now ‘considered too barbarous and martial for 
good citizenship.’359 
 The nature of the conquest of the Highlands in the eighteenth century 
supports the contention that nation-building has historically occurred as a result of 
explicit state directed programmes designed to pacify peripheral populations and 
secure their loyalty to the state.  Although it is true that general economic 
developments associated with a modernizing economy (principally the development 
in Scotland of potato culture, sheep rearing, the kelp industry, and seasonal 
labour360) contributed to the changes that occurred in the Highlands in the eighteenth 
century, it is nevertheless impossible to avoid the conclusion that the decline of a 
distinctive Highland culture was not simply a natural corollary of either 
modernization or industrialization, but came about as a result of state-directed 
nation-building policies orientated toward homogenizing the population.   
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 Nation-building, moreover, was not a wholly peaceful process, but was 
achieved with considerable violence.  Describing the reconciliation of the 
Highlanders to an overall Scottish national identity in the post-1745 period, Smout 
writes;  ‘Deprived of  their  leaders,  their minds benumbed by  the defeat at Culloden 
and their will to resist eroded by the ideological campaigns against them, the wilder 
and more traditional clans succumbed at last to the rule of law.’361  The Highlands’ 
suffering increased in the early decades of the nineteenth century when large-scale 
emigration resulted from poverty and forcible evictions by landlords to make way for 
large-scale sheep-rearing.  The latter phenomenon, known as the Highland 
‘clearances’ has entered into Scottish folk history and forms an important element of 
the myths and memories that constitute Scottish national identity. 
  
The Scottish Enlightenment 
In the spheres of academia and literature, the eighteenth century witnessed a ‘golden 
age’ in Scotland’s history, in the form of the phenomenon that has come to be known 
as the ‘Scottish Enlightenment.’    In philosophy, history, science,  law and medicine 
Scotland acquired an international reputation for excellence which enabled it to 
legitimately lay claim to being in the vanguard of European intellectual development.  
Scottish individuals such as the philosopher David Hume, the economist Adam 
Smith, the sociologist Adam Ferguson, the engineer James Watt and the historian 
William Robertson to name but a few all made vital contributions to the scientific 
progress of the western world.362 
At the heart of the Scottish Enlightenment lay ‘the fundamental belief in the 
importance of reason, the rejection of that authority which could not be justified by 
reason and the ability through the use of reason to change both the human and the 
natural world  for  the better.’363  For a significant portion of the eighteenth century 
Scotland,  although  one  of  Europe’s  small  nations,  wielded  an  influence  over 
European development unrivalled by any of the great nations.  This she did, 
moreover, despite lacking her own independent state. 
The relevance of the Scottish Enlightenment for modern Scottish nationalism 
stems not from the political opinions of its key thinkers, the majority of whom, in 
keeping with the spirit of the age, eschewed any form of nationalism in favour of a 
cosmopolitan commitment to reason.  Rather, subsequent generations have looked to 
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the era of the Scottish Enlightenment as a time of national greatness and pride, as a 
‘golden age’ whose achievements are evoked as proof of Scotland’s unique national 
abilities.   
The concept of a golden age in a nation’s history, argues Anthony Smith, is a 
time of ‘communal splendour, with its sages, saints and heroes, the era in which the 
community achieved its classical form, and which bequeathed a legacy of glorious 
memories  and  cultural  achievement.’364  In the context of nationalist mythology, 
golden  ages  are  seen  to  ‘symbolize  and  crystallize  the  creative  power  and  unique 
virtue of the community.’365  Moreover, golden ages are employed by nationalists as 
focal points of comparison with the present, something to which the nation can 
aspire if only it were granted the degree of political autonomy which its 
distinctiveness merits.366   
 
The Development of ‘Britishness’ 
As suggested above, the preservation of Scotland's institutional autonomy in the 
spheres of religion, law and education subsequent to the Treaty of Union contributed 
decisively to guaranteeing the integrity and continuity of a distinctive Scottish 
identity following the loss of its political independence.  This 'civil autonomy'367, in 
conjunction with the indirect, 'hands-off' approach to governance in Scotland 
adopted by Westminster, meant that a sense of, and commitment to, Scottishness 
flourished even in the absence of a Scottish parliament.  However, whilst it is 
important for understanding the development of Scottish nationalism in the twentieth 
century to recognize that a distinctive Scottish national identity was never obliterated 
by union with England, it is not the case that the Scottish people therefore remained 
entirely unreconciled to the idea of Britishness.  Rather, the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries witnessed the emergence of a strong attachment to an overall 
British identity north of the border, and a strong consensus in support of Scotland's 
membership of the British state.  What prompted this reconciliation in the minds of a 
nation that had demonstrated overwhelming popular hostility to parliamentary union 
when it was first proposed?   
Just as a distinctive Scottish identity emerged in the middle ages against the 
backdrop of prolonged warfare against England, so too was a sense of Britishness 
forged in the experience of war, in this case against France.  Between 1689 and 1815 
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England and France fought each other on no less than seven separate occasions, in 
what has been described as an ‘epic struggle for global dominance’.368  Even before 
the parliamentary union of 1707 formally incorporated Scotland into England’s 
military engagements, significant numbers of Scottish officers and men had gained 
experience of fighting in Europe in the service of the English army.369  With the 
creation of the British state the extent of this experience increased dramatically, with 
important consequences for the way in which Scots conceived their place in the 
world. 
'Time and time again', writes Linda Colley, 'war with France brought Britons, 
whether they hailed from Wales or Scotland or England, into confrontation with an 
obviously hostile Other and encouraged them to define themselves collectively 
against it'.370  Moreover, religious and political factors strengthened the integrating 
power of the series of wars against France.  Because France was the world's foremost 
Catholic power, the wars were easily cast as (and to a large extent actually were) 
religious wars in which Britain was charged with the sacred duty of defending 
Protestantism against the papist threat.  In spite of the Episcopalian/Presbyterian 
divide separating the Church of England from the Scottish Kirk, Linda Colley 
provides a wealth of evidence to support the contention that a shared Protestant 
identity was central in forging a unified British identity out of its constituent 
nations.371 
The collective experience of war against France, and its capacity to unite 
Scottish and English identity-formation, was further influenced by the tendency to 
contrast French absolutism (and later Napoleonic despotism) with a British 
constitutional monarchy touted as the exemplar of political liberty.  As such, 
France's religious and political identity provided an ideal counterpart against which 
to define Britishness.  Britons', Colley argues, 'defined themselves against the French 
as they imagined them to be, superstitious, militarist, decadent and unfree'.372 
 
Scotland and the British Empire 
By the second half of the eighteenth century, free trade with England and the 
colonies began to provide the material benefit that had formed the central rationale 
for Scottish acceptance of the Treaty of Union.  The most spectacular evidence of 
this can be seen from the success of the Scottish trade in tobacco from the colonies 
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of Virginia and Maryland.  In fact, so successful were Scottish commercial 
enterprises in the tobacco trade that they controlled over half the trade in the key 
areas of colonial tobacco production in 1773-4.373  This in turn stimulated complex 
and lucrative networks of transatlantic trade from which the Scottish economy 
greatly benefited, and which would have been impossible without the commercial 
provisions contained within the Treaty of Union and the protection Scottish 
merchant ships received from the Royal Navy.  The huge inflow of profit from 
sources dependent on free-trade with the colonies, such as tobacco, provides a clear 
demonstration of the economic benefits of the Union, and is a factor that did much to 
foster Scottish commitment to the new British state. 
It was not just trade that flowed between Scotland and the colonies; in the 
century following the Union, Scottish transatlantic emigration occurred on a massive 
scale.  Despite having a population only one eighth that of England, during the 
eighteenth century Scotland sent as many emigrants across the Atlantic as its 
southern neighbour.374  Scots had a long history as a nation of emigration stretching 
back to the middle ages.  Traditionally, Scottish emigration had been to England and 
Ireland, and eastward toward Scandinavia, the Low Countries and the Baltic.375  In 
the seventeenth century Scotland experienced the highest rate of net out-migration in 
Western Europe, and in the second half of that century emigration had began to 
move westwards away from Europe and toward England, Ireland, the Atlantic and 
Asia.376  The westward shift of Scotland’s high rates of emigration at least partly laid 
the foundations for the pre-eminent role that Scotland assumed within the British 
Empire following the Treaty of union.  By officially integrating Scotland into the 
English imperial system, the Treaty of Union expanded the opportunities for 
Scotland to develop a closer association with the American colonies, and the end of 
the Seven Years War in 1763 heralded a new age of mass migration from Scotland to 
North America, and in particular to what would later come to be known as 
Canada.377   
 Scottish involvement in the British Empire was not restricted to transatlantic 
trade and emigration.  The Empire proved to be a source of lucrative career 
opportunities for middle- and upper-class Scots, who gained access to a plethora of 
overseas colonial administrative posts.378  Scottish enthusiasm for Empire was such 
that they were over-represented in virtually all of the different professional roles 
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associated with its running.  As an example of Scottish over-representation, in 1750, 
despite constituting only one-tenth of the population of the British Isles, Scots made 
up at least half of the East India Company.379  In terms of military presence, half of 
the fourteen royal regiments garrisoned in the Indian provinces of the East India 
Company between 1754 and 1784 were Scottish regiments; this amounted to a total 
of between 4,000 and 5,000 men.380  So extensive was Scottish participation in the 
running  of  Empire,  that  Devine  is  able  to  argue;  ‘The  Scots  thoroughly  and 
systematically colonized all areas of the British Empire from commerce to 
administration, soldiering to medicine, colonial education to the expansion of 
emigrant settlements’.381 
 Devine argues that postings to the East India Company were used by London, 
in cooperation with the Earl of Islay, as a source of  patronage  aimed  at  ‘bringing 
more political stability to Scotland and forging a stronger union.’382  There was, this 
suggests, at some conscious level an attempt to use the opportunities for 
advancement offered by the expanding empire as a tool to secure Scottish 
commitment to the Union.  In this regard, it was a policy that met with a good deal 
of success, as the enthusiasm for empire that these opportunities aroused amongst 
those Scots in a position to directly benefit from them was to some extent shared by 
the mass of the Scottish public for whom empire acted as a powerful source of 
national pride.383   
 
Dual Identities 
Entrenched political loyalty to Britain, and an emotional attachment to a distinctive 
British identity, thus became the norm in Scotland from the middle of the eighteenth 
century.  This new sense of Britishness was accommodated alongside a Scottish 
national identity which was preserved through Scotland's considerable civil 
autonomy.  Far from obliterating a distinctive Scottish identity, therefore, Britishness 
emerged parallel to it, each sharing a different functional emphasis with, for example, 
the former associated primarily with domestic and the latter foreign affairs. 
 Using as evidence the writings of Scottish Whig sociologists, Colin Kidd 
suggests that the willingness of educated Scots to embrace a British identity 
stemmed from the perceived association of England with ideas of progress, 
modernity and free institutions.384  From the perspective of Scottish Whiggism, Kidd 
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suggests, the Treaty of Union, by assimilating Scotland with its politically more 
advanced neighbour, introduced Scotland to a period of intense accelerated progress, 
transforming at a stroke her previously underdeveloped political and economic 
structure.  Britishness, as a result, became the 'public' identity in Scotland, associated 
with politics and institutions, while Scottishness was relegated to the private sphere, 
surviving as a 'cultural particularism'.385  Kidd Writes; 'Whilst Scots retained an 
emotional bond to the Scottish past, the history to which they had been admitted was 
more relevant to an understanding of institutions, politics and society'.386 
 Whilst recognizing the important 'moral resources' upon which a sense of 
Scottishness could continue to draw, Kidd argues that its political/institutional 
relevance was, in the eyes of the Scottish intellectual class, abruptly ended by the 
Treaty of Union.  Thereafter, 'the Scottish past as a repository of political and 
institutional value remained empty'.387 
 There would, however, appear to be good reasons for questioning such a 
characterisation of the relationship between Scottishness and Britishness in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – it is, at least, not an interpretation shared by 
contemporary Scottish nationalists.  The intimation that the relevance of a distinctly 
Scottish identity became confined to the private sphere of culture as Britishness 
assumed the mantle of primary political identity, is significantly at odds with the 
evidence presented above which the important continuities in Scottish governance 
and civil society that survived the Treaty of Union intact.  Consequently, Scotland 
and Scottish identity was able to command important institutional resources so that, 
far from a division of spheres operating between a public Britishness and a private 
Scottishness, the latter continued to operate as an important political identity, even as 
explicit nationalism was absent. 
 Rather than being monopolised by a 'public' British identity, the dominant 
political identity in Scotland during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is 
described by Brown et al as 'unionist nationalist'.388  According to this perspective, 
commitment to the British state and attachment to a British identity was in Scotland 
always justified by reference to the benefits they brought to the Scottish nation.  
Given its political and economic strength, participation in the British state provided 
the best context within which a distinctive Scottish national identity could thrive.  At 
the heart of such a dual identity lay the idea that the Treaty of Union was a pact 
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made between equal partners, which remained legitimate only insofar as it continued 
to respect this fact.  Brown et al describe the 'unionist nationalist' political identity 
that was dominant in Scotland in the following terms: 
 
 'On the one hand, Scotland had to be in the Union to realise its true potential as a 
nation: thus to be a true nationalist it was necessary to be a unionist.  On the other hand, to 
be a true unionist it was necessary to be a nationalist because, in the absence of Scottish 
nationalist assertion, the Union would degenerate into an English takeover'.389 
 
Nationalism 
The importance of empire for the economic growth that Scotland experienced at a 
ferocious rate from c. 1760, the ability of transatlantic emigration to relieve acute 
social problems at home, and the lavish deployment of imperial patronage, all 
contributed to a situation in which a significant proportion of Scots had good reason 
to be attracted to the idea of Britishness and support the Union (although it is unclear 
the extent to which any cultural assimilation with the English that resulted filtered 
down to the lower strata of Scottish society).   
 In his survey of Scottish nationalism, Tom Nairn argues that the absence of 
any assertive political nationalism in nineteenth century Scotland is best explained 
by  Scotland’s  successful  economic  development  following  the  Treaty  of  Union.  
Unlike most other Continental states, which developed political nationalism as a way 
of gaining access to economic development without succumbing to the hegemony of 
the dominant English and French states, Scotland, because of the political union with 
England and privileged access to her imperial system, experienced an economic 
transformation that obviated any need for the defensive measures of nationalism.390  
One does not have to accept the totality of Nairn’s Marxist theory of nationalism to 
accept that the intimate links between Scottish economic growth and the English 
imperial system in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries played an important role 
in defusing nationalist challenges to the Union state.   
 Moreover, the development of a successful political nationalist movement 
requires the support of an intellectual class capable of providing the ideological 
infrastructure  upon  which  nationalist  mobilization  depends.    However,  Scotland’s 
intellectuals, lured by the promise of imperial patronage, tended toward the defence 
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of the Union, seeing it as an event that rescued the country from feudal barbarism.  
In  these  peculiar  circumstances,  ‘it  is  hardly  surprising  that  Scotland’s  elites were 
attracted to the idea of Britishness.’391 
 The absence of any strongly political assertion of national identity in 
nineteenth century Scotland should not be taken to imply that Anglicization and 
assimilation rendered Scottishness redundant.  It has already been remarked that a 
sense of Britishness existed alongside continuing attachment to an older Scottish 
national identity, and this found expression in various forms of ‘cultural nationalism’ 
which flourished in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  Worried that economic 
success had been bought at considerable cultural cost in terms of the distinctiveness 
of Scottish national identity, but unwilling to undermine the imperial and union 
relationship upon which that success depended, many Scots looked to a cultural form 
of nationalism as a way of reasserting and celebrating Scottish identity.392 
 Late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Scottish writers such as James 
Macpherson, Robert Burns and Walter Scott constructed a Scottish patriotism that 
made ample reference to Jacobitism and painted an image of ‘traditional’ Gaelic and 
Highland culture.  Whilst figures such as these three were undoubtedly committed 
Scottish patriots, theirs was a celebration of national identity shorn of political 
implications; a purely cultural nationalism that eulogized Scotland’s past at the same 
time  as  effectively  denying  the  relevance  of  that  past  for  the  country’s  present.  
Walter Scott himself was a high Tory and fervent unionist, whose romantic 
patriotism existed side-by-side with  the conviction  that Scotland’s future  lay  in  the 
Union.  In the poetry of James Macpherson, in particular his Gaelic epic Ossian, the 
Scottish  public  were  ‘provided  the  pleasures  of  vicarious  Jacobitism  shorn  of  its 
dangerous politics’.393 
 That  the  sentimentalization  of  Jacobitism,  ‘Highlandism’,  and  the  ‘cult  of 
tartanry’  that  came  to  define  Scottish  identity  in  the  nineteenth  century  had  been 
adopted for the cause of unionism was most clearly demonstrated in the visit of 
George IV to Scotland in 1822, when, under the direction of Walter Scott, the King 
dressed in full tartan costume and listened to his host declaim, ‘We are THE CLAN, 
and our King is THE CHIEF’.394 
 Writing of the growing popularity of this non-political conception of Scottish 
identity at the beginning of the Victorian era, Murray Pittock argues; ‘As the images 
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of a Celtic past were more and more adopted as the quaint insignia of present-day 
Scotland, they became emptied of political content.  The kilt, the pipes, haggis, and 
the music-hall Scot became increasingly popular, but with little consciousness of the 
nationalist overtones the tartan had possessed in the eighteenth century.’395 
 By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, things began to change 
and a revived Scottish national movement developed partly out of a  ‘neo-Jacobite’ 
analysis of the devastation wrought on the Highland by the Clearances.  In 
November 1853, the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights 
(NAVSR) was launched at a meeting of 2,000 people in Edinburgh.  5,000 gathered 
under the organization’s lead in Glasgow the following month.  Although the 
organization was in most respects still committed to a traditional cultural conception 
of nationalism, these were explicitly linked to contemporary political issues, and 
aimed at negotiating a better deal for Scotland within the framework of the Union.396   
 A variety of Gaelic revival, Home Rule and neo-Jacobite movements 
surfaced in the 1860s, all of which promoted Scottish interests at the political level.  
Two notable successes of these new nationalist movements were the re-instatement 
of the Scottish Secretaryship (an office which had been abolished in the aftermath of 
the failed Jacobite uprising of 1745), and the adoption by Gladstone’s Liberal Party 
in 1890 of a  policy  of  ‘Home  Rule  All  Round’  as  a  solution  to  the  nationalist 
movements in Ireland and Scotland.  The decision by the Liberal Party to support 
Home  Rule  for  Scotland  was,  argues  Pittock,  ‘a  manifestation  of  the  political 
pressures which had been building up inside Scotland for forty years.’397 
 In 1886 the Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA) was set up to campaign 
for a Scottish parliament to take responsibility for Scotland's domestic affairs.  The 
SHRA were a non-separatist nationalist organisation who were committed to the 
Union but argued Westminster was too remote and congested to legislate effectively 
and efficiently in Scotland's interest.  The formation of the SHRA can be seen as a 
turning point in the history of Scottish nationalism, as from that point onwards the 
national movement in Scotland was primarily concerned with political objectives and 
the establishment of some degree of political autonomy for Scotland rather than the 
primarily cultural concerns of nineteenth century figures such as Walter Scott and 
Robert Burns.       
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Summary  
The origins of a distinctive Scottish national identity can be traced back to the 
twelfth century and the emergence at that time of an effective Scottish state.  In this 
early stage of the development of Scottish national identity, the key agent of the 
nation-building process was the monarchical state, which, following a successful 
programme of institutional ‘modernization’,  introduced the concepts of sovereignty 
and territoriality to the Scottish state.  Scottish national unity was thus initially a 
product of the gradual expansion of the infrastructural power of the central state.  In 
the fourteenth century the principal agent of nation-building  was  Scotland’s 
prolonged military engagement, in particular the common experience of the War of 
Independence, which both expanded the scope of the political nation and furnished 
future generations of Scots with powerful myths and memories.   
 The suggestion that a distinctive Scottish national identity began to emerge in 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries contradicts Gellner’s theory, according to which 
only the complex division of labour brought into being by the move toward an 
industrialized economy can support extensive communities such as nations.  Scottish 
national identity, it has been suggested, began to emerge during the middle ages at a 
time when the economy was almost exclusively agrarian, and long before the 
Industrial Revolution.  The concept of nation, according to Gellner, implies a degree 
of cultural homogeneity not possible within the context of pre-industrial societies, 
within which cultural differentiation between the various sub-strata of the ruling 
class and the majority peasant population is the norm.  Indeed, if cultural 
homogeneity is taken as the indicator of nationhood, then Scotland remained, in the 
twelfth and thirteenth century, a state without a nation.  However, the concept of 
national identity consists of more dimensions than a common culture.   
 Especially  given  the  fact  of  the  Norman  Ascendancy,  ‘horizontal  lines  of 
cultural  cleavage’,  to  use  Gellner’s  phrase,  certainly  separated  rulers  and  ruled  in 
twelfth and thirteenth century Scotland.  This type of cultural differentiation, 
however, does not entirely preclude the existence of national sentiment.  Gellner 
argues  that  the ‘laterally  insulated’ communities within which  the majority peasant 
populations reside in pre-modern societies cause them to have inward-turned lives 
that preclude the possibility of extensive identifications.  However, as the above 
analysis demonstrates, during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the majority 
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population of Scotland were increasingly subject to common political, religious and 
legal institutions, and/or living in newly established royal burghs.  This had a 
powerful nation-building effect, as the shared experience of common institutions 
proved capable of widening the scope of community identification.    
 In claiming that the origins of Scottish national identity can be traced to the 
twelfth century, it is not my intention to argue that a Scottish nation in the full 
modern sense of the term at this time came into existence.  The pervasive 
Highlander-Lowlander cleavage is evidence that this is clearly not the case.  Rather, 
it is to suggest that significant steps were taken in that direction with implications for 
the future development of Anglo-Scottish relations.  Scottish national identity, the 
present analysis demonstrates, has since it’s very earliest foundations been a product 
of the experience of common institutions more than a common ethnicity.   
 
The Treaty of Union 1707 can only be understood in the context of events that 
occurred in the seventeenth century, a number of aspects of which conspired to draw 
the two countries into a closer relationship and into what is described by Kearney as 
a  ‘Brittanic  framework’.398  This is not to say that the Act of Union was therefore 
inevitable, for it was not, but merely to point out that a significant amount of shared 
interest in union had, by the end of the seventeenth century, developed.   
 Of particular importance in this regard is the Regal Union of 1603, which 
inevitably increased both the influence of England over Scottish political affairs, and 
tied Scottish politicians into networks of clientage within the London parliament.  
However, it was with the Revolutionary settlement of 1680 that the full 
consequences of Regal Union for Anglo-Scottish relations became apparent.  As 
sovereignty shifted away from the monarch and towards parliament, the dualism of 
the Regal Union created a constitutional argument for full parliamentary union as the 
only way of satisfying the doctrine of sovereignty that had by then gained common 
currency within political thought.   
 The preference for an incorporating union came from English politicians 
whose primary goal was the establishment of strong government capable of 
guaranteeing national security and stability.  The overriding preference of Scottish 
politicians was for a weaker union based upon some form of federation.  This 
preference was rejected by the English, who nevertheless were prepared to make 
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significant concessions to the Scottish negotiators that ensured the continued 
existence of autonomous institutions in the spheres of religion, law and education.  
This institutional continuity has had profound implications for Scottish national 
identity, which had for long been a product of institutional coherence as much as any 
ethnic identification.  In other words, the maintenance of independent Scottish 
institutions post-1707 created a framework within which a distinctive Scottish 
national identity would continue to thrive.   
 Anglo-Scottish relations have been marked by the perception of Anglo-
centric bias within the operation of the new Westminster parliament.  The under-
representation  of  Scottish  MP’s,  the  conformity  of  the  new  institutions  with 
established English practice, and the English habit, evident in the  dominant  ‘state 
historiography’399, of assuming Scotland was merged with England, are all factors 
that have contributed to the perception that a core English national identity is 
privileged within the British state.  As will become clear in the next chapter, this 
perception occupies a prominent role in the development of Scottish nationalism in 
the twentieth century. 
 The defeat of  the Jacobites  in 1745 and  the accompanying  ‘pacification’ of 
the Highlands to a large extent ended the political significance of the Lowlander-
Highlander cleavage and paved the way for an overall Scottish national identity to 
triumph throughout the territory.  It is important to recognize that this nation-
building process occurred neither ‘spontaneously’ nor peacefully, but was the result 
of the conscious policies of the state and military force.  The whole episode of the 
‘conquest’  of  the Highlands  is  a  powerful  example  of  the  emerging  link  between 
citizenship and nationality that rose to prominence in the eighteenth century.  As the 
administrative capacity of the state expanded the mediated and hierarchical nature of 
pre-modern political membership was replaced by the idea of universal national 
citizenship which placed the individual in a direct relationship to the state, which 
commanded loyalty on the basis of shared nationality.  The case of Scotland thus 
provides  supporting  evidence  for  the  claim made  by  Derek  Heater  that;  ‘Cultural 
homogenisation of provinces, cultural assimilation of ethnically heterogeneous 
peoples and cultural consciousness of the whole population have been policies 
pursued with varying degrees of intensity hand-in-hand with the opening up of 
citizenship rights’.400 
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5 
The Rise of Modern Scottish Nationalism, 1886-1999 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the evolving character of the campaign for self-
government in Scotland from the formation of the Scottish Home Rule Association 
(SHRA) in 1886 to the establishment of a devolved Scottish Parliament in 1999.  In 
the twentieth century, support for Scottish self-government was not confined to the 
independent nationalist movement but was at different times promoted by a wide 
variety of political and civic organizations.  Consequently, the way in which self-
government was defined varied according to the ideological predilections of each 
organisation.  The principle division was between those who advocated Scottish 
Home Rule, usually interpreted as devolving legislative competence for domestic 
affairs to a Scottish Parliament whilst remaining part of Britain, and those who 
supported outright independence.   
The cause of Scottish self-government gained in popularity in the latter 
stages of the nineteenth century, nationalism having been conspicuously absent for 
the majority of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  In the growth of self-
government sentiment in Scotland, the example of the Irish nationalist movement 
was an important catalyst.  Related to a sense of shared Gaelic heritage there existed 
a good deal of sympathy for Irish nationalism within Scotland as well as a measure 
of admiration for the cultural achievements of the movement.  Perhaps more 
significantly,  already  by  1868  the  UK’s  Prime  Minister,  William  Gladstone,  was 
convinced  of  the  need  for  constitutional  reform  in  order  to  resolve  the  ‘Irish 
question’401,  and  his  announcement  in  1886  of  the  Liberal  Party’s  support  for  a 
policy  of  ‘Home  Rule  All  Round’  crystallized  Scottish  support  for  self-
government.402 
For analytical purposes, the evolution of Scottish nationalism from 1886 to 
1999 can be roughly divided into six periods.  First, from 1886 until the creation of 
the Scottish National Party in 1934, nationalism in Scotland remained intimately 
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linked to a vision of defending ‘traditional’ ways of life, folklore and expressions of 
cultural values.  This is also the time in which the long-standing association between 
the Labour Party and Scottish Home Rule was forged.   
 Second, under the influence of the Scottish National Party (SNP), the period 
from 1934 until 1945 witnessed the decisive marginalisation of literary nationalism 
in  favour  of  a  ‘modernized’  pragmatic nationalism which emphasized  the  ‘civic’ 
bases of nationhood and oriented itself toward clear political objectives. 
 Third, from 1945 until 1967 nationalism fell largely into abeyance in the face 
of the post-war growth of the central state and a corresponding disinclination on the 
part of the Labour Party leadership to support Scottish Home Rule.   
 Fourth, from 1967 until 1979 Scottish nationalism experienced a revival 
against the background of an economic crisis that undermined the central 
assumptions underpinning the post-war settlement.  This period culminated in a 
failed attempt to establish a devolved Scottish Parliament in 1979.  
 Fifth, after an initial decline in the strength of nationalist politics following 
the failure of the 1979 devolution proposals, nationalism again resurfaced in reaction 
against  the Thatcher government’s disregard  for Scottish civil  autonomy and weak 
electoral support in the peripheries.  The Home Rule movement united to form a 
Scottish Constitutional Convention in 1988 which called for the establishment of a 
legislative Parliament in Scotland as a means by which to safeguard against what 
was perceived as the excessive centralization of power by the Conservative 
government.    
Finally,  from  1990  until  1997,  despite  the  Conservative  Party’s  surprise 
victory in the 1992 General Election, the demand for self-government in Scotland 
proved to have gained an unstoppable momentum following the success of the 
Constitutional Convention.  The new Labour government of 1997 subsequently 
honoured its commitment to constitutional change and put a new proposal for a 
devolved Scottish Parliament to a referendum.  This led to the creation of the first 
Scottish Parliament to sit since 1707. 
   
The Emergence of Nationalism, 1886-1934 
The Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA) was founded in 1886 as a political 
organisation to campaign for the establishment of a devolved Scottish parliament 
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with principle responsibility for domestic affairs.  Home Rule was therefore 
conceived as a measure of self-government short of independent statehood that 
would enable Scotland to continue to participate fully in the management of the 
British Empire.  Although formally unaligned to any political party, in practice the 
SHRA was closely associated with the Liberal Party, which was at that time the only 
major political party in favour of Scottish Home Rule.  However, prior to 1914, 
Liberal support for Scottish Home Rule reflected less an inherent sympathy for the 
arguments  of  Scottish  nationalism,  but  rather  flowed  from  their  policy  of  ‘Home 
Rule All Round’ as a constitutional response to the demands of Irish nationalists. 
 The nationalist movement that emerged in Scotland toward the end of the 
nineteenth century, of which the Liberal Party and the SHRA provided the main 
focal points, identified Scottish self-government with the broader radical movement 
for franchise reform and an extension of democracy.  In Scotland this campaign was 
intimately linked to the land-reform  demands  of  the  crofters’  movement  and  the 
activities of radical organisations such as the Highland Land Law Reform 
Association (HLLRA), the Highland Land League (HLL) and the Scottish Land 
Restoration League (SLRL). 
 The link between the Scottish Home Rule movement of the 1880s and the 
campaign for Highland land reform was reflected in the prominent concern for 
Gaelic language and culture displayed by the former.  Both Highland land reform 
and Scottish Home Rule were supported by a number of prominent individuals who 
conceived both as means by which to effect a Gaelic political and cultural revival in 
Scotland.  The ‘Celtic nationalism’ of figures such as Ruairidh Erskine of Mar, vice-
president of the SHRA in 1892, was strongly influenced by German  ‘Romantic’ 
nationalism and was more concerned with promoting ‘traditional’ Gaelic culture than 
addressing practical political issues. 
 This should not be taken as implying that nationalism in Scotland was in its 
infancy entirely dominated by Celticists such as Erskine of Mar.  The Scottish 
Labour Party (SLP), founded by Keir Hardie in 1888, emerged from the same radical 
tradition as the crofters’ movement, and as a result inherited the latter’s support for 
Scottish Home Rule.  The decision of the SLP to support Home Rule can also be 
explained by the fact that many of Party’s founding members had their political roots 
in the pro-Home Rule Liberal Party.  That support for Home Rule was therefore a 
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feature of the SLP from its very foundation, and that it was a traditional and 
respected aspect of the Labour movement in general, exercised a profound influence 
on the relationship between the Labour Party and Scottish nationalism throughout 
the twentieth century.403  At the risk of pre-empting the analysis, the long-standing 
nature of the relationship between the Home Rule movement and the Labour 
movement enabled the latter to support Scottish self-government with relative ease 
when political expediency required it (see below).  The association of Home Rule 
with Irish nationalism and the political left was also a major influence over the 
Conservative Party’s trenchant opposition to Scottish self-government.404 
 Prior to the First World War, nationalism failed to make a significant impact 
on the political landscape of Scotland.  Despite the formation of the Young Scots 
Society in 1900, and the continuing support for Home Rule professed by the Liberal 
Party, the real political action lay elsewhere.  The Scottish Labour Party was 
replaced in 1893 by the all-British Independent Labour Party (ILP) and, partly owing 
to its greater reliance on the Trade Union movement as compared to the crofters, was 
less enthusiastic in its commitment to Scottish Home Rule.  Whilst the early-
twentieth century tendency towards the bureaucratisation of trade unions and their 
centralization in London attracted complaints from some within the Scottish Trade 
Unions Council (STUC), defending the independence of Scottish Unions was 
increasingly at odds with the general trajectory of the movement.405   
 In the aftermath of the First World War nationalist arguments gained greater 
prominence in Scottish politics, becoming once again identified with the extension 
of democracy and touted as a remedy to the perceived failure of Westminster to give 
adequate attention to Scottish affairs. 406   Having disbanded during the war, the 
SHRA re-formed in September 1918 in order to resume their campaign for a Scottish 
parliament.  The gradual collapse of the Liberal Party after 1918 paved the way for 
the Labour Party to assume the mantle of the principle Home Rule Party, and 
although the SHRA remained formally committed to a non-aligned political strategy, 
in practice they received the majority of their support from the Labour Party.407  
 Cultural nationalism influenced by Gaelic  traditions  and  ‘Celtic 
Romanticism’  continued  to  occupy  a  prominent  place  in  the  Scottish  nationalist 
movement.  A small Gaelic revival movement had existed since the 1870s408, and in 
the early part of the twentieth century it was primarily represented by the Scots 
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National League (SNL), formed in 1920.  Two of the SNLs principal leaders at the 
time of its formation were William Gillies and former SHRA vice-president Ruairidh 
Erskine of Mar, both of whom were Gaelic speakers living in London.409  In contrast 
to the more limited objective of Home Rule supported by the SHRA, the SNL 
advocated full Scottish independence.  However, the emphasis on Gaelic cultural 
issues at the expense of more narrowly political ones meant that the organisation 
suffered from a lack of clear policies and a failure to grasp the practical political 
concerns of the Scottish public, and its influence was therefore limited. 
   The nationalist movement in Scotland appeared to be on the cusp of a 
political breakthrough with the accession to power, albeit as a minority government, 
of the Labour Party in 1923 under the leadership of the Scotsman and pro-Home 
Ruler Ramsay MacDonald.  The SHRA by this time was almost entirely dominated 
by Labour members and, despite a perceptible downgrading of the Home Rule issue 
in the pre-First World War period, the Labour Party remained officially committed 
to the policy. 
 MacDonald’s  Labour  government  introduced  two  Home  Rule  bills  to 
Parliament; the first in 1924 and the second in 1927.  Both, however, were afforded 
only a low priority by the Labour leadership and consequently failed to make it onto 
the statute book.  The lack of enthusiasm for Home Rule displayed by the Labour 
government reflected a growing ideological tendency within the Party that favoured 
a strategy of UK-wide advance at the expense of pursuing Scottish self-government.  
Amongst  the  Labour  leadership  of  the  1920s,  Richard  Finlay  argues,  ‘the  idea 
became accepted that the British economy was a complete unit, and consequently it 
was decided that it was only from Westminster that the necessary powers required to 
rectify the excesses of the capitalist system could be obtained.’410     
 In terms of the nationalist movement in Scotland, the immediate beneficiaries 
of the failure of the 1924 and 1927 Home Rule bills was the SNL, whose 
independence from any British political party and more radical programme attracted 
many SHRA members disillusioned with Labour’s seeming indifference to Scottish 
self-government.  SNL membership grew accordingly, so that by 1928 it stood at 
over 1,000 in 15 local branches.411 
 In  the  period  1924  to  1935,  the  total  output  of  Scotland’s  traditional 
industries (agriculture/fishing, mining, and manufacturing) fell from £363 million to 
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£283 million, a decline of 22 per cent.412  Over the same period, Scottish GDP as a 
percentage of total UK output declined from 10.5 per cent to 8.8 per cent.  The 
macro-economic response of the British government to post-war economic decline 
was based primarily on the principles of demand-management and state planning.  
The forms of state intervention that this strategy implied proved difficult to reconcile 
with demands for regional self-government, and as a result the strength of Labour’s 
commitment to Scottish Home Rule dwindled further. 
 Lack of government interest in the issue of Scottish Home-Rule prompted 
many within the Scottish nationalist movement to conclude that only an independent 
nationalist organization could hope to campaign for Scottish self-government with 
any effectiveness.  To this end talks were established between the SHRA and the 
SNL aimed at setting up a Scottish national party, which would both act as an 
umbrella organization for Scottish political interests as well as contest elections on a 
self-government ticket. 
 Out of the talks between the SHRA and the SNL the National Party of 
Scotland (NPS) was formed in April 1928.  Given the background of its creation, the 
NPS included within its executive a broad spectrum of nationalist viewpoints, 
ranging from ‘moderates’ such as John MacCormick to ‘fundamentalists’ such as the 
poet Hugh MacDiarmid and Erskine of Mar.  Whilst the inclusion of the likes of 
MacDairmid and Erskine of Mar ensued that the NPS retained a vigorous interest in 
the cultural aspects of Scottish nationalism, the incompatibility of their perspective 
with that of a pragmatist such as MacCormick inevitably led to tension within the 
organization.  Moreover, the radical claims made by some of the NPS membership 
alienated Conservative-minded Scottish nationalists such as Andrew Dewar Gibb 
and George Malcolm Thomson who responded by establishing a rival nationalist 
organisation, the Scottish Party (SP), in June 1932.     
 The response to the establishment of the SP on the part of the 'moderate' 
elements within the NPS involved opening up negotiations between the two 
organizations, at the same time as moving to marginalize, and eventually remove, the 
NPSs 'fundamentalist' faction.  In this process, John MacCormick took the lead.  
MacCormick's strategy met with success following the NPS 1933 May conference 
when most of the fundamentalists were expelled from the Party, in the process 
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paving way for the unification of the NPS and the SP, an event that augured the 
decisive marginalization of cultural nationalism in Scotland. 
    
Nationalism Transformed, 1934-1945 
The unification of the NPS and the SP established a new nationalist party in Scotland, 
the Scottish National Party (SNP), officially launched on 7th April 1934.  The new 
party’s  roots  lay  in  the  ‘purging’  of  the  literary nationalists, men such as Hugh 
MacDairmid and Edwin Muir, from the NPS in 1933, and as such was from its 
inception  relatively  unconcerned  with  overt  expressions  of  cultural  or  ‘Romantic’ 
nationalism.  Its objective was the achievement of Scottish self-government in a 
framework of continuing partnership with England and full participation in the 
management of the British Empire, rather than full independence.  
 The political and economic environment of the 1930s was, however, 
increasingly unfavourable to the nationalist aspirations of the SNP.  On the one hand, 
state planning continued to dominate the economic strategy of both the major 
political parties, and was a policy that sat uneasily with any programme of political 
devolution.  This being said, to the extent that it involved progressive extensions of 
administrative devolution, state economic planning did in some respects strengthen 
the  ‘national  dimension’  in  Scottish  politics.    In  accordance  with  the  tradition  of 
Scottish civic autonomy within the Union, established by the Treaty of Union itself, 
economic planning of the 1930s was explicitly focused on Scottish problems and 
channelled through Scottish institutions, most notably the Scottish Office which was 
moved to Edinburgh in 1939.   
 On the other hand, the timing of the SNPs foundation was politically 
unpropitious, as it coincided with the rise of militant national chauvinism in 
Germany, Italy and Japan, and the British public were understandably hostile toward 
strident expressions of nationalism.  Whilst the democratic nationalism of the SNP 
bore no resemblance to the militant movements making headway on the Continent, 
nevertheless the Party faced an uphill struggle in terms of public perception.   
 More damaging, however, to the SNPs political prospects was internal 
disunity, as individuals from the opposing traditions within the Party produced 
conflicting political statements.  Internal unity was placed under greater strain by the 
onset of the Second World War and arguments within the SNP over whether the 
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Party should support the war effort and/or accept conscription.  In the event of the 
assumption of hostilities, the Party, under the direction of John MacCormick, moved 
to distance itself from its 1939 resolution to oppose conscription.  However, 
dissatisfaction with this stance on the part of a significant anti-war faction, lead by 
the convicted anti-conscriptionist Douglas Young, led to a split in the Party in 1942, 
after which John MacCormick and a number of his supporters left to concentrate 
their attentions on setting up a National Convention to campaign for Scottish 
devolution. 
 Under its new leadership the SNP moved toward a more explicitly left-wing 
stance, and began to develop a distinctive political agenda by formulating policy 
commitments on a range of issues.  The SNPs emerging political identity, which it 
retained for much of the twentieth century, involved a mixture of social 
responsibility and the rights of the individual, and sought to offer a socialist 
alternative to Labour that eschewed the large centralized and bureaucratic state.413   
 From 1940 to 1945 the veteran Scottish Labour MP Tom Johnston occupied 
the post of Secretary of State for Scotland with a considerably expanded sphere of 
competence  to  administer  Scotland’s  affairs.  Under his leadership Scottish 
agriculture and industry experienced a modest revival and the trend toward business 
drifting south was stemmed.  This was interpreted by the Labour Party leadership as 
a clear vindication of the efficacy of administrative devolution and contributed to the 
further weakening of the Party’s commitment to political devolution.414 
 
 
Nationalism in Abeyance, 1945-1967 
On the 12th April 1945, the pragmatic political nationalism of the SNP achieved its 
first taste of electoral success, winning its first parliamentary seat in a Motherwell 
by-election.  It proved, however, a false dawn for Scottish nationalism as the seat 
was lost in the General Election that followed a few months later, and nationalism 
fell into abeyance as a significant political force for almost two decades. 
 In 1945 the politics of class dominated political behaviour in Scotland to an 
equal degree as was the case in England, a fact that the terminal decline of the 
Liberal Party was one reflection.  The nationalist vote in Scotland remained 
negligible as the two main political parties claimed a near monopoly on the political 
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affections of the Scottish electorate.  In this regard there was, despite some evidence 
that the Scottish electorate was marginally more politically radical, very little 
distinctiveness to mid-century Scottish voting patterns as compared with England.415  
‘There was’, argues David McCrone, ‘little room for explicitly ‘nationalist’ politics 
in mid-century Scotland, largely because the two main repertories of Scottish politics 
squeezed it out.’416  
 This is not to say that nationalist arguments found no resonance within 
Scottish civil society.  In 1949 John MacCormick’s Scottish Convention launched a 
national covenant which collected over two million signatories in support of its 
demand for Scottish self-government.  However, this latent nationalist support failed 
to translate itself into votes for the SNP, leaving the fortunes of Scottish self-
government dependent on the actions of the major political parties.  The traditional 
repository of this support for Scottish Home Rule was, as we have seen, the Labour 
Party.  However, a combination of the success of administrative devolution under the 
wartime administration of Tom Johnston and a strong focus on achieving power at 
Westminster, led the Labour Party to continue the downgrading of its commitment to 
Scottish Home Rule that had been evident since the late 1920s.  For the first time 
since their foundation, the Labour Party entered the 1950 General Election with no 
specific commitment to Scottish Home Rule in its manifesto and, by 1959, had 
adopted an official policy of opposition to devolution. 
 Emblematic of the post-war UK political landscape was the inexorable 
growth of the state that occurred.  Within three years of the cessation of the Second 
World  War,  Clement  Atlee’s  Labour  government  had  completed large-scale 
nationalization of power, gas and transport, and created the National Health Service.  
A consensus in favour of the principle of state intervention in the economy and 
society spanned the political divide, with both Labour and Conservative 
governments alike contributing to the post-war growth of the state. 
 The consequences of state growth in Scotland were highly equivocal.  On the 
one hand, the policies of nationalization, and state welfare provision suggested a 
degree of centralization inimical to the decentralization of political authority 
advocated by the nationalists.  The Labour Party’s declining enthusiasm for Scottish 
Home Rule provided a clear example of such a tendency.  On the other hand, in its 
practical implementation, the expansion of the state in Scotland was channelled 
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through distinctive Scottish institutions, with the Scottish Office once again taking 
the lead.  The number of civil servants employed under the formal supervision of the 
Secretary of State for Scotland rose from 2,400 in 1937 to 8,300 in 1970.  Over the 
same period the competences of the Scottish Office were extended to cover 
electricity in 1954, roads in 1956, and the Highlands and Islands Development 
Boards in 1969. 417   As a result the distinctiveness of Scottish governance was 
actually enhanced. 
 The channelling of state growth through specifically Scottish institutions 
represented an expansion of the degree of administrative devolution that Scotland 
enjoyed.  Administrative devolution was not, however, extended according to a 
consciously designed grand plan, but rather occurred on an ad hoc basis as 
successive  governments  sought  to  gain  political  advantage  through  ‘pork-barrel’ 
politics.  Although it remained electorally weak, the threat of the nationalist 
movement also prompted governments to resort to state intervention and 
administrative devolution as palliative measures.418    
 Economic factors played an important role in the re-emergence of Scottish 
nationalism in the late 1960s.  Scotland’s traditional industries, as has been indicated, 
experienced a modest revival in fortunes under the wartime administration of Tom 
Johnston, and this continued in the immediate post-war period following the 
destruction  of  rival  industrial  bases  in Germany  and  Japan.    Scotland’s  advantage 
was, however, quickly overturned as a failure to undertake the necessary investments 
in new technologies and production techniques, together with the debilitating effects 
of poor labour relations, enabled continental firms to overtake their Scottish 
counterparts.  The ship-building and railway engineering industries provide a clear 
illustration  of  Scotland’s  economic  difficulties.    Scotland’s  12  per  cent share of 
world ship-building output between 1950 and 1954 fell to just 1.3 per cent by 1968.  
Meanwhile, railway engineering in Scotland declined from being an industry 
employing 10,000 men in 1950 to one in which fewer than 1,000 men were 
employed by 1963.419 
 These figures suggested that state intervention to protect employment in the 
traditional industries, a policy pursued by both Conservative and Labour 
governments, had by 1960 proved to be largely unsuccessful.  This was the 
conclusion reached in the Toothill Report issued in 1961 by the Scottish Council for 
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Development and Industry (SCDI), which recommended a switch to concentrating 
on  regional  aid  and  ‘growth  points’  as  part  of  a  policy  of  encouraging  the 
development of alternative growth industries. 
 Although the government accepted the findings of the Toothill Report, the 
new policy of growth which it inspired in practice replicated many of the problems 
associated with the old policy of supporting failing industries with government 
subsidies.  Public expenditure continued to expand as the government struggled to 
overcome the resistance of strong unions within the traditional industries.  Moreover, 
state intervention continued to be used as the primary means of driving the economy, 
so much so that by the end of the 1960s public expenditure in Scotland was a fifth 
higher than the UK average.  With increasing public expenditure followed further 
extensions of administrative devolution which, although at least partly intended as a 
way of off-setting demands for political devolution, in practice ultimately 
strengthened the cause for self-government by drawing Scottish politicians and 
policy-makers into a separate Scottish political structure.420 
 In addition to the growth of the state, the other major development in Scottish 
politics during this period was the dramatic collapse of support for the Conservative 
Party in Scotland.  From a high-point  in  1955,  when  the  Conservatives’  won  a 
majority  of  the  vote  in  Scotland,  the  Party’s  political  fortunes  north  of  the  border 
rapidly and comprehensively declined.  A number of variables have been suggested 
by  way  of  explanation  for  the  Conservatives’  collapse  in  Scotland,  including  a 
decline in religiosity, the growing identification of the Conservatives with an 
Anglicized landowning elite, and Scotland’s greater reliance on public spending and 
the cheap rents offered by a large public housing sector.421  Whatever the cause of 
Scotland’s electorate turning away from the Conservative Party, undoubtedly one of 
its effects was to leave the SNP well placed to benefit from voter dissatisfaction with 
the Labour government that emerged in the late-1960s. 
 In 1967, against a background of drastic deflation measures and rising 
unemployment, Scottish politics arrived at a significant turning point as nationalism 
once again moved to the forefront of the political agenda as a result of two notable 
electoral successes for the SNP.  First, in March 1967 the SNP polled 28 per cent of 
the vote in a Glasgow Pollock by-election with a large swing from Labour.  This was 
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followed in November of the same year with a SNP victory at a by-election in 
Hamilton, giving them only their second ever parliamentary seat. 
 
Scottish Devolution: The F irst Attempt, 1967-1979   
The analysis thus far suggests that the progressive extension of administrative 
devolution in Scotland that occurred on an ad hoc basis as a concomitant of the post-
war policy of economic planning, by enhancing the distinctiveness of Scottish 
governance,  increased  the  importance  the  ‘national dimension’  in Scottish politics.  
Consequently, although administrative devolution was in some instances intended as 
a palliative to the nationalist threat, in practice it made political devolution more 
rather than less likely, owing to the separate Scottish political structure which it 
reinforced. 
 The emergence of the SNP as a significant electoral force in 1967 must be 
seen in this context.  The importance of the national dimension in Scottish politics, 
combined with the collapse in support for the Conservative Party, meant that when 
the post-war British settlement began to fail, as it did in the late 1960s, a 
distinctively Scottish solution to the problem was easily sought.422  The SNP, with 
their democratic and pragmatic political nationalism, were ideally placed to profit 
from the Scottish search for a political alternative once the failure of economic 
planning became apparent.  As Alice Brown et al observe;  
 
‘The  credibility  of  the  system  started  to  decay...as  the  state  became  less  able  to 
deliver the material welfare, and it was then that support for a Scottish Parliament began to 
rise.  To say that is not to claim that the sole explanation of that support is material; it is 
merely to point out that the Scottishness that people in Scotland seem to want for their 
politics is in the framework through which material welfare is administered.’423 
 
The SNPs electoral success of 1967 propelled the issue of self-government to 
the forefront of Scottish politics and forced the major political parties to clarify their 
position  with  regard  to  the  nationalists’  demands.    Edward  Heath’s  Conservative 
Party set up a committee under the stewardship of Sir Alec Douglas Home to 
examine the case for and against devolution.  In the following year Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson established a Royal Commission on the Constitution to consider the 
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appropriate constitutional response to what was rightly perceived to be a rising tide 
of nationalism in Scotland. 
The discovery in the early 1970s of North Sea oil further strengthened the 
appeal of the SNP, suggesting as it did that Scottish independence was economically 
viable.    The  SNP  campaigning  slogan,  ‘It’s  Scotland’s  Oil!’  was  designed  to 
emphasise the potential for a Scottish political and economic alternative which its 
discovery seemed to opened up. 
The 1969 Royal Commission on the Constitution, known as the Kilbrandon 
Commission, finally published its report in October 1973, by which time the 
Conservatives had ousted Labour from government.  The Kilbrandon Report 
recommended the establishment of a devolved Scottish Assembly directly elected via 
proportional representation.  That the Commissions’ recommendations could not be 
ignored was made abundantly clear when a few months after its publication the SNP 
scored another electoral success, this time overturning a large Labour majority to 
win a Glasgow Govan by-election.  Similar success followed in the two 1974 
General Elections as the SNP polled 22 per cent of the Scottish vote and gained 
seven parliamentary seats in the February election, rising to 30 per cent of the vote in 
the October poll, a result that saw the Party push the Conservatives into third place 
in Scotland. 
The SNPs 1974 General Election performances convinced the Labour 
government that concessions would have to be made in order to counter the 
nationalist threat, and the leadership lost little time in re-converting to the cause of 
Scottish self-government.   A White Paper based on  the Killbrandon Commission’s 
recommendations entitled Democracy and Devolution was published, recommending 
the establishment of a directly elected Scottish Parliament with considerable control 
over domestic affairs.  This was followed, on the 27th November 1975 by the 
publication of Our Changing Democracy,  a  report  outlining  the  government’s 
detailed proposals for the creation of a legislative parliament for Scotland and a 
weaker executive Assembly for Wales.  The government was now ready to introduce 
the first Parliamentary bill on devolution since 1927. 
The long-standing connection between the Labour Party and the self-
government cause in Scotland undoubtedly facilitated the party's rapid re-conversion 
to Scottish devolution when the scale of the SNP threat became clear.  Although it 
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had been progressively marginalized since the Labour Party began to direct its 
political attentions on Westminster from the mid-1930s, Scottish Home Rule could 
lay claim to a respectable heritage within the Labour movement, and many Scottish 
Labour members had never relinquished their support for the re-establishment of a 
Scottish Parliament.  It was, as a result, relatively easy for the Labour leadership to 
adopt a policy in favour of political devolution in 1974 without running the risk of 
opening damaging splits in the Party's unity.  Moreover, as Keating and Bleiman 
note, because opinion amongst Labour members regarding Home Rule transcended 
the traditional left- and right-wing factions within the Party, the potential of the 
leadership's decision to support devolution to divide the Party was further 
minimized.424  
 The Scotland and Wales Bill, legislating for Scottish and Welsh devolution, 
was introduced to Parliament in November 1976 but, as was the case with the Home 
Rule Bills of the 1920s, failed at the guillotine motion vote.  Whereas the failure of 
the 1924 and 1927 Home Rule Bills owed much to the lukewarm enthusiasm of the 
then Labour government, in 1976 the looming presence of a newly resurgent SNP 
effectively  forced  the  government’s  hand  and  a  second  Scotland Bill appeared in 
November 1977, this time successfully making it on to the statute book.  Prior to the 
completion of the Bill's passage through the House of Commons, a group of anti-
devolutionists from within the Labour Party, including Tam Dalyell and Robin Cook, 
successfully forced two concessions from the government; first, that the 
implementation of the Bill's proposals be conditional on the result of a referendum, 
and as a result of a private members amendment sponsored by George Cunningham 
MP, that the Act be repealed should the 'yes' vote fail to gain the support of at least 
40 per cent of the entire Scottish electorate.   
 The referendum took place in the shadow of an economic crisis in which 
strikes, rising unemployment and high inflation contributed to the general 
unpopularity of the Labour government.  Constitutional reform was rather 
overshadowed by the infamous 'Winter of Discontent' during which public sector pay 
disputes and industrial disruption dominated the headlines.  Against this background, 
not only did the 'yes' campaign struggle to convince the Scottish electorate of the 
overriding importance of constitutional reform, they also had to contend with the 
possibility that the referendum could be turned into a poll on the popularity of the 
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government.  These problems were exacerbated by the absence of cooperation 
between the Labour leadership and the SNP, the two main protagonists of the 'yes' 
campaign.  Certainly the 'yes' campaign was no match for the well-organized 'no' 
campaign led by Labour anti-devolutionists with the support of the majority of the 
Conservatives and the Scottish business community, both of whom played on fears 
that devolution might lead to extensive tax increases. 
 The referendum was held on March 1st 1979, and although a majority of 
those that voted expressed an opinion in favour of devolution, the 'yes' vote 
constituted only 32.85 per cent of the total registered electorate (as compared to 
30.78 per cent against).  The '40 per cent amendment' thus proved decisive and the 
government moved to repeal the Scotland Act.  Before it could do so, however, the 
Conservative Party called on the other Parties to support a vote of no-confidence 
against the government.  Perhaps against their better judgement given their 
performance in the ensuing General Election, the SNP supported the Conservatives' 
motion, thus contributing to the collapse of the government. 
 
The Thatcher-led Conservative Government and the Creation of the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention, 1979-1990 
Scottish nationalism and the campaign for self-government were thrown into turmoil 
by the failure of the 1979 referendum on devolution.  The two most important pro-
devolution Parties, Labour and the SNP, both suffered heavy defeats in the 1979 
General Election.  The SNP lost nine of their eleven parliamentary seats and saw 
their share of the Scottish vote fall to 17.3 per cent.  In the aftermath of this 
disastrous electoral performance the SNP succumbed to internal dispute and division.  
An internal faction known as the '79 Group' emerged arguing in favour of 
abandoning the 'broad' electoral strategy pursued by the Party in the 1960s and 70s in 
favour of adopting a more precise left-wing ideological stance.425  The debilitating 
consequences of Party disunity were made clear in the 1983 General Election, when 
the SNPs share of the Scottish vote fell further to just 11.7 per cent. 
 Reeling from the Conservative’s comprehensive victory in the 1979 General 
Election, a similar fate befell the Labour Party in the early 1980s, in the form of 
militant Trotskyite factions whose activities  contaminated  the Party’s  image  in  the 
eyes of much of the electorate.  Against this background constitutional reform 
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rapidly  descended  down  the  Party’s  list  of  priorities,  to  the  extent  that  devolution 
barely elicited a mention in their political programme between 1980 and 1987.  From 
the perspective of the time, it appeared as if Scottish nationalism was a spent force.  
This, however, proved not to be the case, and for the major explanation as to why, 
we need to examine the politics of Thatcherism. 
 Margaret  Thatcher’s  Conservatives  acceded  to  government  on  a  pledge  to 
initiate far-reaching structural reforms guided by the free-market ideology of neo-
liberalism.  The radical economic agenda of Thatcherism brought an end to the post-
war consensus approach to political and economic management.  In its place a 
macro-economic policy dominated by monetarism, privatization, liberalization of 
free markets, a reduction in trade union power and a cut in welfare subsidies was 
established.426  Ironically for a political project that promised to ‘roll back the state’, 
Thatcherism brought about a significant centralization of power as central state 
control was strengthened at the expense of the peripheries.  This fact, combined with 
the continuing absence of popular support for the Conservative Party in Scotland, 
ultimately brought devolution back onto the political agenda within a decade of its 
apparent demise in the debacle of 1979. 
   With its large public sector and heavy reliance on state intervention, 
Scotland was to some extent especially vulnerable to the new economic and political 
climate of the 1980s as employment in its traditional manufacturing and heavy 
industries once again come under severe pressure.427   The growth in previously 
marginal sectors such as finance and services, which to a large extent replaced the 
losses in more traditional industrial sectors428, was largely obscured by a widespread 
perception of economic decline during the 1980s.  Moreover, economic changes 
nurtured a suspicion in Scotland that the Conservatives were favouring the interests 
of the south-east and the Midlands, where the source of their electoral supremacy lay. 
 As compared with the overall British average, Scotland had, as has already 
been remarked, a particularly large public sector, high levels of state intervention and 
public spending and a dominance of public housing provision over private renting or 
home-ownership.  This was the result, at least in part, of successive post-war 
governments resorting to pork-barrel politics for short-term political gain.  Whatever 
the cause, the result was that, despite lacking its own independent state, by the late 
1970s Scotland possessed a highly  stateist  economy and  society.    ‘In  a  country  so 
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dependent on government,’ argues Christopher Harvie, ‘where priorities were to do 
with infrastructure, education and social overhead capital, the prescriptions of the 
market economists had little relevance.’429  The Conservative’s declining share of the 
country’s  vote  suggests  that  the  Scottish  people  were  inclined to agree with this 
assessment.  Taking Britain as a whole, the Conservative’s consistently polled over 
40 per cent of the electorate throughout the 1980s.  In Scotland, however, the 
Conservative share of the vote fell from 30 per cent in 1979 to 24 per cent in 1987.  
Owing to the vagaries of the first-past-the-post  voting  system,  the  Conservative’s 
share of the Scottish vote translated into just 22 seats in 1979 and 10 in 1987.  The 
1997 General Election marked a new low-point for Scottish Conservatives, as the 
Party managed just 17 per cent of the vote in Scotland and failed to win a single 
Scottish parliamentary seat. 
 Scottish hostility to Thatcherism was not solely based on an aversion to free-
market ideology.  Despite Thatcher’s insistence that ‘there is no such thing as society, 
only  individuals  and  families,’  the  politics  of  Thatcherism  employed  a  strong 
nationalist rhetoric.  Whilst this proved a highly effective strategy in England, as the 
boost  to  the  Conservative’s  popularity  during  the  Falklands war is evidence, the 
lingering impression in Scotland was of a nationalism that took no account of 
Britain’s peripheral nations.  Thatcher, in other words, was perceived as being an 
English nationalist with little interest in, or knowledge of, the distinctive national 
identities Britain’s constituent national units.  ‘As Conservative nationalism became 
more explicit and strident,’ comments David McCrone, ‘so competing nationalisms 
asserted  themselves,  and  Thatcher’s  success  in  England  had  its  counterpart in 
electoral unpopularity in Scotland and Wales.’430 
  This perception was further reinforced by the progressive erosion of 
Scotland’s civil autonomy during the 1980s, as the government sought to subjugate 
Scotland’s  autonomous  institutions  to  central  state powers in the name of market 
efficiency. 431   The attack on Scottish autonomy was especially inflammatory to 
Scottish public opinion given the Conservatives' minority status north of the border.   
On April 1st 1988 the government introduced the poll tax to Scotland without 
regard to the considerable scale of opposition within Scottish local government and 
civil society.  A mass campaign of civil obedience ensued with up to a third of the 
population opting to withhold payment of the tax.  More than any other single event, 
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the poll tax fiasco confirmed the perception widely prevalent in Scotland that the 
Conservative administration’s interpretation of the British constitution represented a 
grave threat to the freedoms guaranteed to Scotland in the Treaty of Union.  In the 
words  of  Tom Devine,  ‘Mrs  Thatcher  disregarded  the  tradition  of  the  union  as  a 
partnership in which Scottish interests had to be taken into account and instead 
seemed to consider there to be no limit to the absolute sovereignty of the 
Westminster Parliament.’432   
As previously indicated in Chapter Four, according to the terms on which the 
Treaty of Union was signed Scotland retained a significant degree of institutional 
autonomy in what was a union, rather than a unitary, state.433  Britain remained a 
union state, displaying a variety of quasi-federative aspects, throughout the 
eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  The actions of the Conservative 
Party in the 1980s revealed the fragility of this informal constitutional arrangement 
and helped convince a significant proportion of the Scottish population that 
constitutional reform was the only way to safeguard the capacity for autonomous 
governance in Scotland. 
After the 1987 General Election nationalism once again moved to the centre 
stage of Scottish politics.  Having successfully overcome the internal disunity that 
damaged the Party in the early 1980s, the SNP staged a modest revival in the 1987 
General Election.  Under the influence of some of the original members of the '79 
Group, the SNP had adopted a more explicitly left-wing ideological stance, as well 
as modifying their long-standing support for independence with a new policy of 
'Independence in Europe'.   
 Meanwhile, under the leadership of Neil Kinnock the Labour Party once 
again adopted the cause of Scottish Home Rule, no doubt in part in response to the 
re-emerging threat posed by the SNP.  However, the most significant driving force 
behind the Home Rule movement from 1987 was the independent civil society 
organisation the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA).  In 1987 the CSA 
appointed a steering committee under the leadership of Sir Robert Grieve to examine 
the possibility of setting up a Scottish Constitutional Convention to consider the case 
for devolution.  On 6th July 1988 the Committee published A Claim of Right for 
Scotland proposing the establishment of a Constitutional Convention composed of 
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MPs, trade unionists, and the Churches, with the objective of deliberating Scotland's 
constitutional future and working towards Scottish devolution. 
 The authors of A Claim of Right for Scotland accused the Thatcher 
government of exploiting the doctrine of 'the Crown-in-Parliament' in order to 
govern without proper regard to the general consent of the people.434  The erosion of 
Scotland's institutional autonomy and the centralization of state power undertaken by 
a government lacking a democratic mandate in Scotland were advanced as evidence 
of the need for constitutional change in order to safeguard the accountability of 
power.  By framing the question of Scottish self-government as a question of the 
generalized protection of democratic principles throughout Britain, the authors of A 
Claim of Right for Scotland presented devolution as the first step in an ongoing 
reform process that would, it was hoped, lead to other parts of the country 
challenging the untrammelled exercise of power by the central state. 
 A Scottish Constitutional Convention was established on 30th March 1988 
under the Convenership of Canon Kenyon Wright.  Notwithstanding the SNPs 
decision to withdraw from the Convention owing to its unwillingness to discuss 
independence as a constitutional option, the Convention united a broad spectrum of 
Scotland's political and civil society.  Membership was taken up by Labour, the 
Liberal Democrats, the majority of Scotland's regional councils, the Scottish Trade 
Unions Council (STUC), the Scottish churches, ethnic minority representatives, the 
Green and Communist Parties, and the Scottish Convention of Women.435  The 
executive committee of the Convention, co-chaired by Sir David Steel, Harry Ewing 
and Canon Kenyon Wright, issued its report on St. Andrews Day 1990 outlining 
plans for a devolved Scottish legislative parliament to be elected under a form of 
proportional representation and financed through 'assigned revenues' from taxes 
raised in Scotland. 
 
New Labour and the Road to Devolution, 1990-1999 
In the same year as the publication of the Constitutional Convention's report, 
Margaret Thatcher was forced to resign as Prime Minister.  Although her successor, 
John Major, led the Conservatives' to a surprise victory in the 1992 General Election 
with a marginal increase in the Party's share of the vote in Scotland from 24 per cent 
to 25.6 per cent, the momentum gained from the Constitutional Convention ensured 
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that Home Rule retained its place at the forefront of Scottish political debate.  
Moreover, the unprecedented unity of the Home Rule movement in Scotland, as 
evidenced by the broad-based membership of the Convention, meant that an 
overwhelming majority of the Scottish votes cast in the 1992 General Election went 
to parties committed to Constitutional change. 
 In July 1992 John Smith, a Scotsman and long-time supporter of Scottish 
Home Rule, became leader of the Labour Party.  In the brief period from 1992 until 
his death in 1994, Smith committed a future Labour government to the establishment 
of a Scottish Parliament, adopting this as official Party policy at their 1993 
conference.  Although personally less enthusiastic about devolution, Smith's 
successor Tony Blair nevertheless followed through on Smith's commitment, and led 
the Labour Party into the 1997 General Election with a programme containing for 
constitutional change including territorial devolution.  The scale of Labour's victory 
in that election – they secured a majority of 179 seats in the House of Commons – 
granted them considerable scope for realizing their policy pledge. 
 A White Paper on Scotland was issued soon after Labour's victory offering a 
devolved legislative Parliament for Scotland broadly similar to the proposals put to 
the Scottish electorate in the referendum of 1979.  The 1997 proposals were, 
however, novel in two important respects; they specified the powers reserved to 
Westminster rather than those devolved to Edinburgh, and allowed the possibility of 
granting the devolved Parliament tax-varying powers.  At the same time a separate 
Bill proposed a less powerful Welsh executive Assembly. 
The White Paper proposals were put to Scottish and Welsh electorates prior 
to their introduction to Parliament.  The Scottish referendum was scheduled to take 
place on September 11th 1997, and despite the length of the campaigning period 
being curtailed owing to the death of the Princess of Wales, the result was a vote in 
favour of devolution, with 74.3 per cent supporting the principle of devolution and 
63.5 per cent agreeing that a devolved Parliament should have the power to vary 
taxes. 
The referendum result therefore proved decisive and a devolved Scottish 
Parliament was established, meeting for the first time in July 1999.  The Parliament 
was given legislative competence over all issues except those specifically reserved to 
Westminster; foreign policy, defence, macro-economic policy, social security, 
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abortion and broadcasting.  In addition it had the power to vary the basic rate of tax 
by up to 3 pence.436   
 
Summary 
The absence of nationalism in Scottish politics prior to the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century should not obscure us to the fact that Britain has always been a 
union state with various federative features, as opposed to the traditional model of 
the unitary state.  As such, Scotland enjoyed a significant degree of civic autonomy 
throughout the period in which it nevertheless failed to produce any significant 
nationalist movement.   
The Scottish nationalism that began to emerge from around the 1870s was 
intimately associated with the broader movement for Highland land reform, and was 
primarily orientated toward the promotion of a Gaelic cultural revival.  Nationalism 
in Scotland was able to achieve some degree of political momentum as a result of the 
ruling Liberal Party's support for 'Home Rule All Round' as its preferred solution to 
the Irish question.  Notwithstanding a brief period in the 1920s when the support of 
the Labour Party ensued that Scottish Home Rule occupied a prominent position in 
political debate, nationalism remained of marginal importance in Scotland until the 
late 1960s.  The formation of an independent Scottish National Party in 1934 did 
little to change this, although it was under its lead that Scottish nationalism was 
transformed into a modern political nationalism emphasizing democratic principles 
and the civic bases of nationhood.  The progressive downgrading of the Labour 
Party's commitment to Scottish Home Rule from the late 1920s onwards further 
marginalized the forces of nationalism. 
 The establishment of a post-war political consensus in favour of state 
intervention in the economy, the nationalization of key industries, and state welfare 
provision, ran counter to the ideology of devolving political power on a territorial 
basis and the nationalist movement struggled to make headway in Scotland.  It is 
important to note, however, that administrative devolution was significantly 
extended during this period, with the result that the distinctiveness of Scottish 
governance actually increased.  By emphasizing the 'Scottishness' of Scotland's 
governance, the post-war extension of administrative devolution helped to foster the 
demand for a distinctively Scottish response to the failure of the post-war settlement 
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that became apparent in the 1960s.  In light of the declining popularity of the 
Conservative Party in Scotland from 1955 onwards, the SNP were therefore ideally 
placed to promote their pragmatic political nationalism as offering the best 
alternative.  The discovery of North Sea oil in the early 1970s further strengthened 
the nationalists' appeal. 
After the failure of the 1979 referendum on devolution, nationalism re-
emerged as a powerful political force in 1987 largely in response to the erosion of 
Scotland's traditional civic autonomy by a Thatcher government that was singularly 
unpopular in Scotland.  The Scottish Constitutional Convention argued that 
constitutional change in the form of political devolution was required to safeguard 
the accountability of power and ensure that the government of the day could not 
govern without recourse to the general consent of its constituent nations' populations.  
The British Constitutional doctrine of the Crown-in-Parliament was held to offer 
insufficient guarantees for the capacity of minority nations to decide upon their own 
political future.  Spectacularly unpopular measures such as the introduction of the 
poll tax galvanized popular support for nationalism in general and devolution in 
particular. 
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6 
The Consequences of Scottish Devolution for the 
Political Cohesion of the British State 
 
 
 
 
 
As was noted in the previous chapter, it was the rise of peripheral nationalism, in 
particular the electoral success of the SNP and the mobilization of Scottish civil 
society through the Scottish Constitutional Convention movement, that provided the 
impetus for the introduction of devolution legislation in 1997.  The Labour Party's 
traditional commitment to Scottish self-government peaked already in the mid-1920s, 
and from the 1930s onwards regional self-rule was progressively subordinated to a 
centralist ideology according to which allocation was to be based on need alone, 
regardless of geography.437  The post-war construction of the welfare state and cross-
party consensus in favour of extensive state management of the economy similarly 
favoured centralization over territorial devolution.438 
When Scottish self-government reappeared on the political agenda in the 
1980s, it did so as a result of pressure exerted by Scottish nationalism.  It is worth 
repeating the central role played by the independent nationalist movement in 
persuading an otherwise ambivalent Labour Party of the benefits of devolution since 
it serves as a reminder that one of the principle motivations underpinning the 1999 
devolution settlement was the belief that it would neutralize the nationalist threat.  
From the perspective of the Labour Party leadership, the success of the SNP, rather 
than indicating the strength of separatist nationalism in Scotland, reflected more its 
ability to successfully present itself as the champion of the 'Scottish dimension' in 
the context of a British constitution that offered inadequate protection against the 
threat of English dominance.  By devolving power to an autonomous Scottish 
Parliament, the Labour Party would, it was supposed, undermine the SNPs capacity 
to present itself as the defender of the Scottish interest.  Not only would devolution 
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therefore strengthen the Union, it would bring the added bonus of re-establishing 
Labour's long-standing dominance of Scottish politics. 
This is not to say that the Labour Party's re-conversion to the cause of 
territorial devolution was based upon entirely cynical calculations of electoral 
advantage.  There were, undoubtedly, many within the Party whose support for 
devolution was based on a sincerely held conviction that it would improve the 
quality of democracy within Britain.  Moreover, devolution was presented as one 
aspect of a wider package of constitutional reform oriented toward the 
'modernization' of the United Kingdom's political institutions, which included House 
of Lords reform, the re-establishment of a London Assembly and the creation of 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) in England.  Nevertheless, the decision to 
grant a greater degree of political autonomy to Britain’s national minorities in the 
form of directly elected administrations was intended as a political measure that 
would neutralise the threat of nationalism and thereby strengthen the Union.  The 
logic behind this perspective was that a territorial dispersal of power from the centre 
to the periphery was necessary in order to re-legitimize the British state in the eyes 
of its national minorities, and counter the threat of separatism. 
In contrast to the Labour Party leadership's insistence that devolution would 
strengthen the Union, commentators opposed to the plan expressed the opinion that 
devolution would unleash fissiparous tendencies latent in Britain’s multinational 
character.  Once unleashed, these centrifugal forces would, it was argued, threaten 
the state’s very existence.  The implication of such arguments is that the political 
cohesion of a multinational state requires for its maintenance a strict unity of 
government, an assumption which, as we shall see, dominated constitutional thinking 
in Britain in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 The objective of this chapter is to analyze the impact of the 1999 devolution 
settlement on the British state as a whole in order to assess whether the latter is likely 
thereby to be strengthened or undermined.  Although the focus is on the specific case 
of Britain, the analysis contained within is intended as a contribution to the broader 
question of how much political/institutional diversity a multinational state can 
tolerate without unduly compromising its future existence as a single state.   
 I distinguish between three aspects of the devolution settlement; legal-
constitutional, political-institutional, and financial.  Within each of these three 
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aspects, the analytical focus is on changes introduced by devolution that potentially 
impact upon the political cohesion – that is, the capacity to function effectively as a 
single unit – of the British state.  In other words, this chapter seeks to examine areas 
in which devolution introduces potentially disintegrative forces into the 
constitutional, political and financial make-up of Britain.  From this it is hoped that 
an overall assessment of the competing claims forwarded about devolution 
mentioned above can be made. 
 Before the analysis can proceed, it should be noted that it is Scottish 
devolution that forms the principle focus of this chapter.  The scant attention paid to 
Welsh and Northern Irish devolution can be justified by reference to the degree of 
political autonomy exercised by Britain’s national minorities since 1999.  As the 
Scottish Parliament has considerably more political autonomy than both its Welsh 
and Northern Irish counterparts, it is likely that any such disintegrative effects as the 
process of devolution contains will be most pronounced in Scotland.  Echoing this 
sentiment, Michael O'Neill has suggested that Scotland 'provides the benchmark of 
devolution.'439 
 
Legal-Constitutional Consequences  
Given the notoriously opaque character of Britain’s unwritten constitution, 
attempting to identify with any precision the constitutional impact of devolution is 
less than straightforward.  As is well known, the 'unwritten' constitution of Britain 
consists of a complex mixture of statutes, custom, conventions and case law.  It has 
been described as 'institutional and practical, as opposed to theoretical and 
doctrinal.' 440   Consequently, the analysis of the constitutional implications of 
devolving power to sub-state national administrations is beset with difficulties, and 
the constitutional status of those administrations is contested. 
 Despite the complexity and ambiguity of Britain’s constitution, it is 
traditionally asserted that it is underpinned by two key principles; Parliamentary 
sovereignty and the rule of law.441  By the former is meant that the Parliament at 
Westminster is the unambiguous centre of undivided sovereignty.  The supremacy of 
Parliament is expressed by the absence of any distinction between fundamental and 
ordinary laws; all laws are, in principle, alterable by a simple Act of Parliament.442  
The latter refers to equality of legal and political rights. 
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 It is toward the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty that the present 
analysis of the constitutional implications of devolution is oriented.  Two questions 
are addressed; first, to what extent, and in what manner, does devolution challenge 
the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty?  Second, in what ways, if any, does the 
relationship between devolution and Parliamentary sovereignty impact upon the 
cohesion, understood as meaning the capacity to resist pressures toward 
disintegration, of the British state as a whole?  Again, it should be reiterated that the 
principle focus of this chapter is Scottish devolution, and the analysis of the specific 
qualities of the 1999 devolution settlement takes as its primary reference point the 
1998 Scotland Act. 
 
Devolution and Parliamentary Sovereignty 
According to the wording of the Scotland Act 1998, the relationship between 
Scottish devolution and the constitutional principle of Parliamentary sovereignty is 
clear.  Section 28 (1) of the Act states that 'the [Scottish] Parliament may make laws, 
to be known as Acts of the Scottish Parliament.'443  Section 28 (7) goes on to state 
that 'this section does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
to make laws.'444  By reserving to the Parliament at Westminster the unrestricted 
right to legislate on all devolved matters, Section 28 (7) is intended to protect and 
maintain the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty.445  In other words, it is intended 
that devolution will leave intact the absolute supremacy of the Parliament at 
Westminster.  The devolved Scottish Parliament is, in principle at least, a 
constitutionally subordinate Parliament, whose very existence can be abolished 
without its consent by a simple Act of Parliament passed at Westminster.  The same 
applies for the Welsh and Northern Irish Assemblies. 
 Situated in the context of Ronald Watts' comparative typology of political 
systems, the 1999 devolution settlement transforms Britain from a unitary state into a 
devolved union, where the latter is characterized by the existence of multi-tiered 
government combining elements of shared rule and regional self-rule in a political 
system in which central government nevertheless remains constitutionally 
superordinate.446 
 In reality, however, the relationship between devolution and Parliamentary 
sovereignty is more complex and ambiguous than the text of the Scotland Act 
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suggests.  For, whilst the Parliament at Westminster retains the legal right to 
unilaterally dissolve the Scottish Parliament, and in this sense remains the locus of 
undivided sovereignty, in practical political terms its sovereignty is significantly 
compromised by the devolution settlement.   In this regard, it is instructive to turn to 
the doyenne of classical British constitutional theory, A.V. Dicey, whose analysis of 
the 'Gladstonian Constitution' embodied in the 1886 Irish Home Rule Bill devotes 
considerable attention to the question of its compatibility or otherwise with 
Parliamentary sovereignty.447 
 There are three interrelated elements to Dicey's discussion of the relationship 
between Home Rule (devolution) and the sovereignty of the Parliament at 
Westminster; the significance of nationality, provisions for amending the 
constitution in a devolved union, and what he terms 'constitutional morality.'  We 
will deal with each in turn. 
 Drawing a distinction between devolution and local self-government, Dicey 
emphasize the added prestige that would attach to a devolved administration as a 
result of its essentially national character: 'A town council, whatever its powers, does 
not represent a nation, and derives no prestige from the principle of nationality; the 
feeblest legislative assembly meeting at Dublin would rightly claim to speak for the 
Irish people.'448  The cachet of being a national assembly would, in Dicey's view, 
lend the devolved Irish administration a moral authority incompatible with 
Westminster's claim to absolute sovereignty.  In sum, Dicey argues, 'Local Self-
Government however extended means the delegation, Home Rule however curtailed 
means the surrender, of Parliamentary authority.'449 
 This argument can be transposed onto the 1999 devolution settlement which, 
after all, established Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish national administrations.  In 
his analysis of the 1998 Scotland Act, Vernon Bogdanor emphasizes the significance 
of the nationality principle in the same way as Dicey and argues that contemporary 
British devolution is incompatible with the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty: 
'The most important power of the Scottish Parliament will be one not mentioned in 
the Act at all: that of representing the people of Scotland.'450  The moral authority 
embodied in the Scottish Parliament as a result of its national democratic mandate 
belies the supposition that Westminster's sovereignty remains untouched by 
devolution.  It is rather the case that, as Bogdanor argues, 'the Scotland Act creates a 
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new locus of political power', in the shape of a Scottish Parliament that 'will be 
anything but subordinate.'451 
 The second aspect of the relationship between devolution and Parliamentary 
sovereignty that Dicey highlights is the issue of where the authority to amend the 
constitution lies following the dispersal of political power to devolved territories.  
Under the proposals put forward  in the 1886 Government of Ireland Bill, the 
creation of a devolved Irish Parliament was to be accompanied by the removal of 
Irish representation from Westminster and the creation of an 'Imperial Parliament' 
made up of a combination of members from the British and Irish Parliaments for the 
express purpose of revising and altering the constitution as and when is was deemed 
necessary.  The existence of this third institution, and the implication that it be 
within its jurisdiction to pass judgement on whether an Act of the British Parliament 
were or were not compatible with the constitution, would have marked a significant 
departure from the traditional British constitution, rendering 'legally doubtful' the 
sovereignty of the Parliament at Westminster. 
 An essential difference, of course, between the Gladstonian Constitution that 
was the subject of Dicey's analysis and the 1999 devolution settlement is that the 
latter does not abolish Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish representation at 
Westminster.  Consequently, contemporary British devolution features no 
organization analogous to Dicey's 'Imperial Parliament', since Westminster remains a 
Parliament in which all the constituent nations are represented.  This being the case, 
it could be argued that the sovereignty of the Parliament at Westminster is 
constitutionally more secure than would have been the case had the 1886 
Government of Ireland Bill been passed.  However, regardless of the continuation of 
Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish representation at Westminster, the 1999 
devolution settlement still implies a need to make specific arrangements for the 
conduct of intergovernmental relations between central and devolved levels of 
government.  To put it another way, in the event of a dispute as to whether an 
individual piece of legislation passed by the Scottish Parliament was ultra vires 
(beyond or exceeding the authority granted to it by the Scotland Act) some 
mechanism or process is required to help resolve the situation to the satisfaction of 
both parties. 
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 The formal mechanism by which disputes as to the legality or otherwise of 
legislation passed by the Scottish Parliament is outlined in Schedule 6 of the 
Scotland Act.  In the final instance, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
(JCPC) has jurisdiction over 'devolution issues' – that is, disputes concerning the 
question of whether an Act of the Scottish Parliament falls within its legislative 
competence.452  The JCPC is described by Bogdanor as 'a constitutional court on 
devolution matters.' 453   This marks a significant departure from the traditional 
conception of the status of law under the British constitution, according to which law 
is understood as 'a world neutrally detached from the contests of political ideas and 
argument', and is as such apolitical, scientific and technical.454  Since disputes over 
'devolution issues' are at least potentially matters of a fundamentally political nature, 
giving jurisdiction for their resolution to the courts in the form of the JCPC is at 
variance with the concept of legal autonomy and, by implication, with the doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty itself.  This has long been recognized by opponents of 
devolution.455 
 The final aspect of Dicey's discussion of the relationship of devolution to the 
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty considers the matter 'not as a question of 
constitutional law, but as a question of public morality.'456  According to Dicey, the 
Government of Ireland Bill represents nothing less than a 'Parliamentary compact' 
between the British Parliament and Irish people.  He goes on; 'This is in a moral 
point of view little less than a treaty; it is an engagement which England (sic) could 
not break, or incur the imputation of breaking, without dishonour.'457  The notion of 
Westminster's undivided sovereignty would, as a result, be 'morally reduced to 
nothing.'458 
 Dicey's argument – that practical and political considerations render impotent 
the constitutional supremacy of the Parliament at Westminster in the event of the 
establishment of autonomous territorial-national administrations – is applicable to 
the contemporary context.  Whilst it is the case that Westminster retains the 
constitutional right to unilaterally abolish the devolved administrations created in 
1999, in practice such a course of action is politically impossible without inducing 
the break-up of Britain.  To the extent that this is true, Westminster can be 
understood to have transferred a degree of political power to Britain’s devolved 
territories.  In terms of the legal-constitutional dimension of devolution, we can 
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therefore say that it represents a real and significant departure from what has 
traditionally been considered one of the two cornerstones of the British constitution; 
the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
  
Sovereignty and Political Cohesion in the Multinational United Kingdom 
Having established that devolution significantly attenuates the meaning of 
Parliamentary sovereignty, we are now in a position to consider the question of 
whether devolution thereby threatens the political cohesion of the British state as a 
whole.  Dicey's intention in highlighting the incompatibility of the Gladstonian 
Constitution and the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty was precisely to argue 
that the capacity of Britain to remain a united state in the future would be fatally 
undermined.  Our question can be reframed thus: on what grounds, if any, can it be 
argued that the unity of a multinational state is significantly imperilled by the 
absence of a central Parliament in which undivided sovereignty resides? 
 According to the anti-devolutionist Labour MP Tam Dalyell, with the 
promise of devolution 'expectations have been aroused which cannot possibly be 
fulfilled.'459  Attempting to appease nationalist demands through the establishment of 
a limited degree of self-government will therefore be counterproductive since, far 
from satisfying these demands, it would act as a catalyst for even greater autonomy.  
Dalyell concludes; 'A greater and greater share of power will be expected: conflict 
with Westminster would become inevitable.' 460   It would, moreover, prove 
prohibitively difficult to resolve such conflict in the absence of a single centre of 
undivided sovereignty. 
 To argue that the most likely consequence of the devolution of political 
power in Britain from the centre to the peripheral nations would be to provoke an 
escalation of nationalist demands, prompting irreconcilable conflict and hence the 
disintegration of the state, begs the question of whether political cohesion is more 
securely safeguarded by rebuffing the demand for political autonomy altogether.  In 
other words, does the potential for dissatisfaction to arise concerning the extent of 
political autonomy devolved represent a greater threat to the integrity of the state 
than preserving the status quo?  In the abstract, it is as at least equally plausible that 
the refusal of a central state to respond to the nationalist demands of minority nations 
itself favours the emergence of nationalisms demanding outright secession.461 
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 The experience of Scottish nationalism during the 1980s is instructive in this 
regard.  Scottish nationalism emerged as a significant political force in the later 
1960s and early 1970s in the context of consecutive governments' failure to halt 
Britain’s postwar economic decline.  The unsuccessful 1979 referendum on Scottish 
and Welsh devolution dealt a serious blow to the political strength of the nationalist 
movement, as the poor electoral performance of the SNP in the 1983 General 
Election bears witness.  However, by the end of the decade a wide cross-section of 
Scottish civil society were united behind the demand for Scottish self-government.  
As was argued in the previous chapter, a key explanatory factor accounting for the 
strong revival of Scottish nationalism in the 1980s was the centralizing character of 
the Thatcher-led Conservative government, in particular its vigorous attachment to 
the twin principles of autonomous executive power and Parliamentary sovereignty. 
 David Marquand argues that the hallmark of British governance since the 
nineteenth century is the dominance of what he terms the 'court vision' of democracy, 
epitomized by a combination of the Whig notion of organic statecraft with a Tory 
ideal of executive leadership.462  Though long sustained, not least in the face of the 
challenge of sub-state nationalism, this traditional British democratic vision was 
comprehensively, and unintentionally, undermined by Thatcherism: 'Mrs Thatcher 
was to the court tradition what Mr. Toad was to motor cars.  She drove it so hard that 
she smashed it up.' 463   The Thatcherite 'revolution' exploited the principles of 
Parliamentary sovereignty and executive autonomy to concentrate power within 
central government and push through a radical pro-market agenda.  However, at the 
same time as it made such strong use of Parliamentary sovereignty, Thatcherism 
unwittingly revealed the limitations of the doctrine, as evidenced by the nationalist 
response which it provoked in Scotland. 
 What the experience of Thatcherism suggests, therefore, is that it is a mistake 
to suppose that sub-state nationalism is most effectively neutralized by reinforcing 
centralized political authority structures and doctrines such as Parliamentary 
sovereignty that support them.  A more plausible line of argument is that the long-
standing cohesion of the multinational British state is explained in part by the 
infrequent and ambiguous use of the nominal doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
 Along these lines, Bernard Crick argues that the historical origins of the 
traditional British idea of Parliamentary sovereignty can be traced back to the 1688 
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revolutionary settlement and the 1707 Treaty of Union.  At this historical juncture, 
Parliamentary sovereignty was an idea that helped bind the new state together.464  It 
was thus an overriding concern with national security – motivated by both memory 
of civil war and the immediate Jacobite threat – that enabled the ideal of 
Parliamentary sovereignty to take root in the British constitution.  However, as Crick 
argues, in practice the unity of the state could only be maintained so long as the 
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty coexisted with a high degree of actual 
administrative autonomy for the constituent nations.  Crick concludes; 'There was, of 
course, always a paradox about the new theory of parliamentary sovereignty.  Like 
its intellectual progenitor, Hobbes' Leviathan, it was a gigantic bluff.  The potential 
powers were not intended to be used, except to prevent a civil war and to preserve 
law and order.'465 
 According to such a perspective, the substantial integrative force at work in 
Britain has historically been the tolerance of administrative autonomy in the 
governance of the state's territorial nations, rather than the undivided sovereignty of 
the Parliament at Westminster.  This explains why the excessive use of 
Parliamentary sovereignty during the 1980s undermined rather than strengthened the 
Union.   
  
Managing relations and resolving disputes between different levels of 
government is an enduring task for all federal political systems.  Prior to 1999, 
Britain’s formally unitary character and single sovereign Parliament militated against 
the possibility of serious friction or conflict resulting from the regulation of intra-
state intergovernmental relations.   
 The establishment of semi-autonomous national administrations in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland introduces the prospect of jurisdictional boundary 
disputes arising between central and devolved levels of government.  The 
problematic nature of the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty following devolution 
significantly complicates attempts to resolve such disputes.  Moreover, the scope for 
contested jurisdiction is perhaps greater than is the case with formal federalism, 
since British devolution does not conform to the neat division of powers 
characteristic of federalism. 466   It therefore seems reasonable to assume that a 
measure of increased volatility will accompany devolution as the devolved 
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administrations explore the limits of their legislative jurisdiction against the 
resistance of central government.  Does the potential for intergovernmental friction 
of this kind threaten the disintegration of the state as a single unit? 
 It was noted above that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) 
has jurisdiction over 'devolution issues', meaning principally disputes as to whether 
or not a specific piece of legislation passed by a devolved administration is ultra 
vires.  In practice, however, no such vires disputes have been referred to the JCPC.  
Alan Trench notes that between 1999 and 2004, only one Act of the Scottish 
Parliament was challenged in the JCPC and then only because it was alleged to have 
infringed the European Convention on Human Rights rather than because it was 
ultra vires to the terms of the Scotland Act.467 
 Its infrequent use reflects the fact that in practice the JCPC is the least 
important aspect of the political mechanisms established for regulating 
intergovernmental relations in post-devolution Britain.  The Memorandum of 
Understanding, in which the procedures for the conduct of intergovernmental 
relations are outlined, emphasizes that recourse to the formal legal intervention of 
the JCPC should be seen as a measure of last resort when it states: 'The devolution 
legislation contains various powers for the Secretary of State to intervene in 
devolved matters.  It also contains power for the Law Officers to refer questions of 
vires to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.  Although the UK Government 
is prepared to use these powers if necessary, it sees them very much as a matter of 
last resort.'468   
 Mechanisms for regulating intergovernmental relations subsequent to 
devolution were deliberately allowed to develop in a somewhat ad hoc and 
pragmatic manner, and are permeated with the assumption that recourse to litigation 
should be avoided as far as possible.469  Rather, there is an emphasis on avoiding 
friction and conflict through the observance of non legally-binding principles of 
governance, set out in the Memorandum of Understanding.  These are; good 
administration and negotiation, no surprises, proper consultation, respect and 
understanding of each other's positions, and clear definitions of roles and 
responsibilities.470  Whether or not this traditionally British common law approach to 
the regulation of intergovernmental relations is sufficient in the multi-level devolved 
Britain is the subject of some dispute, with even devolution-enthusiasts such as 
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Michael O'Neill suggesting that further constitutional reform is likely to be necessary 
in order to introduce a greater degree of formality to the arrangements in this 
regard.471 
 Focusing solely on legal mechanisms such as the JCPC obscures the fact that 
the primary concern of intergovernmental relations in a devolved union is not 
obtaining a legal judgement ruling in favour of one or other of the levels of 
government, but the facilitation of communication and cooperation between them.  
Under Britain’s devolution arrangements, two principle fora exist for the facilitation 
of such communication and cooperation.  In the first instance, relations are 
coordinated via bilateral links between the relevant departments in each 
administration.  In the second instance, for issues which cannot be resolved directly 
within this bilateral framework, the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) was 
established by the Memorandum of Understanding, membership of which includes 
the British Prime Minister, devolved First Ministers, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, the Deputy Prime Minister, Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, and devolved deputy First Ministers.  The JMC is a purely 
consultative body whose decisions are legally binding.  Its functional remit is as 
follows: 
 to consider reserved matters which impinge on devolved areas, and vice 
versa; 
 to consider common issues of concern across all devolved areas;  
 to keep the arrangements for liaison under review; 
 to consider disputes between the administrations.472 
 In the regulation of intergovernmental relations there is inevitably the 
potential for a degree of de-stabilizing friction to arise, but it is by no means 
inevitable that conflict should come to define the process.  The smooth conduct of 
intergovernmental relations depends to a great extent on the political culture of elites.  
In the words of O'Neill; 'Outcomes will depend on the capacity of elites at every 
level to construct procedures, and adopt habits that make cooperation rather than 
conflict the prevailing standards of inter-governmental relations.  There is a new 
political culture to be learned.'473 
 Given the importance of political elites, one importance factor in determining 
outcomes of intergovernmental relations is the degree to which all relevant parties 
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have an interest in making devolution work.  This applies both to the established 
UK-wide parties and the territorially-based nationalist parties.  In the case of the 
former, this means not using the structural advantage enjoyed by central government 
within the existing framework for intergovernmental relations to undermine the 
'spirit' of devolution; i.e. the genuine dispersal of power from the centre to the 
periphery.  In the case of the nationalist parties, this means working towards making 
devolution a success on its own terms, and not just as a means by which to agitate 
for independence.   
 
Before we move on to consider the political and financial aspects of 
devolution, it will be useful to make some brief comments on the nature of 
sovereignty in the global age.  Contemporary globalizing tendencies are 
transforming the relationship between sovereignty, territoriality and state power in 
ways that challenge the traditional nation-state model.474  According to Held et al, 
'any conception of sovereignty which assumes that it is an indivisible, illimitable, 
exclusive and perpetual form of public power – embodied within an individual state 
– is outmoded.'475  To the extent that this statement is true, devolution is far from 
representing the only threat to the traditional British ideal of Parliamentary 
sovereignty. 
 Whilst a detailed examination of the transformed character of sovereignty in 
the global age far exceeds the scope of the present analysis, it is worth making two 
comments relating to Britain’s membership of the European Union and the impact 
that this membership implies for the sovereignty of the Parliament at Westminster.  
First, central to the evolving character of the European Union is that it is 'a network 
of states involving the pooling of sovereignty'476, that is to say, it implies the willing 
surrender by member states of aspects of their sovereignty.  It is in this sense that the 
European Union is a genuinely supranational organization, even though the member 
states retain a final authority in many key areas and are potentially strengthened by 
membership of such a strong geopolitical power. 
 The Parliament at Westminster has, therefore, since 1975 been enmeshed 
within a supranational governmental framework which includes a distinct European 
Parliament.  Consequently, 'Parliament is no longer sovereign save in the highly 
theoretical sense of having the legal capacity to denounce the Rome Treaty but at a 
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political and economic cost that would be so intolerable as to render such an action 
inconceivable in practice.' 477   Similarly in relation to devolution, Westminster's 
constitutional sovereignty is reduced to the theoretical right to repeal the devolution 
legislation, a right that, if exercised against the wishes of the populations of the 
devolved territories, would likely lead to the rapid disintegration of Britain.  
Second, it was noted above that devolution, by placing in the JCPC the 
jurisdiction to rule on vires disputes between central and devolved levels of 
government, introduces a legal element into the operation of the British constitution 
that stands contrary to the ideal of legal autonomy underpinning the principle of 
Parliamentary sovereignty.  The novelty of this development is, however, 
compromised by the existing role of the European Courts in protecting the individual 
rights of EU member citizens.  Prior to devolution, British citizens already possessed 
a right to challenge the legality of Westminster legislation at a European judicial 
level.  In particular the Factortame cases of 1990 and 1991 demonstrate that British 
legislation which contravenes EU law can be struck down by judges. 
 Since the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union, and 
especially following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the Parliament at 
Westminster has ceased to be the locus of undivided sovereignty.  The 
transformation of Britain into a devolved Union, and the implications this holds for 
Parliamentary sovereignty, does present specific challenges to the ongoing stability 
of the state as a whole, but there is little evidence that these challenges are of such 
great magnitude as to threaten the disintegration of the state.   
 
Political-Institutional Consequences  
Asymmetry 
It is of the essence of a unitary state that differential statuses for regional-territorial 
units are not tolerated, and that uniform citizenship rights pertain to all citizens 
regardless of geographical considerations.  By contrast, both federations and 
devolved unions are compatible with variations in territorial status and citizenship 
rights.  Whilst such variations are not of the essence of federalism, indeed it is 
arguable that classical federalism is based on a uniform division of powers, examples 
abound of federal and devolved union states which tolerate territorial variation.478  
Where such differences exist, the state in question is said to exhibit an asymmetrical 
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form of government.  In the study of federalism, symmetry refers to 'the level of 
conformity and commonality in the relations of each separate political unit of the 
system to both the system as a whole and to other component units.'479  
 Asymmetrical features within federal political structures can be of three 
possible types.  First, among the constituent territorial units, variations in 
geographical size, population and economic resources that significantly affect their 
relative political influence and power, create what Ronald Watts refers to as de facto 
asymmetries.480  Such de facto asymmetries are a pervasive, and to some extent 
unavoidable, feature of all federal political systems, but precisely for this reason 
should not be overlooked within analyses of those systems.  As Charles Tarlton 
argues; 'No federal arrangement is likely to be made up states each of which stands 
in exactly the same relationship to the whole system.'481  The degree of asymmetry 
exhibited by a given federal political system is not, therefore, a product solely of the 
political institutions of its territorial components, but is also a reflection of 
geographic, demographic, economic and social factors which partly condition the 
relationship of the individual units to the system as a whole. 
 Second, the principles of autonomy and self-government can be applied 
differentially within the various territorial units that together comprise the state.  
Such differences may include one or more territories enjoying a greater extensity 
and/or intensity of autonomous powers than others; differential institutional 
arrangements for the exercise of autonomy; variations in levels of access to foreign 
representation; and differential arrangements governing the financing of regional 
administrations.  Such variations manifest as de jure asymmetries, that is, they refer 
to differences in the constitutional and legal relationship in which the territories 
relate to the central state and each other.  The most common examples of this type of 
asymmetry involves the existence of one or more territories possessing a greater 
degree of self-government than others. 
 Third, a devolved union can be described as asymmetrical in such instances 
as the principle of self-government is applied to some territories but not others.  
There are two common situations in which this form of asymmetry appears.  On the 
one hand, states in which one territory is clearly dominant in terms of its size and/or 
relative economic or political power and influence, often extend devolution to the 
'subordinate' minority territories so as to prevent the political values of the 'core' 
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territory from dominating the governance of the state as a whole.  On the other, when 
one relatively small (and therefore politically 'insignificant') territory within a polity 
is deemed to possess considerably different interests to the rest of the state, it may be 
that it alone is granted a measure of political autonomy in a state that otherwise 
remains unitary.  This situation often pertains to small offshore island territories of 
larger mainland states.  As both of these examples suggest, this third form of 
asymmetry often reflects, and to some extent is designed to redress, asymmetries of 
the first type. 
 As a devolved union, Britain exhibits all three types of asymmetry.  In terms 
of population size, parliamentary representation and economic strength, England 
enjoys a considerable advantage over Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  
England contains approximately 85 per cent of the total UK population and returns a 
similar proportion of the Members of Parliament to Westminster.  Not surprisingly 
given this disparity, the size of England's economy far  exceeds  those  of  Britain’s 
other constituent units.  From the perspective of some within the state's national 
minorities, this de facto asymmetry reflects a situation in which the political interests 
and values of England are able to dominate throughout the state.  As indicated in the 
previous chapter, one of the factors contributing to the re-invigoration of Scottish 
nationalism subsequent to the failed 1979 referendum was the failure of the 
Conservative government to take adequate account of the divergence in political and 
social values prevalent in Scotland as compared with England, a divergence that has 
become increasingly evident by the dramatic decline of Conservative support in 
Scotland since the late 1950s. 
 The 1999 devolution settlement, instituted in part to provide a safeguard 
against English dominance, is itself markedly asymmetric.  Devolution in the United 
Kingdom exhibits both types of de jure asymmetry described above.  First, whilst the 
Scottish Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly have primary legislative 
competence, the Welsh Assembly is principally an executive body only, its 
legislative capacities restricted to passing secondary legislation within certain limited 
areas.  The extensity and intensity of autonomous powers devolved to Scotland, 
Northern Ireland and Wales thus varies considerably, with significant differences in 
the institutional arrangements governing the exercise of self-government across the 
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three territories.  Second, devolution is presently not applied to England, for which 
Westminster continues to act as domestic Parliament.    
 To what extent, if any, does asymmetry threaten the political cohesion of 
federal political systems?  According to Charles Taunton, 'Whether a state can 
function harmoniously with a federal constitution will...be a result of the level of 
symmetry within it.  The higher the level of symmetry, that is the more each 
particular section, state, or region partakes of a character general and common to the 
whole, the greater the likelihood that federalism would be a suitable form of 
government.' 482   One reason why this may be so is that asymmetry engenders 
debilitating competition over powers as some territories perceive themselves to be 
disadvantaged relative those territories with the most extensive self-government.  
The constant battles over resources that results from such competition would, it 
could be argued, undermine the cohesion of the state as a whole.483 
 In order to assess this claim as it applies to Britain, it will be useful to remind 
ourselves of one of the characteristics of the state analyzed in previous chapters.  
Recall that, although it ceased to be an independent state, Scotland retained much of 
its autonomy in the sphere of civil society following the Treaty of Union 1707 and 
its incorporation into the new British state.  The preservation of Scotland's distinctive 
religious, educational and legal systems reflects the 'pactist' nature of the Treaty of 
Union, which was in theory a voluntary agreement between two equally sovereign 
states.  The multinational state that emerged from the Treaty thus resembled the 
'union state' type theorized by Rokkan and Urwin, that is, it 'entail[ed] the survival in 
some areas of pre-union rights and institutional infrastructures which preserve some 
degree of regional autonomy.'484 
 For our present purposes, the relevance of the 'union state' type as it applies 
to Britain lies in the asymmetry created by the survival of pre-union rights and 
institutional infrastructures; a marked asymmetry, in other words, characterized 
Britain from its foundation.  Moreover, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
the central state pursued a wide range of territorial management policies which 
introduced yet further asymmetries into the governance of Britain.485  It is worth 
bearing in mind that the introduction of such asymmetries was considered a 
necessary price to pay to preserve the territorial integrity of the state.  Rather than 
undermining the cohesion of the state, territorial asymmetries have traditionally been 
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seen as an integrative force.  Bernard Crick argues that one of the key attributes of 
the unwritten, informal British constitution was precisely its capacity to absorb 
multiple asymmetries without engendering the type of competition over powers 
described above.486 
 Perhaps the most controversial, and potentially most threatening to the 
political cohesion of Britain, element of asymmetry as it is manifested in the 
contemporary devolution settlement is the absence of devolved institutions in 
England.  According to Tom Nairn, the failure of the 1999 devolution settlement to 
make specific provision for England in the form of a coherent, uniform federal 
constitution inevitably portends an English backlash that will lead to the 
disintegration of  the Britain: 'Since no provision was made for  the majority in 
Blair's radical project, it will be forced to make its own, erupting bit by bit, using 
disguise and alias, proceeding though an obstacle course of tactical accidents and 
after-thoughts.'487  The exclusion of England from constitutional changes wrought by 
devolution can only lead to resentment and a renewed populist English assertiveness 
that will cast the peripheral nations as a threat to English national identity.  Nairn 
writes; 'All issue will be seen as aggravated, if not provoked, by ill-considered 
changes on the periphery.'488  A similar argument is advanced by David Marquand, 
for whom the unsystematic asymmetrical nature of the devolution settlement creates 
a space for the future emergence of populism, possibly one infected with xenophobia 
and intolerance.489 
Whether or not the asymmetrical character of devolution in Britain is a 
source of chronic instability depends in large part on the willingness of all political 
elites to countenance further constitutional adjustments as and when public demand 
for it arises.  Where devolution is understood as a 'process' rather than a decisive 
settlement, the accommodation of future demands from those territories currently 
either excluded from devolution or lacking extensive autonomous powers need not 
imply the disintegration of the British state.  Indeed, if the underlying justification 
for devolution is it improves the quality of democracy and popular participation, its 
gradual extension would as likely re-vitalize the democratic governance of Britain as 
lead to its disintegration.   
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The West Lothian Question 
Of all the asymmetries contained within Britain’s devolution arrangements, that 
relating to representation at Westminster warrants specific attention.  In 1977, 
Labour MP Tam Dalyell wrote the following of the devolution proposals then being 
considered by Parliament: 'We would have the absurd situation in which Scottish and 
Welsh MP's could continue to legislate on subjects which had been devolved to the 
Assemblies in their own countries.  They would not be responsible to their own 
constituents for such legislation, nor would they be answerable to the English voters 
who would be affected by it.'490  This 'anomaly' is popularly known as the West 
Lothian question after the Scottish constituency for which Dalyell was MP.  The 
situation highlighted by the question is that although the Scottish Parliament has, for 
example, legislative competence over health-care in Scotland, Scottish MP's are still 
able to vote on health-care policy at Westminster which does not apply to Scotland.  
The reverse is not true, since English MP's have no vote over Scottish domestic 
matters devolved to Edinburgh.   
It is possible to identify three factors that together cast doubt on the 
significance of the West Lothian question as an objection to devolution.  First, the 
fact of asymmetrical representation at Westminster was never raised as an objection 
to Northern Irish devolution throughout the half century of the Stormont Parliament's 
existence.  Second, prior to devolution English MP's generally showed little interest 
in Scottish domestic affairs, which passed through a Scottish sub-system in the 
House of Commons.491  Third, as already indicated, the British constitution is replete 
with 'anomalous' features reflecting the notion of the state as a pact or negotiated 
order492, and it is by no means obvious that the problem raised by the West Lothian 
question is of a different order than asymmetries that have proved eminently 
compatible with the existence of Britain as a single state.  
Leaving aside the question of the true significance of the West Lothian 
question, it has two possible 'solutions', but of which are highly problematic in 
themselves.  First, the establishment of either federalism or home rule all round 
would give England (or regions thereof) a separate domestic Parliament from which 
non-English MP's would be excluded.  There is, however, little evidence as yet for 
the existence of popular support for a devolved English Parliament, whilst a 
referendum on the establishment of a North East regional assembly was decisively 
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rejected in 2006.  It is, moreover, unclear how a devolved English Parliament, given 
the size of England's population and relative political and economic strength, could 
coexist with the UK Parliament without being seen as its rival, a situation that would 
itself be de-stabilizing. 
Second, the West Lothian question would be 'solved' by excluding Scottish 
MP's from voting on English legislation, perhaps through the establishment of an 
English Grand Committee at Westminster.  This is, however, not without its own 
difficulties, for it would raise the possibility of a British Government possessing an 
overall majority in the House of Commons except where English-only legislation is 
concerned, when it might constitute only a minority.  Moreover, it is questionable 
whether genuinely English-only matters, in the sense of legislation that has no 
consequential effects for the devolved territories, in fact exist, given that the funding 
of the devolved administrations is determined largely by English priorities under the 
Barnett formula (see below). 
  
F inancial Consequences 
The financial dimension of devolution refers to the mechanisms by which the 
devolved administrations obtain their revenue, the conditions attached to its 
expenditure, and the provisions for determining future adjustments to the fiscal 
structure of devolution.  As Ronald Watts observes, in all multi-level systems of 
government, fiscal arrangements have a strong bearing on the relative powers of 
central and devolved government for two reasons.  First, the manner in which 
devolved administrations are able to exercise their legally constituted responsibilities 
is strongly affected by their fiscal resources.  Second, the task of affecting and 
regulating the economy is itself intimately linked to powers of taxation and 
expenditure.493   
The importance of financial arrangements for the future success of devolution 
is therefore widely recognized.  However, the financial dimension is also one of the 
most strongly criticized aspects of Britain’s devolution arrangements, and identified 
by some as the area most likely to create friction and instability.494  The fiscal 
structure of devolution is criticized both for its highly centralized character and its 
failure to redress perceived imbalances in regional revenues across Britain’s various 
territories. 
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The focus of this section is two-fold.  First, an important feature of the 
financial arrangements within any devolved union is the degree of fiscal autonomy 
afforded the devolved administrations.  Since the logic driving devolution in Britain 
is a perceived need to disperse power from the centre to the periphery in order to 
strengthen the latter's commitment to the Union, it follows that the political 
autonomy of the devolved administrations should not be unduly restricted by the 
arrangements for financing them.  Second, the mechanism calculating the revenues 
of Britain’s constituent nations following devolution continues to be based, as it has 
since 1978, on what is known as the 'Barnett formula.'   
 
F iscal Autonomy 
Applied to multi-level systems of government, the concept of fiscal autonomy has 
three aspects: the degree of expenditure devolved, and the revenue-raising and 
expenditure autonomy of the devolved administrations.495  From an analysis of these 
features as they are found in the financial arrangements of a given federal political 
system, a picture of the overall fiscal autonomy present in that system emerges.  
Since in the case of Britain the logic of devolution is principally that a territorial 
dispersal of power is necessary in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the state from 
the perspective of its national minorities, the mechanisms for funding devolution 
should be compatible with genuine decentralization if they are to contribute to the 
political stability and cohesion of the state as a whole. 
The devolved administrations are responsible for all expenditure relating to 
devolved functional competencies.  In Scotland devolved expenditure accounts for 
approximately 56 per cent of total government expenditure.  For Wales and Northern 
Ireland the figures are 48 per cent and 57 per cent respectively.496  These numbers 
are broadly comparable with other federal and quasi-federal political systems across 
the world and indicate that the scope of devolved functional competencies is 
considerable and meaningful.  Moreover, decisions relating to the allocation of 
expenditure are, in principle at least, entirely at the discretion of the devolved 
administrations themselves.  Central government does not attach any conditions to 
the revenues transferred to territorial sub-units, which consequently enjoy almost 
complete expenditure autonomy. 
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This combination of a wide scope of expenditure with near total expenditure 
autonomy is consistent with the logic of devolution, that is, the dispersal of power 
from the centre to the periphery.  However, arguably more significant in terms of the 
substantive amount of autonomy exercised by the devolved administrations is their 
revenue-raising powers, which in the case of British devolution are severely 
restricted.  Of all the devolved administrations, the Scottish Parliament alone 
possesses tax-varying powers – the most important direct source of revenue-raising – 
which are, however, limited to a right to vary the basic rate of income tax by up to 
three pence in the pound.  This represents approximately a potential ₤450m out of a 
total  Scottish  Office  budget  of  around  ₤14.6bn.    In  addition  to  its  marginal 
importance when seen as a proportion of the overall budget, there are considerable 
practical political difficulties associated with exercising the right. 
Own-source revenues can be raised in an indirect manner by all of the 
devolved administrations via a power to retain for their own use finance earmarked 
for local authority expenditure.  In the case of Scotland, local authority expenditure 
represents approximately 40 per cent of the entire budget, meaning that this indirect 
revenue-raising is of potentially greater significance than the direct tax-varying 
power.  However, the political obstacles impeding the exercise of this indirect 
revenue-raising power are such as to make it practically impossible to make use of.  
Any decision to withhold finance from local authorities would inevitably prompt 
them to respond by raising council tax rates in order to maintain the level of public 
services provided.  In addition to being politically unpopular, the central 
government's strong vested interest in taxation and public spending makes 
intervention likely in instances where it considers local authority taxation or 
expenditure to have risen excessively.  The government's own White Paper, 
Scotland's Parliament, makes specific provision for precisely this scenario in stating: 
 
'Should self-financed expenditure start to rise steeply, the Scottish Parliament would 
clearly come under pressure from council tax payers in Scotland to exercise its powers.  If 
growth relative to England were excessive and were such as to threaten the targets set for 
public expenditure as part of the management of the UK economy, and the Scottish 
Parliament nevertheless chose not to exercise its powers, it would be open to the UK 
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Government to take the excess into account in considering the level of their support for 
expenditure in Scotland.'497 
 
Bell and Christie describe the statement as 'an implicit threat that if the 
Scottish Parliament fails to curb 'excessive' council spending, then the Treasury will 
penalise the Parliament by reducing the size of the assigned budget.'498 
In sum, the financial arrangements for devolution in Britain are characterized 
by a combination of very high (almost total) expenditure autonomy with very low 
(almost non-existent) revenue-raising autonomy, a situation that Watts suggests is 
unique among federal and other multi-level political systems across the world.499  
How far is the fiscal structure of devolution compatible with the stated objective of 
dispersing power from the centre to the periphery?  What are some of the 
implications, in terms of the political cohesion of the British state as a whole, of this 
fiscal structure? 
There is little doubt that the existing arrangements for financing devolution 
are highly centralized and reflect an attempt made on the part of central government 
to maintain its control over the key aspects of economic decision-making within the 
Union.  The denial of meaningful fiscal autonomy to the devolved administrations 
can be seen as the continuation of a trend toward fiscal centralization that has been 
evident since at least the early 1980s.  At the same time as the scope of free markets 
and private enterprise has expanded in Britain, the financial dependence of local 
government on the centre has increased substantially.  This reflects the importance of 
two dominant assumptions within government.  First, that resource distribution 
should be based on relative need rather than geographical considerations.  As 
Bogdanor argues; 'The philosophy that the allocation of public expenditure should be 
determined on the basis of need and that only central government is in a position to 
be able to secure the equitable distribution of public resources on the basis of need, 
still exerts a powerful hold on politicians of both left and right.'500  Second, the 
governmental imperative of securing macroeconomic stabilization is generally 
thought to lie in tension with the decentralization of fiscal power. 
If we accept that the objective of devolution is the dispersal of power from 
the centre to the periphery, then it is the fiscal dimension that is the least satisfactory 
aspect of the devolution settlement as it currently stands.  The absence of meaningful 
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fiscal autonomy for the devolved administrations perpetuates the dominance of 
central government and therefore runs contrary to the spirit of devolution.  Moreover, 
the existence of legislative bodies lacking proper revenue-raising powers breaks the 
link between raising money and spending money that is often thought to be a central 
principle of democratic governance.  As Heald et al argue, 'the link between election 
and tax-raising is an accepted feature of democratic societies', in the sense that 'all 
those who spend public money by virtue of elected office should have responsibility 
for raising some of that money through taxation and/or user charges.'501 
The denial of revenue-raising autonomy to the devolved administrations has 
two important consequences.  First, there is a danger that the absence of 
conventional fiscal accountability will impact upon the political responsibility of the 
devolved governments, by insulating them from the economic consequences of 
policy. 502   Second, by placing the devolved administrations in a dependent 
relationship to central government, existing fiscal arrangements arguably widen the 
scope for political conflict to arise between them.  Bogdanor describes this fiscal 
relationship as an inherently unstable 'pressure-group' relationship that increases the 
likelihood of devolved governments' habitually 'claim[ing] credit for improvements 
in services while blaming their problems on the parsimony of London.'503 
 
The Barnett Formula 
In the absence of decentralization of revenue-raising autonomy, devolved 
expenditure is financed almost exclusively through an unconditional block grant 
('Assigned Budget') transferred from the central Government.  The baseline level of 
the Assigned Budgets is the product of historical inheritance, reflecting the complex 
history of political bargaining over financial resources that has characterized the 
state's territorial management policies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  This 
has led to the complaint that the territorial distribution of public expenditure is in 
some part arbitrary, unjustly favourable to certain territorial regions and undermines 
the legitimacy of devolution. 
 Since overall public expenditure is not static, changes to the levels of the 
Assigned Budgets are governed by what is known as the Barnett formula.  
Developed at the time of the 1978 devolution legislation, but based upon similar 
principles to the 1888 Goschen formula, the Barnett formula allocates to each of the 
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devolved administrations a population-based percentage of the increase in 
comparable expenditure in England.504  By making comparable English spending the 
key factor in determining adjustments to the Assigned Budgets, public expenditure 
levels in the devolved administrations are driven by English priorities.  Consequently, 
the Barnett formula 'is part of a political process that allows the centre to retain tight 
control over the resources available to the devolved administrations and thus the 
extent to which they can differentiate their policies.'505 
In addition to the centralized nature of the Barnett formula, two further 
problematic issues arise from its application.  First, being a population-based 
formula, the Barnett formula takes no account of relative need between Britain’s 
different territorial regions.  It therefore preserves any existing historical imbalances 
in the baseline levels of funding for these territories.  As a consequence of complex 
political bargaining over two centuries, public expenditure in Britain is unevenly 
distributed, with Scotland in particular receiving a disproportionately large share of 
expenditure relative to need.506  It can be expected that devolution will significantly 
increase the visibility and political significance of this fiscal inequity, thereby 
representing a potential source of friction and conflict as those regions such as the 
North East of England that consider themselves  disadvantaged by the Barnett 
formula press their claims. 
Any attempt to measure territorial fiscal equity is at present largely 
speculative in the absence of a systematic needs assessment exercise.  Moreover, 
such an exercise is itself subject to considerable practical difficulties both in terms of 
measuring fiscal effort and devising indicators of need.507  Nevertheless, the failure 
to undertake a comprehensive needs assessment exercise as part of an effort to 
achieve fiscal equalization across Britain’s territories threatens the political cohesion 
of the state as a whole by fostering grievances that undermine the legitimacy of 
devolution.  This argument is put by Heald et al, who write; 
 
'Our best guess is that, on devolved services, such a needs assessment exercise might 
show that Scotland's expenditure is higher than its relative need, necessitating a downward 
adjustment through time.  There is a powerful case for accepting that such an exercise 
should be undertaken as soon as the institutional framework  is in place, rather than 
216 
 
postponing it to a later date, when tension or hostility between the UK and devolved 
governments may have arisen.'508 
 
It is notable that a decade after the establishment of devolution no such 
exercise has yet been undertaken.  It is, however, also worth noting that the Barnett 
formula is recognized as, in principle at least, a 'convergence' formula, in the sense 
that 'the process of applying population-based changes to different levels of 
expenditure will eventually equalise per capita public expenditure throughout the 
UK.'509  The rate at which convergence occurs is dependent on the rate of growth in 
public expenditure.  In practice, however, the convergence effect implicit in the 
Barnett formula has not operated according to theory as a result both of significant 
'formula bypass' and the fact that Scotland's relative population has continued to fall. 
Second, using the Barnett formula to determine changes in the fiscal 
resources available to the devolved administrations could have a destabilising effect 
on the future operation of devolution is its reliance on the concept of 'comparable 
expenditure.'  As Trench observes, the assumption that such comparability exists 
becomes increasingly problematic as policy divergence between central and 
devolved government becomes more pronounced: 'As devolved policy develops and 
different ways of making and delivering public services emerge, [the assumption that 
English functions are comparable] will be decreasingly the case.'510  Insofar as this 
constrains the capacity for devolved government to initiate real policy divergence, it 
is possible that the present financial arrangements for devolution will come under 
some strain. 
  
Summary 
The devolution of political autonomy to its territorial national minorities represents a 
profound change in the governmental structure of Britain, transforming it from a 
unitary state into a devolved union.  This chapter has sought to identify aspects of 
the devolution settlement in which the potential for conflict and friction is greatest, 
with a view to assessing the likely impact of devolution on the political cohesion of 
the British state as a whole.  The following five considerations are key to assessing 
the future stability of devolution in Britain. 
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(1) Political autonomy in the form of devolution enjoys the support of a majority 
of the population in Scotland and Wales.  Ignoring the expressed wishes of 
Britain’s national minorities for some form of self-government therefore 
represents the greatest threat to the political cohesion and integrity of the 
Union.  To claim that devolution will inevitably lead to the disintegration of 
Britain is therefore to commit the 'fallacy of the excluded middle.'511   
(2) If it is to be meaningful and legitimate in the eyes of national minority 
populations, devolution must create scope for genuine policy 
differentiation.512  Recognition of this fact is crucial since any strains inherent 
in the devolution settlement will become more visible as the extent of policy 
differentiation between Britain’s territories increases.   
(3) The unsuitability of Britain’s informal common law tradition for managing 
relations in a multi-level political system suggests that a greater formalization 
of intergovernmental relations will be needed in the future.513 
(4) The present structural dominance of the central government both in terms of 
the conduct of intergovernmental relations and in the financial arrangements 
of devolution514 runs contrary to the spirit of devolution and as such is an 
issue likely to provoke friction and conflict as the devolved governments 
seek to expand the limits of self-government. 
(5) Constitutional reform will continue to proceed in an ad hoc incrementalist 
manner so that asymmetry will continue to characterize the architecture of 
devolution.  Contrary to the arguments of commentators such as Nairn and 
Marquand, there is no reason to suspect that such an approach is 
incompatible with the long-term political cohesion of the British state.  As 
James Kellas argues; 'It is a mistake to look for a one-dimensional answer to 
the territorial policies of the United Kingdom.  What matters is a correct 
perception of what the constituent nations want at this time.  Once that is 
known, then the system should adapt to accommodate those wishes.'515 
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7 
Devolution and Social Cohesion in Britain 
 
 
 
The aim of this chapter two-fold.  First, it examines the impact, if any, the 
establishment of a devolved parliament in Scotland has had on the capacity of British 
society as a whole to generate and maintain effective social cohesion.  The evidence 
upon which the analysis in this section builds is primarily taken from the Scottish 
Social Attitudes survey (SSA) and the British Social Attitudes survey (BSA), and as 
such operates on the level of individual attitudes and perceptions towards such 
factors as; the devolution settlement, national identity, and trust in the fairness and 
efficacy of government institutions.  Reference to data from both the SSA and the 
BSA is included in recognition of the fact that devolution represents a profound 
transformation in the governmental structure of Britain that potentially affects all 
areas of the country, whether or not they currently enjoy devolved institutions.  The 
very  fact  of  British  devolution’s  asymmetricality  means  that  English  attitudes,  as 
much as Scottish, are of central importance to its future development and effect on 
social cohesion.   
Second, the chapter explores the dominant trends within the discourse of 
national identity and nation-building in Britain in the post-devolution political 
context with a view again to understanding the impacts on social cohesion associated 
with devolution.  Public speeches by Donald Dewar, Tony Blair, Alex Salmond, 
Gordon Brown and David Cameron are analysed for insights into the types of 
discourse that are politically salient to post-devolution Britain. 
 
Devolution and the Break-up of the Union? 
The most basic question that can be asked of devolution in respect of its significance 
for social cohesion is whether or not it has encouraged support for the break-up of 
the Union.  The idea that the establishment of devolved national administrations 
would augur the progressive disintegration of Britain as a single state can be found in 
different forms in the arguments of Dicey, Dalyell, and Nairn.516   
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The existence in Scotland and Wales of major political parties (the SNP and 
Plaid Cymru) committed to the break-up of the Union means that election results 
provide one potential indicator of attitudes toward the Union.  Prior to devolution, 
some hope was expressed from within the Labour Party that the establishment of a 
Scottish parliament would undermine the electoral appeal of the SNP by diluting the 
sense of grievance provoked by the widespread perception in Scotland of English 
dominance at Westminster.  According to such a view, the electoral appeal of the 
SNP was based not on strong support for Scottish independence but rather a desire 
for Scotland to be granted a greater measure of self-government as a bulwark against 
the kind of situation that arose in the 1980s when the Thatcher-led Conservative 
government continued in power despite garnering little support in Scotland.  
Conversely, the decision by the SNP itself to support devolution and actively 
contribute  to  the  ‘yes’  campaign  in  the  1997  referendum  suggests  that  nationalists 
saw in devolution an opportunity to move Scotland a step closer to independence.   
 
Table 1: Outcome of Scottish Parliamentary elections, 1999 
 Constituency 
vote % 
List vote % 
Constituency 
seats 
List seats Total 
Labour 38.8 33.6 53 3 56 
SNP 28.7 27.3 7 28 35 
Conservatives 15.6 15.4 0 18 18 
L iberal 
Democrats 
14.2 12.4 12 5 17 
G reens - 3.6 0 1 1 
Scottish 
Socialist Party 
1 2 0 1 1 
Others 1.7 5.7 1 0 1 
Source: www.scottish.parliament.uk/MSP/elections, accessed on 16th March 2009 
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Table 2: Outcome of Scottish Parliamentary elections, 2003 
 Constituency 
vote % 
List vote % 
Constituency 
seats 
List seats Total 
Labour 34.6 29.3 46 4 50 
SNP 23.8 20.9 9 18 27 
Conservatives 16.6 15.5 3 15 18 
L iberal 
Democrats 
15.4 11.8 13 4 17 
G reens - 6.9 0 7 7 
Scottish 
Socialist Party 
6.2 6.7 0 6 6 
Others 3.4 8.5 2 2 4 
Source: www.scottish.parliament.uk/MSP/elections, accessed on 16th March 2009 
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Table 3: Outcome of Scottish Parliamentary elections, 2007 
 Constituency 
vote % 
List vote % 
Constituency 
seats 
List seats Total 
Labour 32.1 29.1 37 9 46 
SNP 32.9 31 21 26 47 
Conservatives 16.6 13.9 4 13 17 
L iberal 
Democrats 
16.2 11.3 11 5 16 
G reens 0.1 4 0 2 2 
Scottish 
Socialist Party 
- 0.6 0 0 0 
Others 0.1 4.3 0 1 1 
Source: www.scottish.parliament.uk/MSP/elections, accessed on 16th March 2009 
 
 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 show the results of the Scottish parliamentary elections 
held in 1999, 2003 and 2007.  Contrary to the expectations of those who saw 
devolution as the most effective way of neutering the nationalist electoral threat, 
support for the SNP has remained high in the elections for the new Scottish 
parliament.  Despite a modest fall in its number of total seats from 35 to 27, the SNP 
placed second to the Scottish Labour Party in the 1999 and 2003 elections.  A 
significant  increase in  the SNP’s vote share in the 2007 election saw them become 
Scotland’s  largest  party  and  enabled  them  to  form  Britain’s  first  nationalist 
government, albeit as a minority administration, under the leadership of First 
Minister Alex Salmond.  The success of the SNP in Scottish parliamentary elections 
suggests that the politics of nationalism continues to resonate in post-devolution 
Scotland.  Far from being neutered as an electoral force by the establishment of 
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Scottish self-government, the SNP have prospered within the context of devolution 
whilst remaining committed to Scottish independence.  The existence of a nationalist 
government  in  Scotland  opposed  to  Scotland’s  inclusion  in  Britain represents a 
significant challenge to the political cohesion of the Union. 
Support for the SNP does not, however, necessarily translate directly into 
support for independence.  In the first place, a comparison between Scottish and UK 
parliamentary elections indicates that Scottish voters are markedly less inclined to 
support the SNP in elections to Westminster. 
 
Table 4: UK Parliament election results in Scotland, 1997-2005 
 
1997 
% votes 
1997 
seats 
2001 
% votes 
2001 
seats 
2005 
% votes 
2005 
seats 
Labour 45.6 56 43.9 56 39.5 41 
SNP 22.1 6 20.1 5 17.7 6 
Conservative 17.5 0 15.6 1 15.8 1 
L iberal 
Democrats 
13 10 16.4 10 22.6 11 
Others 1.9 0 4 0 4.4 0 
Source: Bromley, Curtice, McCrone, and Park 2006 
 
As Table 4 shows, the SNP have performed less well in Westminster 
elections as compared with Scottish parliamentary elections, both in terms of seats 
gained and share of the vote won.  The discrepancy in the number of seats gained by 
the SNP in Holyrood, as opposed to Westminster, elections is largely a consequence 
of the different electoral systems used.  Nevertheless, it still remains the case that the 
SNP have struggled to equal the share of the vote won in elections to the Scottish 
parliament on the Westminster stage.  As Bromley et al argue,  this  suggests  ‘that 
voters vote differently in the two kinds of elections because they recognise that the 
Scottish Parliament is dealing with different issues, and that Scottish Parliament 
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elections give MSPs a mandate that is independent of that enjoyed by their 
colleagues  at Westminster.’517  It seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the 
greater willingness to vote for the SNP in Scottish parliamentary elections reflects on 
perceptions of the function of the Scottish parliament itself rather than on the degree 
of  support  for  independence.    In  other  words,  regardless  of  the  voters’  stance  on 
independence, the SNP are able to prosper in the Scottish parliamentary elections 
(whilst faring comparatively worse in Westminster elections) because of their ability 
to successfully present themselves as the party most likely to pursue a distinctive 
Scottish interest. 
Election results by themselves are a rather crude indicator of voter 
preferences and a more sophisticated picture of constitutional preferences can be 
gained from survey analyses that ask specific questions designed to gauge the 
strength of support for the Union and for devolution.  Table 5 shows the distribution 
of responses to a question about constitutional preferences asked regularly since 
1997, the year of the devolution referendum.518  According to this evidence, the level 
of support for independence has changed very little over the period following the 
establishment of devolution, suggesting the devolution has not fostered 
separatism.519   
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Table 5: Scottish Constitutional preferences, 1997-2006 
 
May 
1997 
% 
Sep 
1997 
% 
1999 
% 
2000 
% 
2001 
% 
2002 
% 
2003 
% 
2004 
% 
2005 
% 
2006 
% 
Independence 
either in or 
outside the E U 
26 37 27 30 27 30 26 30 24 30 
Devolution, tax-
varying powers 
42 32 50 47 54 44 48 41 37 46 
Devolution, no 
tax-varying 
powers 
9 9 8 8 6 8 7 5 6 7 
No devolution 17 17 10 12 10 13 13 18 14 10 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes survey, 1999-2006 and Bromley et al 2006. 
 
Despite the success of the pro-independence SNP, even to the extent of them 
forming the government since 2007, there is less support for independence amongst 
the general population in Scotland than for the existing constitutional settlement.  In 
the latest survey, 46 per cent of respondents gave the existing form of devolution (i.e. 
a devolved parliament with tax-varying powers) as their first preference, with a 
further 7 per cent supporting a weaker form of devolution.  Over half of the 
population are therefore in favour of a devolved Scottish parliament within the 
framework of continued Scottish inclusion in Britain.  By contrast, in the same year 
only 30 per cent of respondents indicated support for one of two forms of 
independence.  Looking at the data over the full range of years, the proportion of 
respondents favouring Scottish independence has undergone no noticeable change 
following devolution, since when a majority have consistently indicated a preference 
for devolution as it has been implemented.   
If devolution has not fostered secession in Scotland, what has been its effect 
on the constitutional preferences of the rest of Britain?  The evidence presented in 
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table 6 suggests that the proportion of the English population supportive of the 
existing constitutional settlement has marginally declined since the establishment of 
devolution in 1999.   
 
Table 6: English constitutional preferences, 1999-2006 
 1999 
% 
2001 
% 
2002 
% 
2003 
% 
2004 
% 
2005 
% 
2006 
% 
Support the current 
model of government 
for England 
63 57 55 54 53 54 53 
Support English 
regional assemblies 
15 22 20 23 21 19 18 
Support English 
parliament 
18 16 18 17 20 19 22 
Source: British Social Attitudes survey, 1999 – 2006. 
 
From 1999 to 2006, the proportion of respondents expressing support for the 
current model of government for England (i.e. the absence of English devolution) 
has declined from 63 to 53 per cent.  Over the same period support for the extension 
of devolution to England either through regional assemblies or an English parliament 
has increased from 33 to 40 per cent.  In the asymmetrical form in which it was 
adopted in Britain, devolution, this evidence suggests, has likely contributed to 
increased support for its extension into England.   
When asked simply whether or not they supported the establishment of an 
English parliament, English, Scottish and Welsh respondents to a BBC Newsnight 
poll undertaken in January 2007 expressed a majority support in favour.  Whilst this 
confirms the suggestion that there is a substantial body of opinion in England 
dissatisfied with England’s omission  from  the 1999 devolution  settlement,  that  the 
Scots and the Welsh echo this sentiment belies the suggestion that English discontent 
with asymmetrical devolution is a serious threat to social cohesion.  There is no 
reason to believe that support for the extension of devolution to England implies a 
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greater willingness to support the break-up of the Union.  This is especially true 
given the evidence cited above showing that the experience of devolution in Scotland 
has not fostered support for secession.   
 
Table 7: Support the establishment of an English Parliament 
 Yes % No % Don’t know % 
England 61 32 2 
Scotland 51 35 9 
Wales 48 40 7 
Source – Newsnight Act of Union poll, 16th January 2007; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_01_07_union.pdf 
 
  A fact that makes the declining support for the existing constitutional 
settlement in England potentially problematic in terms of the political and social 
cohesion of the Union is the absence of obvious major political outlets for the 
expression of such sentiments.  After the failure of the 2004 referendum on the 
establishment of a North-East devolved regional assembly, the Labour Party has 
dropped its support for such assemblies, and no major political party currently 
supports the establishment of a devolved English parliament.  The English 
Constitutional Convention (ECC), the Campaign for an English Parliament (CEP) 
and the English Democrats Party (EDP), all of whom actively campaign for the 
establishment of a devolved English parliament, remain at present fringe 
organizations of little political significance. 
Advocacy of the extension of devolution to include England represents one 
answer to the so-called West Lothian question – the fact that Scottish MPs vote on 
English matters whilst English MPs are excluded from voting on Scottish ones.  An 
alternative answer to this problem is the proposal for excluding Scottish MPs sitting 
at Westminster from voting on legislation which only applies in England.  Table 8 
shows the degree of support such a proposal enjoys within England and Scotland. 
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Table 8: Should Scottish MPs be excluded from voting on English laws? 
 Strongly 
agree % 
Agree % Neither 
agree no 
disagree % 
Disagree % Disagree 
strongly % 
England 12 23 10 6 1 
Scotland 12 30 21 14 5 
Source: British Social Attitudes survey 2006. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, over a third of respondents in England and Scotland 
supported the idea that Scottish MPs should be excluded from voting on English 
laws.  This represents a clear majority of those that expressed an opinion on the 
matter.  However, the fact that approximately half of respondents in England felt 
unable to answer the question suggests that the West Lothian question, despite the 
publicity that it receives, remains a relatively uncontroversial issue in the minds of 
most English voters. 
In order to inquire further into Scottish constitutional preferences, 
respondents in the SSA were asked whether, in their opinion, the Scottish or the UK 
parliament had a greater influence over Scottish affairs, and, further, which 
parliament they believed ought to have a greater influence.  Table 9 shows the 
responses to both of these questions throughout the first seven years of devolution’s 
operation. 
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Table 9: How much influence does the Scottish parliament have? How much 
should it have? 
 1999 % 2000 % 2001 % 2003 % 2004 % 2005 % 2006 % 
Parliament 
has (1999: 
will have)  
most 
influence 
41 13 15 17 18 22 24 
Parliament 
should 
have most 
influence 
74 72 74 66 67 66 65 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes survey, 1999 – 2006. 
  
Immediately prior to its establishment, a large proportion of Scots clearly 
expected the new Scottish parliament to assume the mantle of the most important 
influence over the way in which Scotland is run.  There was a clear expectation that 
a substantial amount of power would shift from Westminster to Holyrood with the 
creation of a devolved parliament sitting there.  A year into the operation of 
devolution and these expectations were largely disappointed, as the proportion of 
respondents who expressed a belief in the relative supremacy of the Scottish 
parliament over Westminster in terms of their influence over Scottish affairs 
declined sharply from 41 to just 13 per cent.  Each year since 2000, the proportion of 
Scots expressing a belief in the supremacy of the Scottish parliament has increased, 
standing in 2006 at 24 per cent.  This suggests that longer experience of the Scottish 
parliament in operation has convinced a significant number of Scots as to its genuine 
importance over the way Scotland is run, although this figure continues to be much 
lower than the number who expressed an expectation prior to devolution that the 
Scottish parliament would have the greatest influence.  
The comparatively low proportion of Scots who think the Scottish parliament 
actually has the most influence over Scottish affairs can be contrasted with the high 
proportion that would like to see the parliament have the most influence.  At the time 
of the establishment of devolution, almost three quarters of Scots agreed with the 
229 
 
statement that the Scottish parliament ought to have the most influence over the way 
Scotland is run.  It would appear, however, that as the number of Scots who believe 
the Scottish parliament already has the most influence increases, so the number who 
think it ought to have such influence decreases.  The proportion answering the latter 
question in the affirmative has declined from 74 to 65 per cent over the first seven 
years of devolution.  It would seem plausible to argue, therefore, that as more Scots 
see the Scottish parliament gaining more influence, less are inclined to view this as a 
desirable situation.   
Such a conclusion should, however, be balanced against the evidence 
presented in table 5 showing no significance reduction in the number of Scots 
supporting the existing constitutional arrangement of a Scottish parliament endowed 
with tax-varying powers.  Moreover, despite a modest decrease, there remains a 
substantial majority (65 per cent) in favour of the idea that the Scottish parliament 
should  have  more  influence  over  Scotland’s  affairs  than  the  parliament  at 
Westminster.  Overall, it seems reasonable to argue that the experience of devolution 
has not fostered a rise in support for Scottish independence, but rather there is 
evidence to suggest that there is substantial support amongst Scots for further 
increasing the power of the devolved parliament.  Certainly there is very little 
support in favour of reversing devolution.  In terms of the impact of devolution on 
English attitudes, it seems clear that the experience of devolution has fostered a 
modest rise in support for some form of English devolution, either in the form of 
regional assemblies or in an English parliament. 
 
Levels of trust and perceptions of fairness 
An assessment of the relationship between devolution and social cohesion cannot be 
based on expressions of constitutional preference alone.  As previously indicated, the 
production and maintenance of social cohesion is related to a range of variables 
relevant to the generation of trust amongst citizens and between citizens and the 
government; facilitating an active participatory practice of citizenship; and creating a 
perception of justness.  We can therefore examine the impact of devolution on social 
cohesion in Britain by looking at the results of survey data designed to assess 
attitudes relating to trust, efficacy and fairness. 
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Beginning with the concept of trust, table 10 shows the results from the 
Scottish Social Attitudes survey to a question about which level of government Scots 
most  trusted  to  act  in  Scotland’s  interests.    The  proportion  of  Scots who  trust  the 
British government to work in Scotland’s interest either ‘just about always’ or ‘most 
of  the  time’  is  very  low  and  declining.    The  proportion  of  these  two  ‘positive’ 
answers combined has fallen from 34 per cent in 1997 to 20 per cent in 2006.  Over 
the  same  time period,  the proportion of Scots who  ‘almost  never’  trust  the British 
government to work in Scotland’s interest has risen from 10 per cent in 1997 to 25 
per cent in 2006.  In 2006 over three quarters of Scots trusted the UK government to 
work in Scotland’s interest ‘only some of the time’ of  ‘almost never’, a figure that 
suggests endemic mistrust in, and disengagement with, British political institutions, a 
fact that in itself might be cited as evidence for the need for devolution as a way of 
restoring trust in the political process. 
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Table 10: Trust in the UK government and the Scottish Parliament to work in 
Scotland’s interests, 1997-2006 
 Sep 
1997 
1999 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 
U K 
Government 
       
Just about 
always 
4 3 2 2 2 2 2 
Most of the 
time 
30 29 20 19 18 20 18 
Only some 
of the time 
52 52 55 58 51 52 52 
Almost 
never 
10 14 22 20 26 22 25 
Scottish 
Parliament 
       
Just about 
always 
35 26 13 10 9 10 8 
Most of the 
time 
47 55 52 52 41 45 42 
Only some 
of the time 
12 14 28 31 38 34 38 
Almost 
never 
3 2 4 4 11 8 8 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes survey, 1999 – 2006 and Bromley et al 2006 
  
This argument is partly borne out by the figures showing a greater degree of 
trust in the Scottish parliament, as compared with Westminster, to work in 
Scotland’s interest.  Scots clearly trust the Scottish parliament to look after their own 
interests more than they trust the British government to do so.  In 2006, half of 
respondents  claimed  to  trust  the Scottish  parliament  to work  in Scotland’s  interest 
either ‘just about always’ or ‘most of the time’, compared to just 20 per cent making 
a similar claim in respect of the British government.  Moreover, the proportion of 
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Scots expressing extreme mistrust in the Scottish parliament remains less than 10 per 
cent, compared with 25 per cent in respect of the British government.   
However, whilst it remains true that the Scottish parliament elicits higher 
levels of trust from Scots than does the parliament at Westminster, there has been a 
similar degree of decline in trust with respect to both institutions.  Both the Scottish 
and British parliaments, this suggests, have shared in a generalized fall in trust in 
politicians.  Whilst it is not possible to judge with any certainty the impact that 
devolution may have had in this generalized decline in trust520, the existence of 
widespread mistrust in the political process is a phenomena that potentially 
undermines social cohesion.  If, as Tocqueville argues, the vitality of a democracy 
depends on the active participation of engaged citizens, political apathy – a variable 
itself intimately related to perceptions of trust in politicians – represents a grave 
threat to the well-being of democratic societies.  One of the claims made by pro-
devolutionists prior to its establishment was that devolution, by bringing the political 
process ‘closer’  to  ordinary  Scots,  would  serve  to  counter  the  trend  toward 
increasing mistrust and political apathy.  It is therefore disappointing to observe that 
the evidence thus far accumulated suggests that trust in the Scottish parliament is 
suffering from similar rates of decline as is seen in the older established political 
institutions.   
Table 11 shows the results obtained by the 2006 British Social Attitudes 
survey to a similar question; whether or not the respondent trusts the government to 
put the interest of the nation above those of their political party?  Since the question 
did not specify what nation is meant, the results tell us less about perceptions of trust 
in central government as compared to more regional layers of government, but rather 
indicate the degree of trust in politicians generally.   
 
Table 11: Trust government to put nation above party? 
 Just about 
always % 
Most of the 
time % 
Only some of 
the time % 
Almost 
never % 
England 2 16 47 33 
Scotland 1 21 38 37 
Wales 4 14 33 49 
Source: British Social Attitudes survey, 2006. 
233 
 
 
Although Scotland and Wales display slightly higher levels of extreme 
mistrust in government than England (with nearly half of all Welsh respondents 
claiming  to  trust  the  government  to  put  nation  above  party  ‘almost  never’)  the 
difference between the national communities is less striking than the similarities.  
Individuals across Britain’s constituent nationalities, these figures suggest, are highly 
mistrustful of government, overwhelming believing that narrow party political 
interests play too important a role in government decision-making.   
Perhaps more important than levels of trust in government, at least in terms 
of its significance for social cohesion, is the extent to which people within civil 
society trust each other.  According to Tőnnies, meaningful trust, in the form of 
reciprocal bonds of sentiment, could only be generated between individuals in a 
Gemeinschaft-like relation to one another.  Trust, and by implication social cohesion 
relies, according to this perspective, upon the existence of a sense of community that 
is necessarily exclusive; based on the ties of kith and kin rather than of contract and 
exchange.  Given this argument, it is interesting to speculate on the relationship 
between the type of identity an individual is attached to and the trust in which that 
individual holds the society around him.  Table 10 shows the results obtained by in 
British Social Attitudes survey when respondents where asked whether they believed 
that most people can be trusted, with the answers cross-tabulated with answers to a 
question about identity.   
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Table 12: Levels of generalized trust by ‘Moreno’ identity 
 Most people can be 
trusted % 
Can’t be too 
careful dealing 
with people % 
Don’t know % 
Nationality not 
British 
38 60 2 
Nationality more 
than British 
42 57 1 
Equally 
nationality and 
British 
39 60 0.5 
More B ritish than 
nationality 
47 51 3 
British not 
nationality 
52 47 0 
Source: British Social Attitudes survey, 2006. 
 
As can be seen, there is a modest difference in the likelihood of respondents 
expressing strong levels of generalized trust when their identity is taken into account.  
60 per cent of those for whom Britishness formed no part of their sense of national 
identity expressed mistrust in other people, compared to 47 per cent of those who 
considered themselves exclusively British.  For all those who privileged a sense of 
regional national identity over a British identity, 58 per cent expressed generalized 
mistrust in others, compared to 49 per cent of respondents who privileged 
Britishness in their identity.  Whilst it is impossible to arrive at any firm conclusions 
from such limited data, it seems at least possible that being attached to a wider sense 
of British identity is associated with being more inclined to trust other people.  Why 
this might be so is a matter of speculation.  Part of the answer might lie in the idea 
that a shared identity is an important resource that generates trust between 
individuals, and that those who identify as British feel that a greater sense of 
identification with, and therefore trust in, British people in general.  This of course 
assumes  that  the  ‘people’  in  the  question  is  taken  as  referring  to  those  in  British 
society, something that is not specified in the question.   
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Does membership of Britain provide equal benefit to its constituent 
nationalities?  Table 13 shows the results to a question asking whether the 
respondent thinks that the Scottish or the English economy benefits most from 
involvement in the Union.  Although, as would perhaps be expected, more of the 
English think that Scotland benefits from the Union, an equal number of them think 
that both countries benefit in equal measure, suggesting that the perception that the 
benefits of Union are unfairly distributed remains a minority one in England.  Scots 
are more likely to express an opinion on the matter (perhaps reflecting the greater 
salience and visibility of the issue in Scottish political discourse), but only a minority 
(15 per cent) express the opinion that England unfairly benefits from the Union.  The 
fact that 26 per cent of Scots think that the Scottish economy benefits more from the 
Union than does the English militates against the thesis that through the Union 
England has economically exploited Scotland.521 
 
Table 13: Scottish/English economic benefits 
 England benefits 
more % 
Scotland benefits 
more % 
 Equal % 
England 5 29 28 
Scotland 15 26 31 
Source: British Social Attitudes survey, 2006. 
 
Related to the question of whose economy benefits the most from 
participation in the Union is that relating to the equitableness of the distribution of 
government spending.  Table 14 shows the attitudes toward this issue in England and 
Scotland.  As indicated in a previous chapter, the distribution of public spending 
across the constituent nations is calculated according to the Barnett formula, which 
proceeds upon a pre-existing level of spending itself not based upon any systematic 
relative needs assessment.  One consequence of this is a general recognition within 
the academic literature that the proportion of public spending Scotland receives is 
probably slightly higher than a strict needs assessment would suggest.   
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Table 14: Does Scotland get fair share of government spending? 
 Much more 
than its fair 
share % 
A little 
more than 
its fair 
share % 
Pretty much 
its fair 
share % 
A little less 
than its fair 
share % 
Much less 
than its fair 
share % 
England 6 10 31 5 1 
Scotland 2 8 35 33 15 
Source: British Social Attitudes survey, 2006. 
 
Similarly as with the West Lothian question, the issue of the fairness or 
otherwise of the Barnett formula is commonly presented as one of the most 
controversial elements of the existing constitutional settlement, and one that carries a 
great deal of potential for sowing discord between England and Scotland, thus 
damaging the social cohesion of British society as a whole.  However, the evidence 
suggests that it is a far less salient or controversial issue than is often assumed, to the 
extent that only 6 per cent of the English believe that Scotland receives much more 
than its fair share of government spending.  A majority of the English respondents 
who expressed an opinion either way thought that Scotland received pretty much its 
fair share of government spending, a sentiment repeated in Scots respondents.  It is 
worth noting, however, that a significant proportion of Scots (48 per cent) thought 
that  Scotland  received  either  ‘a  little  less’  or  ‘much  less’  than  its  fair  share  of 
government spending.  This suggests that any attempts to reform the financial 
settlement accompanying devolution will likely encounter popular opposition in 
Scotland. 
  
Devolution and National Identity 
In the sense that its achievement depends on the existence of a certain framework of 
collective values capable of fostering co-operation between different elements of 
civil society, social cohesion is intimately related to questions of identity.  Here it is 
generally assumed that the absence of any meaningful identification with the state in 
relation to which civil society is defined, represents at least potentially a threat to the 
successful production and maintenance of social cohesion.  It is for this reason that 
questions relating to the propensity for national minorities to identify with 
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‘Britishness’  has  consistently  accompanied  popular and academic discussion of 
devolution.   
There is, moreover, good reason to suspect that the establishment of 
devolution might increase the extent to which national minorities identify with their 
‘Scottishness’  or  ‘Welshness’,  since  the  central  state  has traditionally used its 
considerable resources in the service of nation-building.  It is likely that the existence 
of devolved political institutions would endow sub-state national minorities with 
nation-building resources that it previously lacked.  Whilst it therefore seems likely 
that Scottishness will receive a boost from the existence of a Scottish devolved 
parliament employing some of its resources in support of nation-building policies, 
whether or not this is achieved at the expense of identification with Britishness 
depends on the extent to which Scots are able to retain dual identities.  Table 15, 
therefore, uses a measure of national identity, elicited through what is known as the 
‘Moreno’ question, designed to recognize the possible importance of dual identities. 
 
238 
 
Table 15: ‘Moreno’ national identity, Scotland 1992-2006 
 1992 % May 
1997 % 
Sep 
1997 % 
1999 % 2001 % 2003 % 2005 % 2006 % 
Scottish, not 
British 
19 23 32 32 36 31 32 33 
More 
Scottish than 
British 
40 38 32 35 30 34 32 31 
Equally 
Scottish and 
British 
33 27 28 22 24 22 22 21 
More B ritish 
than Scottish 
3 4 3 3 3 4 5 5 
British, not 
Scottish 
3 4 3 4 3 4 5 5 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes survey, 1999 – 2006; Bromley et al 2006. 
  
The data confirms the fact that Scottish identity is a very salient identity 
within Scotland.  In 2006, roughly two-thirds of respondents privileged their a 
Scottish over a British identity, with one third denying any identification with 
Britishness.  Scottishness was relatively unimportant to only a small minority (10 per 
cent).  Around a fifth of respondents drew no distinction between the relative 
importance of Scottishness and Britishness in their personal identity.  Whilst a sense 
of Scottish identity is therefore of great significance in Scotland, it is interesting to 
note the high number of respondents who professed attachment to a dual identity in 
some form.  In 2006, 57 per cent of respondents professed attachment to both a 
Scottish and English identity, albeit with differing emphasis placed on the relative 
importance of each.  This represents strong evidence in support of the contention that 
it is possible, and indeed common, for individuals to feel attached to more than one 
national identity, meaning that the cultivation of one through, for example, the 
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nation-building policies of sub-state levels of government need not necessarily mean 
a reduction in the salience of the other.  By implication, any such growth in the 
consciousness of Scottishness amongst Scottish people as might occur following 
devolution only represents a potential threat to social cohesion where it completely 
replaces a sense of British identity.   
Observing the data on national identity in Scotland from 1992 to 2006, two 
trends appear most evident.  First, in the five years prior to the referendum on 
Scottish devolution there was some increase in the number of Scots for whom 
Britishness formed no part of their personal identity.  This growth in the number of 
Scots rejecting any type of British identity coincided with a period of intense 
campaigning for Scottish self-government in the context of a British government led 
by a Conservative party with little support in Scotland.  It seems difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that the absence of self-government, and the perception of central 
government as an unrepresentative ‘alien’ force that attended that absence, fuelled a 
rejection of British identity amongst some Scots.  Assuming some link between 
social cohesion and common identity, such evidence offers a warning against 
attempts to present the devolution of power as a threat to social cohesion.  Rather, 
where self-government powers are the manifest wish of a significant section of a 
national minority community, it is the denial of that wish that represents the greatest 
threat to social cohesion, for the resentment provoked by such a denial is likely to be 
channelled  into  a  rejection  of  the  wider  ‘state’  identity  in  favour  of  the  sub-state 
national identity.  
Second, from the establishment of devolution up to 2006, no significant 
changes in the self-professed national identity of Scots can be detected. Devolution 
has not encouraged the replacement of British identities with exclusively Scottish 
ones but has, rather, stabilized commitment to dual national identities in which Scots 
feel some form of allegiance to both a sense of Scottishness and Britishness. 
If the experience of devolution has not led to an increase in Scottish 
consciousness, what has been its effect on Britain’s other nationalities, in particular 
those prevalent in England, where devolution is not currently applied?  Tables 16 
and 17 show the answers given in England and Wales to the ‘Moreno’ question. 
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Table 16: ‘Moreno’ national identity – England, 2001 and 2006 
 2001 2006 
English, not British 17 21 
More English than 
British 
13 15 
Equally English and 
British 
41 45 
More B ritish than 
English 
9 8 
British, not English 11 6 
Source: British Social Attitudes survey, 2001, 2006. 
 
Table 17: ‘Moreno’ national identity – Wales, 2001 and 2006 
 2001 2006 
Welsh, not British 23 30 
More Welsh than British 22 18 
Equally Welsh and 
British 
29 34 
More B ritish than Welsh 11 6 
British, not Welsh 11 7 
Source: British Social Attitudes survey, 2001, 2006. 
 
In Wales and in England, the particular sub-state national identity (i.e. Welsh 
and English respectively) is clearly less salient than is the case in Scotland.  48 per 
cent of people in Wales privilege their Welsh identity over a British one, compared 
to 64 per cent of Scots for whom Scottishness is more important than Britishness.  
That being said,  fully  a  third  of  respondents  in  Wales  identified  as  ‘Welsh,  not 
British’  the  category  potentially  most  in  conflict  with  the  future  maintenance  of 
social cohesion across Britain.  Only 35 per cent of the English privilege their 
English identity over a British one, and only 21 per cent identify themselves as 
‘English not British.’  The fact that 45 per cent of the English claim to feel ‘equally 
English and British’  is a reflection either of high levels of attachment to an overall 
British identity or a pervasive failure to distinguish between the two.   
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Whilst any conclusions based on such limited data must be made tentatively, 
it would appear that there is some evidence to support the claim that the experience 
of devolution has contributed to the sharpening of sub-state national consciousness 
in Wales and England.  The proportion of the Welsh respondents identifying 
exclusively with a Welsh national identity has rise from 23 per cent in 2001 to 30 per 
cent in 2006, whilst over the same period the proportion that privilege a British 
identity fell from 22 to 13 per cent.  A similar result obtains in the case of England, 
where the proportion that rejected a British identity in favour of an exclusively 
English one rose from 17 to 21 per cent and the proportion privileging a British 
identity fell from 20 to 14 per cent.   
 
Summary of data analysis 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the experience of living with a 
devolved Scottish parliament has not fostered secessionist sentiment in Scotland.522  
Support in Scotland for independence has remained stable during the first seven 
years of devolution’s operation.  The contention that devolution is a ‘slippery slope’ 
toward independence, if this is taken as referring to the effect of devolution on public 
opinion, should therefore be rejected.  However, this is not to say that devolution has 
had no impact on public attitudes toward the Union.  Most obviously, discontent 
amongst the English with the existing constitutional settlement, though still only at 
modest levels, appears to be growing, with increasing numbers supporting the 
extension of devolution to England.  However, the fact that such an extension of 
devolution seems to be supported by the Welsh and Scottish publics, there would 
appear to be no grounds for believing that a growth in English support for English 
devolution represents a serious threat to the social cohesion of Britain as a whole.  
 In terms of the performance of their devolved parliament, Scots, it would 
appear, have had their initially high expectations dashed somewhat.  The Scottish 
parliament has less power than they initially expected it to, but the more influence it 
attains the less inclined are respondents to say that this is a good thing.  This must be 
balanced against the fact that a majority of Scots express a preference for the current 
form of devolution, and are more likely to desire an extension of powers rather than 
a reduction. 
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If levels of trust are taken as important for the generation of social cohesion, 
then it would seem that this, rather than the existence of devolved institutions, 
represents the graver threat to British social cohesion.  Although Scots are, it is true, 
more inclined to trust the Scottish parliament than the British government, a fact 
which in itself might suggest that devolution may have a role to play in restoring 
trust in the political process, trust in either institution is falling at a similar rate.  
Mistrust in politicians is evident across the constituent nationalities, with people in 
England, Scotland and Wales expressing high levels of extreme mistrust in the 
government’s ability to put the interests of the nation above those of political party.  
The high levels of mistrust across the board suggest that national identity is an 
insignificant factor in accounting for disengagement with the political process, 
although there is some evidence to suggest that where people feel more personally 
attached to a wider British identity they are more inclined to trust their fellow 
citizens.  This should serve as a warning that it is reasonable to assume that social 
cohesion will prove difficult to sustain in the event of the complete erosion of 
attachment to some sense of Britishness.   
 There is little reason to suspect, however, that devolution in itself contributes 
to the erosion of British identification, since there is no evidence in the Scottish case 
that the existence of a Scottish parliament has fostered a rejection of Britishness.  
Rather, whilst Scottishness is a highly salient and widespread focus of identification 
in Scotland, it coexists alongside a continuing commitment to a British identity.  It is 
in this sense that we can assert that devolution fosters dual identities.  Evidence from 
the Scottish case suggests that it is the absence of devolved institutions, at least 
where this coincides with a perception that their views are unrepresented in British 
institutions,  that undermines commitment to a wider ‘state’  identity.    It  is  therefore 
not surprising that awareness of, and identification with, a distinctive English 
identity  has  grown  as  dissatisfaction  with  England’s  exclusion  from  devolution 
increases the likelihood that English people question the fairness of the Union 
 
Post-Devolution Nation-Building Discourse 
Within the theoretical chapters of this study it was argued that one important 
consequence of the establishment of devolution concerned the extra resources it 
would provide for the promotion of a distinct Scottish nation-building project 
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centred on a national parliament.  It was suggested that whether, and the extent to 
which, devolution served to weaken the bonds of solidarity that underpin the 
cohesion of British society as a whole would in part depend on the nature of the 
nation-building  projects  pursued  by  the  state’s  constituent  nationalities.  Nation-
building is a diverse concept pursued through a variety of different means.  The aim 
of this section is to examine the discursive dimension of nation-building via an 
analysis of a selection of public speeches delivered by a number of important 
political figures involved in articulating ideas of national identity in Britain.   
 
Tony Blair 
Devolution was introduced in 1999 by a Labour Party government under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Tony Blair who, as a result, exercised a considerable 
influence over the manner in which the constitutional project was presented to the 
British people.  In March 2000, Blair delivered a speech addressing the issue of 
national identity and devolution which touched on a number of the themes associated 
with the concept of social cohesion as discussed in Chapter Three.   
 At the same time as arguing in favour of constitutional reform and 
modernization, Blair repeatedly reaffirms his commitment to a united British state 
and an overriding shared British identity saying, for example, ‘the United Kingdom 
is stronger together than apart; all the constituent elements of the Union: its great 
cities, regions and nations are stronger united than separate, stronger together than 
the sum of their parts.’523  By recognising Britain’s constituent elements as nations in 
their own right, Blair recognizes the multinational character of Britain and suggests 
that this is a source of strength rather than weakness; strength in unity is a key theme 
of Blair’s nation-building discourse. 
 Directly addressing the question of national identity, Blair develops two 
related points; concerning its nature and function respectively.  In terms of an 
interpretation of from what source national identity is constructed, Blair is explicit in 
rejecting a traditional conservative interpretation that locates national identity in 
traditional institutions such as, in the British case, the monarchy or Westminster 
parliamentary sovereignty.  Rather, Blair argues, national identity is derived from 
‘our  shared  values  not  in  unchanging  institutions.’    Because  national  identity  is 
constituted  by  ‘shared  values  and  mutual  self-interest’  it  is  capable  of  surviving 
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changes at the constitutional or institutional level and is fundamentally implicated in 
a country’s economic achievements and capacity for collective action.  On the first 
point, Blair argues that it is vitally important for institutions to reflect the values that 
constitute  British  national  identity:  ‘when  our  values  fail  to  be  reflected  in  the 
institutions that govern us then Britain and British identity is under threat.’  However, 
the need for modernization in the context of a rapidly evolving global context 
requires for its satisfaction constitutional and institutional reform; a process that 
Blair suggests is informed by the content of the shared values of British identity.   
On the second point, the importance of national identity as a source of social 
solidarity  essential  for  Britain’s  future  prosperity  is  emphasized  on  the  basis  that 
‘Long-term growth and prosperity and stability depend on a clear sense of shared 
objectives and shared responsibilities.’  A sense of shared objectives is supplied by 
‘a  clear  sense of national purpose’,  the past  absence of which  lies  at  the  centre of 
British post-war decline:  ‘It  left  space  for  a  culture  to  develop  in which  sectional 
social and economic interests have fought to secure rights for themselves without a 
corresponding sense of their obligations to work for the wider public interest as 
well.’   By juxtaposing a shared sense of national purpose conducive to action in 
pursuit  of  the  collective  good  with  narrow  sectional  interests,  Blair’s  discourse 
strongly resembles the some of the theoretical approaches to the problem of social 
cohesion reviewed in Chapter Three.   
It is striking to note that Blair speaks almost exclusively of British identity as 
a foundation of shared values and mutual self-interest;  the  idea  that  Britain’s 
constituent nationalities themselves embody distinctive national values is left un-
explored.  Indeed, Blair implicitly suggests that British national identity is of a 
different, more civic and inclusive, order as compared with the constituent national 
identities.  Devolution, Blair argues, will strengthen Britain and British identity; a 
task whose essential importance lies in the benevolent character of that identity.  
Blair warns  against  ‘a  retreat  from  an  inclusive British  identity  to more  exclusive 
identities, rooted in 19th century conceptions of territory and blood.’  Although it is 
not explicitly stated, the suggestion here would seem to be that Scottish, Welsh and 
English national identities are less civic and inclusive than the concept of Britishness 
and are, therefore, best expressed within the framework of a shared British state.  
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Donald Dewar 
A long-standing advocate of devolution, the Scottish Labour politician Donald 
Dewar was appointed as Scotland’s First Minister in 1999.  In his speech delivered at 
the opening of the devolved Scottish Parliament on 1st July 1999, Dewar sought to 
emphasize its historical context and importance as a tool for the expression of 
Scottish national identity; as a resource, in other words, for the articulation of a 
distinctive Scottish nation-building project.  The new parliament is, Dewar suggests, 
the latest manifestation  of  Scotland’s  long  democratic  tradition  encompassing  ‘the 
long haul to win this Parliament, through the struggles of those who brought 
democracy to Scotland, to that other Parliament dissolved in controversy nearly three 
centuries  ago.’    The nationalistic tone of the speech is continued with Dewar 
invoking  the  memory  of  events  and  personalities  that  have  shaped  Scotland’s 
distinctive historical experience and contributed to the maintenance of a distinct 
Scottish national identity.  Dewar mentions, amongst other things, Robert Bruce, 
William Wallace, Robert Burns, the Scottish Enlightenment, and the Clyde shipyards.  
The relevance of these symbols of national identity is linked to the devolved Scottish 
parliament’s  nation-building function.  More than just a means through which to 
pursue political or legal objectives, the parliament is, Dewar suggests,  ‘about who 
we are, how we carry ourselves.’   
 Given the symbolic importance of a speech delivered at the opening of the 
Scottish parliament, it is to be expected that distinctively Scottish themes would 
provide  the  principle  emphasis.    For  a  picture  of  Dewar’s  understanding  of 
devolution’s significance for  the relationship between Scotland and Britain, we can 
turn to two further speeches delivered to different audiences and with different 
objective in mind.  Addressing the Scottish Labour Party conference in 1999, Dewar 
describes devolution as a means by which ‘to reconnect politics and people – to roll 
back the cynicism that all too often corrodes the political process.’  The image of re-
connecting people to the political process in opposition to growing cynicism contains 
echoes of the idea that social isolation, anomie and pervasive mistrust present 
powerful threats to social cohesion that thrive in the absence of strong political and 
civic participation.  According to this perspective, devolution brings the political 
process closer to the Scottish people in a manner that fosters social and political 
integration in a way that the remoteness of Westminster is unable to achieve. 
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 At the same time as he emphasizes the importance of solving Scottish 
problems  within  a  distinctive  Scottish  context  (‘Scottish  solutions  to  Scottish 
problems’), Dewar offers a strong critique of the SNPs separatist aspirations, which 
he  describes  as  ‘the  politics  of  illusion.’    In  contrast  to  opponents  of  Britain’s 
continued  existence,  the  Scottish  Labour  Party  aim,  Dewar  argues,  to  ‘work  with 
Britain and within Britain to progress our shared agenda.’  This shared agenda is the 
basis upon which social solidarity must build: ‘Solidarity – a vital principle then and 
just as vital a principle now.  We achieve more together than we do apart.  Shared 
beliefs, shared values, a shared future.  Making it work together.’ 
 Dewar’s  final speech addressing the significance of devolution for the 
political future of Scotland and Britain was delivered in Dublin on 29th September 
2000.  Whilst defending devolution, Dewar nevertheless states; ‘I do not believe that 
the future lies with the politics of identity, certainly in Scottish terms.  I do not 
believe that devolution is a stepping stone, a process which leads inevitably to 
independence.    I  believe  it  is  an  end  in  itself  and  that  Scotland will  hold  to  that.’  
This firm rejection of separatism is  justified by reference to  the ‘parochialism’ and 
‘inwardness’ that the campaign for Scottish independence represents.  Separatism, it 
is claimed, fails to adequately value the multitude of bonds that link the constituent 
elements of Britain and justify mutual cooperation within a British framework: 
‘Devolution  does  not,  will  not,  separate  Scotland  from  the  rest  of  the  United 
Kingdom.  There is a common heritage, economic links, shared experience, 
challenges and opportunities.  I believe we are stronger together, weaker apart.’ 
 The manner in which Dewar envisages a devolved Britain working 
successfully is somewhat analogous to the European Union principle of subsidiarity, 
which states that political decisions should be taken at the most localized level 
appropriate:  
 
‘In devolution, we have a settlement which builds on the strengths of the UK.  It 
puts what is best managed in Scotland to be managed in Scotland.  It leaves what is best 
done at the UK level at the UK level.  It recognizes our community of interest.  It recognizes 
our rights and responsibilities within that community.  By getting the balance right, we 
strengthen our shared commitment to the UK, we reinforce the Union.’   
 
247 
 
In this passage Dewar presents post-devolution Britain as a genuine multi-
level polity that seeks to give voice to sub-national communities whilst at the same 
time preserving the benefits that are derived from membership in a larger political 
unit.  
 Finally, Dewar argues that the future stability of Britain is depends in large 
part on its capacity for future reform and adjustment, and the maintenance of good 
will between its constituent nationalities; a good will ultimately derived from the real 
unity of values and interest that unite British people:  
 
‘Devolution is a tribute to the maturity and flexibility of the Union and its ability to 
adapt to meet the needs of its constituent parts.  The whole country, all of us, can take credit 
for that.  Devolution will work, not because of clever drafting or the political equivalent of 
fancy footwork, but because there will be the good will to make it work.  The good will is 
there because we have a shared outlook on the world.’   
 
Alex Salmond 
As the current First Minister of the Scottish Parliament and leader of the only major 
political party in Scotland to support full Scottish independence, Alex Salmond 
occupies a centrally important position with regard to the present discursive 
articulation of Scottish national identity and future nation-building project.  Prior to 
the SNPs accession to power in the 2007 Scottish Parliamentary elections, the 
multinational British state had no previous experience of one of its constituent 
nationalities being governed by a party committed to its dissolution.  Since it is 
reasonable to assume that the SNP sees in devolution an opportunity to advance its 
goal of Scottish independence, the character of the ‘national project’ it promotes is of 
keen interest to our present study into the relationship between Scottish devolution 
and the wider social cohesion of Britain.   
In what follows we examine the content of three speeches delivered by Alex 
Salmond with a view to identifying some of the dominant themes that appear therein.  
The speeches analyzed differ both in terms of the audience being addressed and the 
nature of the issues under discussion; thus enabling a rounded picture of Salmond’s 
principle discursive themes to emerge. 
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In May 2007 Salmond addressed the Scottish parliament to deliver his 
election victory speech following the SNPs triumph in that month’s  Scottish 
parliamentary elections.524  Perhaps in part because of the slim margin of the SNP 
victory (they were compelled to form a minority government), Salmond uses his 
speech to emphasize the unity and consensus to be found in the Scottish parliament; 
something that he relates directly to the unity of Scottish nationhood.  The Scottish 
parliament,  Salmond  suggests,  ‘is  bigger  than  any  of  its  members  or  any  party’, 
owing to the fact that ‘we [the Scottish people] are not divided... We have a sense of 
ourselves, a sense of community and, above all, a sense of the commonweal of 
Scotland.’    Reference  here  to  ‘community’  and  ‘commonweal’  are  intended  to 
convey the image of Scotland as exhibiting Gemeinschaft-like qualities and of its 
peoples sharing a set of collective values.  Concrete evidence for this unity can be 
found, Salmond argues, in the broad consensus in favour of understanding 
devolution as a process moving in the direction of an extension of greater autonomy 
to  Scotland;  ‘there  is  a  broad  consensus for the Parliament to assume greater 
responsibility for the governance of Scotland, as well as an understanding that we are 
engaged in a process of self-government and an awareness of the distance that we 
have already travelled.’ 
Having emphasized the quality of Scottish national unity, Salmond is keen to 
define  that  unity  as  based  on  an  inclusive,  ‘civic’,  multicultural  and  democratic 
conception  of  national  identity.    Speaking  of  Scotland’s  Asian  population  in  the 
context of SNP member Bashir Ahmad winning a seat in the Scottish parliament, 
Salmond  subjects  a  ‘traditional’  symbol  of Scottish  nationhood,  in  this  case  tartan 
cloth, to a distinctively modern interpretation so as to emphasize the inclusive 
character of Scottish national identity.  The Asian community in Scotland, Salmond 
argues,  ‘is now woven  into  the Parliament’s  tartan  and we are much  stronger  as  a 
result.  We are therefore diverse, not divided.’  The imagery applied in this quote is 
particularly instructive, since it evokes an image of Scottish nationhood that is at 
once both informed by culture and tradition (tartan) and open to diverse new 
influences.  The phrase ‘diverse not divided’ is typical of the SNPs preferred mode 
of nation-building, whereby membership to that nation is not limited to any one 
ethnic group. 
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Two  further  ideas  are  expressed  in  Salmond’s  victory  speech.    First,  he 
emphasizes the distinctive nature of the Scottish parliament as compared with its 
Westminster  counterpart  when  he  welcomes  ‘the  chance  to  develop  a  new  and 
fundamentally more reflective model of democracy in Scotland.’  The hope that the 
parliament at Edinburgh would be informed by a more consensual and deliberative 
approach to the practice of democracy, in opposition to the partisan and adversarial 
nature often thought to characterize debate at Westminster, was an oft-expressed one 
prior to the establishment of devolution in 1999.  Often such a desire was related to 
the (alleged) traditionally more egalitarian and consensual bent of Scottish political 
culture,  embodied  in Robert Burns poem,  ‘A Man's  a Man  for  a'  that.’525  Second, 
Salmond  emphasizes  his  overriding  concern  for  the  Scottish  ‘national  interest’, 
declaring  that  ‘Today  I  commit myself  to  leadership wholly and exclusively  in  the 
Scottish national interest.’   This  reference  to working  ‘exclusively’  in  the Scottish 
national interest should be taken as tacitly implying the inability of a Westminster 
parliament, or even of UK-wide political parties, to devote the necessary time and 
attention to specifically Scottish affairs. 
The construction of a national museum is an act of nation-building par 
excellence.  It is no surprise, therefore, that nation-building provided the guiding 
motif when in August 2007 Alex Salmond addressed the National Museum of 
Scotland in Edinburgh.  After once again implicitly evoking the Gemeinschaft-like 
qualities of Scottish society – ‘This  is a nation  that  loves  to express  itself,  to  retell 
old stories and share new ideas, to pass on information, to hear what's happening. 
We communicate passionately with each other as friends, as citizens, as family. It's a 
very deep human need and we  feel  it particularly  strongly  in Scotland’  – Salmond 
proceeds to underline the importance of ambition, confidence, and self-belief for the 
realization  of  the  potential  implied  by  that  sense  of  community;  ‘while  we might 
have always enjoyed self-expression, we have perhaps at times lacked a little bit of 
self-belief.’  In this he detects an ‘incomplete sense of national self-confidence.’   
A recurring theme within Salmond’s speeches is that of nation-building as a 
process of collective regeneration based upon the rediscovery of national confidence 
suppressed  by  Scotland’s  long  absence  of  autonomous  political  and  cultural 
institutions.  Along these lines he praises the infrastructure of nation-building, 
organizations  such  as  the  National  Theatre  of  Scotland  (bringing  ‘energy  and 
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excitement’  to  Scotland),  and  argues  for  the  devolution  of  broadcasting  (because 
‘broadcasting perhaps more than any other form of media reflects the sense a nation 
has of its communicative and expressive abilities.’).   
Hitherto, the principle obstacle to the pursuit of a distinctive Scottish national 
project capable of restoring national self-confidence has been, Salmond argues, the 
marginalization of Scottish interests with British institutional structures: ‘It's just not 
acceptable that networks which purport to serve the whole of the UK should 
marginalise the creative community in Scotland.’   
Salmond links these two ideas – the importance of nation-building as 
generator of national self-confidence  and  ambition,  and  Scotland’s  present 
marginalization within British-wide structures – with an appeal to democratic values 
of civic participation, suggesting that they depend for their successful realization on 
a wide range of autonomous civil society institutions in addition to the autonomous 
political  arena  of  the  Scottish  parliament:  ‘we  need  to  put  in  place what  software 
designers have called 'the architecture of participation'. That will mean our 
institutional structures and priorities may have to change...this is a nation that likes 
to talk. I have said that we need an architecture of participation, so I hope many will 
participate.’ 
By way of contrast to the domestic nature of the two speeches analyzed thus 
far, we can now turn to a speech given by Salmond in October 2007 to the Council 
on Foreign Relations, New York.  In this speech Salmond uses the opportunity of 
speaking  to  a  foreign audience  to  argue  that Scotland’s  lack of political autonomy 
has  trapped  it  ‘in  a  prism  of  insularity’,  which  has  fostered  ‘economic 
underperformance’ and ‘cultural timidity.’  By contrast, devolution has facilitated a 
‘cultural  renewal’  creating  a  ‘new  Scotland...which  is  bold,  confident,  demanding 
and ambitious.’  In so doing, Salmond seeks to portray Scottish nationalism and the 
demand for greater national autonomy as expansively cosmopolitan rather than 
narrowly parochial in orientation.   
To argue that greater national autonomy fosters a diminution of parochialism 
chimes with the repeated emphasis on the inclusive and civic nature of Scottish 
nationalism:  ‘the  re-emergence of Scotland is based on a peaceful, inclusive, civic 
nationalism – one born of tolerance and respect for all faiths, colours and creeds.’  
Scottish nationalism, rather than promoting the Scottish national interest by 
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constructing and emphasizing  the exclusivity of Tőnnies’ vision of  community,  is, 
according  to  Salmond’s  discourse,  effective  in  its  capacity  to  expand  Scottish 
horizons and create a sense of ambition and boldness within the Scottish nation.   
Finally, Salmond makes explicit the link between national self-determination 
and the construction of a distinctive national project.  Once again, such a nation-
building project is to be oriented not toward the cultivation of exclusive conceptions 
of identity but, rather, toward the reinforcement of national self-esteem:  ‘Self-
Government is about more than constitutional change - it is about a transformation of 
expectations and a seismic shift in mentality.  In Scotland, we are not simply trying 
to build a proud nation, but rather to build a nation of which we can be proud.’ 
 
Gordon Brown 
In addition to being the current British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown is the leader 
of the Party that established devolution during its first term in office in 1999.  The 
rhetoric that he chooses to employ in relation to the Scottish parliament is therefore 
strongly conditioned by the imperative of balancing the interests of Scotland and of 
the wider Union.  Unlike the SNP, Brown conceives of devolution as a reform 
oriented  toward  the  strengthening  of  Scotland’s  integration  into  Britain,  and  his 
discourse reflects this desire to avoid any intimations of a possible conflict between 
Scottish and British interests.  The form of Scottish nation-building that he promotes 
is thus one in which the Britishness of Scotland is overwhelmingly emphasized. 
That explicit reference to distinctively Scottish interests in his speeches is 
conspicuous in its absence is evident in the choice of rhetoric employed by Brown in 
a speech given in May 2008 to the Church of Scotland Assembly.526  Although 
Brown opens his address by acknowledging, and given thanks for, the distinctive 
moral values that he acquired from his Scottish religious upbringing, he declines to 
refer to Scotland by name, and emphasises the outward-facing historical stance that 
Scotland has displayed: ‘And all that I was taught [from my childhood] remains with 
me to this day... And I have never forgotten the lessons I learned in the manse of a 
parish in a medium-sized town in a nation that has given so much to the world.’   
Having thus stressed his own Scottish credentials, the remainder of Brown’s 
address takes as its central theme the idea of the interconnectedness of a globalized 
world in which people unrelated by nationality or citizenship nevertheless potentially 
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share a deep well of common values.  When Brown makes the claim that ‘we are not 
moral strangers, but there is a shared moral sense common to us all’, the ‘we’ is left 
unspecified, with  the  intimation  that  it  is  a  global  ‘we’.    This  theme  continues  as 
Brown outlines a vision of a global society being transformed into a single moral 
universe through the power of communications technology: ‘A global society where 
people anywhere and everywhere can discover their shared values, communicate 
with each other and do not need to meet or live next door to each other to join 
together with people in other countries in a single moral universe to bring about 
change.’  Within this global vision there is little space available for the articulation 
of  a  distinctively  Scottish  national  project,  and  Brown’s  de-emphasis of the 
significance of territory serves partly to detach the idea of shared values, which are 
otherwise accorded great importance, from the framework of a shared territorial 
‘homeland’.    Shared  territory,  according  to Brown’s  discourse,  is  no  longer  a  pre-
requisite for the construction of community: ‘Today we see clearly that we share the 
same global neighbourhood within the same moral universe.’ 
In a speech given to CBI Scotland in September 2008, Brown, in obvious 
contrast to the rhetorical stance of Alex Salmond examined above, emphasizes the 
complementary character of Scottish and British national interests, which are thereby 
made effectively indistinguishable.  Such a conceptualization is formed on a tacit 
level in the frequently repeated use of the terms Britain and British, and the absence 
of any reference to Scotland or Scottish.  Brown applauds the work of CBI Scotland 
in helping to ensure the ‘continued competitiveness of British business’, based upon 
a  realization  that  ‘Britain  cannot  insulate  itself  from  these  unprecedented  shocks 
because  we  are  part  of  the  global  world.’    The  ‘we’  that  confront  the challenges 
presented by economic recession are the British, not the Scottish; ‘the choice for us 
is not whether we believe there will be opportunities in the new economy - but how 
we,  the British, choose  to  seize  them.’   The discursive priority accorded to Britain 
reaches a rhetorical crescendo as Brown stresses the need for unity in the face of 
economic change: ‘So if the British economy, British firms and the people of Britain 
are to reap the benefits of a new low carbon future, then every one of us - in every 
part of Britain - will need to act together.’ 
The  second  part  of  Brown’s  speech  directly  addresses  the  relationship 
between Scotland and the wider Union with a view to refuting the nationalist claims 
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of the SNP.  With regard to the politics of Scottish nationalism, Brown’s fear is ‘of 
waking up one day to find that the many benefits of the union had been too long 
taken for granted and thoughtlessly thrown away.’  The close interdependence of the 
economies of Scotland and England point to the clear economic benefits that the 
former continues to derive from membership in the Union: Scotland generates more 
money through trade with England, in financial services, than from its trade in all 
sectors in all areas across the whole of the European Union.  That is simple 
arithmetic  of  the  union.   And  it  adds  up.’    The  beneficial  character  of  Scotland’s 
participation in the wider Union, Brown argues, is ample evidence in support of a 
continuation of that relationship.  Scotland is stronger for its membership of Britain: 
‘Scotland has benefited from this partnership - a source of strength not weakness.’ 
Addressing the claims of the SNP, Brown suggests that Scottish secession 
would be a development out of step with the reality of contemporary global 
transformations which call  instead  for  the search  for  strength  in unity:  ‘Set against 
the global challenges facing us today, the bleak separatist obsession of the 
nationalists to split Scotland from the rest of the UK looks at best like self indulgent 
posturing.’  The pursuit of a national project aimed at the articulation of a distinctive 
national identity is portrayed as a an irrelevance to the challenges facing Scotland, 
which require for the solution a recognition of the strength derived from the Union 
and the cultivation of skills rather than identity: ‘The reality is that we are stronger 
than we ever could be apart.  And what matters is where our talents can take us, not 
where Scotland ends and the rest of the world begins.’ 
Whilst therefore strongly in support of Scotland’s  continued  inclusion  in 
Britain, Brown is nevertheless in favour of a flexible attitude toward the structure of 
the Union, seeing devolution as an evolving process:  ‘The constitution of the union 
has always evolved to meet the changing needs and rising hopes of our people as it 
did most notably when we created the Scottish Parliament - within the United 
Kingdom - 10 years ago.’  As part of this evolutionary process, Brown indicates his 
support for the extension of a greater degree of fiscal autonomy to Scotland as a way 
of improving the accountability and responsibility of the Scottish parliament, a 
measure similarly supported by Alex Salmond.  The speech closes with a re-
statement of Brown’s vision of what devolution means for the future of Scotland and 
her relationship with Britain:  ‘Devolution  is  intended  to  preserve  the  unity  of  the 
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United Kingdom – and developing devolution  is  intended  to  strengthen Scotland’s 
place within it.  There is a modern case of the union and it must be hear.  It is not 
about partnership at the expense of pride; nor about pride that can be satisfied only 
sacrificing partnership.’ 
In his March 2009 address to the Scottish Labour Party Conference, Brown 
repeats many of the themes examined above.  He once again underlines the 
importance of shared values but detaches them from a strongly defined Scottish 
context and points to the inappropriateness of nationalist politics in an age of 
globalization:  ‘you  cannot  retreat  into  a  nationalist  dogma  – you cannot separate 
yourself off and opt out of the world. You solve a global problem not by nationalist 
solutions but by us all working together.’  Brown pursues his theme by setting up a 
discursive opposition between nationalism and social justice, arguing that a concern 
with relative need rather than geographic location or national identity is the 
appropriate stance for a politics that seeks to promote fairness and equality:   
 
‘the  first  priority  for  the  people  of  Scotland  is  not  separation  but  social  justice.  
People know that what scars Scotland  is not its borders but  its poverty.   That  it  isn’t flags 
that matter most to the people of Scotland – but fairness.  That it’s not building embassies 
that count for the future – but  building  greater  equality.   That  it’s  not making  a  virtue of 
isolation – it’s making a reality of working together.’ 
 
Here we see Brown constructing a set of related dichotomies with the aim of 
making the politics of nationalism appear to be antagonistic to those of social justice.  
Separation versus social justice; flags versus fairness; embassies versus equality; 
isolation versus working together.  This is an interesting rhetorical device since it 
contains strong echoes of arguments put forward by anti-devolutionists within the 
Labour Party (figures such as Tam Dalyell and Robin Cook) in opposition to the 
proposals to establish devolved political administrations in Britain in the first place.  
As an avenue of argument, it implies the need for uniform procedures for the 
distribution of resources administered by a central state without regard to 
geographical considerations.  It is such a line of reasoning that accounted for 
Labour’s post-war retreat from their traditional support for Scottish Home Rule.527 
 
255 
 
David Cameron 
As leader of the Conservative Party, David Cameron heads a Party currently holding 
just one Scottish seat in Westminster and seventeen in Holyrood.  Whilst it might, 
therefore, be tempting to express scepticism as to the relative importance of the 
Cameron rhetoric on the Union, to do so would be to ignore two points.  On the one 
hand, the majority of opinion polls currently suggest that Cameron is likely to be 
Britain’s next Prime Minister, meaning that the discourse that he chooses to advance 
in relation to the ‘national question’ within the Union will be of central significance 
to the future direction that Union takes.  On the other hand, the dramatic decline in 
Conservative Party support in Scotland since the late 1950s, and most especially 
since the Thatcher years, is generally linked to their failure to pay adequate respect 
to the idea of the Union as a partnership between equals, a perception that they 
privilege a form of English nationalism, a conception of national interest that ignores 
the distinctive needs of peripheries, and their long-standing historical opposition to 
devolution.528  Therefore, it is the Conservatives, more so than any other major 
political party, for whom the challenge of adapting to devolution is problematic and 
that might be expected to construct and develop a distinctively English nation-
building project.   
In September 2006, David Cameron delivered a speech in which the question 
of Scottish-English relations occupied centre stage.529  The address represents an 
attempt to outline a defence of the Union that nevertheless recognizes the present 
existence of a significant degree of discontent with Scotland and England.  It is this 
extra stress on the English interpretation of Union that, as would be expected, 
distinguishes the discourse of Cameron from both Salmond and Brown.  Cameron 
reminds his audience of the level of support for independence found in polls 
conducted in Scotland; ‘renewed squabbling over the West Lothian Question and the 
Barnett  Formula’;  and  ‘isolated  but  ugly  incidents  of  English  supporters  being 
assaulted on the  streets  of  Scotland.’    By  drawing  attention  to  the  what  are 
sometimes considered the most problematic aspects of the Union settlement as it 
currently stands, Cameron’s discourse provides a space for English self-assertion and 
nation-building that is unparalleled in the rhetoric of Salmond or Brown where 
mention of Englishness, the West Lothian Question or the Barnett Formula are 
studiously avoided. 
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In order to counter the perception, mentioned above, of the Conservative 
Party as an essentially English Party incapable or unwilling to stand up for Scottish 
interests, Cameron emphasizes the long historical pedigree that Unionism can lay 
claim to north of the border: ‘Unionism, in both an intellectual and emotional sense, 
is a mainstream position with a long and noble tradition... Scottish Conservatism is 
not some alien implant... Fifty years ago we secured more than half of all votes cast 
in Scotland.’   
After acknowledging some of the mistakes that the Conservative Party have 
made in the past with regard to the governance of Scotland, Cameron returns to what 
is his guiding theme; the importance for ensuring the survival of the Union of 
addressing  ‘both  sides  of  the  equation’  of  the  Anglo-Scottish relationship.  This 
requires addressing ‘the asymmetrical nature of the current arrangements’, which, in 
the form of the West Lothian Question and the Barnett Formula, provides the 
principle sources of English grievance.  Resolution of such grievances can, Cameron 
suggests, be pursued through a renewed emphasis on education aimed at reducing 
‘the  ignorance of English people about  the Scots and Scotland.’    It  is because  ‘the 
Union  is  supposed  to  be  a  relationship  of  equals’  that  the  misunderstanding  or 
misrecognition of one party to that relationship by another feeds separatism and why 
people  in  Scotland  ‘expect  their  distinct  Scottishness  to  be  both  recognised  and 
respected.’   
Finally, within the speech Cameron briefly articulates a conception of the 
nature of British identity and its relationship to the constituent national identities of 
which it is composed.  Stating first that ‘No one is prouder of being English than I 
am’, Cameron outlines a defence of the importance of Britain and Britishness: ‘But 
I’m  also  passionately  attached  to  the  idea  of  Britain.    Being  British  isn’t  about 
ethnicity or local identity.  It’s one of the most successful examples in history of an 
inclusive civic nationalism.’   Cameron here presents an  interesting  juxtaposition of 
English and British identities.  By situating his strong emotional attachment to an 
English national identity in the context of his equally strong commitment to a British 
identity,  and  then  immediately  stressing  the  point  that  Britishness  ‘isn’t  about 
ethnicity or local identity’, Cameron makes the implicit suggestion that Englishness 
is (to some extent) about ethnicity.  In so doing, he seeks to argue for the superiority 
of a British identity which stands above local ethnic and national distinctions, 
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thereby making it more appropriate to the increasingly plural nature of the societies 
we now inhabit.   
It is clear that the distinction that Cameron is here making, which is part of an 
attempt to re-conceptualization the British nation-building project, resembles the 
theoretical distinction between citizenship and nationality, whereby the former refers 
to an inclusive and universal conception of political membership encompassing 
(almost) all of those residing in the territory of a particular state, and the latter to an 
exclusive form of ethnic community based on a sense of belonging inaccessible to 
significant sections of the population.  As a way of repudiating the claims of 
minority nationalists, Cameron aims to contrast their narrow exclusive nationalism 
with the expansive inclusive quality of Britain.  This is quite clearly incompatible 
with the version of Scottish identity advanced by Alex Salmond, who rejects the 
portrait of Britain being an especially good political arena on which to pursue civic 
and multi-ethnic politics by emphasizing the ‘civic’ credentials of the Scottish nation 
itself.   
Similar themes are explored in a speech given by Cameron in May 2008 to 
the  Scottish  Conservative  Party  conference,  in  which  he  observes  that  ‘the  Union 
between  England  and  Scotland  is  under  attack  as  never  before.’    His  choice  of 
rhetoric to describe the source of that attack contains echoes of Brown’s use of the 
phrase  ‘bleak  separatist  obsession’  quoted  above.    ‘Whether  we  like  it  or  not,’ 
Cameron suggests, ‘the ugly strain of separatism is seeping through the Union flag.’   
In a discourse markedly at odds with both Salmond and Brown, Cameron 
makes  explicit  the  idea  that  identity  lies  at  the  heart  of  Union’s  present  crisis; 
specifically that the growth of attachment to sub-state national identities at the 
expense of a British identity represents  a  serious  threat  to  the Union’s  coherence:  
‘The number of people who think themselves British – ahead of Scottish or English 
– is in decline.  People no longer look to the Union flag for their sense of belonging 
– they look to the cross of St.George or the Saltire...if anything at all.’  Employing 
similar language to that used in the speech analyzed above, Cameron laments the 
decline  in  attachment  to  Britishness  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  ‘one  of  the  most 
successful examples of inclusive civic nationalism  in  the world’  and  represents  ‘a 
shining example of what a multi-ethnic, multi-faith and multi-national society can 
and  should be.’   Again,  there  is  the  implicit  suggestion  that  the  civic, multi-ethnic 
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quality of Britain can be favourably contrasted with the ethnic, exclusive character of 
purely Scottish or English identities.   
Having argued for a purely civic conception of British identity, Cameron 
nevertheless criticizes attempts, which he associates with Gordon Brown, to define 
Britishness in what amounts to a top-down imposition lacking in genuine emotional 
depth:  ‘Gordon  Brown’s  view  of  Britishness  is  mechanical,  not  organic,  it’s 
something to be redesigned, repackaged and re-launched by Whitehall, not 
something which  lives  in  our  hearts.’    In criticizing such an approach to defining 
British identity, Cameron outlines a distinctively Conservative vision of the 
foundations of attachment to Britain.  What it means to be British is, according to 
this  vision,  to  have  an  ‘emotional  connection  with  the institutions that define 
Britishness.’  For Cameron, the important institutions that define British identity are 
those most traditionally associated with a Conservative world-view: ‘Our monarchy. 
Our armed forces. Our parliament.’   
 
Summary 
The idea that devolution represents a grave threat to the continued viability of the 
British state and a British identity, and therefore undermines social cohesion, is 
entirely absent from the discourse of the major political figures examined in this 
section.  Certainly, such a claim is not advanced by any of them, even though, 
particularly in the case of David Cameron, it might be thought that political capital 
could be gained from the pursuit of such an agenda.  Moreover, all five personalities 
express support for devolution.  The fact that none of the mainstream political parties 
operating in Britain is strongly critical of devolution is significant to the extent that it 
reflects the weight of public opinion more generally. 
Notwithstanding the shared commitment to making devolution work 
displayed, we can identify significant and revealing differences in the discourse 
constructed by each in relation to the question of nationality in post-devolution 
Britain.  For Alex Salmond, devolution presents an opportunity for the pursuit of a 
distinctive Scottish nation-building project capable of acting as a countervailing 
force against what he perceives to have been a history of Scottish marginalization 
within the Union.  Political autonomy, according to this perspective, is a means 
through which to reinforce national self-confidence and self-esteem, which will in 
259 
 
turn bring tangible economic benefits.  In contrast to the traditional nation-building 
project associated with the modernizing states of nineteenth century Western Europe, 
where the principle emphasis lay on the cultivation of homogeneous cultural 
identities amongst the population, the nation-building project advanced by Salmond 
is concerned with fostering a greater sense of pride and confidence in an identity 
assumed to already exist.  Of the other non-nationalist politicians examined, Donald 
Dewar alone makes extensive reference to a distinctive Scottish nation-building 
project, the promotion of which he argues is an important function of the new 
devolved parliament.  However, unlike Salmond, Dewar repeatedly reaffirms a 
commitment to a conception of Scottish nationality in which its intimate and long-
standing links within a British context.   
Of  course,  Salmond’s  is  also  a  partly  instrumental  approach  to  nation-
building, since he hopes that devolution will facilitate the move toward 
independence.  For Gordon Brown however, the motivation underpinning devolution 
is the belief that it will actively strengthen the Union.  Because of this overriding 
concern, he promotes a British nation-building project, in which the benefits accrued 
to Scotland from her participation in the Union are repeatedly emphasised.  Whereas 
Salmond is able to invoke his commitment to the Scottish national interest, Brown 
makes Scottish and British national interests indistinguishable.   
All five politicians advocate a democratic, civic, and inclusive understanding 
of nationhood, and in this sense there is little evidence that devolution has the power 
to undermine social cohesion by sharpening national tensions.  That being said, 
David Cameron is least reluctant to make explicit reference to national grievances 
associated with devolution.  By highlighting sources of English discontent such as 
the West Lothian Question and the Barnett formula, and arguing that the resolution 
of these grievances is an important priority, Cameron creates a discursive space for 
the expression of views potentially hostile toward devolution.  Moreover, he is alone 
in making explicit the idea that the growth of attachment to sub-state national 
identities potentially threatens the cohesion of the Union.  It is, however, important 
to recognize both that Cameron adopts a deliberately moderate approach when 
discussing the issue of English grievances and, more significantly, stresses the 
important of dual identities.  In contrast to the emphasis placed on Scottishness by 
Salmond, and the almost exclusive reference to Britishness preferred by Brown and 
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Blair, Cameron and Dewar make extensive reference to Englishness/Scottishness and 
Britishness and argue that the coherence of the Union is threatened only where 
attachment to sub-state national identities grows at the expense of attachment to a 
wider British identity. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
The central question of this thesis is how the establishment of devolution in Britain 
affects the social cohesion of British society?  In order to answer this, a number of 
subsidiary questions are considered, including: In what ways does devolution alter 
the structure of the British state?  What is the significance of national identity within 
Britain?  How should sovereignty be understood, and where is it located, in the 
context of post-devolution Britain?  What is meant by the term social cohesion and 
what are its principle foundations in Britain?   
 Analyses of the consequences of the 1999 devolution settlement in Britain 
are of considerable relevance given that the latter represents arguably the most 
significant constitutional change since the establishment of the Home Rule 
Parliament of Northern Ireland in 1921.  Despite long-standing symbolic recognition 
of Britain as a  ‘nation of nations’,  (that  is  to say, official public acknowledgement 
that England, Scotland and Wales constitute distinct national communities) until 
1999 Britain remained an ostensibly unitary state with a highly centralized political 
structure.  On previous occasions when proposals for the devolution of political 
authority  were  advanced, most  notably  in  Prime Minister  Gladstone’s  support  for 
‘home  rule  all  round’  in  the  late  nineteenth  century and the 1979 devolution 
referendums, critics of the idea argued that by compromising the unity of the British 
state and the ideal of Parliamentary sovereignty upon which its authority (allegedly) 
depends, devolution would unleash fissiparous tendencies  latent  in  Britain’s 
multinational character precipitating its eventual disintegration.530  More recently, a 
number of political philosophers have argued that the resilience of any state, as well 
as its capacity to pursue policies designed to promote redistributive justice, depends 
upon the existence of a single overriding national identity in order to supply the 
affective bonds of social solidarity for which legal citizenship alone is insufficient.531  
It is therefore pertinent to enquire into the relationship between devolution and 
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identity in Britain; whether devolution fosters attachment to minority national 
identities at the expense of a unifying British identity? 
 By way of responding to these questions, this study is divided into two parts: 
First, a theoretical analysis of  the key concepts animating the issue of devolution’s 
consequences.  Second, an empirical analysis of devolution in Britain focusing 
principally on Scotland as the constituent unit of Britain to which the largest and 
most significant level of political autonomy has been extended.  What follows is a 
summary of the major arguments advanced within the thesis and an examination of 
their significance for the question of whether devolution undermines social cohesion 
in Britain.   
 
Theoretical Arguments 
 (1) Where advanced by national minorities, the demand for a measure of 
political autonomy short of full independence, justified with reference to a 
claimed right to national self-determination, stands in tension with the 
historically dominant conception of the nation-state as necessarily centralized 
and functionally integrated.  Max Weber’s celebrated definition of the state as ‘a 
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force within a given territory’532 is, as is emphasized by both Anthony 
Giddens533 and Michael Mann534, an accurate description of the distinctly modern 
state alone and points to the manner in which the latter exercises direct rule as the 
unchallenged centre of political authority.  The modern state emerged out of the 
central authority’s successful struggle to subordinate autonomous aristocratic power 
and concentrate legitimate political authority within itself, an achievement made 
possible  by  the  central  state’s  progressive  accumulation  of  ‘infrastructural  power’ 
and the corresponding extension in the scope of its rule.  As a result, the modern 
state has traditionally been conceived as being, in the words of Gianfranco Poggi, 
‘concerned and committed to a distinctive, unified and unifying set of interests and 
purposes.’ 535   A state embodying centrality, defined by a centralized and 
monopolistic structure of political authority, is one that will resist demands for 
political autonomy advanced by a territorially-concentrated portion of its population 
that contests the state’s political authority.  The essence of devolution is the transfer 
of functionally-specific political powers from the centre to the periphery, conferring 
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autonomy on the latter whilst maintaining the constitutional superiority of the former.  
Such decentralization, whilst less extensive than that enshrined in the principle of 
federation, in which a division of autonomous powers between the centre and 
peripheries is constitutionally guaranteed, is nonetheless frequently resisted by 
nation-state’s committed to the ideals of unitariness, centralization and a functionally 
integrated governmental structure. 
 
 
(2) By demanding political recognition of national diversity, many 
contemporary nationalist movements challenge the dominant interpretation of 
the relationship between nation and state, which assumes that the survival of 
the former as a distinct entity is dependent on its possessing an independent 
state of its own and that modern state’s are necessarily nationally homogeneous.  
The emergence of nations as collectivities inherently constituted by certain political 
claims is historically linked to developments associated with modernity and in 
particular the rise of the modern state.  An important aspect of the latter concerns the 
nature of  its  legitimacy.   The modern state’s distinctive capacity  to govern directly 
and effectively penetrate civil society expresses an increasingly tight state-society 
relationship that changes the basis of its legitimacy.  Put simply, the legitimacy of 
the modern state is structured by the relationship between state and society, ruler and 
ruled, as indicated in the prominence of the ideal of popular sovereignty (see below).  
Because  the  modern  state  therefore  derives  its  legitimacy  from  the  ‘people’ 
constituted  as  a  ‘nation’,  it  has  an  interest  in  promoting  the  ideal  of  national 
homogeneity as a means by which to reinforce its legitimacy.  Nation-states 
therefore access their considerable resources and actively seek to build a nation.  The 
nation-state’s nation-building aspirations are aptly described by Yael Tamir where 
she writes: 
 
‘Since the nation had become the only valid source of state legitimacy, every group 
of individuals who saw themselves as a nation yearned to establish an independent state, and 
members of every state hoped to transform themselves from a population into a nation.  
Governments were pressured to prove that they represented a nation rather than a mere 
gathering of individuals.  As a result, they developed an interest in homogenizing their 
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populations – they began to intervene in the language, the interpretation of history, the 
myths and symbols or, to put it more broadly, in the culture of their citizens.  The modern 
nation-state thus became the agent for cultural, linguistic, and sometimes religious 
unification – it attempted to build a nation.’536 
 
By demanding public recognition of national diversity, minority nationalists 
contest the image of the nation promoted by the central state and seek political 
autonomy in order to support a countervailing nation-building project.  In doing so, 
they explicitly challenge the tendency to treat nation and state as synonymous and 
assert their right to be considered a nation, with the corresponding right to political 
autonomy, regardless of possession of a separate nation-state of their own. 
  
(3) Minority nationalists re ject the dominant statist discourse of sovereignty in 
favour of a non-statist concept of popular sovereignty interpreted as a right to 
national self-determination.  Because of the link between the revival and 
reinterpretation of the idea of sovereignty and the modernization and development of 
the unitary nation-state in place of the politically fragmented structure of European 
feudalism, there has resulted a tendency to collapse the concepts of state and 
sovereignty  into  a  single  ideal  of  ‘state  sovereignty’  whereby  sovereignty  is 
interpreted as an intrinsic property of statehood.  There is an external and an internal 
dimension to the ideal of state sovereignty that together function to deny the right of 
national minorities to be politically self-determining.  The ideal of external 
sovereignty assumes the mutual acknowledgement of the sovereignty of other states 
within a system of sovereign states.537  By considering the state as the sole legitimate 
actor in the international system, this interpretation of sovereignty effectively denies 
sub-state national minorities opportunities for autonomous participation in their 
external relations.  With regard to the internal dimension of sovereignty, despite 
general acceptance of the principle of popular sovereignty, the nation-state claims 
the unchallenged authority to determine which groups are nationalities and whether 
or not they have a right to self-determination. 
 The demand advanced by some national minorities for political recognition 
as a separate and distinct nationality with the right to decide upon its own political 
future rejects the contention that sovereignty is an intrinsic property of states, 
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positing instead that sovereignty be seen as ultimately residing in the people as 
popular sovereignty with the assumption that the scope of the demos be subject to 
revision according to the democratically expressed wishes of national minority 
groups.  According to this perspective, a multinational devolved union by definition 
consists of a plurality of self-determining political communities meaning that 
sovereignty is pluralistic, divided and shared.  In its capacity to challenge the state-
centric doctrine of sovereignty associated with the traditional nation-state model, 
devolution contains parallels with supra-national political projects such as the 
European Union.  Although its analysis has been beyond the scope of the present 
thesis, we agree with Keating’s suggestion  that European  integration implies a less 
state-centric interpretation of the doctrine of sovereignty: ‘A crucial effect of the new 
European order is the way in which it throws into question the whole state-centred 
doctrine of sovereignty and opens up the possibility of new and pluralistic normative 
orders.’538   
 
(4) Emotional bonds generated by shared national identity are an important 
source of social solidarity and cohesion in modern societies, the beneficial 
effects of which are most effectively realized where national diversity is 
formally recognized rather than, as has been the dominant view for much of the 
modern era, where there exists a single encompassing national identity 
(achieved through nation-building policies) which alone is given political 
recognition.  Contractual relationships among self-interested individuals supported 
by just institutions and basic citizenship rights are insufficient conditions for the 
maintenance of social cohesion, which must in part depend upon the existence of 
affective ties of social solidarity capable of motivating mutual reciprocity and 
cooperation.  With the development of modern industrial capitalist societies, the 
foundations of social solidarity were transformed as increased mobility, diversity and 
the rise of individualism eroded traditional communal bonds and the thick shared 
values they supported.539  Against the backdrop of the radical social dislocations 
associated with industrialization, nationalism became a tool of social integration 
promoted by modernizing states, a point made by Mommsen when he writes; ‘While 
traditional social lineages and loyalties had lost much of their binding force, the 
national idea proved to be a substitute for them in as much as it provided a new sort 
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of cohesion among the various social and political groupings.’540  The view that a 
nationally homogenous population is a necessary condition for the maintenance of 
social cohesion and democratic governance further underpinned nation-states efforts 
at nation-building and the marginalization of national minorities. 
 However, the evident fact that an overwhelming majority of nation-states 
continue to exhibit significant national diversity represents a serious challenge to the 
presumption that social cohesion is best secured by making nationality and 
citizenship congruent.  Where stateless nations have retained a sense of distinct 
national identity over the course of a considerable period of time, the continued 
pursuit of nation-building is likely to be ineffective, offensive to democratic norms, 
and have a corrosive effect on social cohesion by further alienating members of 
national minorities from the state.  One advantage of devolution is that it offers 
political recognition of the national communities to which people actually belong, 
thus harnessing the emotional bonds of solidarity embodied in national membership.  
This positive relationship between devolution and social cohesion is noted by 
Guibernau where she writes; 
 
 ‘Nationalist  movements  in  nations  without  states  seek  to  generate  a  common 
consciousness among their members and to restore an endangered sense of community 
among them.  The nation, portrayed as a community which transcends the life of the 
individuals who belong to it, encourages its members’ emotional attachment and favours the 
emergence of a certain sentiment of solidarity among them.’541 
 
(5) Active citizen participation in civil society strengthens democracy and 
promotes social cohesion; owing to the forms of social solidarity embodied in 
membership of minority national identities, such participation is encouraged 
where these identities are given public expression.  The importance of civil 
society institutions as foci for the integration of the individual into the collectivity 
and the promotion of social cohesion is recognized by classical social theorists as 
diverse as Tocqueville and Durkheim, and is a theme that is found in contemporary 
analyses in social capital theory and communitarianism.  Common to all these 
approaches is an emphasis on the significance of shared values and identity as 
factors facilitating civic engagement.  As communities of mutual identification, sub-
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state national minorities embody feelings of social solidarity that can facilitate 
citizen participation in civil society, and to this extent strengthen social cohesion.  
 
Discussed in abstract terms, these basic theoretical arguments provide an analytical 
framework with which to approach the study of states and societies which have 
extended formal political recognition to internal national minorities.  In return, 
empirical case studies of this type provide an opportunity to test the assumptions, 
arguments and conclusions generated in theoretical analysis.  The empirical analysis 
contained within this thesis is therefore informed by the preceeding theoretical 
analysis as well as oriented toward testing the arguments advanced in that latter.   
 
Empirical Arguments 
(1) The survival within an ostensibly unitary British state of multiple distinct 
nationalities contradicts the oft-put assertion that nations cannot survive 
without the educational and cultural infrastructure provided by possession of 
an independent state of thei r own.  As an example, despite the absence of an 
independent Scottish state following the 1707 Treaty of Union, a distinctive Scottish 
national identity and a recognizable Scottish nation persists; albeit one that has, like 
all national identities, undergone various changes throughout its history.  The 
foremost evidence for this claim is to be found in the self-definitions of individuals 
residing in the territory of Scotland.  A significant facet of nationhood is its largely 
subjective existence; that is, there exists no definitive list of objective factors by 
which a collectivity can be identified as a nation.  Nationhood does not inhere 
ultimately in objective conditions, although these are important features of 
nationality, but in the subjective understandings of individuals.  This idea underpins 
Benedict’s  Anderson’s  description  of  the  nation  as  an  ‘imagined  community’  and 
Ernest  Renan’s  description  of  nationality  as  a ‘daily  plebiscite.’542  According to 
recent survey data, roughly a third of people living in Scotland reject all 
identification  with  ‘Britishness’  in  favour  of  exclusive  attachment  to  a  Scottish 
identity.  Furthermore, of the remaining two-thirds, over 80 per cent describe 
themselves as either more Scottish than British or as equally Scottish and British.  
Just 10 per cent of Scots privilege a British identity over a Scottish one, with only 5 
per cent eschewing all identification with Scottishness.  Where an overwhelming 
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proportion of a people consider themselves as constituting a nation, as the above 
figures suggest is the case in Scotland, then they should be considered as such by the 
outside observer.   
 The survival of a distinct Scottish nation in spite of the long absence of a 
Scottish nation-state, challenges the claim, made most prominently by Ernest 
Gellner543, that only the independent nation-state is capable of supporting the literate 
high culture of nationality.  What then, in the Scottish case, supported the continued 
existence of a sense of nationhood?  The idea of a Scottish nation has deep historical 
roots reaching back as early as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries when a 
combination of institutional modernization effected by the central monarchical state 
and the experience of prolonged military conflict with England introduced the 
concepts of sovereignty and territoriality into the Scottish state, expanded the scope 
of the political community, and created powerful myths upon which future 
generations of Scots could draw in order to promote nation-building.  Most 
fundamentally, a distinctive sense of Scottish nationhood was forged in the long 
experience of Scottish independence from 1328 to 1707; by the time of its 
incorporation into a larger British state, Scotland possessed many of the 
characteristics of a modern nation-state, and memories of political independence 
played an important role in maintaining a distinctive Scottish national identity 
following the loss of that independence in 1707. 
 Moreover, the survival of an independent Scottish state into the eighteenth 
century was itself implicated in the terms of the Treaty of Union preserving an 
important degree of Scottish autonomy, most notably in the spheres of religion, law 
and education.  By maintaining a degree of ‘administrative autonomy’ Scotland was 
never comprehensively incorporated into the British state, which consequently 
resembled a union rather than a unitary state. 544   Scotland’s  autonomous  civic 
institutions provided an effective locus of for a continuing Scottish nation-building 
project that enabled the survival of a distinct Scottish national identity in the absence 
of  the  ‘political  shell’ 545  provided by independent nation-statehood.  It is 
nevertheless important to recognize that a Scottish national identity survived 
alongside an emerging and significant British identity, which were long experienced 
by a significant portion of Scots as mutually compatible and reinforcing rather than 
antagonistic identities.   
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(2) Two competing discourses of sovereignty have historically been advanced 
within the context of the B ritish state, grounded in the supremacy of the 
Westminster Parliament and the status of the T reaty of Union respectively.  The 
conception of sovereignty that has dominated British public discourse is that 
commonly referred to as Parliamentary sovereignty, an ideal closely associated with 
the English legal theorist A.V. Dicey.546  According to the doctrine of Parliamentary 
sovereignty, the Parliament at Westminster is considered the unambiguous centre of 
undivided sovereignty expressed in the idea that there exists no distinction between 
fundamental and ordinary laws; a simple Act of Parliament is sufficient to alter any 
and all laws.  An alternative interpretation of sovereignty grounded in Scottish legal 
and political theory emphasizes the significance of the Treaty of Union as a pact 
between equal partners who despite agreeing to renounce their individual 
independent statehoods nevertheless retain national sovereignty.  According to this 
perspective and contrary to the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty, the Treaty of 
Union specifies certain fundamental and essential conditions that cannot be altered 
or repealed by the Westminster Parliament.   
 According to the Scotland Act 1998 establishing the terms of Scottish 
devolution, the constitutional doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty is explicitly 
upheld.  Section 28 of the Act states that though the devolved Scottish Parliament is 
henceforth enabled to pass primary legislation, the power of the Westminster 
Parliament to make laws is unaffected.  Westminster, in other words, retains the 
unrestricted right to legislate on all devolved matters and is in this sense the 
undivided centre of unlimited sovereignty.  A number of further observations 
regarding the status of sovereignty in Britain are nevertheless apposite.  First, as a 
state committed to democratic norms of governance, Britain accepts the principle of 
popular sovereignty; that is, it is from the people that sovereignty ultimately derives.  
Accordingly, the notion of unlimited Parliamentary sovereignty must be tempered by 
recognition that the British people, rather than Parliament, are to be properly 
regarded as the source of sovereignty authority.   Second, Britain’s accession to the 
European Union (then known as the European Economic Community EEC) in 1973 
initiated a process by which European Union law now overrides British law, within 
which it has direct effect.  The supremacy of European Union law in the areas of EU 
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competence was confirmed in the judgements of the Factortame Cases delivered in 
1990 and 1991.  European Union membership must be seen as a significant erosion 
of the ideal of Parliamentary sovereignty given the implication that Westminster is 
no longer able to unilaterally override European Union legislation.  The European 
Union has been described as an arena of pluralistic or divided sovereignty547, in 
which the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty inevitably sits uneasily.  Third, 
notwithstanding the terms of the Scotland Act 1998 mentioned above, in practice 
Westminster would encounter insurmountable obstacles should it decide to 
unilaterally exercise its constitutional right to repeal devolution and abolish the 
devolved Scottish parliament.  Moreover, the right of Britain’s constituent national 
units to secede should their populations express a clear wish to do so has been 
publicly acknowledged by the British state.  During the 1992 general election, for 
example, the then Prime Minister John Major acknowledged that ‘No nation can be 
held  within  a  Union  against  its  will’ 548 ;  thus  clearly  implying  each  nation’s 
continuing right to national self-determination.  Where Britain’s constituent national 
units are acknowledged as entitled to unilaterally secede from the Union, the 
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty is once again partially abrogated. 
 
(3) The centralization of political power evident throughout the post-war period 
but significantly accelerated by the Thatcher-led Conservative governments of 
the 1980s provided an impetus to the Scottish nationalist movement, adherents 
of which argued that only political devolution could safeguard the 
accountability of power and ensure that the government of the day could not 
govern without recourse to the general consent of its  constituent  nations’ 
populations.  Although significantly weakened by the outcome of the 1979 
referendum on devolution, Scottish nationalism experienced a strong revival in the 
second half of the 1980s in large part owing to a reaction against the centralizing 
policies of the Conservative governments of the time which were committed to the 
twin principles of autonomous executive power and Parliamentary sovereignty.  
Contrary to the Conservative Party’s rhetorical support for ‘shrinking’ the state, their 
radical pro-market agenda in fact promoted the concentration of power within central 
government at the expense or regional and local levels of government.  A widespread 
perception  in Scotland  that such policies were an attack on Scotland’s autonomous 
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civic institutions guaranteed by the Treaty of Union motivated a dramatic renewal of 
nationalist political sentiment culminating in the establishment of the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention.  The stability and cohesion of the British state, this 
episode suggests, is dependent on its recognizing the right of its constituent national 
units to some means of exercising autonomy over its political future rather than on 
the existence of a unitary and centralized structure of governance. 
 
(4) Central to the success of devolution and the future stability of Britain as a 
devolved union are the mechanisms established for managing relations and 
resolving disputes between Westminster and the devolved administrations.  
Owing to its common law tradition and unwritten constitution, Britain lacks 
experience of formal mechanisms for regulating relations between different levels of 
government, a lacuna that is more significant in the multi-level political system 
established by devolution.  Moreover, given the asymmetrical nature of  Britain’s 
devolution settlement and the absence of the neat division of powers characteristic of 
federalism, there is considerable scope for contested jurisdiction and friction 
between central and devolved administrations.  The extent to which these frictions 
serve to undermine the cohesion of the British state depends on the establishment of 
intergovernmental mechanisms capable of resolving disputes in an equitable manner 
as well as the good will of the different administrations.  It is likely that the ad hoc 
and informal approach to intergovernmental relations established by the devolution 
legislation, as well as the superiority that these afford to central government over its 
devolved counterparts, will require revision if intergovernmental relations are not to 
prove a source of serious political instability.549   
 
(5) Whilst  claims  that  the  asymmetrical  nature  of  Britain’s  devolution 
settlement  makes  it  an  inherently  unstable  one  are  unfounded,  the  ‘English 
question’ – the fact that devolution is presently not applied to England – stands 
as a potential focus of political friction should public opinion in England move 
toward greater support for English autonomy.  Devolution in Britain exhibits a 
‘double  asymmetry’:  Scotland  and  Wales  have  devolved  administrations whereas 
none exists in England, and the extent and character of the devolved administrations 
that have been established varies in each case.  Unlike the case in most federations or 
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in instances of symmetrical devolution, the relationship of Britain’s  constituent 
political units to the system as a whole and to each other lack conformity.550  An 
additional informal asymmetry exists in terms of population size, parliamentary 
representation and economic strength in which England enjoys a significant 
advantage.    Two  claims  against  the  asymmetrical  nature  of  Britain’s  devolution 
settlement require consideration: that it offends against principles of justice and that 
it undermines the stability of the Union by promoting debilitating competition over 
powers as some territories perceive themselves to be disadvantaged relative to those 
territories with the most extensive self-government.  As a union state created by a 
voluntary agreement that preserved a degree of regional civic autonomy, Britain has 
never been a perfectly symmetrical unitary state.  Furthermore, a variety of territorial 
management policies pursued in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries introduced 
further asymmetries into the governance structure of the British state.  Such 
territorial asymmetries, rather than undermining political cohesion, were defended as 
necessary  for  preserving  the  integrity  of  the multinational  British  state.    Britain’s 
informal unwritten constitution was in this regard suited to absorbing multiple 
asymmetries without engendering the type of competition over powers described 
above.   
 In addition it is important to recognize the reasons for the present absence of 
devolution in England; i.e. the lack of significant public support for English 
devolution.  Devolution in Scotland and Wales was established in part as a way of 
protecting these minority national communities from being subordinated to the 
interests of the dominant English nation.  The widespread perception that England’s 
numerical dominance within a Westminster parliament, whose structure and practice 
reflects English parliamentary traditions, was cited by national minorities in support 
of their claim that devolved political administrations were necessary in order to 
safeguard their distinctive interests.  This explains the relative absence of support for 
devolution in England; put simply, since English MPs represent an overwhelming 
majority in Westminster, it is not plausible to sustain a vision of the latter as 
potentially hostile to English interests.  Whether or not the present absence of 
devolution to England generates resentment and a renewed populist English 
assertiveness threatening to the political stability of the British state depends in large 
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measure on the willingness of political elites to countenance further constitutional 
adjustments should public demand for it arise.   
 
(6) A subsidiary facet of the broader ‘English question’ is the so-called ‘West-
Lothian  question’,  analysis  of  which  serves  to  highlight  the  importance  of 
regarding devolution as a flexible ‘process’ capable of adapting  in response to 
changing attitudes among the populations of the constituent nations.  The West 
Lothian question is a constitutional anomaly deriving from the exclusion of British 
MPs from voting on matters devolved to the Scottish parliament at the same time as 
Scottish MPs continue to legislate in Westminster on matters that do not affect 
Scotland.  Given that an analogous situation existed for approximately half a century 
with relation to the Stormont parliament in Northern Ireland; the general lack of 
interest displayed by English MPs in Scottish affairs prior to devolution; and the 
existence of myriad other anomalies arising  from Britain’s unwritten constitutional 
tradition, it is doubtful that the West Lothian question represents a significant 
political  issue.    Of  the  possible  ‘solutions’  to  the  West  Lothian  question,  the 
exclusion of Scottish MPs at Westminster from voting on English legislation is the 
most practical, given the evident lack of support for English regional parliaments and 
the difficulties of a devolved English parliament representing 80 per cent of the 
British population co-existing with the Westminster parliament  
 
(7) The financial dimension of the devolution settlement represents the most 
significant potential source of friction and instability.  The absence of revenue-
raising powers attached to the devolved administrations combined with a 
system for allocating resources not based on relative need impact upon the 
perceived ter ritorial equity of the devolution settlement.  The fiscal resources 
available  to Britain’s devolved administrations, as well  as  their powers of  taxation 
and expenditure have a strong bearing on the manner in which they are able to 
exercise their legally constituted responsibilities.  A number of observations 
regarding the financial arrangements of devolution in Britain are of particular 
significance.  First, in the case of Scotland, the devolved unit with the most far-
reaching financial powers, almost total autonomy over expenditure is combined with 
very limited revenue-raising powers.  This arrangement has two principle effects: (i) 
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it works against the logic of decentralization that underpins political devolution by 
perpetuating the dominance of central government over revenue-raising decisions; 
(ii) the absence of meaningful revenue-raising powers for devolved administrations 
breaks the link between raising money and spending money that is often though to 
be a central principle of democratic governance.  By insulating them from the 
economic consequences of policy-decisions, this carries a danger of undermining the 
political responsibility of devolved governments lacking fiscal accountability.  There 
is a danger to the political cohesion and stability of Britain if the absence of 
devolved fiscal autonomy fosters persistent conflict between central and devolved 
levels of government over spending decisions. 
 Second, there is a serious issue of territorial equity raised by the present 
Barnett formula system for calculating expenditure allocation  between  Britain’s 
constituent national units.  The problems associated with the Barnett formula are 
three-fold; (i) because it makes comparable spending in England the key factor in 
determining adjustments to the Assigned Budgets, it further reinforces the 
dominance of the central state at the expense of the devolved administration, since 
public expenditure levels in the devolved administrations are inevitably driven by 
English priorities; (ii) because the Barnett formula is based upon existing levels of 
spending rather than a relative needs assessment,  
 
(8) If it is to be meaningful and legitimate in the eyes of national minority 
populations, devolution must create scope for genuine policy differentiation.  
Recognition of this fact is crucial since any strains inherent in the devolution 
settlement will become more visible as the extent of policy differentiation 
between the United K ingdom's ter ritories increases.  Devolution represents an 
effort to decentralize political power in Britain, making it more responsive to the 
needs of its citizens, increasing democratic accountability, and recognizing the 
democratic right to national self-determination.  Underpinning devolution is an 
assumption that such decentralization will facilitate identification with the political 
system  and address  the  problem of national minorities’  alienation  from  the British 
state, the legitimacy and cohesion of which will thereby be strengthened.  It is crucial, 
therefore, that the devolved administrations enjoy a sufficient scope of powers, and 
the resources to use those powers, to enable them to pursue genuinely differentiated 
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policy programmes in response to the distinctive demands of national minority 
populations.    It  is  because  Britain’s  constituent  national  units  exhibit  distinct and 
distinctive attitudes towards important political and social issues that devolution is 
necessary in order that this diversity can be reflected in policy.  Devolution must, 
therefore, weaken the structural dominance of the central government if it is to 
achieve the objectives for which it was established.  It is important to recognize that 
the logic of devolution requires that policy differentiation between central and 
devolved administrations must be possible and where it occurs is both legitimate and 
desirable, because the successful functioning of devolution is made more challenging 
as the extent of policy differentiation increases.  The conflict and frictions that are a 
feature of any multi-level polity will become more apparent in the British case as 
devolution  ‘beds  in’  over  time  and  policy  differentiation  increases;  this  should  be 
seen as sign that devolution is working rather than evidence of its failure or the 
disintegration of the British state.   
 
 
(9) In opposition to the abstract claim that devolution will erode social cohesion 
by emphasizing sub-state national identities at the expense of a unified British 
identity, supporters of devolution argue that devolution can strengthen social 
cohesion by enabling national minorities to more close ly identify with, and thus 
trust, the form of governance to which they are subject.  There is little evidence 
that devolution has significantly eroded or weakened social cohesion, or that it is a 
‘slippery slope’ toward the break-up of Britain.  Secessionist sentiment in Scotland, 
where  support  for  independence  is  substantially  higher  than  in  Britain’s  other 
constituent units, has remained stable since the establishment of devolution, and 
levels of support for the existing constitutional settlement are high.551  In England, 
where discontent with the constitutional settlement might be expected to be highest 
owing to the absence of English devolution, there is some evidence of a small 
growth in levels of dissatisfaction and support for some extension of devolution to 
England.  Such support, however, remains modest and there in any case exists very 
little opposition to the idea in Scotland and Wales, suggesting that strong growth in 
support for English devolution, should it occur at some point in the future, need not 
necessarily represent a serious threat to the integrity and cohesion of Britain.   
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 From the evidence provided by the British and Scottish Social Attitudes 
surveys, overall levels of trust in the political process and the ability of the 
government to put the interests of the nation above those of political party are very 
low.  The disengagement and alienation from the political process that these statistics 
suggest is endemic in British society should be of significant concern for those 
interested in social cohesion and democratic governance.  This, rather than the 
political recognition of national diversity, represents the gravest threat to social and 
political cohesion in Britain.  Although the difference is modest, there is evidence 
that Scots, for example, are more inclined to trust the Scottish parliament to advance 
the national interest over and above party political concerns than the Westminster 
parliament, suggesting that devolution does have a role in restoring trust in, and 
engagement with, the political process in Britain.  However, in terms of the 
significance of generalized trust for the maintenance of social cohesion, it should be 
noted that survey data indicates that individuals who profess a sense of attachment to 
a wider British identity exhibit greater levels of trust in fellow citizens than those 
exclusively attached to non-British national identities.  This should serve as a 
reminder that identity is pertinent to social solidarity and that the diffusion of a 
common identity facilitates the maintenance of social cohesion.  Were attachment to 
a British identity to become the preserve of only a small minority, social cohesion 
would be imperilled and the disintegration of the British state made likely. 
 
(10) Devolution provides Britain’s national minorities with significant resources 
with which to pursue thei r own distinctive nation-building projects, the effects 
of which on social cohesion in Britain is in part dependent on thei r capacity to 
support  ‘dual’  identities.  The founding agreement creating the British state, the 
Treaty of Union 1707, although incorporating Scotland and England into a single 
British Parliament, nevertheless preserved a number of areas of regional autonomy, 
thus making the newly established state a union rather than a unitary state.  As 
indicated above, this fact played a significant role in the preservation of minority 
national identities (particularly in Scotland) even as a broader sense of British 
identity was forged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  It is important that 
for the majority of its history, a significant proportion of its citizens have not 
understood national identity as a zero-sum game whereby the rise of one occurs 
277 
 
inevitably at the cost of another, but have instead adopted dual identities according to 
which continuing identification with historical national identities has not been seen 
as antagonistic or incompatible with commitment to an overall British identity. 
 The historical coexistence of alternative conceptions of nationality and the 
prevalence of hybrid identities within British history is an important factor for its 
capacity to generate strong political and social cohesion.  The degree to which 
devolution either fosters or inhibits such dual identification is therefore an important 
consideration, since anything that promotes a more exclusive interpretation of 
personal and social identity does threaten to undermine the integrity of the state and 
the maintenance of social cohesion.  Taking survey data as evidence, there is little 
indication that devolution has led to a decline in the levels of identification with 
Britishness within the devolved territories.  The distribution of identity attachments 
in Scotland, where traditionally Britishness has been weakest, has remained largely 
static since the introduction of devolution, with a clear majority (approximately two-
thirds) continuing to identify themselves in some form with a British identity.  It is 
rather the case that alienation from Britishness amongst Scots has increased the most 
at times when political institutions were perceived as unrepresentative of Scottish 
political opinion and when the dominance of the central state has been strongest.  
Devolution, instead of undermining a sense of British national identity upon which 
the strength of Union partly rests, has instead facilitated dual identities amongst its 
national minorities by decreasing their sense of alienation from a state often 
perceived as dominated by English interests.  A Litmus test of the impact of 
devolution on identity in Britain is provided by the types of nation-building 
discourse advanced in the post-devolution period.  Amongst some of the central 
political figures in post-devolution Britain, significant criticism of devolution is 
almost entirely absent, and there is universal support for a democratic, civic and 
inclusive interpretation of nationality that provides the most fertile basis for dual 
identities.   
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